Information and Knowledge: Austrian Economics in Search of its Uniqueness

The Austrian School of Economics since WWII has increasingly claimed a unique position within the scientific community of economists. This paper argues that the most persuasive way to make this claim to uniqueness is to focus on the distinction scholars in the Austrian tradition place between information and knowledge in their work. In other words, it is the epistemic-cognitive turn that the Austrian school took in the wake of the socialist calculation debate that separates the school from other branches of neo-classicism within economic science that constitutes its best case for analytical uniqueness.     

Price-setting power vs. private information: An experimental evaluation of their impact on holdup

This paper investigates the extent of the holdup problem in a buyer–seller relationship in which the seller has private information about his alternative opportunities. Theory predicts that, compared to a situation in which outside options are publicly observed, the seller obtains an informational rent whereas the buyer bears an informational loss. As a result the seller is predicted to invest more while the buyer is expected to invest less. In contrast to this, private information has no impact on the investment levels observed in the experiment. But actual investments do increase with the price-setting power of the investor. These findings are roughly consistent with a model in which agents are inequality-averse. Overall the results question some recent theoretical suggestions that private information rents might substitute for price-setting power in mitigating holdup.     

The social value of public information with costly information acquisition

In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.     

Marx's value forms and Hayek's rules: a reinterpretation in the light of the dichotomy between physis and nomos

This paper argues that both Marx and Hayek objected to the dichotomybetween physis and nomos, and offered concepts which integrate,or mediate between, the two. Marx's value forms and Hayek'srules aim to grasp something neither purely natural nor purelyartificial or social, but ‘socially natural’. Valueforms and rules are natural in the sense that they pre-existagents and are taken by agents as given. On the other hand,forms and rules are social in that production relations or spontaneousorder are reproduced as the unintended consequences of agents'using forms or following rules. Thus value forms and rules standas links between agents and production relations or spontaneousorder.     

Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring

We consider finitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, and provide several sufficient conditions for such a game to have an equilibrium whose outcome is different from repetition of Nash equilibria of the stage game. Surprisingly, the conditions are consistent with uniqueness of the stage game equilibrium. A class of repeated chicken is shown to satisfy the condition.     

The Microfoundations of Austrian Economics through a New Classical Theoretical Lens

This paper is an attempt to contribute to the microfoundations debate by discussing the distinctive methodological characteristics of the Austrian school, and how they relate to different conceptions of equilibrium and general equilibrium models. Further, we shall focus on one specific branch of the Austrian school (those who see markets as exhibiting equilibrating tendencies) and one specific branch of neoclassical economics (the New Classical School) to highlight some hitherto overlooked points of tangency. Indeed, we shall use the monetary theories of Hayek and Lucas to argue that the limitations of New Classical models may lead to Austrian solutions.     

The social value of information on product quality

In the context of a seller with private information about product quality, I show that revelation of information on product quality is sometimes, but not always, socially valuable. When it is socially valuable, there is generally a tradeoff between the acquisition and revelation of finer, but more costly information and the revelation of coarser, but less costly information. As a result, it can be socially optimal for firms to reveal only coarse private information.     

Towards an information economy : The case of Singapore

Recent empirical studies have documented the emergence of information-based economies in developed countries within Europe, the U.S.A., Japan, and Australia. Casual observations suggest that the newly industrializing country of Singapore is proceeding towards a similar trend. The primary purpose of this paper is to account for the share of Singapore's national product which originates from informational activities. In particular, we define and estimate the size of Singapore's information sector within an input-output framework. Our results indicated that a sizable portion of Singapore's economy is information-based. In view of the significant penetration of informational activities in economic production, advances in communication technology and concomitant improvements in information-handling capabilities are bound to affect factor productivities and incomes with consequences for a country's pattern of employment and production structure. It is anticipated that an economics of communication becomes necessary for an awareness of communication technology as a choice variable in economic planning. We conclude our discussion with an assessment of the admissability of an information sector concept in economic analysis and the usefulness of empirical studies based on such a concept.     

The bullwhip effect on inventory: a perspective on information quality

In recent years, there has been a vast increase in the quantity of information shared across supply chain. We investigate how the timeliness and accuracy of information quality affect the value of information sharing. We use the inventory bullwhip effect (BWE) to measure the value of information sharing in a two-level supply chain consisting of one retailer and one manufacturer. The retailer faces a price-sensitive demand and the price is an AR (1) process. Our study shows if customer demand and retailer’s immediate order are delayed, using retailer’s historical order quantity to forecast can decrease manufacturer’s BWE. If information errors happen, during delivery and utilization, information sharing is not always valuable for the manufacturer. Sometimes, no information sharing can decrease much more of BWE. If information errors occur when the retailer collects demand information, value of information sharing is more significant than when there are no information errors.     

Boettke,The Austrian School and the Reclamation of Reality in Modern Economics

In a series of recent papers, the prominent Austrian economist Peter Boettke has criticised orthodox economics for its lack of realism. This paper situates Boettkes critique in the context provided by recent developments in the methodology of economics, most notably critical realism. While there is a good deal of common ground between Boettkes approach and critical realism, the latter also helps to reveal some of the limitations of the variant of Austrian economics to which Boettke subscribes. Suggestions are made as to how critical realists and Austrians such as Boettke might move forward together in developing a more realistic, relevant and fruitful approach to economic analysis.     

Regulation and information in a continuing relationship

Regulation typically involves a continuing relationship between a regulator and a firm, and that relationship is often complicated by asymmetric information. A multiperiod model of this relationship is analyzed in which a regulated firm has private information about its costs which may changed over time in a manner observable only to the firm. The regulator is assumed to be able to commit to a policy for the entire regulatory horizon, and the optimal pricing policy is shown to depend on an informativeness measure that indicates how information by the firm in one period will be used in future periods.     

The life insurance market: Asymmetric information revisited

This paper finds evidence for the presence of asymmetric information in the life insurance market, a conclusion contrasting with the existing literature. In particular, we find a significant and positive correlation between the decision to purchase life insurance and subsequent mortality, conditional on risk classification. Individuals who died within a 12-year time window after a base year were 19% more likely to have taken up life insurance in that base year than were those who survived the time window. Moreover, as might be expected when individuals have residual private information, we find that the earlier an individual died, the more likely she was to have initially bought insurance. The primary factor driving the difference between our and the prior literature's findings is that we focus on a sample of potential new buyers, rather than on the entire cross section, to address the sample selection problem induced by potential mortality differences between those with and those without coverage.     

The curious destiny of a heterodoxy: The Austrian economic tradition

The Austrian School has had a curious destiny: while contributing many concepts to contemporary economic theory, it is either ignored or criticised by much of modern economic literature. This article discusses possible reasons for this institutional sidelining and the main futures of a renewal of Austrian thought.

The Washington Consensus revisited: a new structural economics perspective

The Washington Consensus reform resulted in economic collapse and stagnation in many transition economies and “lost decades” in other developing countries in 1980s and 1990s. The paper provides a new structural economics perspective of such failures. The Washington Consensus reform failed to recognize that many firms in a transition economy were not viable in an open, competitive market because those industries went against the comparative advantages determined by the economy’s endowment structure. Their survival relied on the government’s protections and subsidies through various interventions and distortions. The Washington Consensus advised the government to focus their reforms on issues related to property rights, corporate governance, government interventions, and other issues that may obstruct a firm’s normal management. Without resolving the firms’ viability problem, such reforms led to the firms’ collapse and an unintended decline and stagnation of the economy in the transition process. This paper suggests that the viability assumption in neoclassical economics be relaxed when analyzing development and transition issues in socialist, transition, and developing economies.     

Taxes versus quotas in lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on abatement costs

We present a model of lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on pollution abatement costs and compare taxes with quotas under such conditions. We also examine the effect of private information on lobbying activity and social welfare under these two instruments. It is found that private information might improve social welfare under taxes when the government has little concern for social welfare, whereas private information does not improve social welfare under quotas. Quotas are generally socially preferred when the slope of marginal abatement costs is steeper than that of marginal damage or when the government does not concern itself with social welfare. However, private information reduces the comparative disadvantage of taxes compared to quotas when the government has little concern for social welfare. Finally, the results of numerical examples suggest that quotas are employed rather than taxes if the difference in natural emission levels between high- and low-cost industries is large.     

The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies

We provide an evaluation of the measure of privately blocking coalitions in differential information economies. In the case of atomless economies, it is proved that for a Pareto optimal allocation that is not a Walrasian expectations equilibrium, to any symmetric profile there corresponds a ball such that "almost half” of the profiles it contains are privately blocking. Analogous results are proved in the case of finite differential information economies for generalized coalitions and social coalition structures. From a different point of view, the paper can be considered as a contribution showing private core equivalence theorems under restrictions on coalition formation. We thank an anonymous referee for observations and comments improving an earlier version of the present paper.     

From Keynes to Hayek: The marvel of thriving macroeconomies

Inherent ignorance of and uncertainties about the future may translate into doubts about the overall viability of market mechanisms. However, these doubts are quelled by a broad empirical observation: market economies thrive. Hayek sometimes abstracted from such ignorance and uncertainties in order to identify the market mechanisms that are essential to thriving economies. His often-overlooked “interest-rate brake,” for instance, keeps the rate of implementation of new technologies in line with peoples willingness to save. A careful reading of macroeconomic history suggests that artificial booms often ride piggyback on genuine booms. During a period of technological breakthroughs, the central bank's adherence to the Real Bills Doctrine overrides the interest-rate brake and engenders an unsustainable boom. JEL Code B22, E30, E50     

The political economics of complexity : From the information economy to the ‘complexity’ economy

The economics of information allows one to distinguish within the national product the real production from the costs of organization. It reveals a continuous inflation of these costs which, per employee and since 1900, has been twice as fast as the increase of productivity. From this, one can conclude that the growth of productivity comes up against a real ‘wall’ when the costs of organization approach 50% of the national product. This is the essential cause of the present crisis. The author subsequently designs an economy of organization structures applicable to complex systems, such as physical, biological or social systems. He shows how the 50% wall is characteristic for centralized structures. Most economic structures are those where social forces and solidarities are distributed justly among all levels of organization, from local to global ones. They tend to establish themselves by self-organization, but a new political economy applying these principles would, aided by information and communication technologies, accelerate this process.     

The relevance of private information in mechanism design

Recent results in mechanism design show that as long as agents have correlated private information and are sufficiently risk neutral, it is possible to design mechanisms that leave agents with arbitrarily small information rents. We show that these full-rent-extraction results hinge on the implicit assumption that the agents’ beliefs uniquely determine their preferences. We present an example of the voluntary provision of a public good in which this assumption is relaxed, and consequently, even in highly correlated environments, if agents’ beliefs do not uniquely determine their preferences, then the extraction of the agents’ entire information rents is impossible.     

Creating legitimacy in global private governance: The case of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil

This article suggests that understanding legitimization processes of private governance initiatives requires a multi-dimensional approach. This suggestion has been operationalized in three aspects that can be used to better understand such processes: legality, moral justifications, and consent/acceptance. These aspects are based on different theoretical traditions and are applied in an analysis of the process of creating legitimacy of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). This empirical research reveals the characteristics of the legitimization process of the RSPO and shows the value of a multi-dimensional approach. The three perspectives complement each other and deepen our insights in legitimization processes by revealing tensions and trade-offs in the different ways in which non-state market driven governance arrangements can create legitimacy.