策略性环境政策:环境税和减排补贴的比较分析

文章把战略性贸易政策模型扩展到环境领域,策略性环境政策认为政府有动机通过降低环境标准补贴出口企业,以达到利润转移的目的.文章分析了策略性环境政策中比较受忽视的一部分--环境技术补贴,本国政府结合使用环境税和减排补贴,我们验证了政府使用策略性环境政策的动机,得到了最优的污染排放税率,认为虽然环境政策仍旧不能消除生产带来的环境损害,但是环境技术补贴提高了本国的环境标准,企业会更少地遇到绿色壁垒报复.     

Allowing for Household Preferences in Emission Trading – A Contribution to the Climate Policy Debate

In the context of emission trading it seems to be taken as given that people's preferences can be ignored with respect to the whole process of fixing emission targets and allocating emission permits to polluters. With this paper we want to reopen the debate on how citizens can be involved in this process. We try to show how citizen preferences can be included in the process of pollution control through emission trading. We propose an emission trading system where all emission permits are initially allocated to households who are then allowed to sell them in the permit market or to withhold (at least some of) them in order to reduce total pollution. This proposal tries to overcome the fundamental disadvantage of traditional permit systems which neglect consumer preferences by solely distributing emission permits to producers / polluters. In our system the property right to nature is re-allocated to the households who obtain the opportunity of reducing actual emissions according to their personal preferences by withholding a part or all of the emission permits allotted to them. Such a change in environmental policy would mark a return to the traditional principles of consumer sovereignty by involving households (at least partially) in the social abatement decision process instead of excluding them. Another advantage of admitting households to the TEP market as sellers or buyers of permits is that this increases the number of agents in the permit market and thus significantly reduces the possibilities of strategic market manipulations.     

Incentives for Technology Adoption Under Environmental Policy Uncertainty: Implications for Green Payment Programs

Water quality protection policy in the UnitedStates has been based on the provision offinancial incentives to farmers for adoptingimproved nutrient management practices.Increasing reliance on subsidy programs couldresult in expectations for such programs in thefuture. Using an option-value model thatindicates uncertainty can lead to a delay ininvestment, this paper analyzes the extent towhich uncertainty about cost-share subsidypolicies would impact adoption decision.Application of the model to adoption ofsite-specific technologies indicates thatuncertainty about subsidy policies has thepotential to impact the investment decision.When there is currently no cost-share subsidy,an increase in the probability of an expectedpolicy delays adoption. If the policy is ineffect, an increase in the probability of awithdrawal of the program encouragesinvestment. Cost-share subsidy policy is mosteffective when it is immediately offered andguaranteed that it will be removed soon.     

External Effects of Agricultural Production in Italy and Environmental Accounting

This paper deals with the valuation of some negative external effects arising from agricultural production in Italy. External effects are treated in a transformation function as a bad output additional to the normal output of a production activity. In this case we can distinguish a price component or shadow price of the external effect and a quantity component and estimate them separately. In order to calculate the price component of the external effects we first estimate one point on the marginal external costs curve and then try to obtain the whole curve, i.e. external costs associated to different levels of emissions in different years. As to the quantity component, net emissions of Nitrogen, Phosphorus and Potassium have been estimated. The aggregate value of external effects is then calculated for thirty years from 1961 to 1991 and deducted from the value added of the agricultural sector, as a first step towards the correction of national accounting aggregates to take environmental degradation into account.     

Limits and Cycles of Environmental Policy

The OLG-model analyzes emissions of an accumulative pollutant in a laissez-faire economy and an economy regulated through a government controlled license market. The government either takes the price on the license market as given or sells the licenses demanded at the Cournot price. The first type of regulation is called a 'liberal environmental policy', and the second type a 'monopolistic environmental policy'. The forward looking temporary and the stationary equilibria as well as the pollution boundaries of the mechanisms are studied. If people can choose between laissez-faire and regulation (or between the liberal and the monopolistic environmental policy regime), then in general no steady state exists. Instead endogenous policy cycles can alternate between laissez-faire and regulation or between liberal and monopolistic regulation.     

环境税经济效应的扩展分析及其政策启示

本文从环境税的理论基础入手,回顾了环境税经济效应分析的几个有代表性的基本观点,认真分析了环境税经济效应传统分析中存在的局限性,并在此基础上将"经济结构优化效应"和"国际贸易受益效应"引入到环境税经济效应分析当中,大大拓宽了环境税经济效应分析的研究视角,最后在环境税经济效应创新性分析的基础上提出了相应的环境税政策启示。     

气候政策的经济环境效应及其缓解措施的研究综述——兼谈对我国的启示

气候政策对一国经济和环境产生一定的效应,开放经济条件下还将对一国产业的国际竞争力产生影响。碳泄漏等问题使得气候政策的实际减排效果受到了质疑。气候政策实施过程中产生的这些问题都将严重影响气候政策的有效性。为使气候政策的有效性达到最优,很多学者研究了缓解气候政策负面效应的措施。本文对一些重要的气候政策的经济环境效应进行了理论总结,从竞争力效应、经济效应、环境效应和研究方法这四个方面综述了相关实证研究成果,分析了气候政策负面效应的缓解措施,以期为制定适合我国的气候政策提供借鉴。     

Efficient Climate Policy with Internationally Mobile Firms

A major concern in the design of an incomplete climate agreement is thatfirms that use fossil fuels intensively may respond to emission regulationsby relocating their plants from cooperating to non-cooperating countries.This paper analyses how the cooperating countries might deal with the issueof firm delocation through emission taxes, trade provisions and alocalisation subsidy to mobile firms. It is shown that firms should not beinduced to stay in the cooperating countries by lowering emission taxesbelow the Pigouvian tax rate. Incentives to stay should be given partlythrough trade provisions and partly through a localisation subsidy. A secondbest solution without localisation subsidies is also discussed. In thatcase, the efficient emission tax is lower than the Pigouvian tax rate.Finally, the paper discusses the implications of the first best and thesecond best policy regimes for the pattern of firm localisation.     

基于CGE模型的环境税优惠政策的环保效应分析

通过建立一个CGE模型,并对该模型在存在和不存在环境税优惠政策两种场景下的社会产出、产品供应和社会福利状况进行模拟分析,考察环境税优惠政策的环保效应。结果表明,环境税的税收减免在长期内对社会福利的影响不大,但是,它却会对环境税的环境保护效果产生较大的负面影响。在使用税收减免工具时,政府要从社会福利和环境保护、能源使用等方面加以考虑,避免社会总福利的净损失。     

市场结构、环境税与福利效应分析

运用短期局部均衡分析方法研究完全竞争市场和垄断市场条件下环境税对社会福利的影响.结果显示:在完全竞争市场条件下,对企业征收环境税可以增进社会福利.而在垄断市场条件下,环境税的福利效应具有不确定性,这取决于垄断造成的扭曲程度.如果垄断造成的扭曲较小,环境税仍然可以提高社会福利.但无论是增进抑或降低社会福利,对垄断企业征收环境税都不可能实现最优化,因为环境税在矫正污染外部性的同时,垄断造成产量水平下降导致福利损失增加,所以只能追求一个次优的结果,次优环境税低于完全竞争条件下的标准环境税.     

A Dynamic Model of the Environmental Kuznets Curve: Turning Point and Public Policy

We set up a simple dynamic macroeconomic model with (i) polluting consumption and a preference for a clean environment, (ii) increasing returns in abatement giving rise to an EKC and (iii) sustained growth resulting from a linear final-output technology. There are two sorts of market failures caused by external effects associated with consumption and environmental effort. The model is employed to investigate the determinants of the turning point and the cost effectiveness of different public policies aimed at a reduction of the environmental burden. Moreover, the model offers a potential explanation of an N-shaped pollution–income relation. It is shown that the model is compatible with most empirical regularities on economic growth and the environment.      

Timing and Commitment of Environmental Policy,Adoption of New Technology,and Repercussions on R&;D

We investigate the interplay between environmental policy, incentives to adoptnew technology, and repercussions on R&D. We study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in R&D and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms. We consider four different timing and commitment regimes of environmental tax and permit policies: ex post taxation (or issuing permits), interim commitment to a tax rate (a quota of permits) after observing R&D success but before adoption, and finally two types of ex antecommitment before R&D activity, one with a unique tax rate (quota of permits), the other one with a menu of tax rates (permit quotas). We study the second best tax and permit policies and rank these with respect to welfare. In particular, we find that commitment to a menu of tax rate dominates all other policy regimes.