The Anglo-Irish context for William Edward Hearn's economic beliefs and the ultimate failure of his Plutology

Abstract

William Edward Hearn is generally regarded as Australia's first economist of international note and his Plutology ([1863]1864) is invariably deemed to be Australia's first economics text. In this paper I argue that it is more appropriate to describe Hearn as an Anglo-Irish economist and, to this end, provide the Anglo-Irish context for the economic doctrines that he expressed in Plutology and elsewhere. I also argue that the failure of Plutology in the market place was, in part, due to a campaign waged against Hearn in London by John Elliot Cairnes, who was an undergraduate contemporary of Hearn's at Trinity College, Dublin.     

Budgetary institutions and fiscal discipline: Edmund Burke's insightful contribution

Recent developments in the political economy of public finance literature have focused on the features of budgetary institutions that facilitate budgetary discipline — a sub-discipline of constitutional economics. In this literature, there has been no attempt to trace the development of economic thought on the relationship between budgetary institutions and fiscal discipline. This may be because debt accumulation in peacetime is seen as a late twentieth-century phenomenon. As a result, Edmund Burke's contribution, in his speech ‘On Economical Reform’, seems to have been forgotten. This paper highlights Burke's contribution and identifies the extent to which it captures those features of budgetary institutions that are currently recognized as facilitating budgetary discipline.     

The Political Economy of Economic Reforms in Argentina

In 1989, Argentina entered a process of sweeping transformation of its economic institutions which provided for the (temporary) recovery of economic growth and the taming of inflation. The Argentine experience with market-oriented reforms has been regarded by the literature as a salient case of radical and 'unconstrained' reform. Yet, a closer scrutiny portrays that the building and maintenance of a pro-"reform coalition determined the pace, depth and characteristics of the 'new economic institutions'. The idiosyncrasies of Argentina's political institutions, in turn, conditioned this coalition-building strategy. The same idiosyncrasies were at play in the 2001/2002 collapse of the convertibility regime and ensuing social and political chaos.     

The structure of Say's economic writings

The present paper establishes a general picture of Say's economic thought. The first part provides a general view of Say's writings stressing his economic publications other than the Traité, and the non-economic publications covering two other realms of what was labelled the Sciences morales et politiques in France at that time. The second part is devoted to the Traité since this theoretical piece belonging to Classical political economy has a history throughout its various editions. Finally, the third part considers Say's second great book in economics, the Cours complet d'éeconomie politique pratique and explains the reasons why he wrote it.     

Estimating domestic content in exports when processing trade is pervasive

For many questions, it is crucial to know the extent of domestic value added (DVA) in a country's exports, but the computation is more complicated when processing trade is pervasive. We propose a method for computing domestic and foreign contents that allows for processing trade. By applying our framework to Chinese data, we estimate that the share of domestic content in its manufactured exports was about 50% before China's WTO membership, and has risen to nearly 60% since then. There are also interesting variations across sectors. Those sectors that are likely labeled as relatively sophisticated such as electronic devices have particularly low domestic content (about 30% or less).     

The Commission and the Council Presidency in the European Union: Strategic interactions and legislative powers

This paper develops spatial, game-theoretical models of European Union (EU) policy-making that include the rotating Council Presidency as one of the main actors. Previous such models have typically ignored the Presidency's role, even though it is instrumental in shepherding the Commission's proposals through the legislative process. We study whether the Commission takes the Presidency's preferences into account when formulating proposals, and whether the Presidency's role limits or expands the Commission's powers. We find that even though the Commission has lost powers as a result of the introduction and extension of the codecision procedure, as shown in the literature, it maintains a degree of legislative power by strategically using the rotating Presidency. In particular the Commission times its proposals. It formulates a proposal on an issue when the Presidency is close to itself on that issue.     

EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WITHIN A FIRM ON OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET OUTCOMES

I analyze the implications of the Laffont–Tirole type agency problems on oligopolistic market outcomes. In the model, a firm's marginal cost is decreasing in managerial effort and is subject to an additive shock. Both managerial effort and the realization of the shock are a manager's private information. A firm first offers a menu of contract to its manager, and then competes in the product market. As in the model of single principal and single agent, the incentive contracts implement efforts that are distorted downward relative to full information. In this model, with multiple agency relationships, an additional source for upward distortion of effort emerges as a result of the interaction in the product market. The results are robust to whether firms compete in price or quantity.     

Mobile Payments,Social Money: Everyday Politics of the Consumer Subject

How should we think about mobile payments systems such as Apple and Android Pay? We argue that mobile payments should be understood in the context of changing consumption practices and the wider problematic of the consumer subject in International Political Economy. One (managerialist) view of these changes suggests that certain ‘immaterial’ values in brands, logos or networks can become an important element in economic growth. Thus, businesses increasingly craft user experiences to realise brand value as the indicator of future consumption, for example, Facebook, Netflix. Against this view, the critical literature has underlined how the customer relationship should be understood as an element in corporate power; enticing consumer subjects to dedicate their social lives to the task of monetisation. Rather than choose between sides of this dichotomy, we suggest it may be more fruitful to reflect upon the unanticipated potentialities of mobile payments. By reflecting on the sociality of money, we move beyond a simple cost-benefit analysis, or a structural determinism, to emphasise the contingency of market subjects, questioning how to think about the relationship between consumer subjects, on the one hand, and and a putatively impersonal (yet palpable) global economy, on the other.     

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION IN AGENCY CONTRACTS*

We study how a principal uses her subjective evaluation of the agent's performance in an incentive contract. It is shown that the subjective evaluation can be used either 1) when there is no other information about the agent's performance and the principal is able to discard money, or 2) when the principal chooses between wage payment based on subjective evaluation by foregoing objective evaluation, and the one based only on the objective evaluation and when the subjective evaluation is sufficiently accurate. The principal pays a high fixed wage when her rating at the subjective evaluation is above a certain level. On the other hand, when it is below that level, she either pays a low fixed wage or obtains objective evaluation and pays based on its outcome.     

THIRD PARTIES, INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND MONITORING INCENTIVES

Within an incomplete contract setting, the paper analyses the role of third parties in ameliorating incentive problems arising in the context of financial contracts with costly verification and lender's bargaining power. Contrary to the findings of the bilateral lender–borrower relationship, characterised by no information revelation and possibly a breakdown of the market, it is shown that, in the presence of third parties, an optimal contract exists featuring partial information revelation and random monitoring. The importance of third parties is therefore not limited to improving efficiency, as it is when the contract offer comes from the informed party, but to ensure project realisation, and thus to ensure that the surplus that can arise from the project does not get lost.     

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION GAMES WITH MULTIPLE PRIORS*

We present a model of incomplete information games, where each player is endowed with a set of priors. Upon arrival of private information, it is assumed that each player “updates” his set of priors to a set of posterior beliefs, and then evaluates his actions by the most pessimistic posterior beliefs. So each player's preferences may exhibit aversion to ambiguity or uncertainty. We define a couple of equilibrium concepts, establish existence results for them, and demonstrate by examples how players’ views on uncertainty about the environment affect the strategic outcomes.     

Designing credit agent incentives to prevent mission drift in pro-poor microfinance institutions

Credit agents in microfinance institutions (MFIs) must be given incentives to acquire information on potential borrowers and select them in accordance with the MFI's objectives. We show that while giving incentives has no cost in for-profit MFIs, it is costly in pro-poor MFIs: When repayment and wealth are positively correlated, a pro-poor MFI cannot obtain the selection of poor clients in the proportion it wishes with incentives based solely on repayment. It then becomes necessary to audit the share of very poor borrowers selected by an agent in order to provide the latter with adequate incentives. When audit costs are large, pro-poor MFIs may have to forego selection on wealth — and use other targeting devices such as working in impoverished geographical locations. Driven by donor concerns with ‘mission drift’ away from the poor, audits on the wealth status of clients have been introduced at the level of MFIs. We show that introducing pro-poor incentives requires extending such audits to the level of credit agents.     

Investment in trade facilitating infrastructure: A political-economy analysis

This paper analyzes public investment in infrastructure that facilitates international trade. It considers a world consisting of small open economies that face transport costs for exporting or importing a particular good. Transport costs can be lowered by an improvement in transport infrastructure. National governments non-cooperatively decide about their respective country's investment level. Governments' preferences are assumed to be biased in favor of producers' interests with consequences for equilibrium investments: Exporting countries, whose producers benefit from a transport cost reduction, spend more for infrastructure than importing countries, whose producers are protected by transport costs from foreign competition. This outcome is inefficient, and governments have an incentive to cooperate internationally. The paper also incorporates bilateral trade with two goods that benefit from infrastructure improvements as well as trade that results from offshoring.     

How to improve government performance?

The article reviews Timothy Besley's book Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government and considers application of the concepts and conclusions of the book to China.     

Shareholding structure, depoliticization and firm performance

In this study we use a dataset that provides information on Chinese Communist Party grassroots organizations’ political control over decision‐making in China's listed firms. Specifically, we examine how different types of shareholders affect (1) the party's level of decision‐making power and (2) the implications of party control for firm performance. We obtain two major results. First, we find that the proportion of shares held by domestic individual shareholders is negatively related to the party's level of decision‐making power. Second, we find that the existence of large institutional investors is associated with a reduced negative performance effect of party control. Our results suggest that both the exit and the voice channels may offer mechanisms for depoliticizing China's listed firms and improving their performance. This study both addresses an important corporate governance issue relevant to China's listed firms and offers interesting information in terms of comparative studies of corporate governance and reform strategies in transitional economies.     

Can micro-credit bring development?

We examine the long-run effects of micro-credit on development in an occupational choice model similar to Banerjee and Newman (JPE, 1993). Micro-credit is modeled as a pure improvement in the credit market that opens up self-employment options to some agents who otherwise could only work for wages or subsist. Micro-credit can either raise or lower long-run GDP, since it can lower use of both subsistence and full-scale industrial technologies. It typically lowers long-run inequality and poverty, by making subsistence payoffs less widespread. Thus, an equity-efficiency tradeoff may be involved in the promotion of micro-credit. However, in a worst case scenario, micro-credit has purely negative long-run effects. The key to micro-credit's long-run effects is found to be the “graduation rate”, defined as the rate at which the self-employed build up enough wealth to start full-scale firms. We distinguish between two avenues for graduation: “winner” graduation (of those who earn above-average returns in self-employment) and “saver” graduation (due to gradual accumulation of average returns in self-employment). Long-run development is not attainable via micro-credit if “winner” graduation is the sole avenue for graduation. In contrast, if the saving rate and self-employment returns of the average micro-borrower are jointly high enough, then micro-credit can bring an economy from stagnation to full development through “saver” graduation. Thus the lasting effects of micro-credit may partially depend on simultaneous facilitation of micro-saving. Eventual graduation of the average borrower, rather than indefinite retention, should be the goal of micro-banks if micro-credit is to be a stepping stone to broad-based development rather than at best an anti-poverty tool.     

Political Economy and Islamic Politics: Insights from the Indonesian Case

It is argued in this study that the trajectory of Islamic politics in Indonesia has been shaped within larger processes of state formation and socio-economic and political changes associated with the advance of the market economy and the pressures of globalisation. It incorporates the Indonesian case into a vast and well-developed debate that has hitherto focused on North Africa and the Middle East. As such it offers a distinct interpretation that goes beyond the prevailing understanding of Islamic politics in Indonesia as the product of conflicts over ideas, doctrine or culture or the institutional requisites of authoritarianism or democracy. Specifically, it is proposed that Islamic politics has been underpinned variously by the conservatism of small propertied interests, the populism of marginalised urban and small town middle classes and the ambitions of the upper middle classes and business. While these dynamics are found across much of the Muslim world, the political outcomes have been diverse. We show that the Indonesian trajectory has been greatly influenced by the failure of Islamic politics to establish effective cross-class alliances behind the banners of Islam and the ability of the secular state to effectively establish its own apparatus of populist politics.     

Is Foreign Direct Investment “Gender Blind”? Women's Rights as a Determinant of US FDI

The impact of women's rights on a country's competitiveness in the global economy is a source of contention. While educational opportunities for women, as well as political empowerment, are linked to a variety of positive outcomes, the impact of economic rights is mixed. Toward better understanding these issues, we focus on the role of women's rights in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Though foreign capital plays a key role in the development strategies of many countries, and many of the growth areas in FDI rely heavily on women's labor, extant literature on the determinants of FDI largely ignores gender. To gain insight into these issues, we examine the impact of women's political, economic, and educational rights across four different types of US FDI into the developing world. We find a mixed relationship between women's rights and FDI that varies across industrial sectors.     

ENTRY AND QUALITY SIGNALLING WHEN ONLY SOME CONSUMERS ARE INFORMED OF THE ENTRANT'S QUALITY

This paper focuses on competition between an incumbent and an entrant when only the entrant's quality is unknown to (some) consumers. The incumbent may or may not know the entrant's quality. The model reveals a separating equilibrium where the entrant's high price signals its high quality when the proportion of informed consumers is at some intermediate value. The case in which the incumbent knows the entrant's quality generates two additional equilibria. When the proportion of informed consumers is large enough, firms choose their prices as in the complete information case. The entrant's high price in combination with the incumbent's low price signals the entrant's high quality. When the proportion of informed consumers is at some intermediate value, the incumbent's high price signals the entrant's low quality, while its low price signals the entrant's high quality. Interestingly, we find that entry may be facilitated with informational product differentiation.     

GLOBALIZATION AND WOMEN'S PAID WORK: EXPANDING FREEDOM?

In Development as Freedom , Amartya Sen takes expanding freedom to be the primary end and the principal means of development. I discuss his emphasis on women's agency as central to development theory and practice and the strategies he advocates for enhancing it. Recent work in feminist economics and postcolonial studies tests Sen's complex account of freedom. Further levels of complexity need to be added when we examine how global forces of power interact with local systems of oppression in ways that often limit women's freedom. This argument rests on an analysis of how globalization affects a domain of freedom that is a central concern for Sen, that of increasing women's freedom to work outside the home as a way of strengthening their agency. Attending to elements missing in Sen's account will enhance freedom in women's lives.