Optimal tax and tariff policies with tax credits

This paper examines the optimal tax and tariff policies for a small open economy when mobile capital receives a tax credit for taxes paid to the host country. For a capital-importing country, a tax on capital equal to the source country tax rate (to capture tax revenue) combined with a subsidy to encourage capital imports is the optimal policy. Results are also derived for cases in which only one of the instruments can be varied. For a capital-exporting country that cannot reduce its capital tax rate, a subsidy to the sector using exported capital is desirable.     

The welfare effects of illegal immigration

"This paper extends the work of Ethier on illegal immigration by examining the optimal level of enforcement for the labor-importing country in a two-country model and by considering the effects of allowing capital mobility. We derive a formula for the optimal level of enforcement against firms that hire illegal workers, and show that the presence of enforcement costs makes the policy less efficient than a wage tax. With capital mobility, foreign workers gain from an increase in enforcement in the home country because capital is driven out of the home country."     

A reappraisal of strategic trade policies with the endogenous mode of competition under vertical structures

This paper examines the endogenous choice of competition mode with strategic export policies in vertically related markets when each upstream firm located in each country determines the terms of the two-part tariff contract by maximizing generalized Nash bargaining. We show that (i) choosing Cournot (Bertrand) competition is the dominant strategy for both downstream firms when goods are substitutes (complements), which leads Pareto superior regardless of the nature of goods under the optimal trade policies; (ii) irrespective of rival’s competition mode, the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy under Cournot competition and an export tax under Bertrand competition; and (iii) trade liberalization may give rise to changes of competition mode and increase of social welfare.     

Composition of trade flows and the effectiveness of fiscal devaluation

We empirically explore whether the magnitude of the effects of fiscal devaluation, which consists of reducing the employers’ social security contribution rate and increasing the value‐added tax rate, depends on the composition of trade flows. Our sample comprises data on bilateral balances of trade between 28 European Union (EU) Member States and their main EU trade partners over the 2000–14 period. We use robust ordinary least squares regressions, controlling for the country‐pair and time fixed effects, to test whether there are differences in the sizes of relationships between these taxation forms and bilateral trade balances for different types of goods, by distinguishing between: (i) consumer, intermediate and capital goods; and (ii) labour and capital‐intensive goods. Our results show that the overall effectiveness of fiscal devaluation depends on the composition of trade flows. Value‐added tax is more strongly (positively) associated with (bilateral) balances of trade in consumer goods, compared to balances of trade in capital and intermediate goods. The employers’ contribution rate, in contrast, is more tightly (negatively) related to balances of trade in capital goods. The latter finding also holds true for trade balances of labour‐intensive goods compared to balances of capital‐intensive goods.     

Cross-border pollution,public pollution abatement and capital tax competition

We analyze the case where governments have to use income tax revenue to finance public pollution abatement and relate the results to the existing literature on capital tax competition. We show that the impact of public pollution abatement on Nash taxes on mobile factor income is non-trivial and the standard results from the tax competition literature can be reversed. When the two countries are identical, the Nash equilibrium capital income taxes converge to the tax on immobile factors income as the degree of cross-border pollution converges to one. When countries are asymmetric and pollution is local the presence of public pollution abatement lowers the capital tax for the capital exporting country, while the impact on the capital tax of the capital importing country is ambiguous.     

Fiscal policy and regional inflation in a currency union

Substantial attention has been devoted to inflation differentials within the European Monetary Union, including suggestions that inflation differentials are a policy issue for national governments. This paper investigates the ability of a region participating in a currency union to affect its inflation differential with respect to the union through fiscal policy. In a two-region general equilibrium model with traded and nontraded goods, lowering the labor income tax rate in response to positive inflation differentials succeeds in compressing inflation differentials. Such policies can lead to higher volatility of domestic inflation while leaving the volatility of real output roughly unchanged. Regional fiscal policies also have spill-over effects on the volatility of union-wide and foreign inflation in our model.     

Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System

If conventional instruments of strategic trade policy are unavailable, the system of foreign profit taxation and transfer price guidelines may serve as surrogate policy instruments. In this paper, I consider a model where firms from two countries compete with each other on a market in a third country. Both firms have affiliates in the third country where (part of) the production takes place. I analyse optimal policy choices of the firms' residence countries aiming at strategically manipulating the competitiveness of their firms. I show that, first, countries prefer the tax exemption system over the tax credit system if there is no intra‐firm trade. Second, if the headquarters provide inputs for production in the affiliate, countries prefer the tax exemption system if the transfer price for these inputs is close to the headquarters' variable cost and if the residence country's tax rate is high. However, if transfer prices are high and the residence country's tax rate is low, I show that the tax credit system is an optimal tax policy choice for both countries. From a policy perspective, the view that the tax exemption system is generally the best policy response if domestic firms' competitiveness is a policy goal has to be qualified.     

Trade liberalization, wage inequality, and endogenously determined nontraded goods

We examine the boundary between traded and nontraded goods as a channel for trade to impact factor prices. In a two-country, two-factor, continuum-good model, tariffs generate a range of nontraded goods. A tariff reduction has a direct effect to expand a country’s import set and an indirect effect through terms of trade to expand its export set. We show that the export expansion can dominate the import expansion, raising the relative demand for the factor intensively used in production. The result is useful in explaining observed rising wage inequality in developing countries following trade liberalization.     

Goods and factors liberalization under increasing returns to scale

This paper develops a general equilibrium model with alternative forms of import restrictions, international capital mobility, and taxes on the rate of return on foreign capital in the context of a small open economy using an external increasing returns technology. Within this framework, this paper analyses the price and welfare effects of import liberalization in the presence of tax on foreign capital and of factor flows liberalization in the presence of alternative forms of import restrictions. It is shown, among other things, that, in contrast to the existing literature on constant returns to scale economy, the optimal policy towards foreign factors is possibly tax under each form of import restrictions.     

Taxation of Foreign Profits with Heterogeneous Multinational Firms

This paper analyses optimal taxation of foreign profits using a model with heterogeneous multinational firms that serve a foreign market through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). If a firm switches from exporting to FDI, domestic activity and tax payments may decrease, stay constant or even rise because of intra‐firm trade. It turns out that, in contrast to recent claims, in all three cases, the optimal tax system implies full taxation after deduction of foreign tax payments. If the country accounts for the effects of its policy on the foreign price level, the case for taxing foreign income becomes even stronger. However, the globally optimal tax system may require exemption of foreign income from tax.     

Distributive Policies and Economic Growth: An Optimal Taxation Approach

In an infinite‐horizon endogenous growth model a capital income cum investment subsidy tax is considered to investigate if distribution of income towards the non‐accumulated factor of production (labour) retards growth and if capital income taxes are bad instruments to finance investment subsidies. The paper identifies conditions under which the tax scheme is better for growth than other distorting tax schemes. In the model a pro‐labour government acts growth maximizing and distributing income towards labour raises growth. A pro‐capital government's preferred policy is not growth maximizing under the tax scheme, but may generate higher growth than its optimal policy under other tax schemes.     

Strategic trade policy with endogenous choice of quality and asymmetric costs

This paper examines strategic trade and joint welfare maximizing incentives towards investment in the quality of exports by an LDC and a developed country. Firms first compete in qualities and then export to an imperfectly competitive, third country market. Under Bertrand competition, unilateral policy involves an investment subsidy by the low-quality LDC and an investment tax by the developed country, whereas jointly optimal policy calls for the reverse so as to reduce price competition by increasing product differentiation. Under Cournot competition, unilateral policy is also reversed from the Bertrand outcome, but jointly optimal policy involves a tax in both countries.     

Home bias and high turnover: Dynamic portfolio choice with incomplete markets

Why do investors trade a lot in foreign assets and hold so little of them in their portfolios? This paper shows that both observations can arise naturally in the presence of nondiversifiable nontraded consumption risk when each country specializes in production, preferences exhibit consumption home bias, and asset markets are incomplete. Using a general equilibrium two-country, two-sector (tradable and nontradable) model of the world economy with production I show that low diversification occurs because variations in relative prices (i) increase the riskiness of foreign assets and (ii) facilitate risk-sharing across countries. Large and volatile capital flows are necessary to take advantage of international risk premia differentials that occur in response to productivity changes in the nontradable sector. I characterize the optimal portfolio holdings, the evolution of the investment opportunity set, the risk premium, and the dynamics of capital flows using a new methodology for solving dynamic general equilibrium models with incomplete markets and portfolio choice.     

The theory of international factor flows: The basic model

The basic model used to discuss the simultaneous international flow of labor and capital is a one-commodity model in which a common technology is shared between countries. The Ramaswami result, wherein an optimal restriction of labor inflows is superior to an optimal restriction on capital outflows for a capital abundant country, is extended to reveal that optimality requires inflows of both factors. Box diagrams and iso-welfare contours are used to show how optimal policy rankings are reversed if foreign labor must be paid higher home wages.     

Non-traded goods and optimal trade policy in a cash-in-advance economy

This paper develops a standard trade model of a small open monetary economy with two traded and one non-traded goods. Money is introduced through a generalized cash-in-advance constraint where the share of goods purchases that must be made using cash, varies across sectors. We find that free trade may be harmful so that alternative policy instruments may be considered to improve welfare. In addition, we study and compare the optimal tariff formula and the optimal consumption tax structure. In the presence of a monetary distortion of the non-traded good, a consumption tax may not Pareto dominate a tariff although the latter bears an additional production burden. This corroborates the theory of second best.     

Trade patterns,unemployment and growth

This paper analyses the implications of a minimum wage in an open economy two-sector model where the effect of growth on trade and unemployment is explicitly determined. The first-best policy is a wage subsidy to all employment while the second-best policy is a production tax cum subsidy. In the absence of policy intervention it is shown that growth in the short run results in decreasing unemployment for the home country if it is specialized in consumption goods or incompletely specialized provided that the minimum wage is binding. If the economy is specialized in investment goods, then unemployment may increase initially but as growth continues the minimum wage no longer remains binding and full employment is restored. In the long run by examining the dynamic interaction between trade and growth it is possible for the economy to be incompletely specialized with unemployment. If the economy specializes in consumption goods, it is possible for the economy to attain full employment.     

International externalities and optimal tax structures

This paper develops a model of two trading countries which are related by a bilateral production externality. Necessary conditions which must characterize an optimal tax structure from the point of view of one country are solved for and interpreted. Second, the model serves as a vehicle to extend the theory of corrective taxation in the case where only one policy instrument is available to deal with several distortions simultaneously. It is pointed out that the ranking of alternate second best tax structures typically depends upon which good is imported and which good is exported.     

Learning by doing, trade in capital goods and growth

This paper aims at reconciling theoretical models of endogenous growth with the empirical evidence on trade and growth. In particular, we show that the conventional wisdom according to which trade is growth-impairing for a country with comparative advantage in goods with limited opportunities for learning fails to hold when the imported good is a capital good. The intuition is that the country gains access to cheaper capital goods, which raises investment, output per worker and learning by doing.     

Technology gap,imported capital goods and productivity of manufacturing plants in Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper uses firm-level data from Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya to examine the effect of capital goods imports on domestic firms' productivity, and the role firms' technology gap plays in aiding the transmission of knowledge embodied in capital goods to domestic firms. The results show that increasing imports of capital goods and closing technology gaps have positive effects on productivity. Furthermore, domestic firms with technology standards farther from international best practices benefit more from capital goods imports. The results also imply that trade liberalization policy aimed at eliminating tariffs on capital goods will significantly improve the performance of technically incompetent firms in the African manufacturing sector.     

Do taxes influence the organizational boundaries of international firms? An incomplete-contracting model with empirical evidence

Firms that import intermediate goods choose between outsourcing and vertical integration. When corporate tax rates differ between the home country and the foreign country, the possibility of shifting income and reducing overall tax payments through transfer pricing makes integration more attractive than outsourcing. This paper develops an incomplete-contracting model in which an international firm facing tax rate differentials chooses whether or not to internalize intermediate transactions in order to trade off production efficiency and tax minimization. By shifting economic activities across borders, an integrated multinational enterprise establishes a proper transfer price and reaches the optimal profit-splitting arrangement that maximizes its total after-tax profit. This paper finds that cross-country differences in corporate tax rates and product intangibility play important roles in affecting firms’ internalization decision. Empirical analysis employing the US data also supports the theoretical findings. The positive correlation of the integration level of US firms and tax rate differentials between the US and foreign countries remains in the sample excluding tax havens.