Leverage causes fat tails and clustered volatility

We build a simple model of leveraged asset purchases with margin calls. Investment funds use what is perhaps the most basic financial strategy, called ‘value investing’, i.e. systematically attempting to buy underpriced assets. When funds do not borrow, the price fluctuations of the asset are approximately normally distributed and uncorrelated across time. This changes when the funds are allowed to leverage, i.e. borrow from a bank, which allows them to purchase more assets than their wealth would otherwise permit. During good times, funds that use more leverage have higher profits, increasing their wealth and making them dominant in the market. However, if a downward price fluctuation occurs while one or more funds is fully leveraged, the resulting margin call causes them to sell into an already falling market, amplifying the downward price movement. If the funds hold large positions in the asset, this can cause substantial losses. This in turn leads to clustered volatility: before a crash, when the value funds are dominant, they damp volatility, and after the crash, when they suffer severe losses, volatility is high. This leads to power-law tails, which are both due to the leverage-induced crashes and due to the clustered volatility induced by the wealth dynamics. This is in contrast to previous explanations of fat tails and clustered volatility, which depended on ‘irrational behavior’, such as trend following. A standard (supposedly more sophisticated) risk control policy in which individual banks base leverage limits on volatility causes leverage to rise during periods of low volatility, and to contract more quickly when volatility becomes high, making these extreme fluctuations even worse.     

Quarter-End Effects in Banks: Preferred Habitat or Window Dressing?

Allen and Saunders [Allen, A., and A. Saunders. “Bank Window Dressing: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Banking and Finance 16 (1992), 583–623.] document abnormal behavior of bank assets and liabilities at the turn-of-the-quarter and attribute it to window dressing by banks. Using different methods we re-visit bank turn-of-the-quarter balance sheet activity. We also examine quarter-end changes in the effective fed funds rates and fed funds rate standard deviations. We confirm the presence of turn-of-the-quarter activity on bank balance sheets and in the fed funds market. However, we conclude that the turn-of-the-quarter effects are more consistent with customer preferred habitats than window dressing.     

Liquidity shocks,size and the relative performance of hedge fund strategies

We examine whether the increase in the flow of capital to hedge funds over the period 1994–2005 had a negative impact on performance. More specifically, we study the relative performance of small versus large funds for each of the hedge fund strategies. Our results indicate that on an absolute return basis, small funds outperform large funds. On a risk-adjusted return basis, however, we find that large funds outperform small funds, and that large funds are also shown to hold less liquid assets and take on less systematic and idiosyncratic risk than small funds. Further, funds that experience positive liquidity shocks generally outperform those that experience negative liquidity shocks. We also find evidence that hedge fund managers that are aggressive in dealing with liquidity shocks perform better than hedge fund managers that are conservative in dealing with liquidity shocks.     

ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL FUNDS RATE CHANGES AND VARIANCE PATTERNS

We analyze Fed funds rate changes in GARCH‐in‐mean (GARCH‐M) models and find that daily rate change and variance patterns differ with the timing of the rate observation, but that all patterns are generally consistent with optimal reserve account management. We also find that Fed funds daily and intraday variances exhibit trends and persistence, and that daily variance effects differ when using marginal rates versus daily weighted average rates. Furthermore, we find that conditional variances do not provide information about daily or intraday rate changes. Our results provide support for the use of GARCH models for studies on other financial assets. JEL classification: G21, G28     

A corporate bond innovation of the 90s: The clawback provision in high-yield debt

This paper examines a recent financial innovation in corporate bond contracts, referred to as the clawback provision. A clawback provision in debt contracts gives the issuer an option to redeem a specified fraction of the bond issue within a specified period at a predetermined price and with funds that must come from a subsequent equity offering. We argue that issuers use clawback provisions to mitigate the wealth losses that would otherwise occur when new equity is offered. Consistent with the hypotheses, the evidence shows that bond offerings are more likely to include a clawback provision if their issuers are private, have more intangible assets, have fewer liquid assets, and are unregulated. We also estimate the price of clawback provisions and find that yield spreads on bonds with clawback provisions are a median of 86 basis points higher relative to what they otherwise would be.     

Payoff complementarities and financial fragility: Evidence from mutual fund outflows

The paper provides empirical evidence that strategic complementarities among investors generate fragility in financial markets. Analyzing mutual fund data, we find that, consistent with a theoretical model, funds with illiquid assets (where complementarities are stronger) exhibit stronger sensitivity of outflows to bad past performance than funds with liquid assets. We also find that this pattern disappears in funds where the shareholder base is composed mostly of large investors. We present further evidence that these results are not attributable to alternative explanations based on the informativeness of past performance or on clientele effects. We analyze the implications for funds’ performance and policies.     

The value relevance and reliability of reported goodwill and identifiable intangible assets

We examine the value relevance and reliability of reported goodwill and identifiable intangible assets under Australian GAAP from 1994 to 2003; a period characterised by relatively restrictive accounting treatment for goodwill and relatively flexible accounting treatment for identifiable intangible assets. Our findings, using an adaptation of Feltham and Ohlson (1995), suggest that for the average Australian company the information presented with respect to both goodwill and identifiable intangible assets is value relevant but not reliable. In particular, goodwill tends to be reported conservatively while identifiable intangible assets are reported aggressively.     

Hedge funds as liquidity providers: Evidence from the Lehman bankruptcy

Hedge funds using Lehman as prime broker faced a decline in funding liquidity after the September 15, 2008 bankruptcy. We find that stocks held by these Lehman-connected funds experienced greater declines in market liquidity following the bankruptcy than other stocks; the effect was larger for ex ante illiquid stocks and persisted into the beginning of 2009. We find no similar effects surrounding the Bear Stearns failure, suggesting that disruptions surrounding bankruptcy explain the liquidity effects. We conclude that shocks to traders' funding liquidity reduce the market liquidity of the assets that they trade.     

Performance of Enhanced Index and Quantitative Equity Funds

We examine the performance of enhanced index and quantitative equity funds. Both types of funds use quantitative models in investment selection. Enhanced index funds set an explicit objective to outperform a benchmark index. Proponents of quantitative funds argue that their management style takes human emotions out of the investment decision‐making process and leads to more objective stock selection. We find evidence of outperformance by quantitatively managed growth funds, especially those investing in small cap stocks.     

My global fund portfolio is not yours: the effect of home bias on European- and US-managed convertible bond fund exposures

This paper shows that global convertible bond funds (CBFs) and their resulting equity-bond exposures are regionally biased. Global bond fund managers display home bias, resulting in CBFs that are not only tilted towards the home market but also reflect the different bond-equity exposures of European and US convertibles. More specifically we find that global funds managed by a European asset management firm are more bond-like than global funds managed by a US-based asset manager. Hence, investors have to account for the asset management company's origin to avoid that the performance of the fund and its correlation with other assets is not in line with investor's ex ante expectations about globally managed portfolios. Our results also indicate that for investors of European-based CBFs this home bias has resulted in an ex post opportunity cost up to 1.38% per year, depending on the sample period.     

Trade Credit, Corporate Groups, and the Financing of Belgian Firms

We investigate the role of trade credit as a source of financing. Using a sample of 661 large non-financial Belgian firms for the 1989–1991 period, we find that the amount of trade credit a buyer takes is determined by his need for funds and the internally available funds. Trade credit is primarily used to finance short-term assets. As such, it seems to be an important alternative not only for short-term bank debt but also for long-term financial debt, including intragroup debt. We find no evidence that the amount of trade credit taken is influenced by affiliation with the supplier.     

Closed-End Fund Discounts with Informed Ownership Differential

We develop a multiasset trading model to examine the closed-end fund discount. The model shows that the discount can arise if the quality of private information in the underlying assets is sufficiently better than in the fund. The model also indicates that a discount (premium) can arise if the excessive volatility of the fund dominates (is dominated by) the fund's diversification benefit. Moreover, the model predicts a negative relation between the discount and the institutional ownership differential, as arbitrageurs prefer funds with large discounts. Using a sample of U.S. equity closed-end funds, we test these predictions and find supporting evidence. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G10, G12, G14.     

Naïve Buying Diversification and Narrow Framing by Individual Investors

We provide the first tests to distinguish whether individual investors equally balance their overall portfolios (naïve portfolio diversification, NPD) or, in contrast, equally balance the values of same-day purchases of multiple assets (naïve buying diversification, NBD). We find NBD in purchases of multiple stocks, and in mixed purchases of individual stocks and funds. In contrast, there is little evidence of NPD. Evidence suggests that NBD arises due to stock picking behavior and neglect of diversification. These findings suggest that behavioral finance theory should incorporate transaction, as well as portfolio, framing.     

Corporate Repurchase Decisions Following Mutual Fund Sales

This paper examines managerial response to widespread selling by mutual funds. We study the effect on share repurchases of liquidity‐based price pressure measured by mutual fund transactions caused by capital outflows. Firms whose shares undergo widespread selling by funds experiencing large outflows are more likely to repurchase their own shares, controlling for the effect of returns on share repurchases. The empirical results suggest that firms act as buyers of last resort and provide price support for their own shares.     

The dynamic relationship among the money market mutual funds,the commercial paper market,and the repo market

In this paper, we present the short-run and the long-run relationships among the financial assets of the money market funds, the commercial paper market, and the repurchase agreement market by undertaking a cointegration analysis of quarterly data over the 1985–2017 period. This was based on the empirical observation that the commercial paper and repo markets account for 50 percent of the assets of money market funds. The evidence suggests that there exists a common long-term cointegrating trend among these three components of the shadow banking system. Any disequilibrium in this long-run relationship among these variables is corrected by movement in the financial assets of money market funds. The Beveridge-Nelson decomposition from the estimated cointegrating relationship shows that the cyclical component of money market funds is large and captures huge swings in these markets during the financial crisis. We also find evidence of change in these dynamic relationships in the post-crisis period, where in addition to the money market funds, the commercial paper market also exhibits a tendency to correct for the disequilbrium.     

Who Charges More: Hedge Funds or Mutual Funds?*

Explicit mutual fund fees are typically less than 1% of the assets under management. By comparison, the typical hedge fund charges a base fee of 2% plus a performance fee equal to 20% of net profits. Thus, hedge funds appear to charge far more for even comparable performance—unless one takes account of the following:

• ? For most mutual funds, a very high percentage of performance is driven by its passive exposure to the market, even though the fee is applied to the total fund.
• ? Many hedge funds are designed to provide returns that are completely independent of market performance.

Using these two assumptions, the author provides a simple example that shows that a representative mutual fund's performance can be replicated by combining an index fund, which represents the mutual fund's passive component, with a hedge fund, representing the mutual fund's active component. When analyzed in this way, the fee of the combined fund turns out to be remarkably close to the actual fee of the mutual fund. This in turn suggests that the implicit fee for the mutual fund's small active component is comparable to the fees of the hedge fund.     

Pension Funds and the U.K. Economy

Abstract

The paper considers the impact of U.K. defined benefit (DB) pension plan unding and investment on the U.K. economy. It suggests that many conventional theories are based on incomplete or inconsistent economics. In particular, the author suggests that:

? An economy cannot really gain competitive advantage from high returns on the domestic assets in which pension funds invest.

? DB liabilities are essentially similar for most schemes and can be closely matched with bonds.

? Funding pension liabilities has no primary impact on individuals’ consumption and saving or on firms’ capital investment.

? Pension funds are not natural investors in the equity of new ventures.

The conclusion of the paper is that the most significant impact of pension funds on the U.K. economy relates to the costs imposed by extreme mismatching between their financial assets and liabilities. The author argues that such risks can, in essence, “crowd out” entrepreneurial risk. He asserts that the U.K. economy would gain from greater focus on the matching of these assets and liabilities, and that the best way to stimulate enterprise is by eliminating the frictional costs in the economy arising from current practices.     

Is “voting with your feet” an effective mutual fund governance mechanism?

Investors in open-end mutual funds can vote with their feet by withdrawing assets from or adding assets to these funds. This paper assesses the effectiveness of this market discipline mechanism by investigating whether voting with the feet prevents the abusive practices that led to the 2003-2004 trading scandals. The research results indicate that funds with higher flow sensitivity—that is, a higher density of vigilant clients—have lower arbitrage potential and fewer abnormal flows, which in turn implies less opportunistic trading. As a result, these funds have a lower probability of being implicated in scandals. These findings suggest that investor ability to withdraw assets from or add assets to the funds is an effective mutual fund governance mechanism. In funds with less sophisticated investors who cannot use this option, other means of governance are especially important.     

Option Pricing for Pure Jump Processes with Markov Switching Compensators

This paper proposes a model for asset prices which is the exponential of a pure jump process with an N-state Markov switching compensator. We argue that such a process has a good chance of capturing all the empirical stylized regularities of stock price dynamics and we provide a closed form representation of its characteristic function. We also provide a parsimonious representation of the (not necessarily unique) risk neutral density and show how to price and hedge a large class of options on assets whose prices follow this process.     

Value at risk and the cross-section of hedge fund returns

Using two large hedge fund databases, this paper empirically tests the presence and significance of a cross-sectional relation between hedge fund returns and value at risk (VaR). The univariate and bivariate portfolio-level analyses as well as the fund-level regression results indicate a significantly positive relation between VaR and the cross-section of expected returns on live funds. During the period of January 1995 to December 2003, the live funds with high VaR outperform those with low VaR by an annual return difference of 9%. This risk-return tradeoff holds even after controlling for age, size, and liquidity factors. Furthermore, the risk profile of defunct funds is found to be different from that of live funds. The relation between downside risk and expected return is found to be negative for defunct funds because taking high risk by these funds can wipe out fund capital, and hence they become defunct. Meanwhile, voluntary closure makes some well performed funds with large assets and low risk fall into the defunct category. Hence, the risk-return relation for defunct funds is more complicated than what implies by survival. We demonstrate how to distinguish live funds from defunct funds on an ex ante basis. A trading rule based on buying the expected to live funds and selling the expected to disappear funds provides an annual profit of 8–10% depending on the investment horizons.