Competition and monopoly of Chinese rural groundwater market：structure and determinants

China is facing severe problem of water scarcity.Agricultural sector,the main consumer of water resource,has remarkably changed its institutions on water resource deployment,due to heavy environmental pressure.As a new and spontaneous institution,groundwater market has developed rapidly in northern China,and has impacts on waterusing behaviors and benefits of farmers.Using household survey data from Hebei and Henan in 2007,this paper attempts to pin down the development and operating of groundwater market in rural China.We focus on the monopoly and competition in the market.Empirical analysis reveals that Chinese farmers are trying to make rational decision when they compete with others in groundwater market.In general,monopoly is not fierce in Chinese rural groundwater market,with great variations among different villages and even different tubewells within one village.Tubewell costs,regulation and the density of tubewells are the main determinants that affect monopoly level of groundwater market.To make water market benefit more and more farmers of low income,corresponding policies are needed to modify its development in the future.     

熊彼特的竞争理论及其启示

熊彼特的竞争理论表明,短期限制竞争可以激励和保护创新,而完全竞争并不适合创新。熊彼特理论没有颠覆传统的反垄断范式,但调整了它的重心和内部结构,使得反垄断关注的重点从静态转向动态、从相关市场转向创新活动、从市场份额和集中度转向进入壁垒。     

垄断条件下企业研发的最优决策研究

研发决策是企业战略发展和组织管理中必不可少的重要内容,对于垄断企业更是如此。分别从企业层面和产业层面对垄断条件下垄断企业的最优研发决策进行了分析。研究表明,由于信息不完全和研发成本的存在,垄断厂商可能会选择低效技术;当研发投入成本较低、风险较小时,厂商进行技术转换、增加研发投入的激励更大。而在进行技术投入时,非合作竞争中的研发投入水平和厂商利润均小于合作研发时的水平,从而导致研发不足。而通过合作研发将技术的外部扩散效应内部化,对企业的研发具有正向激励作用。     

Resource extraction by cartels facing constraints on cooperation

This paper considers a non-renewable resource cartel facing constraints on cooperation. Although different kinds of constraints are conceivable and some of them are also investigated, the analysis focuses on the case in which cooperation is restricted to sufficiently high quotas. This approach of imposing constraints on cartelization complements papers that assume exogenously when a monopoly ends (in particular Benchekroun, H., Gaudet, G., Van Long, N., 2006. Temporary natural resource cartels. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 52, 663–674) in two aspects: an endogenous determination when the cartel breaks up and the consequence that it is impossible to shift resource sales between the two regimes.     

基于技术存在形式的技术垄断研究

界定了技术垄断的概念并区分了市场垄断和技术产权。以技术存在形式视角分析了技术垄断的形成和结构,以及技术垄断的外在表现,并研究了在市场经济体制下影响技术市场垄断程度的因素。提出了技术的市场垄断程度的评价体系和计算方法,并将市场中技术垄断组织作为一个系统,分析技术创新投入和技术市场垄断程度之间的关系。分析了技术垄断的周期,并从中得出了技术垄断竞争力的构成,推出产业技术联盟的技术垄断竞争力内涵。     

On the scope of indirect regulation of monopolies in the presence of large entry cost

This paper reexamines the ingenious regulation scheme put forward by Burnovsky and Zang (1991), that features a regulator who promises to subsidize entry into a market, which exhibits properties of a natural monopoly. If the subsidy promise is sufficiently high, the monopolist is led to increase output and lower price at no cost of regulation. The assumption that the monopolist always honors his pre-entry commitment has been shown to be crucial for the results obtained. This motivated our inquiry into the scope of costless indirect regulation in situations in which the incumbent's commitment cannot be inforced. It then turns out that no commitment on behalf of the incumbent can be credible that deters entry by choosing an output (capacity) at a level in excess of the monopoly output after successful entry deterrence. This represents an additional constraint for the regulator's behavior.I like to thank Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Economics Department at Boston University for generous support.     

Games played in a contracting environment

We analyze normal form games where a player has to pay a price to a supplier in order to play a specific action. Our focus is on supplier competition, arising from the fact that distinct suppliers supply different players, and possibly different actions of the same player. With private contracts, where a player only observes the prices quoted by his own suppliers, the set of equilibrium distributions over player actions coincides with the set of equilibrium distributions when all actions are supplied competitively, at cost. With public contracts, the two distributions differ dramatically even in simple games.     

The Exploitation of Sports Market Forces： Case Study of American Professional Franchises

Three market forces play into the hands of American professional sports franchises, which are leagues, cities and monopoly power. In consideration of the American professional franchises, this paper studies how teams exploit the three market forces and achieve the optimal revenue.     

Wealth Distribution and Imperfect Factor Markets: A Classroom Experiment

The author presents a simple exercise to demonstrate how initial property distribution can affect final wealth patterns in developing areas of the world. The simulation is a variant of the Monopoly board game in which students role play different members of a market in which they each face different rules of credit access and salary patterns. The property distribution and new mortgage rules reflect the reality of many developing areas. The simulation can be completed in one full class period and has proven successful in making students more sensitive to wealth distribution issues. Students have suggested several variations of this simulation to make it applicable across more settings.     

价格歧视战略与福利效应分析

在完全竞争市场条件下 ,竞争均衡可实现帕累托最优效率。垄断市场一般很难提供价格等于边际成本的产量水平 ,其产量与价格选择对社会来说不是最优的。垄断厂商以内生范畴和外生范畴为基础对消费者进行分类 ,使得价格歧视成为一种可行战略。由于定价策略存在差异 ,不同类型的价格歧视便具有不同的福利效应。     

Marshall and Walras: Incompatible bedfellows?

Abstract

The standard view about the relationship between the Marshallian and the Walrasian approaches is that they are complementary to each other. My aim in this paper is to show that, on the contrary, they constitute alternative sub-research programmes within the wider neoclassical paradigm. I make my point by contrasting the two approaches against the following benchmarks: the purpose of economic theory according to Marshall and Walras; their views as to the role of mathematics; their specific ways of tackling complexity; the conception of equilibrium underpinning their theories; and, finally, their trade organisation assumptions.     

Marshall on equilibrium and time: a reconstruction

This paper's aim is to offer a reconstruction of the Marshallian conception of equilibrium and time. Its main features are as follows. First, I argue that the hallmark of this conception is to posit an interrelationship between two equilibrium concepts — market-day and normal equilibrium. I claim that they are part and parcel and cannot be analysed separately. Second, my reconstruction gives a central role to the market period. Third, I argue that the so-called short and long-period equilibrium concepts refer to the same unique concept of normal equilibrium. Fourth, I argue that Marshall’s value theory admits the effective existence of disequilibrium states. A Marshallian disequilibrium refers to cases where market-day and normal values fail to coincide, this state of affairs going along, however, with market clearing. I also propose an alternative interpretation of Marshall's corn model wherein perfect information is considered the linchpin of achieving equilibrium. Finally, I argue that my reconstruction avoids a series of interpretative pitfalls.     

Bounding consumer surplus by monopoly profits

Regulatory agencies and other public authorities in the United States frequently require private firms seeking regulatory approvals to enter geographic markets, or offer products, that they would not otherwise provide. Examples include “build-out” rules for cable television franchisees, and universal service or “common carrier” obligations. The social welfare consequences of such policies are often difficult to evaluate because, among other things, consumer surpluses generated by entry must be assessed. This article shows that the level of (variable) monopoly profits in the markets of interest can be used to place an upper bound on the associated consumer surplus whenever demand vanishes at a sufficiently high price. This result, which is new, can then be used to evaluate the social consequences of forced entry. Our methods can also be used to provide a bound on the change in consumer surplus resulting from the imposition of regulated prices on an existing monopoly.      

The value of buyer's ignorance in monopoly

A non-linear pricing monopolist always prefers to sell to buyers with no private information about their tastes for the product if the marginal production cost is smaller than the marginal utility of consumption for all buyers.