Full versus quasi MLE for ARMA-GARCH models with infinitely divisible innovations

We compare the backtesting performance of ARMA-GARCH models with the most common types of infinitely divisible innovations, fit with both full maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and quasi maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE). The innovation types considered are the Gaussian, Student’s t, α-stable, classical tempered stable (CTS), normal tempered stable (NTS) and generalized hyperbolic (GH) distributions. In calm periods of decreasing volatility, MLE and QMLE produce near identical performance in forecasting value-at-risk (VaR) and conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). In more volatile periods, QMLE can actually produce superior performance for CTS, NTS and α-stable innovations. While the t-ARMA-GARCH model has the fewest number of VaR violations, rejections by the Kupeic and Berkowitz tests suggest excessively large forecasted losses. The α-stable, CTS and NTS innovations compare favourably, with the latter two also allowing for option pricing under a single market model.     

河南省大中型工业企业技术创新能力比较研究

企业技术创新能力的大小直接关系到企业的组织绩效,影响着区域经济的发展。笔者将河南省大中型企业按地区分组,建立了企业技术创新能力评价指标体系,利用因子分析的方法比较各地区大中型企业的技术创新能力的差异。在此基础上,提出了提升河南省大中型工业企业技术创新能力的路径。     

A simple test for multivariate conditional symmetry

This paper proposes a simple consistent nonparametric test of multivariate conditional symmetry based on the principle of characteristic functions. The test statistic is shown to be asymptotically normal under the null and consistent against any conditional asymmetric distributions.     

Spillover effects and conditional dependence

A better understanding of cross-market linkages and interactions would help to better manage international financial exposure. So far, no attempt has been made to investigate the degree of price and volatility spillovers in a non-Gaussian conditional framework. We present a new model for these transmission mechanisms that relies on asymmetric-t marginal distributions and a copula function to characterize the conditional dependence. Rendering the dependence parameter time varying, we investigate how the dependence structure is affected by stock return innovations.     

On the evolution of conditional cooperation

A long series of laboratory and field experiments, as well as conventional empirical studies, has established that (1) individuals voluntarily provide themselves with public goods at levels exceeding those predicted by the Nash voluntary contributions mechanism, and (2) agents reciprocate increases in the contributions of their counterparts in such settings (conditional cooperation). This paper presents a simple model of the evolution of preferences for conditional cooperation in the presence of a public good, which explains these two empirical findings without employing reputational or group selection arguments. In this model, individuals inherit preferences to match other agents' contributions to the provision of a public good, at some specified “matching rate.” Agents whose preferences induce them to be relatively successful – in material terms – increase in number, from one generation to the next. Under complete information and with randomly matched groups of N agents who have quasilinear preferences over the public good and a private good, the unique evolutionarily stable matching rate is 1, leading to Pareto optimal voluntary provision of the public good, regardless of group size N. The evolutionarily stable matching rate can be viewed as an endogenous social norm.     

Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation

We develop a model of social norms and cooperation in large societies. Within this framework we use an indirect evolutionary approach to study the endogenous formation of preferences and the co-evolution of norm compliance. The multiplicity of equilibria, which emerges in the presence of social norms, is linked to the evolutionary analysis: individuals face situations where many others cooperate as well as situations where a majority free-rides. The evolutionary adaptation to such heterogenous environments favors conditional cooperators, who condition their pro-social behavior on the others’ cooperation. As conditional cooperators react flexibly to their social environment, they dominate free-riders as well as unconditional cooperators.     

Hedging for multi-period downside risk in the presence of jump dynamics and conditional heteroskedasticity

This study extends the one period zero-VaR (Value-at-Risk) hedge ratio proposed by Hung et al . (2005 Hung, JC, Chiu, CL and Lee, MC. 2005. Hedging with zero-Value at Risk hedge ratio. Applied Financial Economics, 16: 259–69.  [Google Scholar]) to the multi-period case and incorporates the hedging horizon into the objective function under VaR framework. The multi-period zero-VaR hedge ratio has several advantages. First, compared to existing hedge ratios based on downside risk, it has an analytical solution and is simple to calculate. Second, compared to the traditional Minimum Variance (MV) hedge ratio, it considers expected return and remains optimal while the Martingale process is invalid. Thirdly, hedgers may elect an adequate hedging horizon and confidence level to reflect their level of risk aversion using the concept of VaR. Pondering the occurrence of volatility clustering and price jumps, this study utilizes the ARJI model to compute time-varying hedge ratios. Finally, both in-sample and out-of-sample hedging effectiveness between one-period hedge ratio and multi-period hedge ratio are evaluated for four hedging horizons and various levels of risk aversion. The empirical results indicate that hedgers wishing to hedge downside risk over long horizons should use the multi-period zero-VaR hedge ratios.     

Treatment effect analysis of early reemployment bonus program: panel MLE and mode-based semiparametric estimator for interval truncation

We use Korean data to find the effects of Early Reemployment Bonus (ERB) on unemployment duration; ERB is a bonus that the eligible unemployed receive if they find a job before their unemployment insurance benefit expires. A naive approach would be comparing the ERB receiving group with the non-receiving group, but the ERB receipt is partly determined by the unemployment duration itself (thus, an endogeneity problem). Interestingly, there were many individuals who did not receive the ERB despite being fully eligible, and this is attributed to being unaware of the ERB scheme. Taking this as a ??pseudo randomization??, we construct treatment and control groups using only the eligible. Our data set is an unbalanced panel with the response variable interval-truncated due to eligibility requirement of the ERB. We propose a panel random-effect MLE and a semiparametric ??mode-based?? estimator for the interval-truncated response. Our empirical finding is that the effect varies much, depending on individual characteristics. As for the mean effects, whereas the MLE indicates large duration-shortening effects, the semiparametric estimator shows much weaker and mostly insignificant effects.     

企业生命周期与企业家管理周期匹配下的动态竞争力模型

对企业持续竞争优势的研究,主要采用的是经济学的研究方法,其中资源基础论和核心能力理论从企业内部对企业持续竞争力的来源进行了分析。能力理论在此基础上进一步引入了“动态竞争力”的概念,指出企业能力应与动态环境相适应。但是已有研究所没有考虑的是:由于企业在自身不同发展阶段面临不同的挑战,需要解决不同的问题,因而在不同阶段需要不同的能力与之相适应;同时,由于企业竞争力与企业家能力之间存在的密切联系,企业家能力与企业生命周期的匹配对企业竞争力具有重大影响。本文借鉴企业生命周期理论,通过分析企业家在企业不同发展阶段的不同角色,试图初步构建企业生命周期与企业家管理周期匹配下的动态竞争力模型。     

IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics

In this paper we suggest that the dual role played by the IMF, as a creditor and as a monitor of economic reforms, might explain the lack of credibility of the Fund threat of sanctioning non-compliance with conditionality. Specifically, we show that the IMF's desire to preserve its reputation as a good monitor may distort its lending decisions towards some laxity. Moreover, such distortionary incentives may be exacerbated by the length of the relationship between a country and the Fund. Estimating a dynamic panel of 53 middle-income countries, for the period 1982–2001, we find that a longer relationship does increase IMF disbursements.     

IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics

In this paper we suggest that the dual role played by the IMF, as a creditor and as a monitor of economic reforms, might explain the lack of credibility of the Fund threat of sanctioning non-compliance with conditionality. Specifically, we show that the IMF's desire to preserve its reputation as a good monitor may distort its lending decisions towards some laxity. Moreover, such distortionary incentives may be exacerbated by the length of the relationship between a country and the Fund. Estimating a dynamic panel of 53 middle-income countries, for the period 1982–2001, we find that a longer relationship does increase IMF disbursements.     

Normality test for multivariate conditional heteroskedastic dynamic regression models

In this paper, we study the Jarque-Bera test for the normality of the innovations of multivariate GARCH models. It is shown that the test is distribution free and its limiting null distribution is a chi-square distribution.     

A simple IID test for autoregressive conditional duration models

We propose using the rank-based variance ratio test as an easy-to-implement test for testing the independent and identically distributed assumption of autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) models. We apply the proposed test to duration data of five stocks and get the same conclusions as previous studies.     

Modelling conditional moments and correlation with the continuous hidden-threshold-skew-normal distribution

A key issue in modelling conditional densities of returns of financial assets is the time-variation of conditional volatility. The classic econometric approach models volatility of returns with the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models where the conditional mean and the conditional volatility depend only on historical prices. We propose a new family of distributions in which the conditional distribution depends on a latent continuous factor with a continuum of states. The distribution has an interpretation in terms of a mixture distribution with time-varying mixing probabilities. The distribution parameters have economic interpretations in terms of conditional volatilities and correlations of the returns with the hidden continuous state. We show empirically that this distribution outperforms its main competitor, the mixed normal conditional distribution, in terms of capturing the stylized facts known for stock returns, namely, volatility clustering, leverage effect, skewness, kurtosis and regime dependence.     

On uniqueness of the conditional maximum likelihood estimation for a binary panel model

This paper considers an estimation method for a binary panel model with incidental parameters as individual effects. The necessary condition for the conditional maximum likelihood approach proposed by Andersen (1970) is investigated and we show that unique sufficient statistics exist only for logit models in a two-wave panel.     

Marginal and conditional probabilities of excess demand

This note compares and illustrates two criteria for classifying observations on a non-clearing market, namely the marginal probability of excess demand and the probability of excess demand conditional on the observed quantity.     

Rank, separability, and conditional demands

Rank R demand systems that are either conditioned on some good (such as durables) or are separable from that good, are shown to be identical to unconditional demand systems having rank R or R + 1. More generally, the rank of a conditional demand system or a separable subsystem is a lower bound on the rank of the corresponding demand system over all goods. This relationship is applied to reinterpret some existing empirical results regarding rank, conditioning goods, and separability.
Rang, séparabilité et demandes conditionnelles. On montre que des systèmes de demande de rang R qui sont conditionnés par rapport à un bien (des biens durables par exemple) ou sont séparables de ce bien sont identiques aux systèmes de demande inconditionnels de rang R ou R + 1. Plus généralement, le rang d'un système de demande conditionnel ou d'un sous-système séparable est une limite inférieure au rang du système de demande correspondant pour tous les biens. Cette relation est utilisée pour ré-interpréter quelques résultats empiriques pour ce qui est du rang, des biens conditionnants et la séparabilité.     

Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers

Summary. We present a game in which n persons split a cake, where a distinction between conditional and unconditional offers is made. This distinction sheds light on the contrasting results obtained in the previous literature of multilateral bargaining. By allowing the proposer to make both conditional and unconditional offers, we show that the game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome. Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: March 13, 2001