On the transformation of theorems

Professor W. Ethier (1979) has argued that replacing land by capital in the familiar 2×2 trade model leaves the four basic theorems unaffected, with time-phasing and a positive interest rate. In fact, Ethier's HOS and FPE theorems are different in kind from the traditional ones. The traditional theorems predict certain results in terms of trade-independent data: Ethier's theorems describe equilibrium in terms of factor endowments and intensities defined by equilibrium prices. Hence his theorems do not support his central message that nothing is lost in trade theory by treating capital as if it were homogeneous land.     

A simple approach to international monetary policy coordination

This paper analyzes the strategic interaction between the monetary policymakers of two countries, in an intertemporal general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and imperfect competition. It offers an excursus on non-cooperative towards cooperative solutions. In a non-cooperative equilibrium the monopolistic allocation prevails in both countries, because of the incentive to use strategically the terms of trade. In a cooperative solution where both policymakers internalize the externalities given by the terms of trade, the competitive allocation is reached. However, cooperation can be counterproductive. We then characterize a problem of delegation in which the set of choice is restricted to the Pareto efficient allocations and in which the participation constraints implied by the non-cooperative equilibrium are taken into account.     

Prices In Motion: Towards A Schumpeterian Price Theory

To Schumpeter, endogenous development is an essential characteristic of capitalism that disrupts the equilibrium of the circular flow of the economy. Price equilibrium in the circular flow is displaced by an analysis of prices in motion. The diversion of productive inputs from their existing employment through competition from entrepreneurs and the process of creative destruction both impact on prices throughout the economy and generate business cycles. While Schumpeter's theory of the business cycle and, implicitly, his price theory, have been heavily criticized, this article suggests a way forward to a revised theory of prices in motion.     

人民币实际汇率与贸易条件的实证研究

基于均衡汇率理论,应用协整模型,采用真实变量分析了1980-2003年的人民币实际汇率及其与均衡汇率的失调情况,进而研究了不同时期人民币实际汇率与贸易条件的关系。结果表明:贸易条件与中长期以及短期的实际汇率存在显著的关系,贸易条件的恶化或改善是导致人民币实际汇率升值或贬值的重要原因之一。并且,在不同的发展时期,贸易条件对实际汇率的影响呈现出不同的特点。     

COURNOT OLIGOPOLY UNDER STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY WITH OPTIMISTIC AND PESSIMISTIC FIRMS

In this paper the Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty is analyzed by means of the Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) theory. Firms are supposed to be either optimistic (CEU maximizers who hold concave capacities) or pessimistic (convex capacities). Reaction functions, equilibrium quantities, prices and profits are derived and compared for different degrees of uncertainty and uncertainty attitude (optimism or pessimism). It is proved that optimists make higher profits than pessimists whenever uncertainty is sufficiently low. If it is high just optimists participate in the market making losses. An interpretation of the main results in terms of the market's level of maturity is provided.     

Procurement bidding with restrictions

In many procurement situations with simultaneously offered projects, firms face participation restrictions and can bid only on a subset of the projects. This phenomenon is prevalent in a variety of observed situations such as bidding for private label supplies, business to business procurement or government projects. We show that for the case of n bidding firms where each is restricted to bid on a subset of the offered projects, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which each bidder has a positive expected equilibrium profit. Prices are bounded away from marginal costs even if all the bidders are homogenous. This results from the fact that there is a positive probability that each firm will find itself in the position of being the sole bidder on a project. While the equilibrium probability of bidding on a project increases with its value, it is interesting to note that the bidding probability on the projects approaches an equiprobable one as the number of bidding firms increases. We find that the equilibrium profits decrease as firms are able to bid on more of the available projects. In contrast, bidder commitment to bid on specific projects increases the equilibrium profits of all firms. We also examine the effect of heterogeneity on equilibrium profits. Greater heterogeneity in the project valuations leads to lower firm profits. On the other hand, heterogeneity among bidders in terms of the number of projects that they are constrained to bid on leads to greater profits for the firms that can bid on more projects (regardless of the mix of the firms in the industry.) Finally, we analyze the effect of uncertainty in project valuations and show greater uncertainty in project valuations (as represented by a mean preserving spread) decreases the equilibrium profits. We conclude with an empirical analysis of bidding behavior that tests the predictions of the theory. We find that the probability of bidding on a particular project is increasing in its value, decreasing in the other projects values and decreasing in the number of bidding subjects. Furthermore, the value of the bids on a project increase with its valuation and decrease with the total number of bidders.

SOCIAL CONFLICT,GROWTH AND FACTOR SHARES

Standard growth theory is based on atomistic agents with no strategic interactions among them. In contrast, we model growth as resulting from a one‐off, strategic game between ‘workers’ and owners of capital (‘capitalists’) on factor shares, in an otherwise standard ‘AK’ growth model. The resulting distribution of income between factors further determines the marginal revenue product of capital and the rate of growth. We analyse the properties of four equilibria: competitive, Stackelberg equilibrium, a hybrid non‐cooperative regime and cooperative, in terms of labour shares, growth and welfare. Our model thus endogenizes key aspects of the ‘social contract’.     

Fuzzy Bargaining Games: Conditions of Agreement,Satisfaction, and Equilibrium

Game theory in its several variants is widely recognized as a contribution to social and economic modeling. One relevant development of classical game theory, Generalized Game Theory (GGT), entails its extension and generalization through the formulation of the mathematical theory of rules and rule complexes. Social theory concepts such as norm, value, belief, role, social relationship, and institution as well as game can be defined in a uniform way in terms of rules and rule complexes. Among the applications, one major initiative has been the conceptualization of fuzzy games and equilibria. In this paper a GGT model of 2-person fuzzy bargaining games is outlined. Two key concepts are applied: (1) players’ value (or “utility”) structures consisting of ideal points or expectation levels, on the one hand, and limits of acceptance, on the other; (2) fuzzy judgment functions in which players deal with imprecise information and use approximate reasoning in making decisions and negotiating agreements. Such fuzzy judgment functions can take into account economic, socio-psychological, and cultural and institutional aspects of the bargaining context, which affect the bargaining process in specifiable ways. Several significant results are obtained from the application of this model: the opportunities (or not) for agreement, the participants’ satisfaction levels with an agreement, and the question whether or not the agreed “price” is an equilibrium price.     

Long‐term Effects of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis in Goodwin‐type Economies

The existence of an efficiency wage mechanism in Goodwin‐type models may lead to the unexpected appearance of an economically meaningful equilibrium with zero labour share, which is globally stable for some parameter constellation and allows the system to attain its ‘maximal growth'. A subsequent ‘normative’ comparison between the possible long‐term regimes of the economy shows that (1) the zero labour share equilibrium can be the ‘preferred’ equilibrium in terms of welfare; (2) in all the long‐term regimes the welfare is higher than in the original Goodwin model; (3) a point of maximal welfare exists. Moreover, the effects of rational behaviour of firms are compared with the ‘traditional’ situation in which rationality is not explicitly assumed. A striking result appears: myopic rationality can have deleterious effects on the profit of firms and on the overall welfare of the economy.     

Technical Change and the Equilibrium Profit Rate in a Market with Sequential Bargaining

The Marxian theory of the tendentially falling rate of profit is shown to be consistent with a competitive equilibrium scenario for labor markets in which wages are determined by sequential bargaining within a stationary matching process. The central result establishes that if trade is possible, there exists a set of individually rational capital-using, labor-saving technical innovations which lower the equilibrium rate of profit if adopted universally. The model yields as an important special case wage conditions under which the universal adoption of any such innovation reduces the equilibrium rate of profit.     

贸易条件变动对中国经济增长影响的实证分析

文章根据1980-2006年的数据对价格贸易条件、收入贸易条件与经济增长之间的关系进行了经验分析,主要结论有：（1）贸易条件调整的实际GDP指标分析表明,从总体上看,价格贸易条件变化对我国的经济增长产生了负效应。（2）协整分析的结果表明,经济增长与价格贸易条件、收入贸易条件之间存在着稳定的长期均衡关系,但是价格贸易条件对经济增长的影响不显著,收入贸易条件对经济增长的影响也不是非常显著。（3）Granger因果检验、脉冲响应和方差分解也都验证了协整分析的结果。最后,根据实证分析的结果,提出了相应的对策建议。     

资源环境约束下的城市化水平的一般均衡分析模型与实证检验

根据中国典型的城乡二元经济结构特征,在城市经济一般均衡模型的基础上,将资源环境要素纳入生产函数,从理论上首次推导了资源环境约束下的城市化水平的一般均衡模型。利用江西省1989-2008年的时间序列进行实证研究,结果显示:在考虑资源环境约束条件下,江西省农村人口向城市部门转移达到稳定状态下的均衡城市化水平为79.23%。在分析实证结果的基础上,就江西省城市化发展提出相应的政策建议。     

INTERTEMPORAL COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM,CAPITAL AND THE STABILITY OF TÂTONNEMENT PRICING REVISITED

This paper reconsiders a recent criticism which contends that the theory of general intertemporal equilibrium, formulated by taking the physical endowments of capital goods as given, is not protected from the problem of capital at the centre of the two Cambridges debate of the 1960s. The author confirms such a criticism following a different approach. He argues that the stability analysis of an intertemporal equilibrium via tâtonnement must be consistent with a uniform rate of return on capital. He shows that the resulting non‐orthodox tâtonnement subverts the traditional analysis of equilibrium stability.     

基于碳排放责任视角的碳税征收方式选择

文章基于碳排放责任认定的“生产者责任”、“消费者责任”以及“共担责任”视角,运用产业内贸易理论,分别构建了开放经济下两个国家征收生产型碳税、消费型碳税和混合型碳税的博弈模型。并利用各模型的均衡解,从国家福利、碳排放量和企业利润等方面比较了这些征税方式的效果,分别得出了实现国家福利改善、碳减排和企业发展等目标的条件,并探讨了实现综合目标的可能性。结果表明：分别从实现国家福利改善目标和实现碳减排目标看,混合型碳税均优于生产型碳税;从实现企业发展目标看,生产型碳税优于混合型碳税;任何一种碳税征收方式无法同时实现所有目标,政府必须在三个目标之间有所取舍,在一定条件下消费型碳税或混合型碳税可同时实现福利改善和碳减排目标。     

RETHINKING DYNAMIC CAPITAL STRUCTURE MODELS WITH ROLL‐OVER DEBT

Dynamic capital structure models with roll‐over debt rely on widely accepted arguments that have never been formalized. This paper clarifies the literature and provides a rigorous formulation of the equity holders’ decision problem within a game theory framework. We spell out the linkage between default policies in a rational expectations equilibrium and optimal stopping theory. We prove that there exists a unique equilibrium in constant barrier strategies, which coincides with that derived in the literature. Furthermore, that equilibrium is the unique equilibrium when the firm loses all its value at default time. Whether the result holds when there is a recovery at default remains a conjecture.     

Collusion Theory: Where to Go Next?

This note comments on Feuerstein's (Feuerstein, Switgard, “Collusion in industrial economics: A survey,” forthcoming in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2005) survey of collusion theory. I start by presenting evidence from a recent real-world collusion case: the lysine industry. Based on this, I point out a few areas where collusion theory can improve: (a) the problem of equilibrium choice (bargaining over each firm's share), which is especially important in asymmetric oligopolies; (b) the problem of equilibrium implementation, including in particular communication in an asymmetric information context; and (c) the relation between price wars and collusion. I conclude with a few notes on policy issues, namely leniency programs and cartel detection strategies.     

东亚区域汇率合作与协调：基于一般均衡模型的分析

研究东亚货币合作和汇率协调的理论模型在20世纪80年代初期以后获得较快的发展．其中早期的理论模型多是局部均衡分析,或者是应用博弈论建立的理论模型。通过建立三个国家的一般均衡理论模型,我们可以看到东亚各经济体对美元或者日元的单一钉住不如钉住一篮子货币。在东亚汇率合作中,钉住以贸易为权重的货币篮子是一种纳什均衡,它可以缓冲美元与日元汇率变动对各经济体的宏观经济所带来的冲击。     

WELL‐BEHAVED PRODUCTION ECONOMIES

We show that production economies are tâtonnement stable if consumers satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference. To ensure that producer supply decisions are well defined, we restrict prices in the tâtonnement so that positive profits cannot occur but do allow supply decisions to be multi‐valued. The model therefore permits linear activities and hence the technologies that admit capital theory paradoxes. The result thus shows that if the consumer side of the economy is well behaved then capital theory paradoxes are irrelevant for stability. Other features of the Walrasian general‐equilibrium model that have aroused suspicion (e.g. that a price below its equilibrium value may have negative excess demand and thus temporarily move even lower in a tâtonnement) may be a sign of trouble but also have nothing to do with capital theory paradoxes. We show that these phenomena arise even when there is no choice of technique and there is an aggregate production function.     

虚拟产业集群知识系统的自组织特性分析

自组织理论主要包括普利高津创立的耗散结构理论和H．哈肯的协同学。耗散结构方法论称为自组织的创造条件方法论。虚拟产业集群知识系统是开放、远离平衡态、非线性的,虚拟产业集群知识系统是自组织系统。协同论是虚拟产业集群知识系统自组织的动力学方法论,虚拟集群内部的竞争与协同是自组织系统演化的动力。“涨落放大”使系统由非稳定平衡态逐步演化到稳定平衡态。     

ASSET PRICE BUBBLES,LIQUIDITY PREFERENCE AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

In his Treatise on Money, Keynes relied on two different themes to argue that the interest rate need not rise with rising levels of expenditure. One of these was the elasticity of the money supply, and the other was the interaction between financial and industrial circulation. A decrease (increase) in what Keynes called the bear position was similar in its impact to that of a policy‐induced increase (decrease) in the money supply. In the General Theory, this second line of argument lost much of its force as it became reformulated under the rubric of Keynes liquidity preference theory of interest. Assuming that the expected return on capital adjusts to the interest rate in short‐period equilibrium, Keynes ignored the effect of bull or bear sentiment in equity markets as a second‐order complication that can be ignored in analyzing the equilibrium level of investment and output. The objective of this paper is to go back to this old theme from the Treatise and underscore its importance for Keynesian theory of the business cycle.