On Optimal Commodity Taxes When Consumption Is Time Consuming

This paper studies the problem of optimal taxation of commodities when consumption is a time‐consuming activity. This is done under two distinct preference separability assumptions: between goods and labor supply, and between goods and leisure. It argues that with the labor separability, the traditional uniform taxation results of optimal tax theory continue to hold. With leisure separability, on the other hand, consumption time is a major ingredient of optimal tax rates. However, the relationship between consumption time and optimal tax rates depends crucially on the representation of the economy. In representative consumer economies, time differences determine the pattern of optimal tax rates so that goods whose consumption take more time are subjected to higher tax rates. When individuals have different earning abilities, redistributive, incentive, and efficiency considerations also come into play resulting in a complex relationship. The paper derives formulas for optimal commodity taxes in this case on the basis of three different tax structures: linear commodity taxes in combination with linear and nonlinear income taxes, and nonlinear commodity taxes in combination with nonlinear income taxes.     

Product Quality and the Optimal Structure of Commodity Taxes

The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation is among the oldest issues in formal public finance and is important for policy in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere. This paper develops and articulates simple but very general elasticity rules that characterize the optimal balance between the two in a model of endogenous product quality. These rules temper the preference for ad valorem taxation that emerges from homogeneous product models, pointing to relatively heavy reliance on whichever form of taxation has the least effect on product quality.     

Commodity Tax Competition with Constrained Taxes

This paper examines a symmetric Nash equilibria of a two-country model of fiscal competition with a continuum of taxable commodities in each country. The innovation is to impose a uniformity restriction that there can be only two rates of tax on the different commodities, a positive rate and the zero rate. The main results characterize, under two alternative modes of taxation, the equilibrium fiscal rules chosen by countries, i.e., the level of the positive rate and the set of taxed commodities. Under the origin principle, it appears that the equilibrium fiscal base is narrower than the optimal one and the tax rate is too high. In contrast, under the destination principle, the optimal rule is implemented.     

中国封建赋税与商品经济

从秦汉至唐代中叶商品经济的发展 ,主要由封建国家赋税收入所形成的有效需求所拉动。本文从封建赋税提升商品市场丰度、扩展商品市场广度、增加商品市场容量、发挥商品市场功能以及推动商品生产发展等几个方面作了论证     

Commodity Taxes, Wage Determination, and Profits

We examine the effects of two different types of commodity taxation, specific and ad valorem, on wages and profits. We analyze two models of wage determination, one with efficiency wage setting and one with union-firm bargaining. In the former, a (locally) revenue-neutral shift from specific to ad valorem taxation leads to an increase in both employment and wages and a reduction in profitability. In the latter, the effect on wages and profits may be reversed: predominantly ad valorem taxation raises employment but lowers wages, and under certain circumstances, the net effect is an increase in profits.     

What Should Optimal Income Taxes Smooth?

According to the theory of tax smoothing, income tax rates should be kept constant so as to minimize the distortionary costs of taxation. By explicitly considering how labor supply is distorted by income taxes in a fully specified intertemporal model, we find that the optimal income tax policy should smoothen leisure. In the case of varying income (productivity changes) this is attained by a pro‐cyclical (progressive) tax rate.     

Optimal Commodity Taxation in the Presence of Tourists

Abstract

This paper explores empirically whether Japanese consumers became more prudent in the second half of the 1990s, a decade in which Japan registered historically low economic growth. Employing the methodology developed by Dynan (1993), this study uses micro-level data from the Family Savings Survey and the Family Income and Expenditure Survey to estimate the coefficient of prudence for Japanese households in the second half of the 1990s. The estimates reveal that the coefficient of prudence is positive and statistically significant in the 1998–1999 period. The obtained value for the coefficient of prudence is four, which is much higher than that estimated for US households (not significantly different from zero) or UK households (around 2). The estimated coefficient for young households is higher still, which is consistent with simulation studies conducted by Gourinchas & Parker (2002) showing that precaution is the most important saving motive for younger households.     

Carbon Subsidies,Taxes and Optimal Forest Management

We consider the effect of carbon credit payment schemes on forest owners’ land use and harvest decisions. We study two possible credit allocation regimes: one where credits are allocated according to the actual amount of carbon sequestered by the trees on a piece of land and another where credits are allocated according to the long-run potential to sequester carbon on the land. Using a real options model with uncertain future timber prices, we examine the effect on the timing of harvests and the replanting-abandonment decision. We show that both schemes discourage deforestation. Compensating growers for actual carbon sequestration leads to longer rotation periods between harvests, while basing compensation only on the long-run potential level of sequestration induces shorter rotation periods. The former scheme leads to greater benefits of carbon sequestration at lower cost than the latter scheme. Although inducing moderate levels of sequestration is expensive under both schemes, the cost falls dramatically when the level of payments climbs above some threshold. Indeed, providing the payments are sufficiently generous, carbon credit payment schemes offer an effective means of increasing carbon sequestration. The views expressed in this paper are strictly those of the authors and do not represent the views of the New Zealand Commerce Commission. We thank Lewis Evans and two anonymous referees for many very helpful comments. Kevin Counsell, Steen Videbeck, and participants at an ISCR seminar also provided useful suggestions. Fletcher Forests Ltd and the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry generously provided data.     

Optimal Commodity Taxation with a Representative Agent

It is argued that the task of describing the optimal vector of commodity taxes is trivialized by the traditional assumption of a price‐taking representative agent; that, in particular, the assumption of a representative agent ensures that the null vector is optimal.     

Changes in Indirect Taxes in Australia: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis

Over the last thirty years, the effects of indirect taxation changes have been analysed using comparative static general equilibrium models. We use a new method to analyse current changes in Australia's indirect taxes: dynamic computable general equilibrium modelling. Comparative static methods compare the situation in a given year (usually unspecified) with and without a policy change. The dynamic method shows the effects of a policy change through time. Comparative static methods are usually restricted to estimates of long-run changes in allocative efficiency. The dynamic method provides information not only on efficiency but also on adjustment processes, including variations in employment. With our dynamic method, the effects of policy changes are analysed as deviations from explicit forecasts. We find that these forecasts are important for the policy results. For Australia's current set of indirect tax changes, our main conclusions are (i) the short-run employment effects depend critically on the wage response; (ii) merchandise exporters benefit but tourism is harmed; and (iii) the long-run welfare effectsare likely to be negative, reflecting a decline in the terms of trade and increased compliance costs.     

Jointly Optimal Taxes and Enforcement Policies in Response to Tax Evasion

Assuming the government cannot fully observe either individual types or incomes and jointly picks optimal taxes and audit policies against evasion can significantly alter standard results from optimal income taxation and tax‐evasion models, which treat these separately. We consider this when individuals differ in their risk preferences and incomes. Given the resulting complexity, supplementing analytic results with numerical analysis helps explain the structure of the resulting policies and how they change when the distribution of income or the revenue requirements of the government change. We do this analysis with and without audit errors and with incomes exogenous or affected by occupational choice.     

Emission Taxes and Optimal Refunding Schemes with Endogenous Market Structure

The purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free-entry market where the production process generates emissions. We consider the regulation by a three-part tax policy: the government sets an emission tax, a refunding scheme, and an entry-license tax. In contrast to the case of the two-part tax-refund policy under no entry, we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside, the first-best outcome is always attained. Further, the government’s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes. Our result implies that the tax-refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry.     

Some Marginalist Intuition Concerning the Optimal Commodity Tax Problem

The author offers a simple intuition that can be exploited to derive and to help interpret some canonical results in the theory of optimal commodity taxation. He develops and explores the principle that the marginal social welfare loss per last unit of tax revenue generated be equalized across tax instruments. A simple two-consumer, two-taxed-commodity economy is used to explore how this intuition can be used to derive the famous inverse elasticity rule, as well as the modifications and extensions needed to account for the redistributive effects of commodity taxes.     

对不恰当理解最优商品税理论的一点纠正

国内外部分主流公共经济学文献将最优商品税问题归结为:政府在其预算约束下如何选择最优商品税结构以使社会福利最大化,进而在严格的生产技术假设条件下求解上述问题,并得出结论:最优税制应使对每种商品的补偿需求均以税前状态的同等比例下降.然而,文章通过对单个消费者条件下最优商品税理论的重新梳理发现:(1)最优税制应使得对每种商品或服务的补偿需求均以税后状态的同等比例变化;(2)这种变化不是消费者补偿需求的实际变化;(3)结论(1)的成立是建立在小额税收的基础上,根据结论(1)提供税制改革的政策建议应谨慎.     

Decomposing Redistributive Effects of Taxes and Transfers in Australia: Annual and Lifetime Measures

This paper decomposes the redistributive effect on annual and lifetime inquality of a range of taxes and transfers in Australia, using a dynamic cohort lifetime simulation model. The redistributive effect is decomposed into vertical, horizontal and reranking effects. Horizontal inequities in the tax and transfer system are found to be negligible. The extent of reranking is greater in the lifetime than in the annual context and is affected by the equivalence scales used to adjust household incomes. If no adjustment is made to household incomes, reranking is about nine per cent of the reduction in lifetime inequality. However, if each child is counted as equivalent to one-third of an adult, reranking is found to be less than one per cent.