The costs of behavioral health care coverage

Psychiatric and chemical dependency conditions can have significant financial implication for plan sponsors, but a variety of mechanisms are available to control these costs. The application of appropriately designed and implemented benefit designs in combination with managed behavioral health care protocols can have a significant return on investment for the plan sponsor.     

Clever enough to tell the truth

We conduct a field experiment on 427 Israeli soldiers who each rolled a six-sided die in private and reported the outcome. For every point reported, the soldier received an additional half-hour early release from the army base on Thursday afternoon. We find that the higher a soldier’s military entrance score, the more honest he is on average. We replicate this finding on a sample of 156 civilians paid in cash for their die reports. Furthermore, the civilian experiments reveal that two measures of cognitive ability predict honesty, whereas general self-report honesty questions and a consistency check among them are of no value. We provide a rationale for the relationship between cognitive ability and honesty and discuss its generalizability.     

The art of truth telling: handling failure with disclosure and apology

There are sentinel events and near misses associated with leadership and management, as well as the clinical process of health care. We should hold ourselves accountable to the same level of rigor and analysis of these events and near misses as we expect from clinicians. Research and analysis will continue to help us understand the science behind the power of truth telling and apology.     

Social choice and telling the truth

This paper presents a straightforward proof of Gibbard's theorem that any non-manipulable choice rule with at least three outcomes is dictatorial. The proof is similar to proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem, but does not rely on that theorem. The last part of the paper discusses the relation between Gibbard's and Arrow's theorems. The paper contains no new result, and is intended to make this important area of social choice theory accessible to a wider audience.     

The extension of social security coverage in developing countries

We study the dynamic general equilibrium effects of introducing a social pension program to elderly informal sector workers in developing countries who lack formal risk sharing mechanisms against income and longevity risks. To this end, we formulate a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates defining features of developing countries: a large informal sector, private transfers as an informal safety net, and a non-universal social security system. We find that the extension of retirement benefits to informal sector workers results in efficiency losses due to adverse effects on capital accumulation and the allocation of resources across formal and informal sectors. Despite these losses recipients of social pensions experience welfare gains as the positive insurance effects attributed to the extension of a social insurance system dominate. The welfare gains crucially depend on the skill distribution, private intra-family transfers and the specific tax used to finance the expansion.     

Retiree health coverage

This article reviews a number of issues that affect retiree medical coverage as part of a multiemployer trust. Strategies for both short- and long-term planning to ensure economic viability of the retiree medical plan include overcoming myths, obtaining data and doing the math, being realistic, minimizing political issues, communication and education. The resolution of issues and problems should always be a part of a strategic planning process rather than dealt with on an emergency or quick fix basis.     

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota.     

Hiding an inconvenient truth: Lies and vagueness

When truth conflicts with efficiency, can verbal communication destroy efficiency? Or are lies or vagueness used to hide inconvenient truths? We consider a sequential 2-player public good game in which the leader has private information about the value of the public good. This value can be low, high, or intermediate, the latter case giving rise to a prisoners? dilemma. Without verbal communication, efficiency is achieved, with contributions for high or intermediate values. When verbal communication is added, the leader has an incentive to hide the precise truth when the value is intermediate. We show experimentally that, when communication must be precise, the leader frequently lies, preserving efficiency by exaggerating. When communication can be vague, the leader turns to vague messages when the value is intermediate. Thus, she implicitly reveals all values. Interestingly, efficiency is preserved, since the follower does not seem to realize that vague messages hide inconvenient truths.     

Portfolio management with tail dependence

Many publications, that treated with Portfolio Management, were devastating for all asset allocation models in the context of portfolios. The elimination of extreme events (asymmetric or tail dependence) during the portfolio construction process can reduce the skills of asset managers to reduce risk through diversification. The copula theory allows us to calculate an alternative to measure the dependence of extreme events in assets through the index lower tail dependence. We check that the strategies with tail dependence overcame Talmud rule, the Markowitz model and the model of Tu and Zhou by simulating 1,000 portfolios with 3, 5, 10 and 20 randomly selected assets from DJIA for the period 03/1990 until 12/2016. We conclude that models of tail dependence and Markowitz had more performance ex-ante than Talmud and the Tu and Zhou model for portfolios with 3, 5, 10 and 20 assets. Tail dependence models overcome Markowitz, in terms of cumulative return, in over 60% of months considered in the analysis. The results indicate that the Talmud rule should be discarded in a context of constructing portfolios with individual stocks ahead strategies with tail dependence.