Fiscal Stabilisation and EMU

This paper builds on the papers published by HM Treasury in2003 alongside the UK Government's assessment of the case forEMU entry. The paper considers the potential for fiscal policyto play a greater role in stabilisation policy if the UK wereinside EMU. The paper considers: the scope for strengtheningthe automatic stabilisers and the possible trade-offs; how institutionalchanges could increase the effectiveness of discretionary fiscalpolicy; which fiscal instruments might be most effective; andto what extent stabilisation might be promoted in other ways,such as through enhanced risk sharing by financial markets.(JEL E62, E63)     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules in the EMU

Abstract. This paper studies the design and effects of monetary and fiscal policy in the euro area. To do so, a stylized two‐region model of monetary and fiscal policy rules in the EMU is built. We analyse how monetary and fiscal rules affect the adjustment dynamics in the model. Both the effects on the individual countries and on the EMU aggregate economy are studied. Three aspects play an important role in the analysis: (i) the consequences of alternative monetary and fiscal policy rules, (ii) the consequences of asymmetries between EMU countries (asymmetries in macroeconomic shocks and macroeconomic structures), and (iii) the role of alternative degrees of backward‐ and forward‐looking behaviour in consumer decisions and inflation expectations.     

Thoughts on a Fiscal Union in EMU

Using an estimated large‐scale New Keynesian model, we assess the consequences of introducing a fiscal union within EMU. We differentiate between three different scenarios: public revenue equalisation, tax harmonisation and a centralised fiscal authority. Our results indicate that no country would significantly benefit from introducing any form of fiscal union. Comparing long‐term, that is, steady state, effects we have winners and losers depending on the scenario. Differences in terms of business cycle statistics as well as in terms of risk sharing of asymmetric shocks are minor. This also explains why welfare differences are small across the fiscal union scenarios. A counterfactual exercise indicates that with a fiscal union regime already installed at the start of EMU, key macroeconomic variables would have reacted very similarly while debt dynamics would have changed notably.     

Macroeconomic Stabilization in the EMU: Rules Versus Institutions

This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary‐fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities, that act strategically vis‐à‐vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals than cyclical stabilization, such as interest rate smoothing and fiscal stability, we show that coordination among national fiscal authorities can reduce output and inflation volatility relative to the non‐cooperative setting in specific circumstances, as in case of demand disturbances, while turning potentially counterproductive otherwise. The adverse effects of union‐wide coordinated fiscal measures can be attenuated in a regime of global coordination, namely, when a centralized fiscal stabilization is coordinated with the common monetary policy as well.     

EMU: Optimal Fiscal Strategy and the Punishment Effectiveness

This paper investigates the ability of the Stability and Growth Pact to prevent governments in the "euro zone" from running excessive budget deficits. It is shown that in a static two-country game, the Pareto-optimal strategy of no excess deficits cannot be systematically enforced, whatever the toughness of the sanction under the Pact. However, in a multiperiod setting, the Pareto-optimal configuration of no excess deficits would prevail even if no sanctions were applied to deviant governments. In this case, neither a heavily punitive SGP, nor a centralized budget appears to be helpful in the EMU context.     

The Attractiveness of the EMU Exchange Rate Stabilization Program

One of the arguments for a monetary union is that it reduces the variability of exchange rates. This paper demonstrates that the welfare gain that EU countries can expect to gain from the move to a single currency is moderate. The gains from exchange rate stabilization are limited by imports of foreign consumption goods and borrowing by governments. Furthermore, exchange rate stabilization may imply a welfare loss as the removal of non-zero exchange rate expectations deprives investors of the opportunity to speculate on expected-rate-of-return differentials. Numerical simulations suggest that the welfare gain from exchange rate stabilization for the average EU country is equivalent to a 0.9 percent rate of return on portfolio wealth.     

Modern Perspectives on Fiscal Stabilization Policies

The present paper describes recent research on two central themesof Keynes' General Theory: (i) the social waste associated withrecessions, and (ii) the effectiveness of fiscal policy as astabilization tool. The paper also discusses some evidence onthe extent to which fiscal policy has been used as a stabilizingtool in industrial economies over the past two decades. (JELE32, E63)     

经济转型中的财政分权化与经济稳定

本文从不同参与者的博弈过程及其约束条件的分析入手,对经济转型中财政分权化与经济稳定的关系进行了理论探讨。由于信息不透明以及缺乏有力的预算约束,经济转型过程中财政分权化导致了地方政府某些不合理的投资行为。这些负面影响并非财政分权化改革本身导致的必然结果,而是由分权化过程中相应的配套制度未能建立所引起的。因此,需要进行制度创新,从而对预算及地方政府的其他行为进行有效的监督。     

Liability-creating Versus Non-liability-creating Fiscal Stabilisation Policies: Ricardian Equivalence, Fiscal Stabilisation, and EMU

This paper looks at theoretical and empirical issues associated with the operation of fiscal stabilisers within an economy. It argues that such stabilisers operate most effectively at a national, rather than local, level. As differing cycles across regions tend to offset each other for the country as a whole, national fiscal stabilisers are not associated with the same increase in future tax liabilities for the region as local ones. Accordingly, the negative impact from the Ricardian effects associated with these tax liabilities is smaller. Empirical work on data across Canadian provinces indicates that local stabilisers are only one third to one half as effective as national stabilisers which create no future tax liability.     

Fiscal policy,government size and EMU business cycle synchronization

We provide new evidence on the effects of fiscal policy and government size on pairwise business cycle synchronization in EMU. A novel time-varying framework is employed to estimate business cycle synchronization and subsequently a panel approach is used to establish the role of fiscal variables in determining the pairwise synchronization observations across time. The findings suggest similarities in the size of the public sector, yet divergence in fiscal policy stance, matter for the determination of business cycle synchronization. Hence, increased fiscal federalism in EMU will contribute to increased business cycle synchronization. Our results remain robust to different specifications and sub-periods.     

Strategies for Fiscal Reform in the Context of the EMU: the Case of Portugal

The authors use an endogenous growth dynamic general‐equilibrium model, which accommodates the institutional constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact, to study tax reform in Portugal. Simulation results suggest that tax cuts financed in a nondistortionary way increase long‐term GDP; i.e., they are efficiency improving, but do not always increase welfare. The tradeoff between efficiency and welfare is alleviated when reductions in public spending or increased public indebtedness finance the tax cuts. Since these mechanisms are not realistic under the institutional setting of the Stability and Growth Pact, tax reform in Portugal must involve trading off distortionary tax margins. In this case, the best strategy to increase both efficiency and welfare is to increase investment tax credits and finance them either through personal income taxes or through employers’ social security contributions.     

Wage Rigidity, Monetary Integration and Fiscal Stabilization in Europe

Flexibility in fiscal policy is a necessary ingredient in a policy package for EMU. Even with strong endogenous shock absorbers, such as real wage flexibility, fiscal policy can speed up the stabilization process in response to demand shocks. If real wages are rigid, as they typically are in Europe, fiscal policy cannot remove the adverse effects of asymmetric supply shocks, but it can successfully limit the divergence between member states. Monetary flexibility, a possible option in the run-up to EMU, cannot completely make up for the stabilization function of fiscal policy.     

Automatic Fiscal Stabilisers in EMU: A Conflict between Efficiency and Stabilisation?

It is often claimed that tax and welfare reforms that aim atenhancing efficiency may come at the cost of cyclical stabilisation.Reducing the generosity of welfare systems and lowering taxesmay boost efficiency and output, and improve market adjustmentto shocks. But, by reducing the size of automatic stabilisers,it may also imply less cyclical smoothing. This would be unwelcomein EMU given the loss of national monetary autonomy and thewell-known pitfalls of active fiscal management. This paperargues that the alleged trade-off between efficiency/flexibilityand stabilisation may not exist. We show that, if the initiallevel of the tax burden is high, reducing it may lead to higheroutput stabilisation in the event of a supply shock and higherinflation stabilisation in the event of a demand shock. Simulationsshow that European countries - especially small ones - mighthave a tax burden close to or even higher than the thresholdlevel. (JEL E52, E61, F42)     

Monetary and Fiscal Stabilization of Demand Shocks Within Europe

This paper examines alternative macroeconomic stabilization rules for demand shocks, for a single open economy, and for an integrated European region. These questions are tackled in two ways. First a very simple macroeconomic model is used to focus on intercountry interconnections. Then the effects of shocks are simulated using the McKibbin Sachs MSG2 global economic model. The theoretical model analyzes just how much larger the disturbances caused by asymmetric shocks might be in a European Monetary Union, as compared with outcomes under floating exchange rates, especially (1) if rigid central monitoring and discipline of the fiscal policy prevents the full operation of the inbuilt fiscal stabilizers within individual European countries, and (2) if European monetary policy does not concern itself with fully European objectives. Simulations with the MSG2 model bear out the significance of these risks. They show that a demand shock like GEMU can have strongly negative effects on output in other European countries if either interest rates are raised to counter the demand shock in the originating country, or if, for some reason, fiscal stabilization is not allowed to be as strong as the inbuilt fiscal stabilizers.     

Deficit sustainability and inflation in EMU: An analysis from the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

Price determination theory typically focuses on the role of monetary policy, while the role of fiscal policy is usually neglected. From a different point of view, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level takes into account monetary and fiscal policy interactions and assumes that fiscal policy may determine the price level, even if monetary authorities pursue an inflation targeting strategy. In this paper we try to test empirically whether the time path of the government budget in EMU countries would have affected price level determination. Our results point to the sustainability of fiscal policy in all the EMU countries but Finland, although no firm conclusions can be drawn about the prevalence of either monetary or fiscal dominance.     

Co-ordinating Stability: Some Remarks on the Roles of Monetary and Fiscal Policy under EMU

The launch of Monetary Union in Europe has prompted calls for enhanced policy co-ordination among economic policy-makers. This paper sounds a note of caution and argues that the problem of policy co-ordination needs to be placed in the broader context of the efficient assignment of tasks and responsibilities among separate actors. In the presence of incentive and information problems, overly ambitious attempts at EXPLICIT forms of policy co-ordination may actually turn out to undermine the IMPLICIT co-ordination properties of the clear division of responsibilities enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. A single monetary policy that is credibly geared to the maintenance of price stability and national fiscal policies that genuinely accept the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact already go a long way in securing macroeconomic stability. Additional channels for dialogue among policymakers should be helpful to the extent that they enhance the understanding of individual responsibilities and do not dilute accountability.     

Fiscal Policy to Stabilise the Domestic Economy in the EMU: What Can We Learn from Monetary Policy?

An important issue for the EMU countries is to what extent fiscalpolicy can be used to stabilise the domestic economy in thecase of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. The paper reviews possiblereforms of national fiscal policy institutions in order to promoteefficient fiscal stabilisation policy: (i) the introductionof a more transparent legal framework for the government's stabilisationdecisions; (ii) the establishment of an independent advisoryFiscal Policy Council; and (iii) the delegation of actual stabilisationdecisions to an independent Fiscal Policy Committee. The conclusionis that the Fiscal Policy Committee solution has much to speakfor itself. It seems possible to delegate fiscal stabilisationpolicy decisions, in much the same way as monetary policy hasbeen delegated to central banks, at the same time as fiscalpolicy decisions focusing on income distribution and socialefficiency are kept in the political sphere. Such delegationcan be made compatible with democratic accountability. (JELE61, E63, P16)     

Business-cycle synchronization in the EMU

This article asks whether the business cycles of the EU countries have become more or less synchronized after the introduction of the euro. Our findings show that all countries in our EU sample are better synchronized with the EMU-wide economy in the post-EMU period than they were before the euro. We also show that this increase in synchronization is present in all components of aggregate demand, as well as two supply-side variables, but it is more pronounced in the trade components (imports and, particularly, exports). It is also shown that the increase in trade within the EMU area is at least partly responsible for the increase in cyclical synchronization.