Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts

I consider an environment in which contract enforcement is a decision variable for the principal. I construct a model in which entrepreneurs cannot commit to repaying investors for the capital advanced, but investors can force repayment by spending resources. The principal uses enforcement to reduce the resources available to the agent after a default, thus providing incentives for the agent to stay in the relationship. She also ensures contract compliance by backloading the payments to the agent: expected utility rises over time, preventing a default. I consider an application of the framework developed in the paper to the area of firm dynamics. I show that enforcement and backloading are always used jointly. Firm size (measured by capital) grows with time and each firm converges to the efficient size. A second application is to the field of economic development. Costlier enforcement leads to the choice of sub-optimal technology; secondly, it leads to inefficient dispersion of capital across establishments.     

Dynamic coordination with timing frictions: Theory and applications

We present a general framework of dynamic coordination with timing frictions. A continuum of agents receive random chances to choose between two actions and remain locked in the selected action until their next opportunity to reoptimize. The instantaneous utility from each action depends on an exogenous fundamental that moves stochastically and on the mass of agents currently playing each action. Agents' decisions are strategic complements and history matters. We review some key theoretical results and show a general method to solve the social planner's problem. We then review applications of this framework to different economic problems: network externalities, statistical discrimination, and business cycles. The positive implications of these models are very similar, but the social planner's solution points to very different results for efficiency in each case. Last, we review extensions of the framework that allow for endogenous hazard rates and ex ante heterogeneous agents.     

Reciprocity and matching frictions

The ability of search and matching models to replicate stylized facts—such as volatilities and correlations—has been a center of attraction over the last couple of years. This paper introduces the Akerlof (Q J Econ 97:543–569, 1982) fair wage approach into an endogenous separation search and matching model. Within a RBC general equilibrium context, we show that the efficiency wage model outperforms its benchmark Nash bargaining pendant. In particular, the model generates the empirically observed volatilities in response to a productivity shock and replicates a strong Beveridge curve. Furthermore, we derive the Solow condition in a search environment and discuss the interactions of search and efficiency wage frictions. We show that search frictions create a wedge between the optimal wage/effort solution in the search and the competitive equilibrium. The efficiency wage consideration adds an additional margin to the firm's decision problem. As effort varies over the cycle, it changes the firm's optimal response to exogenous disturbances and amplifies the response to shocks.     

Financial frictions and stabilization policies

After the financial crisis of 2007, in many economies, public and private debt have moved in opposite directions, as opposed to pre-2007 evidence. Private deleverage and public debt build-up may affect the recovery path of countries after a recession. In a new Keynesian model with financial frictions, we show that when the economy is hit by a credit risk shock, the negative correlation arising between public and private debt amplifies the response of GDP. In our setup, the traditional monetary-fiscal policy mix is not enough to offset this private-public debt mechanism and therefore bring back economic stability. When macroprudential policy is part of the policy mix, the private-public debt channel can be broken. Interestingly, depending on the macroprudential instrument, a trade-off may arise between private debt and output stabilization.     

Pricing and signaling with frictions

We study a market where each seller chooses the quality and price of goods and the number of selling sites. Observing sellers? choices of prices and sites, but not quality, buyers choose which site to visit. A seller?s choices of prices can direct buyers? search and signal quality. A unique equilibrium exists and is separating. When the quality differential is large, the equilibrium implements the efficient allocation with public information. Otherwise, the quality of goods and/or the number of sites created is inefficient, due to a conflict between the search-directing and signaling roles of prices.     

Search frictions and labor market participation

Cross-country differences in labor market participation are often larger than differences in unemployment rates. The same holds true across demographic groups within a given economy. We argue that the interaction between labor force participation decisions and labor market frictions can help us understand these patterns. This interaction highlights dynamic aspects of the participation decision, in contrast to standard textbook treatments that emphasize static costs and benefits of participation. We extend the standard labor market search problem to allow for a third state—non-participation—and assumes that stochastic participation costs precipitate flows into and out of non-participation. We fully characterize the worker's decision problem and use numerical simulations to demonstrate how participation patterns vary with individual characteristics and with labor market conditions.     

Contractual frictions and margins of trade

A recent body of work has shown that quality of national institutions that enforce written contracts plays an important role in shaping a country’s comparative advantage. The current paper contributes to this literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms through which institutional frictions affect the pattern of aggregate trade flow by distinguishing its effect on the intensive and extensive margins. We find that better contracting institutions not only increase the probability of exporting (the extensive margin) but also enhance the export sales after entry (the intensive margin), particularly in industries where relationship-specific investments are most important. With around two-third to three-fourth share (depending on the definition used), the contribution of institutions along the intensive margin dominates that along the extensive margin. The benefits of improved institutions, particularly via the intensive margin, favor the less developed countries over the more developed ones. In addition, better contracting institutions increase the probability of survival of export products in more contract-intensive industries in particular. These findings are robust to measuring the intensive and extensive margins using a more granular export data based on firm-level aggregates, as well as the variety and destination based definitions.     

Political frictions and public policy outcomes

We study the role of political frictions in public policy outcomes. We propose a simple model of fiscal policy that combines a lack of commitment by the government, political turnover, and another political friction that can be interpreted either as political polarization or as public rent-seeking. We show that political turnover increases public debt levels, while political polarization or public rent-seeking leads to higher public spending. We evaluate the importance of different political frictions for fiscal policy outcomes using a sample of twenty developed countries. We find that the data on political instability combined with the data on public rent-seeking explain 25% of the variation in public debt levels.     

Financial frictions and changing macroeconomic volatility

This paper studies the impact of changing financial frictions on the Great Moderation using an estimated, nonlinear New Keynesian model. The model features financial frictions, parameter drift, and stochastic volatility. The estimation results show that financial frictions fell during the 1980s and remained low throughout the Great Moderation. Based on counterfactual studies, the reduction in financial frictions was an important reason for the reduction in volatility observed during the Great Moderation. The results show little role for changing monetary policy or reduced shock volatility, two common explanations, in causing the Great Moderation.     

Financial frictions and the futures pricing puzzle

In perfect capital markets, the futures price of an asset should be an unbiased forecast of its realized spot price when the contract matures. In reality, futures prices are often higher for some assets and lower for others. However, there is no stability in the relationship between futures prices and the realized spot prices. This instability has been a puzzle in the existing financial literature. The key to this puzzle may lie in the nature of the model and the lack of market imperfections. In this study, we take a theoretical approach in a dynamic multi-period environment. We incorporate competition between disparate economic agents and impose financial frictions (i.e., imperfections) that are in the form of hedging and borrowing limits on them. Our model gives rise to multiple equilibria, each with unique market clearing prices, with the market switching between these equilibria. Our analysis incorporates a comprehensive consideration of the risks faced by the futures markets participants (i.e., speculators and hedgers) and leads to a better understanding of the puzzle.     

Product diffusion and pricing with market frictions

Summary. We study pricing and product diffusion in a dynamic general equilibrium framework with product market frictions. Ongoing R&D activity leads, with an endogenously determined probability, to continual improvements in product quality. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium with endogenous product diffusion in which a number of different goods co-exist on the quality ladder. We show that the severity of the economy's market frictions is a crucial determinant of the pricing structure, the product diffusion pattern, the level of R&D investment, the rate of endogenous growth, the length of Schumpeterian product cycles and the possibility of multiple growth paths. Eliminating market frictions leads to a degenerate product ladder of precisely one step, containing only the most recent product, as in the monopolistic competition literature. Received: August 16, 1999; revised version: March 6, 2001     

Labor market frictions and the international propagation mechanism

The paper studies the role of labor market frictions in accounting for international business cycle comovement. To this aim, we embed labor market search and matching frictions in a two-country New Keynesian model. We show that labor market frictions amplify the international propagation of supply and demand shocks. In terms of cyclical properties then, they raise the cross-country output correlation. Adding labor market search in the New Keynesian model thus improves its ability to account for the business cycle comovement observed in G7 countries in the recent decades. Nominal wage rigidity substantially contributes to this result. Labor market institutions also play a role. Yet, their impact is not unequivocal depending on the institution considered. Business cycle synchronization is thus found to increase with the generosity of the unemployment benefits system, whereas it decreases with the strictness of employment protection.     

Financial frictions and the ratio in UK manufacturing

This note concerns an asymptotic distribution result from the literature on nonlinear estimation with integrated variables. It points out a way of strengthening local asymptotic distribution results towards results that hold for the global minimizer of the criterion function.     

What do information frictions do?

Summary. We present an overlapping generations model in which a labor market friction (moral hazard) coexists and interacts with a credit market friction (costly state verification). Our main results are: (i) while credit market frictions have long- and short-run real effects, labor market frictions typically have only short-run effects unless they also affect the volume of investment per worker, (ii) the frictions amplify each other to produce higher long-run unemployment than would result from only labor market frictions, (iii) these distortions may prolong the effect of temporary shocks, and (iv) the dynamics of economies with both frictions are qualitatively similar to their frictionless counterparts.Received: 25 February 2003, Revised: 1 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: E13, E24, O41, O17. Correspondence to: Joydeep BhattacharyaWork on this paper began while Bhattacharya was visiting the University of Texas at Austin and was completed when Chakraborty was visiting the IMF Institute in Washington, DC. We are grateful to both institutions for their hospitality. For helpful comments and suggestions we thank Valerie Bencivenga, Dean Corbae, Scott Freeman, Rajesh Singh, participants at the Macro Tea in Austin, and especially, an anonymous referee of this journal. The usual caveat applies.     

Mixed wage and rent contracts as reinterpretations of share contracts

This note extends the result of Stiglitz (1974) and Newbery (1977) concerning the equivalence of mixed wage and rent contracts to share contracts to the case where the only assumption is that there are no enforcement or transaction costs. This is so because an equivalent mixed wage/rent agreement can always be obtained by simply reinterpreting a share agreement.     

Financial frictions and investment: requiem in Q

Understanding the nature of financial frictions faced by firms is relevant for both monetary and fiscal policy experiments. Empirical investment studies commonly find that proxies for firms' internal funds are significant as explanatory variables, particularly in the Q-theory based regression framework. These findings are often interpreted as evidence of financial frictions. This paper investigates that inference by specifying and estimating a class of dynamic optimization models where imperfectly competitive firms face financial constraints. Market power induces the principal link between investment and internal funds. We find no evidence to support the argument that capital market imperfections contribute to the relationship between investment and profitability.     

Tax contracts and elections

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government and voters may behave strategically. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks when in office. A government raises taxes for both purposes. We show that tax contracts yield moderate policies and lead to lower perks by avoiding the formation of grand coalitions in order to win government. Moreover, in polarized societies they unambiguously improve the welfare of the median voter.     

Respect and relational contracts

Assuming that people care not only about what others do but also on what others think, we study respect in a labor market context where the length of the employment relationship is endogenous. In our three-stage gift-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect by giving the employee costly symbolic rewards after observing his level of effort. We study whether symbolic rewards are used by the employers mainly to praise employees or as a coordination device to build relational contracts by manipulating the balance between labor demand and supply in the market. We find that a high proportion of long-term relationships have been initiated by the assignment of symbolic rewards. However, the assignment of symbolic rewards decreases when it becomes clear that the relationship is durable, suggesting that employers mainly use symbolic rewards as a coordination device to initiate relational contracts. Compared to the balanced market condition, assigning symbolic rewards in initial relationships is less likely when there is excess demand in the market and more likely when there is excess supply, i.e., when the relationship is more valuable. Receiving symbolic rewards increases the employees’ likelihood of accepting to continue the relationship with the same employer. It also motivates them to increase their effort further but only when the market is balanced. Overall, the ability to assign symbolic rewards does not give rise to higher profits because it is associated with lower rents offered to the employees on average, leading to lower effort levels.     

Contractual distortions in a market with frictions

This paper analyses contract design in a decentralized market environment with frictions. While principals (e.g., firms) have all contractual power, their market power is constrained as agents (e.g., workers) can choose to wait and search for better offers. We find that results depend crucially on how market frictions affect agents’ utilities. With type-independent costs of search and waiting, equilibrium contracts are always first-best. If agents are impatient and discount future payoffs, however, distortions vanish only gradually. In the latter case, we also characterize equilibrium offers and show that the market exhibits two types of externalities, both of which are absent in the case of type-independent costs of search.