会计信息预测宏观经济增长的实现路径: 盈余传导与风险感知

会计信息对宏观经济增长的预测功能已得到证实,但这一预测功能的实现路径尚不清楚.文章基于国民经济核算体系内在逻辑与会计稳健性原则,将净利润分解为资产减值项目和调整会计盈余两部分,考察了会计信息的宏观经济预测功能的实现路径.研究发现,汇总的资产减值损失和汇总的调整会计盈余对GDP增长均具有预测功能.但资产减值损失主要通过稳健性原则将对宏观经济运行风险的估计提前反映在盈余信息中,预测路径表现为"风险感知";而调整会计盈余的预测功能主要通过与GDP收入法下营业盈余的相关性来实现,体现为"盈余传导".进一步研究发现,当经济下行压力加大时,资产减值项目与未来GDP增长的负向关系更加显著,而调整会计盈余与未来GDP增长的正向关系在不同经济运行状态下没有显著差异.文章的研究拓展了会计信息有用性的文献,且对宏观经济分析和预测具有重要的现实意义.     

Sequential vs. simultaneous contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting. In one parameterization we find that overall provision is lower under sequential than simultaneous contributions, as predicted, but the distribution of contributions is not as extreme as predicted and first movers do not attain their predicted first-mover advantage. In another parameterization we again find that the distribution of contributions is not as predicted when the first mover is predicted to free ride, but we find strong support for equilibrium predictions when the second mover is predicted to free ride. These results can be explained by second movers' willingness to punish first movers who free ride, and unwillingness to reward first movers who contribute.     

Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids

This paper studies the incentives of a bidder to acquire information in an auction when her information acquisition decision is observed by the other bidders before bidding. Our results show that the sealed bid (second price) auction may induce more information acquisition about a common component of the value than the open (English) auction but less about the private component of the value. Moreover, we show that more information about the private value and less information about the common value may improve efficiency and revenue. Consequently, our results suggest new arguments in favor of the open auction.     

价值选择VS.价值创造-来自中国市场机构投资者的证据

本文研究机构投资者持股变动对公司业绩和公司业绩改善的影响。实证研究显示,机构投资者持股变动对公司业绩具有显著的正面影响,但是,有别于先前的研究,本文发现这个影响在中长期迅速减弱。而且,中国市场不同类型机构投资者的价值选择和价值创造能力存在显著差异:(1)投资实力强、倾向于采用集中投资策略的基金、QFII具有较强的价值选择能力,券商、社保基金、信托公司的价值选择能力较弱;(2)基金表现出一定程度的价值创造能力,而其他机构投资者目前尚不具备价值创造能力。     

Asymmetric Loss and the Rationality of Inflation Forecasts: Evidence from South Korea

We examine asymmetry in the loss functions of South Korean consumers' and the Bank of Korea's (BOK) inflation forecasts, and test the rationality of these forecasts under the assumption of a possible asymmetric loss function. Under an asymmetric loss function, we find evidence of asymmetry and support for rationality. We also examine whether the BOK's forecasts incorporate respective forecasts and consensus forecasts efficiently. They broadly use available information efficiently, and their results are robust to inflation‐targeting measures and the recent global financial crisis. However, our results suggest that the information efficiency of the BOK's forecasts for consumers was affected during the period 2007–2008.     

价值选择VS.价值创造-来自中国市场机构投资者的证据

本文研究机构投资者持股变动对公司业绩和公司业绩改善的影响.实证研究显示,机构投资者持股变动对公司业绩具有显著的正面影响,但是,有别于先前的研究,本文发现这个影响在中长期迅速减弱.而且,中国市场不同类型机构投资者的价值选择和价值创造能力存在显著差异:(1)投资实力强、倾向于采用集中投资策略的基金、QFⅡ具有较强的价值选择能力,券商、社保基金、信托公司的价值选择能力较弱;(2)基金表现出一定程度的价值创造能力,而其他机构投资者目前尚不具备价值创造能力.     

从事前效率问题到事后效率问题——不完全合同理论的几类经典模型比较

通过对不完全合同经典理论模型的组成要素的梳理和分类,本文首次将不完全合同理论的模型分为四种类型:行动事前不可缔约而事后可缔约的事前效率问题模型,行动事前和事后都不可缔约的事前和事后效率问题模型,事前部分可缔约的事前和事后效率问题模型,收益事后不可证实的事前和事后效率问题模型。这些不同的理论被纳入一个统一的框架中进行表述。传统的产权理论具有一些缺陷,而事后不可缔约的模型更适合研究权威、授权、科层等问题。相对于关于投资激励的事前效率问题,事后效率问题的来源要多得多。对事前与事后缔约性问题的探讨以及对事后效率问题的研究是丰富不完全合同理论发展的动力。     

性别工资差异中的企业效应

现有对性别工资差异的研究大多是基于个人样本的分析而忽略了企业的作用。本文运用企业和工人匹配的调查数据研究性别工资差异中的企业效应。研究发现,在工资决定方程中加入企业效应后工人的教育回报显著下降,且在性别工资差异的分解中加入企业效应后禀赋效应和价格效应所占的比例也显著下降,企业在性别工资差异中有着非常重要的作用。进一步研究发现,企业的外部市场环境和内部制度特征是决定企业性别工资差异程度的重要因素,市场竞争激烈的企业、经常采用计件工资制的企业以及内部职工收入差距较大的企业性别工资差异较大,小规模企业和私有产权比重较大的企业也呈现较大的性别工资差异,但工人的谈判能力有缩小性别工资差异的作用。     

Institutional Design as a Commitment Device in Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information: Experimental Evidence

The aim of this experiment is to test the role of institutional design in credit markets as a commitment device against renegotiation: when there is asymmetric information does a lower degree of centralization enhance efficiency? Does decentralization alleviate the adverse selection problem in credit markets? We run a large‐scale computerized experiment involving 12 different data sets and 3 different uncertainty scenarios on a sample of 120 subjects. The results obtained confirm the superiority of a decentralized institutional framework: the number of poor projects undertaken in a decentralized market was significantly smaller than the number of poor projects undertaken in centralized markets in all the scenarios. This experimental evidence shows that the institutional design is crucial in seeking financial discipline and therefore can shed some light on the debate on ‘Anglo‐Saxon’ versus ‘German–Japanese’ credit practices. (J.E.L.: C90, D82, G21, L10).     

Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.     

Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies: Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India

Electric irrigation contributes to food security in rural India, but deteriorating electrical infrastructures threaten the functioning of farmers’ pump sets. This problem could be solved through investments in energy‐efficient technologies. However, network externalities create a coordination problem for farmers. We develop a framed field experiment to study the effects of group size, leading by example, and payoff structures on the ability to coordinate technology adoption investments. The experiment is based on a game that combines features of a step‐level public goods game and a critical mass game. Our findings show that smaller groups more frequently coordinate on payoff‐superior equilibria and that higher payoffs lead to more investments. Contrary to previous studies, leading by example reduces investments but has no effect on efficiency. Building on this analysis, we discuss possible bottom‐up solutions to the energy crisis in rural India.     

全面推行国际财务报告准则与盈余质量——来自欧盟上市公司的经验证据

本文以2000至2007年具有独特制度背景的欧盟15国资本市场上市公司为研究样本,对欧盟2005年1月1日开始全面推行国际财务报告准则并加强各国会计协调是否提高了欧盟上市公司盈余质量进行了研究。本文以截面操纵性应计利润绝对值作为盈余质量的替代变量,研究结果发现欧盟全面推行国际财务报告准则并加强各国会计协调后上市公司具有显著更低的截面操纵性应计利润绝对值,这表明欧盟全面推行国际财务报告准则并加强各国会计协调后显著提高了欧盟上市公司盈余质量。本文进行了一系列稳健性检验证实了上述研究结论是稳健的。     

衰退企业盈利信息披露战略的实证研究

本文以我国A股市场上遭遇持续性绩效下降而陷入生存危机的制造类衰退企业为样本,运用回归分析方法,研究衰退企业的盈利信息披露战略。研究结果表明,对于衰退企业而言,操纵信息披露的根本目的在于影响与改变关键相关利益者对企业的认知与态度,维持他们对企业的认可与支持,为复苏绩效、摆脱生存危机赢得资源与时间。因此,与其他非衰退困境企业不同的是,业绩亏损与否并不重要,而其所面临的破产风险的大小,现金流的短缺与否以及对外部资源的依赖性,才是决定衰退企业是否采取操纵盈利信息披露时间和透明度的关键性因素。     

盈余管理程度的估计模型与经验证据:一个综述

盈余管理是一个与投资者保护和会计准则制定紧密相关的重要问题,它已经成为会计乃至金融、经济领域的重要研究课题。要研究在经济上具有意义的盈余管理,其前提是估计盈余管理的程度。本文对盈余管理程度的估计方法及其相应的经验证据进行评述,文献评述结果表明,非预期应计利润模型能够估计出单个公司的盈余管理程度,但它无法估计经济上具有意义的盈余管理程度;盈余分布法是目前估计盈余管理程度的核心方法,它能够估计出整体上的盈余管理程度,但它假设真实盈余分布是光滑的。盈余管理程度估计的未来研究,需要剔除盈余指标选择以及标准化方法选择等因素的影响,解决在同时存在多个阈值情况下不同阈值之间相互关联的影响问题,并放宽模型的假设或者给假设提供直接的证据。     

Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence

We present a positive political theory of criminal sentencingand test it using data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission.Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, judges can use "offense-leveladjustments" (fact-based decision making) to lengthen or shortenthe Guidelines' presumptive sentences. Judges also can use "departures"from the Guidelines (law-based decision making) to lengthenor shorten sentences. In general, departures are reviewed morestrictly than adjustments by circuit (appeals) courts. Our theorypredicts that a sentencing judge politically aligned with thecircuit court will be more likely to alter sentences throughsentencing departures than a judge not so aligned with the circuit;by contrast, our theory predicts that judges can more freelyuse fact-oriented adjustments to alter sentences, regardlessof the circuit court's sentencing policy preferences. Our analysisof federal sentencing data largely supports the theory's predictionsregarding the use of adjustments and departures and the impactof political alignment between higher courts and sentencingjudges.     

Journey to Magnet: cost vs. benefits

As hospitals and health systems strive to be an "Employer of Choice", one important goal for their nursing leaders has been the decision to embark on their journey of becoming a designated Magnet facility. Approximately 12 months ago, conversations with a few chief nursing executives uncovered a hot topic concerning the achievement/designation of Magnet status and specifically its cost benefits. With more and more hospitals obtaining Magnet status, these nurse leaders did not know how other organizations felt about their journey including outcomes and were very interested in learning more details about their colleagues' experiences.     

Resource Allocation in Public Agencies: Experimental Evidence

Many organizations, including philanthropies and public agencies, require their employees to make resource allocation decisions that are intended to serve a broad social purpose or mission. In most cases, the criteria on the basis of which scarce funds are to be allocated are imprecisely specified, leaving agents with considerable discretionary power. This paper reports results from an experiment that explores the manner in which such power is exercised. Using a sample of public servants working in education, health, child care, and nutrition programs in Colombia, and a sample of potential and actual beneficiaries of such programs, we attempt to identify the set of recipient attributes that induce the most generous responses from officials. This is done using a design we call the “distributive dictator game,” which requires officials to rank recipients, with the understanding that a higher ranking corresponds to an increased likelihood of getting a voucher convertible into cash. We find that women (especially widows), individuals with many minor dependents, and refugees from political violence are generally favored. We also find significant interaction effects between ranker and recipient attributes, with rankings varying systematically by ranker age and gender.     

Equity vs. efficiency vs. self-interest: on the use of dictator games to measure distributional preferences

We conduct modified dictator games in which price of giving varies across choice situations, and examine responses to price changes in two contexts—one where dictators divide their own earnings, and another where they divide the earnings of others. Varying the price of giving allows us to decompose social preferences into two components: the level of altruism when the price of giving is one, and the willingness to reduce aggregate payoffs to enhance equity. Changing the source of a dictator’s budget impacts her decisions because it affects the weight that she places on others’ payoffs. However, we find no impacts on the willingness to trade off equity and efficiency.     

The Efficiency of Stock-Based Incentives: Experimental Evidence

The authors report the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects are offered contracts structured similar to equity compensation packages and result in subjects receiving cash payments that are a function of their effort and random factors. The authors compare the outcomes from alternative contractual forms to theoretical benchmarks and report the efficiency of the contracts to provide evidence on whether options or stocks that have same economic cost to the employer yield the same or different effort levels from the managers. Both contracts elicit lower levels of effort than would be chosen by an expected-payoff-maximizing decision maker. Effort choices under the option contract did not differ significantly from effort choices under the stock contract except for male subjects. The option contract elicits a higher effort level for these subjects and condition than the stock contract. Effort choices reflect loss aversion and regret based on past stock price realizations.     

The Impact of Children on the Lifetime Earnings of Australian Women: Evidence from the 1990s

This article presents estimates of the consequences of having children for the lifetime earnings of Australian women in the late 1990s.