行业竞争、第一大股东与公司绩效

文章采用2002年以前在中国上市的能源、公用事业、工业、可选消费和日常消费行业695家上市公司2004年12月31日的观察值为样本,从行业竞争角度对第一大股东持股比例、持股性质与公司绩效关系进行了实证研究。结果表明:在竞争程度低的行业中,第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效相关性较弱,当第一大股东是国有股股东时,公司绩效较高;在竞争程度高的行业中,第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效显著正相关,当第一大股东是非国有股股东时,公司绩效较高。     

第一大股东控股与盈利信息披露及时性研究

本文对2000-2005年间的第一大股东性质及持股比例与盈利信息披露及时性之间的关系进行了研究。研究结果表明，上市公司第一大股东持股比例与盈利信息披露及时性之间呈现“N”形，第一大股东为国有法人股股东的公司。其盈利信息披露的及时性比第一大股东为国家股和其他股股东的公司好。     

股权结构与公司绩效关系实证研究

本文以我国2003-2005年498家制造业上市公司为样本,研究股权结构和公司绩效关系.本文试图说明股杈结构和公司绩效的内在联系,为公司治理结构的完善提供理论上的参考.实证结果表明,我国上市公司的绩效与前五大股东及前十大股东的持股比例有着显著的正相关关系.与第一大股东持股比例并没有明显的相关关系;公司绩效与国有股比例显著正相关,与法人股比例负相关,与流通股比例负相关.本文的研究结果对加强上市公司股权机制改革、完善公司治理结构、提高上市公司绩效等提供了实证参考.     

中国能源行业上市公司资本结构与绩效的实证研究

本文采用能源行业65家上市公司2001年至2004年的资料，研究了用托宾Q值代替的公司绩效与总资产负债率、第一大股东持股比例之间的关系。实证结果表明，经营绩效佳的公司，绩效与总资产负债率负相关；而经营绩效相对不佳的公司，绩效与总资产负债率显着正相关；公司绩效与第一大股东持股比例没有显示出倒U型关系。     

能源企业资本结构与公司绩效的相关性研究

能源行业是国家经济的重要组成部分,也是国民经济运行的基础。因此对能源企业股权结构与效率关系进行研究有着非常重要的理论意义与现实意义。本文利用计量经济学的实证分析方法,建立多元回归模型,对公司资产负债率和第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效之间的相关关系进行检验,分析得出公司绩效与资产负债率呈负相关关系、公司绩效与第一大股东持股比例呈正相关关系的结论,并在此基础上提出实行交叉持股、注意能源企业的资产构成、提高盈利水平等相关建议。     

股权结构与公司绩效的实证研究

本文通过选取综合性较强的公司股东权益净利率作为衡量公司绩效的指标,将我国股权结构划分为国有股比例、法人股比例、流通股比例和十大股东持股比例,以沪深两市的283家上市公司作为研究对象,就股权结构对公司绩效的影响进行了实证分析。结果发现：国有股比例与公司绩效负相关,但不显著;法人股持股比例与公司绩效负相关;流通股比例与公司绩效不相关;而十大股东持股比例与公司绩效表现出正相关性。研究还表明,股权集中度与公司绩效呈正相关性,这为股权结构改革以提高公司绩效提供了理论支持。     

上市公司股权集中度与公司绩效的关系研究

本文对上市公司股权集中度与公司绩效之间的关系进行了研究。研究发现,第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效之间存在负相关关系,前五大股东持股比的平方和与公司绩效存在正相关关系。     

上市公司股权集中度与公司绩效的关系研究

本文对上市公司股权集中度与公司绩效之间的关系进行了研究.研究发现,第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效之间存在负相关关系,前五大股东持股比的平方和与公司绩效存在正相关关系.     

第一大股东持股比例与涉农上市企业绩效——兼论混合所有制改革股权比例安排

基于92家企业2002～2018年的面板数据,研究涉农上市公司混合所有制改革股权比例安排问题,发现从整体上存在涉农上市公司第一大股东持股比例"底部绩效陷阱"。即第一大股东持股比例与企业绩效之间是显著的U型曲线关系,绩效最低点的第一大股东持股比例约为37.3%,其分布区间约为[37%,38%]。股权性质对第一大股东持股比例与企业绩效的关系存在显著调节作用。国有第一大股东持股比例与企业绩效是显著倒U型曲线关系,绩效最高点的持股比例约为36.5%,存在"顶部绩效馅饼";非国有第一大股东持股比例与企业绩效是显著U型曲线关系,绩效最低点的持股比例约为33.7%,其分布区间约为[33%,34%],存在"底部绩效陷阱"。整体样本公司第一大股东持股比例与企业绩效的U型曲线关系主要是由非国有性质股东贡献的。该结论表明涉农上市公司混合所有制改革过程中可能存在着暂时性困境。     

大股东持股对过度投资的影响研究--基于A股民营上市公司的经验研究

本文选取2008-2012年沪深两市A股民营上市公司为研究样本,实证分析了大股东持股比例对公司过度投资行为的影响。研究结果显示,第一大股东持股比例与过度投资存在着先下降后上升的“U”型关系;即随着第一大股东持股比例的不断加大,过度投资水平逐渐降低,然而当第一大股东持股比例达到临界点25.35%之后,随着持股比例的进一步增加,过度投资程度显著增加。     

股权结构、行业特征与公司绩效

本文以1995～2004年沪深两市全部上市公司为总样本,对股权结构与公司绩效关系分行业地进行了描述性统计和多元回归分析。结果表明,相对集中的股权结构有利于企业绩效,股权构成与公司绩效却无显著相关,无可靠证据表明国有股持股比率与企业绩效负相关。     

OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS

Abstract. The notion that the separation of ownership from control may create a divergence of interests between managers and shareholders has led to a large number of studies which investigate the influence of ownership structures upon a firm's financial structure and its performance. The purpose of this paper is to review and critically evaluate the literature that empirically analyses the effects of ownership and control structures on both the financial structure and the performance of the firm. In addition, further consideration is given to the dynamic relationships between ownership, control, financing and firm performance.     

Large shareholders and firm value: Are high-tech firms different?

This paper explores the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The results of the estimations, taking into account simultaneity and reverse causality, show that the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value differs across firms belonging to the sector of innovative technologies and more ‘mature’ firms. The results give support to the hypothesis that ‘mature’ firms with higher ownership concentration are likely to perform better than firms with more dispersed ownership. In contrast, in high-tech companies, with large share of knowledge related activities, higher ownership concentration is associated with lower firm value. This effect is robust to various alternative specifications.     

股权结构、隧道挖掘与公司价值的实证研究

本文应用大小股东之间代理冲突的理论分析框架,研究了股权结构对于大股东隧道挖掘行为以及公司价值的影响。研究发现,大股东的隧道挖掘行为与其持股比例成显著的倒U型关系,股权制衡能够抑制隧道挖掘行为和缓解大、小股东之间的代理冲突;公司价值与第一大股东持股比例成显著的U型关系,股权制衡能在一定程度上提升公司价值,但效果不显著。研究结果证明,投资者能够识别股权结构所代表的代理问题,并给代理问题较大的公司予以较低的定价。     

Institutional investors and firm performance: Evidence from IPOs

We investigate the post-IPO evolution of institutional investor holdings and the manner in which operating performance is related to these holdings. During the first year after the IPO, average institutional holdings increase from 24% to 36% of shares outstanding and stabilize at about 42% by the end of the second year. We document that post-IPO operating performance is positively related to institutional holdings, but this relation subsides in the third year after the IPO. Overall, our findings indicate that institutional ownership is a valid indicator of the firm’s operating performance in its initial years as a public company.     

Employee ownership and firm performance: a meta‐analysis

Employee ownership has been an area of significant practitioner and academic interest for the past four decades. Yet, empirical results on the relationship between employee ownership and firm performance remain mixed. To aggregate findings and provide potential direction for future theoretical development, we conducted a meta‐analysis of 102 samples representing 56,984 firms. Employee ownership has a small, but positive and statistically significant relation to firm performance ( = 0.04). The effect is generally positive for studies with different sampling designs (samples assessing change in performance pre‐employee–post‐employee ownership adoption or samples on firms with employee ownership), different performance operationalisation (efficiency or growth) and firm type (publicly held or privately held). Suggesting benefits of employee ownership in a variety of contexts, we found no differences in effects on performance in publicly held versus privately held firms, stock or stock option‐based ownership plans or differences in effects across different firm sizes (i.e. number of employees). We do find that the effect of employee ownership on performance has increased in studies over time and that studies with samples from outside the USA report stronger effects than those within. We also find little to no evidence of publication bias.     

Corporate governance and pay for performance: evidence from Germany

This paper investigates how two distinctive features of the German corporate governance system—concentrated ownership structure and representation of employees on firm supervisory boards—influence the sensitivity of managerial pay to firm profitability. There is a positive, though very small, link between pay and profitability for widely held firms. The presence of a largest owner seems hardly to affect this link in any economically significant way. However, the link between pay and profitability is smaller and indeed not significantly different from zero in firms whose largest owner is a German financial institution. This suggests that large owners tend to act as a substitute for rather than a complement to performance related pay in Germany. We thank Dennis Leech for allowing us to use his algorithms for computing voting power indices, and Brian Cheffins, Tim Guinnane, Andrew Harvey, Dennis Leech, Hamish Low, Sheilagh Ogilvie, Melvyn Weeks and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The research reported in this paper was started during a joint visit to CES, University of Munich, and completed during visits of Edwards and Weichenrieder to the University of Konstanz and the ifo Institute for Economic Research in Munich. We thank the three institutions for their hospitality, especially Bernd Genser and Hans-Werner Sinn. A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “The Measurement of Firm Ownership and its Effect on Managerial Pay”.     

The Effects of a Separation of Ownership from Control on UK Listed Firms: An Empirical Analysis

There has been a wide‐ranging debate concerning the effects of the separation of management and ownership of large firms. Given recent issues concerning corporate remuneration, this debate is as relevant and possibly more so today as it has ever been. Theoretically, as the ownership of a firm becomes more diverse, the management of the firm will have more discretion and opportunity to act in accordance with their own interests at the expense of those of the shareholders. This paper considers the effect of a separation of ownership from control on 406 UK listed firms. Simultaneous equations are used to test for a relationship between the percentage of shares owned by significant outsiders and insiders and the performance of the firm. A number of authors have suggested that there may be a significant relationship between these variables. The analysis conducted in this study supports the view that there is a relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

产权保护、信贷机会、所有权结构与公司投资——来自中国制造业企业的经验数据

本文以2002年中国制造业企业的经验数据为样本,在控制了相关微观企业变量与宏观城市变量的基础上,对公司投资支出与产权保护、信贷机会、所有权结构之间的关系进行了实证研究。结果表明,公司投资支出与保护企业财产权利的产权保护因素及所有权结构显著相关,但使用该样本回归分析中信贷机会的作用则不明朗,这可能与样本采集年份的国家政策有一定关联。建议完善保护企业财产权利司法体制、加强促进公司投资的制度建设,同时尽快缩小转型经济期间对不同所有制企业的区别对待等。     

How Domestic and Foreign Firms Differ and Why Does it Matter?

Abstract.  This paper reviews and summarises the results of selected studies on performance gaps between multinational enterprises and their domestic counterparts. Performance gaps arise in such fields as productivity, technology, profitability, wages, skills and growth. While these gaps are often attributed to foreign ownership of the affiliates, the theory of the Multinational Enterprise argues that these gaps are due to being a Multinational rather than the nationality of the firm. Empirical evidence on the existence of performance gaps between foreign and domestic firms is supportive of this view: foreign ownership turns out to be a much less important explanatory factor than normally assumed. Firm‐specific assets and firm characteristics like industry, size, parent country and multinationality per se are more important. Such results are broadly consistent with those derived in the literatures on ownership change, on foreign entry and on spillovers. We conclude that there is little case for foreign direct investment promotion policies to discriminate between firms on the basis of ownership.