Method and analysis in Piero Sraffa's 1925 critique of Marshallian economics

This paper provides an analysis of the logical structure and analytical content of Piero Sraffa's 1925 Italian paper, ‘Sulle relazioni fra costo e quantità prodotta’. It shows that Sraffa's criticism of the supply side of Marshall's theory of value in a competitive partial equilibrium model involves analytical and methodological issues. Endorsing an agressive methodology Sraffa logically reconstructs Marshall's model on variable returns to determine its empirical domain. He demonstrates that the latter encompasses only the empirically irrelevant cases of specific factor industries and specific external economies industries and that it cannot be generalized to non-specific factor industries and to non-specific external economies industries.     

垄断条件下企业研发的最优决策研究

研发决策是企业战略发展和组织管理中必不可少的重要内容,对于垄断企业更是如此。分别从企业层面和产业层面对垄断条件下垄断企业的最优研发决策进行了分析。研究表明,由于信息不完全和研发成本的存在,垄断厂商可能会选择低效技术;当研发投入成本较低、风险较小时,厂商进行技术转换、增加研发投入的激励更大。而在进行技术投入时,非合作竞争中的研发投入水平和厂商利润均小于合作研发时的水平,从而导致研发不足。而通过合作研发将技术的外部扩散效应内部化,对企业的研发具有正向激励作用。