THE RISK OF FIRE SALES IN THE TRI‐PARTY REPO MARKET

This paper studies the risk of “fire sales” in the tri‐party repo market, a large and important market where securities dealers find short‐term funding for a substantial portion of their own and their clients' assets. We distinguish between fire sales of assets by a dealer who, facing a run that could lead to default, sells securities to generate liquidity, and fire sales of assets by repo investors after a dealer's default has occurred. While fire sales do cause damage no matter how they arise, the tools available to lessen the harm from the two types of fire sales are different. We find that limited tools are available to mitigate the risk of predefault fire sales and that no established tools currently exist to mitigate the risk of postdefault sales. (JEL G01, G18)     

Information Revelation and Market Incompleteness

This paper introduces a theory of market incompleteness based on the information transmission role of prices and its adverse impact on the provision of insurance in financial markets. We analyse a simple security design model in which the number and payoff of securities are endogenous. Agents have rational expectations and differ in information, endowments, and attitudes toward risk. When markets are incomplete, equilibrium prices are typically partially revealing, while full relevation is attained with complete markets. The optimality of complete or incomplete markets depends on whether the adverse selection effect (the unwillingness of agents to trade risks when they are informationally disadvantaged) is stronger or weaker than the Hirshleifer effect (the impossibility of trading risks that have already been resolved), as new securities are issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effect dominates, an incomplete set of securities is preferred by all agents, and generates a higher volume of trade.     

A coalition proof equilibrium for a private information credit economy

Summary This paper examines an economy in which agents with private information about their own productive capabilities seek to raise capital to fund their investment projects. We employ an equilibrium concept which is closely related to Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium. In equilibrium, all agents who succeed in raising capital (entrepreneurs) are pooled; they all receive the same contract or consumption schedule. Entrepreneurs, however, are separated from those who fail to raise capital. This separation results in productive efficiency for the economy. If the economy has no viable alternative investment opportunity (other than agents' projects) then equilibrium allocations can be supported by a (non-intermediated) securities market. If there is a viable alternative, the equilibrium allocations cannot be supported by a securities market equilibrium. We interpret this case as suggesting the emergence of financial intermedary coalitions.     

Do sunspots matter under complete ignorance?

In a two-period, sunspot, pure-exchange economy we analyse the case in which agents do not assign subjective probabilistic beliefs to the ‘sunspot activity’. Two generations, each of which is made up of identical agents, populate this economy. Participation in the Arrow securities market is restricted and the generation, which is allowed to trade in assets, can alternatively face uncertainty via two distribution-free decision rules under ‘complete ignorance’ (axiomatized by Milnor [Milnor, J., 1954. Games against nature. In: Thrall, R. Coombs, C., Davis, R. (Eds.), Decision Processes. John Wiley, London, pp. 49–60]): the ‘minimax regret criterion’ [Savage, L.J., 1954. The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York, ch. 9] and the ‘maxmin return criterion’ [Wald, A., 1950. Statistical Decision Functions. Wiley, New York]. When the former is used, then sunspots can matter. In particular, we prove that, if the economy admits two Walrasian equilibria, then a unique sunspot equilibrium always exists. We pin down this equilibrium, determine the prices of the Arrow securities and show that, at these prices, no trade in securities takes place. In the same framework we prove that, with agents using the maxmin return criterion, sunspots do not matter.     

STABILIZATION POLICY AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND

We construct a monetary economy with aggregate liquidity shocks and heterogeneous idiosyncratic preference shocks. In this environment, not all agents are satiated at the zero lower bound (ZLB) even when the Friedman rule is the best interest‐rate policy the central bank can implement. As a consequence, central bank stabilization policy, which takes the form of repo arrangements in response to aggregate demand shocks, temporarily relaxes the liquidity constraint of impatient agents at the ZLB. Due to a pecuniary externality, this policy may have beneficial general equilibrium effects for patient agents even if they are unconstrained in their money balances.     

Injecting rational bubbles

This paper proves two theorems about economies with a finite number of infinitely lived agents who trade a complete set of one-period Arrow securities and several infinitely lived securities at each date, subject to short-sales constraints. The first theorem in the paper considers an equilibrium to an economy of this kind. It proves that there exists another economy with perturbed short-sales constraints in which there is an allocation-equivalent equilibrium in which asset prices have a bubble. The second theorem extends to the result to the case in short-sales constraints are endogenously determined in the sense of Alvarez and Jermann [Efficiency, equilibrium, and asset pricing with risk of default, Econometrica 68 (2000) 775-797].     

The Stability of the Relation Between the Stock Market and Macroeconomic Forces

This paper identifies the macroeconomic factors that influence Italian equity returns and tests the stability of their relation with securities returns. The relation between stock returns and the macroeconomic factors is found to be unstable: not only are the factor loadings of individual securities virtually uncorrelated over time, but a high percentage of the shares experience a reversal of the sign of the estimated loadings. This result is not confined to single periods or to a small group of shares, but holds in different sub–periods and for securities in all risk classes. These findings suggest that research should carefully investigate the specification of the return generating process and the stability of the risk measures.
(J.E.L.: G12, E44).     

Generic inefficiency of equilibria in the general equilibrium model with incomplete asset markets and infinite time

Summary. We consider a Lucas asset-pricing model with heterogeneous agents, exogenous labor income, and a finite number of exogenous shocks. Although agents are infinitely lived, endowments and dividends are time-invariant functions of the exogenous shock alone and are thus restricted to lie in a finite-dimensional space; genericity analysis can be conducted on sets of zero Lebesgue measure. When financial markets are incomplete, that is, there are fewer financial securities than shocks, we show that generically in individual endowments all competitive equilibria are Pareto inefficient. Received: November 22, 1999; revised version: March 4, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to an anonymous referee for very insightful comments on earlier drafts.     

Uncertainty and insurance in strategic market games

Summary. For perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and one with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over to a particular form of imperfect competition. Specifically, I look at three Shapley-Shubik strategic market games: one with contingent commodities, one with Arrow securities traded under imperfect competition and one with Arrow securities traded under perfect competition. First I compare the feasibility constraints of these three games. Then I compare their equilibrium sets. As in Peck and Shell (1989), the only common equilibria between the first and the second game are those which involve no transfer of income across states. However, if the securities markets are competitive, then the set of equilibria of the contingent commodities game and the securities game coincide. Received: June 16, 1997; revised version: April 30, 1998     

绿色金融、绿色技术创新与经济高质量发展

基于绿色金融的资源配置与绿色技术创新视角，首先将绿色金融分为绿色信贷、绿色证券和绿色保险三个维度，进而采用2013—2020年中国30个省份（因数据缺失，未包含西藏地区和港澳台地区）面板数据，利用动态广义矩估计面板模型（GMM）分析绿色金融对经济高质量发展的非线性影响，探讨绿色金融通过绿色技术创新促进经济高质量发展的作用机制，并分析绿色金融对绿色技术创新与经济高质量发展关系的调节效应。结果表明：(1)绿色信贷、绿色证券与经济高质量发展之间均呈“先扬后抑”的倒U型关系，大多数中西部省份绿色信贷、绿色证券水平尚未跨过拐点，其对经济高质量发展的影响处于促进阶段，绿色保险则对经济高质量发展具有显著线性促进作用；(2)绿色技术创新在不同维度绿色金融与经济高质量发展之间均起到部分中介作用，且绿色技术创新在绿色证券促进经济高质量发展中的传导作用最强，其次是绿色信贷，而绿色保险最弱；(3)绿色信贷、绿色证券和绿色保险对绿色技术创新与经济高质量发展关系均起显著正向调节作用，且三种类型绿色金融的调节效应依次递减。     

中国证券商的业务竞争与创新发展势态

本文分析了开放条件下我国证券业经营竞争环境的变化，并从6个方面分析了中国证券商业务创新的发展势态。（1）证券业分类管理制度使证券商的经营规模发生变化；（2）证券发行与承销方式的改革深化了证券业内的服务竞争；（3）证券网络化交易的快速发展完善了交易清算的服务管理模式；（4）交易佣金制度的改革将使证券业的结构调整得到不断优化；（5）投资基金业务与投资组合的多样化对基金经理行为的监管提出了新的要求；（6）中国放宽市场准入条件的同时必须完善制度创新与管理创新。     

七大主体 一个市场——中国资本市场的生物链效应

2005年,中国资本市场将进入一个关键时期,以银行、证券、基金、期货、信托、保险、QFII七大投资主体主导的大资本市场格局已初步形成。银行业:有赖于证券市场化解风险;证券业:可能是中国大金融的多米诺骨牌引倒者;保险业:寻求证券市场的双赢;基金业:中国资本市场最活跃的力量;信托业:资本市场发展的补充性主体;期货业:创新为资本市场的繁荣酝酿机会;QFII:资本市场的新力军。     

对我国资本市场参与者的分析及其政策建议

作者通过对我国资本市场上主要参与者——发行人(上市公司)、投资者、中介机构(主要指证券公司)和监管机构进行国际对比,分析了资本市场上所存在的这些问题以及形成这些问题的原因,并在文章的最后部分提出规范和发展资本市场的政策思路。     

证券争议:两种法律解决途径的比较分析

新兴加转轨的中国证券市场中,披露虚假信息、内幕交易、非法关联交易、操纵市场等欺诈行为猖獗,由此产生了大量的证券争议.证券争议法律解决途径主要有证券侵权民事赔偿诉讼以及证券纠纷仲裁制度.笔者认为,中国目前有关证券侵权赔偿的司法救济途径存在较多问题,应当在司法解决途径之外,考虑借鉴美国的证券仲裁制度,在中国大力推广非诉的争议解决方式--仲裁.     

On bidding with securities: Risk aversion and positive dependence

DeMarzo et al. (2005) consider auctions in which bids are selected from a completely ordered family of securities whose values are tied to the resource being auctioned. The paper defines a notion of relative steepness of families of securities and shows that a steeper family provides greater expected revenue to the seller. Two assumptions are: the buyers are risk neutral; the random variables through which values and signals of the buyers are realized are affiliated. We show that this revenue ranking holds for the second price auction in the case of risk aversion. However, it does not hold if affiliation is relaxed to a less restrictive form of positive dependence, namely first order stochastic dominance (FOSD). We define the relative strong steepness of families of securities and show that it provides a necessary and sufficient condition for comparing two families in the FOSD case. All results extend to the English auction.     

证券市场制度缺陷的实证分析

中国证券市场存在着“三重制度缺陷”,即结构性缺陷、体制性缺陷和功能性缺陷。结构性缺陷主要是指股票市场和债券市场发展的非均衡;股票市场内部缺乏有效统一的市场体系等。体制性缺陷是指证券市场呈现管制性低水平均衡下的金融资源逆配置;国有企业“父爱主义”向上市公司的移植;以及证券市场行政化监督对市场运行的扭曲。制度性缺陷是指证券市场基本功能的缺失,社会资源的帕累托改进无法得到有效实现;上市公司仅仅形成了公司制的“外壳”,而没有形成公司制的实质和内涵。解决“三重制度缺陷”的出路在于按照市场性、效率性和竞争性的原则进行证券市场的制度创新。     

国内证券市场自律监管问题分析

证券市场自律监管主体包括三方面：证券业协会、证券交易所在内的自律性组织;证券公司、证券投资咨询公司、会计师事务所、律师事务所等在内的中介机构;市场发行主体和交易主体。一个完善的自律监管体系应是三方面都能做到自我约束、自我监管。要达到这种效果,需要通过以下措施：完善证券市场法律法规,提高违法成本;完善相关机构的内部治理;提高自律性组织自律监管能力,理清权责关系等。     

Overlapping expectations and Hart's conditions for equilibrium in a securities model

Hart (J. Econ. Theory9 (1974), 293–311) gave conditions for equilibrium to exist in a securities model where each agent undertakes asset transactions to maximize expected utility of wealth. These conditions rule out agents wanting to undertake unbounded balanced transactions to reach a Pareto superior allocation given their expectations. With mild extra assumptions to make agents unwilling to risk incurring unbounded losses on their portfolios, Hart's conditions become equivalent to an assumption of “overlapping expectations,” which is comparable to a much weaker form of Green's “common expectations” (Econometrica41 (1973), 1103–1124).     

The explosive growth of the ABCP market between 2004 and 2007: A “search for yield” story

Abstract

The years immediately preceding the financial crisis of 2007 witnessed an explosive growth in the supplies both of the long-term securities issued by the shadow banking entities, the asset-backed securities (ABSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and of the short-term securities issued by these entities, notably asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). Although there is now some acknowledgment that the search for yield was the major driver of ABS and CDO growth in the United States, the same is not true of the U.S. ABCP market where other factors such as regulatory arbitrage on the part of banks or the safety and liquidity concerns of institutional investors are seen as having been the more important growth driving force. This article argues that the search for yield did play a crucial role in U.S. ABCP growth between 2004 and 2007. To back up this argument, the article points to four variables that were closely correlated with this growth: the federal funds rate; U.S. money market mutual funds asset holdings; the change in the geographical breakdown of the institutions supplying ABCP; and, finally, the change in the program breakdown of the ABCP market.     

基于期权思想的融券费率定价方法研究

证券融资融券交易是成熟证券市场普遍实施的一种交易制度。融券与融资不同,其标的不是资金而是证券,但两者都是信用业务,需要为相关交易支付一定的费用,融资的利率相对容易确定,而融券费率则比较复杂一些,目前各类管理规定中对此并没有明确的说法。本文借鉴了我国台湾地区的经验,计算出我国大陆地区试行融资融券可行的融券费率。