Private takings

This paper examines the implications associated with a recent Supreme Court ruling, Kelo v. City of New London (2005). Kelo can be interpreted as supporting eminent domain as a means of transferring property rights from one set of private agents—landowners—to another private agent—a developer. Under voluntary exchange, where the developer sequentially acquires property rights from landowners via bargaining, a holdout problem arises. Eminent domain gives all of the bargaining power to the developer and, as a result, eliminates the holdout problem. This is the benefit of Kelo. However, landowners lose all their bargaining power and, as a result, their property investments become more inefficient. This is the cost of Kelo. A policy of eminent domain increases social welfare compared to voluntary sequential exchange only when the holdout problem is severe, and this occurs only if the developer has very little bargaining power. We propose an alternative government policy that eliminates the holdout problem but does not affect the bargaining power of the various parties. This alternative policy strictly dominates a policy of eminent domain, which implies that eminent domain is an inefficient way to transfer property rights between private agents.     

EFFICIENCY AND BARGAINING POWER IN THE INTERBANK LOAN MARKET

Using detailed transactions‐level data on interbank loans, we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no‐arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada's Large Value Transfer System, we show that although the market is fairly efficient, systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the Bank of Canada's operations as well as phases of the 2007–8 financial crisis. We find that bargaining power tilted sharply toward borrowers as the financial crisis progressed and (surprisingly) toward riskier borrowers.     

Mr Keynes,the Classics and the new Keynesians: A suggested formalisation

Abstract

The paper suggests a new Keynesian model of the General Theory. A reduced form entails a diagram with three curves relating employment and the real wage, which represent the two fundamental classical postulates and the principle of effective demand. This diagram illustrates better than IS–LM the generality of Keynes's theory, clarifying the distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. Other significant features are the role of the distribution of expected interest rates among heterogeneous agents, whether dispersed or concentrated, in shaping the LM curve, as well as the role of wage competitiveness constraints as a foundation of Keynes's relative wage hypothesis.     

Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments Within an Incomplete Contract Framework

This paper compares three different legal means—no environmental policy (the pollutee pays), full liability (the polluter pays), and pollution standards—to reduce and regulate neighborhood externalities within an incomplete contract framework. It turns out that the relative efficiency of these instruments depends, in general, on details. However, moderate standards are preferable to no environmental policy and tight (but not too tight) standards dominate liability. This provides under the given assumptions (neighborhood externalities, incomplete contracts) a justification for “sensible” standards for three reasons. First, unilateral allocations of property rights are biased that distort allocations even if ex post bargaining takes place. Second, a standard is superior in the following sense: if it is set equal to the outcome under any allocation of rights, it will be improved in the process of ex post bargaining. Third, unilateral property rights encourage strategic ex ante investments up to the point that committing to no bargaining would be beneficial (if possible).     

should Transfers To Poor Families Be Conditional On School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective*

This article considers the welfare implications of transfers to poor families that are conditional on school attendance and other forms of investment in children's human capital. Family decisions are assumed to be the result of (generalized) Nash bargaining between the two parents. We show that, as long as bequests are zero, conditional transfers are better for children than unconditional transfers. The mother's welfare may also be improved by conditional transfers. Thus, conditioning transfers to bequest‐constrained families have potentially desirable intergenerational and intragenerational welfare effects. Conditioning transfers to unconstrained families make every family member worse off.     

N-PERSON NASH BNARGAINING WITH VARIABEL THREATS*

We consider two models of n-person bargaining problems with the endogenous determination of disagreement points. In the first model, which is a direct extension of Nash's variable threat bargaining model, the disagreement point is determined as an equilibrium threat point. In the second model, the disagreement point is given as a Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. These models are formulated as extensive games, and axiomatizations of solutions are given for both models. It is argued that for games with more than two players, the first bargaining model does not preserve some important properties valid for two-person games, e.g., the uniqueness of equilibrium payoff vector. We also show that when the number of players is large, any equilibrium threat point becomes approximately a Nash equilibrium in the underlying noncooperative game, and vice versa. This result suggests that the difference between the two models becomes less significant when the number of players is large.     

The Impact of Regret on Exports

We examine optimal production and export decisions of a firm facing exchange rate uncertainty, where the firm's management is not only risk averse but also regret averse, i.e., is characterized by a utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex post suboptimal alternatives. Experimental and empirical results support the view that managers tend to be regret averse. Under regret aversion a negative risk premium need not preclude the firm from exporting which would be the case if the firm were only risk averse. Exporting creates an implicit hedge against the possibility of regret when the realized spot exchange rate turns out to be high. The regret‐averse firm as such has a greater ex ante incentive to export than the purely risk averse firm. Finally, we use a two‐state example to illustrate that the firm optimally exports more (less) to the foreign country than in the case of pure risk aversion if the low (high) spot exchange rate is more likely to prevail. Regret aversion as such plays a crucial role in determining the firm's optimal allocation between domestic sales and foreign exports.     

Pricing policies for a two-part exhaustible resource cartel: The case of OPEC

This paper examines pricing policies for OPEC under the assumption that the cartel is composed of a block of spender countries with large cash needs and a block of saver countries with little immediate need for cash and a lower rate of discount. The decision problem for the two-part cartel is embodied in a game-theoretic framework and the optimal bargaining solution is computed using results from the theory of cooperative games developed by Nash. The set of feasible bargaining points—and the corresponding Nash solution—is computed under two assumptions on the behavior of output shares: that they are subject to choice and that they are fixed at historical values. Our results suggest that for fixed output shares, there is little room for bargaining, and the price path approximates the optimal monopoly price path. If the shares are subject to control, optimal paths depend significantly on the relative bargaining power of each block.     

Severance Payment: Incentive or Lethargy Effect?

The aim of the paper is to determine the impact of severance payment on the motivation of the worker to make an effort, when there is a risk for him to be dismissed once his effort was made. We highlight through a two‐stage model the various factors which influence the dismissal decision by the firm and the worker's effort, such as the initial wage, the litigation costs and the relative bargaining powers of the parties when the relationship ends or goes on. In this context, we show that the impact of the severance payment paid ex post in case of dismissal on the level of effort chosen by the worker ex ante may depend on such characteristics.     

Aristotle vs. Plato: The classical origins of capitalist & socialist political economies*

Competing definitions of justice in Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics indicate the existence of two distinct economic systems with different priorities. The three-class society of the Platonic economy (guardians, auxiliaries, producers) gives rise to guardians who by virtue are expected to enforce output targets on producers directly or through auxiliaries. The three-class society of the Aristotelian economy (rich, middle, poor) facilitates the emergence of different ruling coalitions and compensates the efficiency losses of central planning with political gains derived from representative governance. In the Aristotelian economy, the middle class is better off than in the Platonic economy (auxiliaries), because a just society (polity) is achieved under its coalition with the rich. I argue that the equilibrium solutions of the Platonic and Aristotelian economic systems provide analytical insights on the origins of capitalist and socialist political economies.     

From the Encyclopédie to the Tableau économique : Quesnay on freedom of grain trade and economic growth

This paper investigates the evolution of Quesnay's economic thought between his Encyclopédie articles and the first edition of the Tableau économique. The rediscovery of a forgotten piece Quesnay included in an agricultural treatise — the Essai sur l'amélioration des terres — leads us to reconsider the origins of the first edition of the Tableau. This forgotten piece of writing is the missing link between Quesnay's first economic writings and the Tableau. It improves on the theory of grain trade liberalization Quesnay presented in his first writings on two levels. First, it reconstructs of his previous argument in order to give it a more coherent shape. Second, this text complements the Encyclopédie articles by a growth mechanism. Through a reconstruction of Quesnay's growth mechanism, we show that his argument is a significant analytical step toward the first edition of the Tableau.     

Economists on Darwin's theory of social evolution and human behaviour

Abstract

This article analyses Darwin's image among economists with a specific focus on his theory of social evolution as presented in the Descent of Man (1871). We propose an analysis of the way and context in which economists refer to Darwin, mention his name and quote his writings. It then appears that Darwin is most of the time viewed as a biologist only, who never developed his own theory of social evolution. He is thus quoted as a biologist who either borrowed concepts from economists who developed a theory of social evolution, or laid the basis for biological theory of social evolution developed by others, Spencer, in particular. It is only recently that eventually the twofold dimensions—biological and social—of Darwin's general theory of evolution are considered together by bioeconomists.     

Debt Concentration and Bargaining Power: Large Banks,Small Banks,and Secondary Market Prices

Commerical bank debts of developing countries are held by large international banks and smaller domestic banks. This paper investigates how debt concentration—the proportion of a country's debt held by large banks relative to small banks—affects the secondary market price for these loans. We find that countries with higher concentrations have higher secondary-market prices. We explain this empirical finding in a bargaining model that endogenizes the maximum penalty that banks can credibly impose on a recalcitrant debtor. We show that the banks' bargaining power increases with the degree of debt concentration, thus increasing repayment and secondary-market prices.     

Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining

Experiments are used to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders about the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. This significantly increases offers and offer‐specific rejection probabilities. For comparison, we consider another change in informational conditions: telling responders the total pie is $30—ex ante it was either $15 or $30—affects offers and rejection probabilities roughly as much. Our results are consistent with people’s dislike for deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.     

ON MAJORITARIAN BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION*

This article studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohn's (American Political Science Review 83 (1989), 1181–206) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information. Of many findings, we show that (i) allowing for delay can be optimal for a proposer; (ii) the revelation of a type depends on two conflicting concerns, the “offer” concern à la Spence's signaling (the higher the type the better) and the “coalition inclusion” concern in a majority consent (the lower the type the better); and (iii) players take actions to distinguish themselves via delay, but separating equilibria often fail to exist due to incapability or unprofitability of exercising delay.     

Civilisations and Their Discontents: Political Geography and Geopolitics in the Huntington Thesis

This article considers the place of political geography and geopolitics in Samuel Huntington's celebrated work Clash of Civilizations. It is argued that Huntington's engagement with geography is fundamentally ambivalent. On the one hand, he frames his entire analysis as a form of what he calls political geography, and he invokes geographical factors in various ways throughout the entire text. At the same time, however, he explicitly discounts the significance of space or territory in the civilisational framework that he depicts. An analysis of Huntington's inconsistency in this regard contributes to a broader critique of his overall premises, logic, and conclusions. Beyond this, it provides insight into the uncertain position of geography more broadly in contemporary discourses of international relations and international security. Ultimately, I suggest that the ambivalences in the Clash of Civilizations are indicative of certain ‘fault lines’ — to borrow from Huntington's own lexicon — that have been characteristic for the American security imagination across much of the twentieth century.     

Maternal Healthcare in Tajikistan: A Bargaining Framework

Abstract

This study examines women's declining use of maternal healthcare services in post-socialist Tajikistan. Using data from the 2003 and 2007 Tajikistan Living Standards Surveys (TLSS), the findings support previous evidence that a woman's use of prenatal and delivery care depends on her education, household income, and proximity to services. However, previous models have not specified who makes the decision to use maternal healthcare services. This study finds that in Tajikistan a woman shares decision making with her spouse and the eldest woman in the household. There is limited evidence that traditional proxies for bargaining power, such as relative earnings level, affect outcomes. The authors conclude that where women's exit options are limited, surveys evaluating the value of women's assets and their services in the home, as well as questions about decision making, will allow more refined measures of women's bargaining power.     

Paper credit and the multi-personae Mr. Henry Thornton

The bicentenary celebration of the publication of Henry Thornton's An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain (1802) presents an appropriate time for a reconsideration of this great work on monetary economics. This paper highlights Thornton's criticisms of Adam Smith along with the importance that Thornton attached to the lender of last resort role of the Bank of England. It suggests that there are three Mr. Thorntons who appear in Paper Credit. The first is the concerned anti-inflationist of the first section. The second is the worried anti-inflationist of the second section of the book. Besides these, there may be a third Mr. Thornton. This persona was that of the practical banker who understood the new emerging financial architecture that had resulted in paper credit supplanting metallic money. Thornton understood this new transformation of the monetary system. It is conjectured that the existence of the usury laws, inter alia, may have prevented Thornton from fully investigating the possibility of the UK moving to a specie-less system.     

Instability and Crisis in Financial Complex Systems

This paper contrasts the Efficient Markets Hypothesis with Hyman Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH), taking into account the dynamic complexity of financial markets. This approach offers analytical tools that can account for crisis through processes endogenous to contemporary economies. Recent work, notably by J. Barkley Rosser, has suggested that complex dynamics is a strong foundations for Keynesian models and results. Group dynamics enter into the analysis in at least two ways: they provide an independent source of fundamental uncertainty which, as discussed by Keynes himself, can lead to speculative bubbles in asset markets, and they can cause overreactions in both lenders' and borrowers' attitudes toward risk. These aspects can lead to financial fragility and instability following a variety of complex dynamics. I shall argue that a financially complex system is, according to the FIH, inherently flawed and unstable: in the absence of adequate economic policy boom and bust phenomena, in financial markets which are fuelled by credit booms and busts, may generate endogenous instability and systemic crisis, such as the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis.

[O]ur economic leadership does not seem to be aware that the normal functioning of our economy leads to financial trauma and crisis, inflation, currency depreciations, unemployment, and poverty in the midst of what could be virtually universal affluence—in short, that financially complex capitalism is inherently flawed. (Minsky, 1986, p. 287; our emphasis)     

The Role of Keynesian Policies in Semi-industrialized Countries: theory and evidence from India

This paper examines the relevance of Keynesian policies—interpreted as those policies implied by Keynes's theoretical analysis of unemployment developed in The General Theory—for a subset of developing economies, which are called semi-industrialized countries. It draws on recent contributions in development economics to argue on theoretical grounds that Keynesian policies are relevant for semi-industrialized countries even when they are constrained by capital shortages, stagnant agricultural sectors, and foreign exchange availability. It then discusses the recent development experience of India to illustrate the empirical relevance of some of these theoretical issues.