债务期限结构、流动性与公共债务管理

本文研究中国公共债务期限结构管理如何实现中央和地方两级政府债务融资效率性与稳定性的统一。我们的理论模型证明,当前地方政府融资平台和一些具有准政府性质的国有经济部门的短期债务融资在未来发生流动性冲击时会导致资产降价销售和负的社会外部性。基于资产组合理论和比较优势原理,我们提出中央和地方债务融资的利率互换方式以及债务期限结构优化管理的基本原则,并且对地方政府不同融资模式的经济效应和治理效应进行了简要的比较分析。     

国债的性质与国债发行的转变

与现代资本市场发展的内在要求相比,中国的国债发行是很不规范的.本文从准确认识国债的性质出发,对我国今后的国债发行必须实现的三个转变进行了深入系统的分析,提出转变国债发行对象、转变国债发行品种、财政部门自设国债发行机构的观点.     

Capital Controls,Public Debt and Currency Crises

This paper examines the possibility that, contrary to conventional wisdom, capital controls accelerate currency crises. Theoretical analysis shows that capital controls can constitute an additional burden on government budget and so bring forward the onset of crises. Since perfect capital mobility does not occur, domestic interest rates may deviate from world interest rates. High interest rates under capital controls create an additional cost of servicing outstanding domestic public debt, precipitating crises. Even though the government can delay crises with capital controls, welfare may be less than in a situation with perfect capital mobility.     

The Budget Deficit, Public Debt, and Endogenous Growth

This paper analyzes the effects of public debt on endogenous growth in an overlapping generations model. The government fixes the budget deficit ratio. If the deficit ratio stays below a critical level, then there are two steady states where capital, output, and public debt grow at the same constant rate. An increase in the deficit ratio reduces the growth rate. If the deficit ratio exceeds the critical level, then there is no steady state. Capital growth declines continuously, and capital is driven down to zero in finite time.     

Public Debt and Generational Balance in Austria

Based on Austria's fiscal stance in 1995, wecompute the generational accounts for currently living as well as future generations.The results reveal the existence of an intergenerational imbalance in favor of currentlyliving generations. Total public sector liabilities may be more than five times as high asthe officially recorded level of public debt. Without any action, future generations would facelife-time net taxes that are about 65 percent higher than the tax burden of a current newborn.If the government could fully and permanently retain the expenditure cutting andrevenue raising effects of the 1996 fiscal consolidation package and the 1997 pension reform,then it might be able to significantly reduce the intergenerational liabilities. However,enacting both the recent tax reform 2000 and the reform of the family support scheme wouldincrease again the fiscal imbalance and intergenerational bias of fiscal policy in Austria.     

Optimal Monetary Policy, Taxes, and Public Debt in an Intertemporal Equilibrium

This article is devoted to a study of the optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the framework of an overlapping generations model with cash-in-advance constraints. We first characterize the intertemporal equilibrium. Then we show how to decentralize the optimal growth path using available policy instruments (i.e., labor income and capital taxes, public debt, money supply). Between the four instruments: wages and capital taxes, debt and monetary policy, one is redundant among the three last which implies that the Friedman Rule is only a special case.     

Economic Growth,Public Debt and Welfare: Comparing Three Budgetary Rules

Abstract. We present an endogenous growth model with externalities of capital and elastic labor supply where we allow for public debt and welfare‐enhancing public spending. We analyze different debt policies as regards convergence to a balanced growth path and their effects on long‐run growth and welfare. Three budgetary rules are considered: the balanced budget rule, a budgetary rule where debt grows in the long run but at a rate lower than the balanced growth rate and a rule where public debt grows at the same rate as all other economic variables but where it guarantees that the intertemporal budget constraint is fulfilled.     

The Sustainability of Italian Public Debt and Deficit

In this paper, we analyse the sustainability of Italian public debt using a unique database, reconstructed by Forte (2011), which covers the years 1862–2013. The study focuses on empirical tests for the sustainability and solvency of Italian public finance. The results of unit root and stationarity tests show that public debt and deficit variables are non-stationary at levels, but stationary in first-differences form, or I(1). However, some breaks in the series emerge, given internal and external crises (wars, oil shocks, regime changes, institutional reforms). Therefore, the empirical analysis is conducted for the entire period, as well as two sub-periods (1862–1913 and 1947–2013). In essence, the paper’s results reveal that Italy has sustainability problems in the Republican age (1947-2013). Our Markov-switching dynamic regression model indicates the existence of two distinct states, both for public debt and deficit, with means and standard deviations rather different. Both states are extremely persistent.     

公共债务对实体经济的传导机制及政策启示

在我国经济发展的“新常态”下,公共债务将如何作用于实体经济的问题值得关注与思考。文章简要描述了国内外公共债务的实践历程及现状,并在对早期西方公共债务理论以及近期相关文献梳理的基础上,关于公共债务对实体经济的传导机制进行系统性分析。研究表明,公共债务分别通过三个层面实现对实体经济的传导：基于宏观层面,通过影响生产要素投入,实现公共债务对实体经济产出的传导;基于微观层面,通过刺激消费与投资,实现公共债务对实体经济总需求的传导;基于金融层面,通过调整流动性和利率,实现公共债务对实体经济运行的传导。因此,应当合理调控公共债务规模,提高公共债务的投资效率,有效地发挥公共债务对实体经济长期发展的推动作用。     

我国国债利率效应及其实证分析

国债的利率效应是衡量政府政策效果的重要指标.本文运用OLS方法和Granger-Causality检验,对我国中长期国债的利率效应进行了研究.结果表明:我国中长期国债对市场利率具有微妙的正面效应,长期国债利率效应相对显著;我国国债对市场利率的托宾效应并不显著,政府投资可能对私人投资产生挤出效应.研究政府债务与市场利率之间的关系,对于政府行为与市场机制关系的理论研究以及避免政策失效具有重要意义.     

Principles for a European Union''s Public Debt

The EU has neither the power to tax nor the right to run a public debt. We analyze if the EU should receive the right for public indebtedness. We make use of the normative theory of public indebtedness and of positive political economy analysis. Our normative analysis identified specific cases for an appropriate use of public indebtedness. According to the political economy analysis, a misuse of public debt may be possible. As the implementation of strict constitutional constraints can limit this misuse, we propose the assignment of a right to public borrowing to the EU within tight constitutional restrictions.     

Heterogeneous Dynasties and the Political Economy of Public Debt

We consider a small open overlapping generations economy with descending altruism. Heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that each parent procreates a fixed proportion of selfish children. Altruistic parents can recognize the type of each child. There is no Ricardian equivalence and an active public intergenerational transfer policy is attractive to altruistic dynasty members, although there may be no unanimity among them. We display reasonable conditions for indirect preferences to be single-peaked and we apply the median voter theorem. We then describe political equilibrium paths and discuss their compatibility with the steady path of an underlying closed economy with autonomous labor productivity growth.
JEL classification : D 31; D 64; D 72; D 91; H 63     

全球公共债务危机:发生、发展与未来

全球公共债务危机从短期看是迅速扩大的公共开支,从长期看是政府的赤字财政政策,从根源看则是资本主义经济的运行方式。公共债务危机不仅进一步加重经济复苏的难度,而且对世界政治也将产生深远影响。对我国来说,不仅要应对全球公共债务危机的冲击和影响,更要分析债务危机形成的原因,防范公共债务危机的发生,以保证中国公共债务的可持续运用和中国经济的可持续发展。     

国债规模的实证分析

本文从实证的角度出发,运用EViews软件分析了影响国债发行规模的多种因素,确定财政赤字与还本付息额是影响国债发行规模的最重要的因素,并对1979-2001年的国债规模进行了拟合.我们的结论是发行国债额几乎等于财政赤字与还本付息额之和,而这一债务格局难以实现长期稳定性.     

Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies

I introduce a microfounded model of campaign finance with office-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework. Politicians use contributions to finance their electoral expenditures. Voters are not fooled by electoral expenditures: they are influenced in a way that is consistent with the equilibrium behavior of lobbies and politicians. The model is used to: (i) determine the relation between campaign spending and the deviation from the median voter's preferred policy; (ii) show the informational value of lobbies' contributions; (iii) evaluate the welfare implications of restricting campaign spending; and (iv) interpret the empirical finding that campaign expenditures have a very low effect on election outcome. Although in equilibrium advertising provides voters with useful information, under reasonable parameter values, a ban on campaign contributions makes the median voter better off. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D72, D82, M37.     

可持续公共债务水平下的政府违约问题研究

现实经济中存在公共债务具有可持续性时却发生政府违约的现象,本文在政府未来收支波动具有不确定性的假设下,建立一个政府与投资者的重复博弈模型以分析这一现象,研究发现:公共债务可持续性并不能完全排除政府违约风险,在政府未来基本盈余不确定的条件下,理性投资者愿意持有的公共债务水平远低于可持续的公共债务水平,两者的差异取决于政府对未来基本盈余的控制能力.     

Debt, liquidity and dynamics

Summary. Money, which provides liquidity, is distinct from debt. The introduction of a bank that issues money in exchange for debt and pays out its profit as dividend to shareholders modifies the model of overlapping generations. The set of equilibrium paths, their dynamic properties, as well as the scope and effectiveness of monetary policy are significantly altered: though low rates of interest are associated with superior steady state allocations, stability of the steady state may require a nominal rate of interest above a certain minimum: without production, a decrease in the nominal rate of interest may result in explosive behavior or convergence to an endogenous cycle, while in an economy with production, an increase in the nominal rate of interest may lead to indeterminacy and fluctuations.Received: 5 October 2004, Revised: 5 November 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: E30, E32, E50, E52.C. Rochon, H.M. Polemarchakis: We thank Jean-Michel Grandmont for helpful comments. Correspondence to: C. RochonThis revised version was published online in May 2005 with a corrected abstract.     

Public Debt Reduction in Advanced Countries and Its Impact on Emerging Countries

Financial crises accompanied by banking crises often entail heavy fiscal legacies. For the U.S., for example, the gross government debt to GDP ratio exceeded 100 % in 2012. Due to the unsustainability of public debt, both in the U.S. and in other advanced countries, moves towards a substantial reduction in debt levels would appear to be unavoidable. However, as shown in this paper, the long-run welfare impact of debt reduction in advanced countries, both at home and abroad, may prove to be somewhat of a disincentive for policy makers. In particular, we find that under conditions of dynamic inefficiency, and when Home (U.S.) has a negative external balance and a lower capital production share than Foreign (China), both domestic and foreign welfare decrease if Home reduces public debt.