Decentralized borrowing and centralized default

In the past, foreign borrowing by developing countries was comprised almost entirely of government borrowing. However, private firms and individuals in developing countries now borrow substantially from foreign lenders. It is often asserted that this surge in private sector borrowing generates excessive borrowing and frequent sovereign defaults in developing countries. This paper analyzes the impact of decentralized borrowing using a quantitative model in which private agents decide how much to borrow and the government decides whether to default. Relative to a model in which the government determines both the level of borrowing and whether to default, decentralized borrowing drives up aggregate credit costs and sovereign default risk, and reduces aggregate welfare. Interestingly, decentralized borrowing may lead to either too much or too little debt in equilibrium depending on the severity of default penalties.     

What can sector accounts tell about the financial crisis?

The current sovereign debt crisis is widely believed to have been caused by insufficient budget discipline. However, the financial sector accounts reveal that public as well as private borrowing in the euro area was dwarfed by the synchronised explosion of assets and liabilities of financial corporations. The paper suggests that the current concentration on a speedy cutback of public debt is premature at best. Policy should pay more attention to the main causes of the crisis: the excesses of the financial sector and the flaws in the design of the heterogeneous currency union.     

Crisis costs and debtor discipline: the efficacy of public policy in sovereign debt crises

Recent debate on the reform of the international financial architecture has highlighted the potentially important role of the official sector in crisis management. We examine how such public intervention in sovereign debt crises affects efficiency, ex ante and ex post. Our results shed light on the scale of capital inflows and the implications for debtor country output of such a regime. The efficacy of measures such as officially sanctioned stays on creditor litigation depend critically on the quality of public sector surveillance and the size of the costs of sovereign debt crises.     

Infrastructure,returns to scale and sovereign debt

This paper explores the nexus between the issue of sovereign debt and investment in infrastructure, emphasizing the case of economies of scale. The focus is on debt contracts that are incentive compatible. It is shown that public and private financial institutions may need to lend amounts above some threshold to force the borrowing sovereign to take full advantage of any economies of scale that may be present. Low levels of lending may or may not result in default. Sufficiently high amounts of lending may be needed to ensure repayment and may prove to be mutually beneficial.     

Is Corporate Governance in China Related to Performance Persistence?

This paper examines the relationship between performance persistence and corporate governance (as proxied for by board characteristics and shareholder structure). We document systematic differences in performance persistence across listed companies in China during 2001–2011, and empirically demonstrate that firms with better corporate governance show higher performance persistence. The results are robust over both the short and long terms. We also find that performance persistence is an important factor in refinancing, and it can lower companies’ costs of borrowing. Overall, our findings offer important implications for business ethics, as we demonstrate how corporate governance can lower companies’ costs of debt.     

Effects of Foreign Institutional Ownership on Foreign Bank Lending: Some Evidence for Emerging Markets

Despite the large literature on developed countries, little is known about the interactions between corporate governance, foreign ownership, and foreign bank lending in developing countries. Using data from five Latin American countries from 2001 to 2008, we provide one of the first pieces of evidence of how foreign ownership affects the loan cost of borrowers in emerging markets. We find that in terms of foreign bank lending, the cost of debt financing is significantly higher for firms whose largest shareholder is a foreign institutional one. The results support the hypothesis that because of potential agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, having block institutional shareholders tend to increase the borrowers’ debt burden. There is further evidence supporting this agency conflict hypothesis as we find that the effects of large institutional shareholders on borrowing costs become larger (smaller) when the conflicts are aggravated (mitigated).     

Finanzielle Repression — ein Instrument zur Bewältigung der Krisenfolgen?

Financial repression committed by central banks has been put forward as a means to secretly reduce the real burden of high public debts. Financial repression has allegedly played an important role in the impressive reduction of the US debt ratio after World War II. A mix of conventional budget consolidation and rapid growth was the main driver in this relative debt reduction with a minor role for financial repression. But does financial repression really exist? The authors express different opinions on evidence for this concept. Those authors who find that there are indicators of financial repression fear redistributive tendencies between debtors and creditors and high opportunity costs in the form of savings and investment distortions. Therefore, financial repression is not a “cure” for the high public debts amassed in the euro area during the recent sovereign debt and banking crisis. Furthermore, the high sovereign debts in the euro area may threaten economic development and impose high costs on society. Therefore, reducing these debts is politically highly relevant, and fiscal policy should be characterised by a modest reduction in government spending and/or tax increases, combined with a policy promoting economic growth. Macroprudential regulations should supplement this financial policy.     

Renegotiation, collective action clauses and sovereign debt markets

Collective action clauses (CACs) are provisions specifying that a supermajority of bondholders can change the terms of a bond. We study how CACs determine governments' fiscal incentives, sovereign bond prices, and default probabilities in environments with and without contingent debt and IMF presence. We claim that CACs are likely to be an irrelevant dimension of debt contracts in current sovereign debt markets because of the variety of instruments utilized by sovereigns and the implicit IMF guarantee. Nonetheless, under a new international bankruptcy regime like that recently proposed by the IMF, CACs can increase significantly the cost of borrowing for sovereigns, contrary to what is suggested in previous empirical literature.     

Debt composition and balance sheet effects of exchange rate depreciations: a firm-level analysis for Chile

By studying the behavior of foreign currency borrowing, maturity, sales and the investment decisions of firms listed in the Chilean Stock Exchange from 1994 to 2001, this paper assesses whether in the aftermath of the Asian crisis of the late 1990s the depreciation of the local currency (Chilean peso) affected these firms’ real and financial decisions. At issue is the contrast between a negative net-worth effect and a potential expansionary competitiveness effect for the tradable sector. We find that there exists little evidence that devaluations cause a positive impact on investment and sales for firms with dollar denominated debt. The maturity structure of Chilean firms is mainly explained by the size of the companies. Large firms will have a debt structure biased to higher maturities. Analyzing dollar denominated debt composition the evidence shows that larger firms maintained a higher proportion of dollar denominated debt reflecting the development of the financial sector in Chile.     

The stock of external sovereign debt: Can we take the data at ‘face value’?

The stock of sovereign debt is typically measured at face value. Defined as the undiscounted sum of future principal repayments, face values are misleading when debts are issued with different contractual forms or maturities. In this paper, we construct alternative measures of the stock of external sovereign debt for 100 developing countries from 1979 through 2006 that correct for differences in contractual form and maturity. We show that our alternative measures: (1) paint a very different quantitative, and in some cases also qualitative, picture of the stock of developing country external sovereign debt; (2) often invert rankings of indebtedness across countries, which historically defined eligibility for debt forgiveness; (3) indicate that the empirical performance of the benchmark quantitative model of sovereign debt deteriorates by roughly 50% once model-consistent measures of debt are used; (4) show how the spread of aggregation clauses in debt contracts that award creditors voting power in proportion to the contractual face value may introduce inefficiencies into the process of restructuring sovereign debts; and (5) illustrate how countries have manipulated their debt issuance to meet fiscal targets written in terms of face values.     

On the Risk of a Sovereign Debt Crisis in Italy

The intention for the Italian government to stimulate business activity via large increases in government spending is not in line with the stabilisation of the public debt ratio. Instead, if such policy were implemented, the risk of a sovereign debt crisis would be high. In this article, we analyse the capacity of the Italian economy to shoulder sovereign debt under different scenarios. We conclude that focusing on growth enhancing structural reforms, would allow for moderate increases in public expenditure.     

Sovereign defaults and liquidity crises

Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and banking crises. The conventional view is that the domestic turmoil is the consequence of foreign retaliation, although there is no clear empirical evidence on “classic” default penalties. This paper emphasizes, instead, a direct link between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises building on two natural assumptions: (i) government bonds represent a source of liquidity for the domestic private sector and (ii) the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors in the event of default. In this context, external debt emerges even in the absence of classic penalties, and government default is countercyclical, triggers a liquidity crunch, and amplifies output volatility. In addition, a reform that involves a substitution of government bonds with privately-sourced liquidity instruments could backfire by restricting governments' access to foreign credit.     

Von der Staatsverschuldung zum Staatsbankrott?

The increase of sovereign debt and the crisis in the Eurozone led to a public discussion about the possibility and the causes of a sovereign default. This paper shows by looking at the development in the Eurozone that for a government defaulting on its debt the amount of sovereign debt is not crucial; the essential question is whether a government is able to borrow in its own currency and — if that is not the case — the amount of international debt of the whole country. This leads to important conclusions for European economic policy.     

Sovereign default, private sector creditors, and the IFIs

The data reveal that emerging market sovereign borrowing from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is small, intermittent and countercyclical compared to that from private sector creditors. The IFI loan contracts offered to sovereigns differ from the private ones in that they are more enforceable and have conditionality arrangements attached to them. Taking these contractual differences as given, this paper builds a quantitative model of a sovereign borrower and argues that better enforceability of IFI loan contracts is the main institutional feature that explains the size and cyclicality while conditionality accounts for the intermittency of borrowing from the IFIs.     

Nightmare on Kaiserstrasse

The overhang of debt (private and surging public) is perhaps the principal reason why recessions following financial crises are so deep and lasting. Frequently, a wave of international financial and banking crises is followed by a wave of sovereign defaults. This is the case of the Eurozone crisis today. How might a sovereign debt default of, say, Greece affect the Eurozone? The nightmare scenario is a complete unraveling of the euro. The euro can still be saved, but perhaps only with the weaker countries undergoing major restructuring of their sovereign debt.     

Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector

We use micro-level data to analyze emerging markets' private sector access to international debt markets during sovereign debt crises. We find that these crises are systematically accompanied by a decline in foreign credit to domestic private firms, both during debt renegotiations and for over two years after restructuring agreements are reached. This decline is large, statistically significant, and robust. We find that this effect is concentrated in the non-financial sector and is different for firms in the exporting and in the non-exporting sectors. We also find that the magnitude of the effect depends on the type of debt restructuring agreement.     

Banking sector reforms and corporate leverage in emerging markets

Using a large panel of non-financial firms in emerging markets, we study the relation between detailed measures of banking sector reforms and corporate leverage. We find that banking sector reforms are associated with lower corporate debt in emerging market firms, consistent with the notion that these reforms improve banks' risk management and result in tighter lending standards, leading firms to use less bank debt in their capital structure. These effects are less pronounced for financially constrained firms, suggesting a relative increase in the supply of bank credit to firms which were rationed prior to the banking sector reforms.     

Optimal reserve management and sovereign debt

Most models currently used to determine optimal foreign reserve holdings take the level of international debt as given. However, given the sovereign's willingness-to-pay incentive problems, reserve accumulation may reduce sustainable debt levels. In addition, assuming constant debt levels does not allow addressing one of the puzzles behind using reserves as a means to avoid the negative effects of crisis: why do not sovereign countries reduce their sovereign debt instead? To study the joint decision of holding sovereign debt and reserves, we construct a stochastic dynamic equilibrium model calibrated to a sample of emerging markets. We obtain that the reserve accumulation does not play a quantitatively important role in this model. In fact, we find the optimal policy is not to hold reserves at all. This finding is robust to considering interest rate shocks, sudden stops, contingent reserves and reserve dependent output costs.     

Designing a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism for a European Monetary Fund

The establishment of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) enjoys increasing academic and political support, though its advocates do not necessarily agree on the purpose and functions of such an institution. This paper aims to examine the features of the EMF that are relevant to sovereign debt restructuring. We argue that a European sovereign debt restructuring mechanism would be a feasible and useful tool in a crisis. It would facilitate private sector involvement and convey all the advantages that pre-defined procedures offer compared to ad hoc solutions in dealing with a crisis.     

地方政府债务对工业资本配置效率的非线性影响效应——基于动态面板平滑转换回归PSTR模型的检验

经济新常态下,提高工业资本等要素配置效率是实现经济向高质量增长转变的必然要求。本文在政府主导、投资驱动的工业发展模式下,结合地方债务压力和金融发展差异门限变量,在非线性框架下运用动态面板平滑转换回归模型实证检验地方债务规模与工业资本配置效率的渐进演变关系。研究发现,适度的地方债务规模有助于提高资本配置效率,但随着债务压力增加,举债对资本配置的正效应逐步减弱并产生负效应。究其原因,适度举债能补齐工业基础设施短板,压低土地成本,对工业发展产生杠杆效应,从而提高资本配置效率;但过度举债推升财政风险,占用信贷资源并强化企业融资约束,造成资本配置低效率。此外,研究发现,地方信贷规模提升,能缓解举债的融资约束,促进工业行业间的资本流动;而工业金融深化程度提高,能增强市场竞争机制在要素配置中的作用,缓解举债造成投资错配,从而增强资本配置效率。以上分析结果表明,地方政府举债应更理性、适度、规范。