Deficits and Divided Governments: The Case of the German ‘Bundesrat’

The hypothesis of divided government is applied to the development of deficits in Germany. Since the party system is relatively stable, divided governments emerge not from coalitional governments, but rather from the bicameral structure of the country. Different majorities in the two chambers promote deficits, especially in the case of central government deficits. The results suggest that under different majorities in the two chambers deficits are more than 0.5%-Point higher. Further, it is indicated, that only ideological polarization, but not unstable majorities per se induces higher deficits.

Financial Analysts’ Forecasts and Unprecedented Events: The Case of German Reunification

We use the chain of events from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the reunification of Germany to examine how capital market participants respond to momentous and unprecedented events. Our examination measures the impact of these events on analysts’ forecasts for the earnings of West German firms. Our results show a significant decrease in analysts’ ability to accurately forecast earnings. Contrary to the public’s euphoria, the sense of the market was generally negative about the implications of unification for West German firms. This negative sentiment was spread across most of the broad sectors, but within those sectors the results were significantly positive for select groups of industries. It appears that, in the face of this extraordinary event, financial analysts were detached from the emotions it engendered and were discriminating in their assessment of its impact.

The debt brake of the German states: a faulty design?

The debt brake for German states, which demands that they are forbidden from taking up new net debt from 2020 onwards, has two major shortcomings. First, states do not have tax autonomy. In fiscal crises, they can only make adjustments to expenditure but not on the revenue side. Given the fact that most expenditure is—at least in the short term—predetermined by law, in such a crisis a balanced budget without new debt is hardly feasible. Second, the measure does not take into account that large investments, in particular in small regional units, can scarcely be financed by current expenditure. Thus, there is a high probability that at least some states will take up new net debt even after 2020 and, therefore, violate the rules of the debt brake.     

Jevons's Theory of Political Economy and the ‘Marginalist Revolution’ *

Very many statements have been made about the (non-)existence and characterisation of the ‘marginal revolution’ but it is urged here that detailed study of the relevant texts is far more valuable than the making of grand statements about such matters. In particular, a close reading of Jevons's Theory of Political Economyis proposed as an antidote to over-easy generalisation. Jevons by no means rejected all elements of classical theory. He did not propose a catallatic revolution; he attributed such an emphasis to earlier authors and himself stressed the role of production. It is shown that Jevons was very aware of the necessarily general equilibrium nature of his theory but that he was simply not able to cope with it satisfactorily; it is suggested that this explains, at least in part, his fluctuating and apparently inconsistent statements relating utility and labour to value. Jevons certainly attempted to sketch a complete marginal productivity theory of distribution, even if he was far from successful in providing one.     

1917–2017: The Geopolitical Legacy of the Russian Revolution

The essays collected in this forum discuss the geopolitical legacy of the Russian Revolution of 1917, one of the most momentous political events of the twentieth century. From a range of different academic disciplines and perspectives, the authors consider how the profound transformations in society and politics were refracted through space and geography, and how enduring these refractions proved to be. The authors focus on three themes that have been dominant in Russian affairs over the past century: 1)the problem of center-periphery relations, 2)the civilizational dynamics of Russia’s self-identification in relation to Europe and to Asia, and 3)the geopolitics of national identity.     

Globalisation and/or Europeanisation? The Case of Flexicurity

The relationship between globalisation and Europeanisation is conventionally studied by focusing on the domestic level. In this article we explore this relationship at the international level instead. We examine the way in which the two phenomena in the form of the ILO and the EU relate to one another. Adopting a discursive institutionalist approach and focusing on flexicurity, we investigate whether, how and under what conditions the discourse on flexicurity provides a point of convergence or divergence between globalisation and Europeanisation. Our empirical data reveals attempts by the European Commission to use globalisation as a legitimating device for a market-accommodating programme for labour market reform. The ILO remains more sceptical, both about the overall effects of globalisation and the more concrete uses of flexicurity. Meanwhile, the concept of flexicurity is subject to change and rearticulation in line with the evolving policy agenda endorsed by the Commission and/or the member states. The relationship between Europe and globalisation is thus far from neutral. ‘Europe’ is active in shaping globalisation; translated into the work undertaken here, Europeanisation could be conceived as a facet of globalisation rather than as a bulwark to it, or merely as a process running parallel to it.     

State-led or Capital-driven? The Fall of Bretton Woods and the German Currency Float Reconsidered

This article argues that the lead role of West Germany in the transition from fixed to floating exchange rates sits uneasily with accounts that conceptualise the breakdown of Bretton Woods in terms of hegemonic power politics, the influence of global economic interests or a neoliberal paradigm shift. Short of a convincing explanation, the German currency float seems to be a prime example of states surrendering to financial markets. The article offers an alternative interpretation that focuses on the nexus between state agency and capital accumulation. German authorities were indeed confronted with a destabilising influx of dollars that undermined their available policy options. But as they realised that these inflationary flows emanated from the same export-oriented forces in whose interest they had sought to hold on to an undervalued currency, they chose floating in order to regain command over liquidity and create an anti-inflationary programme that was at the heart of Germany's subsequent ability to better manage the 1970s crisis than its partners. Attention to the particular circumstances and consequences of these ‘structured choices’, I conclude, may offer a more compelling account of financial globalisation as a state-led project than those which generalise from the US context.     

A vote at the opera? The political economy of public theaters and orchestras in the German states

Policymakers generally have powerful incentives to attract votes by strategically manipulating public policies, for instance by increasing public spending during election periods or by implementing ideologically valued policies for their electoral base. At first sight, public theaters and orchestras appear an unlikely domain for such tactics. Highbrow culture is elitist and provides few jobs to artists as voters (patronage). However, we argue that policymakers indirectly target a larger highbrow culture-consuming voting public, as this public is more likely to go voting, to actively engage in politics, and to influence other voters' political behavior through political and sociological multiplier effects. We find evidence of such manipulation tactics in Germany, 1993–2010. Artist numbers increase during state-level, and even more during municipal-level, election years (electioneering). More tentatively, leftwing party power increases cultural subsidies and jobs in Eastern states.     

Where is the Land of Hope and Glory? The geography of intergenerational mobility in England and Wales*

We present a new analysis of intergenerational mobility across three cohorts in England and Wales using linked decennial census microdata, focusing on occupation, homeownership, and education. Four main results emerge. First, area-level differences in upward occupational mobility are highly persistent over time. Second, measures of absolute and relative mobility tend to be spatially positively correlated. Third, there is a robust relationship between upward educational and upward occupational mobility. Last, there is a small negative relationship between upward homeownership mobility and upward occupational mobility, revealing that social mobility comparisons based on different outcomes can have different trends.     

Money, Income and Inflation in Equilibrium – The Case of Greece

The specification of the linear long-run relationship among money, income and the opportunity cost of holding money has been a popular study in economic literature. In the specific case of Greece, numerous articles investigated this relationship using quarterly data, mainly of the period after 1960. The objective of this article is to investigate the same long-run relationship using annual data and covering the historical period between 1858 and 1938. The results of the used cointegration analysis are presented along with the findings of other authors who covered the post war era of the Greek Economy.

The ‘Americanisation’ of West German economics after the Second World War: Success,failure, or something completely different?

Abstract

The paper examines the intellectual and structural change that German economics experienced after the Second World War. This development often was described as ‘Americanisation’, since it seemed to rest upon the influences of the American occupation regime. In contrast, the paper applies another meaning of ‘Americanisation’. It is considered a ‘discourse’ that serves to structure the disciplinary procedures to produce progress. As it can be shown by the adoption of Keynesianism and neoclassical microeconomics, the change of the discipline was not primarily driven by direct American influences. Rather, in some respect the German reception took a path of its own. That contradiction can be solved by a theoretical modification of the classical concept of ‘Americanisation’. ‘Americanisation’ there meant a change of the operational procedure of German economics to generate progress.