The Euro's place in the world monetary system

The European Union is striding ahead on schedule towards European monetary union (EMU). Eleven member states will introduce the euro for book-keeping purposes on 1.1.1999, assigning responsibility for monetary policy to the European System of Central Banks. On 1.1.2002, the euro will also be in circulation as notes and coins, and the participating countries will abandon their national currencies by 30.6.2002 at the latest. But what part will the euro play in the world monetary system? And what conclusions do we need to draw?     

Economic Integration in East Asia: An International Input‐Output Analysis

To establish economic and monetary union (EMU) in East Asia, deepening regional integration through international trade is important. The economic interdependence (one of the important criteria for regional integration) study, using macro data does not reflect the indirect effects generated by interactions between different production sectors and different countries. We use the international input‐output (IIO) framework to study the economic interdependence at both macro and production sector levels. We refine the existing methods to reflect exogenous country effect and size effect of the economy. Our study suggests that establishing EMU in East Asia appears to be somewhat premature. However, we can be more optimistic for regional integration at the production sector level in East Asia when including Japan, which will create a basis for EMU in the region.     

Unions, competition and international trade in general equilibrium

We develop a two-country, multi-sector model of oligopoly in which unionised and non-unionised sectors interact in general equilibrium. The model is used to study the impact of trade liberalisation, deunionisation and firm entry on wages in unionised and non-unionised sectors, and on welfare. We find that a shift from autarky to free trade increases non-union wages and welfare, whereas the effect on union wages is ambiguous. We also show that partial deunionisation leads to higher wages in both unionised and non-unionised sectors, but only increases welfare when the proportion of unionised sectors is sufficiently low. Finally, wages in non-unionised sectors necessarily increase with firm entry, while the response of union wages and welfare depends on the trade regime.     

Economic Policy within a European Monetary Union

A European Monetary Union (EMU) and the complete transfer of the responsibility for monetary policy to a European central bank are no longer utopian ideas, but a politically highly relevant possibility. The question how economic policy goals can be achieved within such a monetary union is therefore gaining in importance.     

On the Relation of Monetary and Political Union

When EMU took effect in 1999, no progress in the direction of political union had been achieved — indeed, it had not even been attempted. Therefore, from the beginning the euro was confronted with a kind of sword of Damocles: can monetary union survive without political union?     

The road to European Economic and Monetary Union

The debate on the concrete shape of the second stage of European economic and monetary union ist in full swing. What are the benefits that may be expected from EMU? What risks have to be avoided?     

EMU calls for comprehensive labour market reform

The debate about European monetary union has so far been dominated by questions of fiscal convergence, the adequate conversion exchange rate and the stability of the Euro. Relatively little attention has been given to the labour market effects although labour market performance will be crucial for the long-term success or failure of EMU. The following article deals with the interrelationship between EMU and labour market flexibility in Euroland.     

Hysteresis and Emu

We consider how differences between the way firms react to a common monetary policy affect the performance of a monetary union. A model is presented in which heterogeneous firms respond discontinuously to monetary shocks. The implication is that the level of economic activity has a selective memory of the extremum values of the shocks experienced, and depends on the distribution of switching values for entry and exit.     

Monetary Union – a Successful Venture for Europe?

A broad EMU is now in prospect when the single European currency is launched in 1999, including ten or eleven EU member states. The UK could also join early in the next century "if EMU is a success". This article describes the path to monetary union and discusses the potential problems and opportunities raised by this ambitious project. Distinguishing between technical and economic success, it outlines three potential sources of tension and difficulty for those joining in the first wave, and argues that Britain will not be able to avoid its effects even though it will not be joining initially.     

A currency board for European Monetary Union outsiders

It is becoming clear that strict interpretation of the Maastricht criteria and adherence to the 1.1.1999 as the starting date for EMU will lead to a two-speed monetary union with insiders and outsiders. In this case, the author proposes the introduction of a currency board for outsiders in order to ensure a minimum of convergence before these countries join EMU as well as to confront the danger that outsiders may become faced with longer term obstacles to membership. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A02GP105 00003     

The trilemma of a monetary union: Another impossible trinity

A monetary union among autonomous countries cannot simultaneously maintain an independent monetary policy, national fiscal sovereignty and a no-bailout clause. These three features make up an impossible trinity, and attempts to preserve all three concurrently will ultimately end in failure. In order to save EMU, one of these three must be abandoned.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union

This paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is hit by supply shocks. We also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization. While monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade. Besides exploring optimal policies, we also consider monetary and fiscal rules. We study these rules both under coordination and non-coordination by the fiscal authorities.     

Greece and the Euro: The chronicle of an expected collapse

Ten years after Greece’s accession to EMU, the venture has proved to be almost a complete failure. Obviously, the country joined EMU disappointingly unprepared. After EMU accession, Greece failed to seek the necessary adaptations. Its economic policy was inconsistent with the economic logic and rules of the game of a monetary union. EMU did not in itself lead to the Greek crisis. Nevertheless, the supervisory arrangements clearly failed to work. Moreover, the unfolding of the crisis was assisted by EMU’s inherent weakness in managing asymmetric disturbances and the absence of early warning and rapid intervention mechanisms.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union

This paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is hit by supply shocks. We also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization. While monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade. Besides exploring optimal policies, we also consider monetary and fiscal rules. We study these rules both under coordination and non-coordination by the fiscal authorities.     

Managing an Economy Under EMU: The Case of Ireland

Ireland's experience of limited monetary independence within the EMS indicated that such independence was bought at the price of significant risk premia on interest rates. This experience informed its decision to join EMU, and membership has resulted in the expected credibility gain. Since the start of EMU inflation in consumer prices in Ireland has risen well above the EU average. However, this need not be a matter of concern within a monetary union. Instead, what should concern the Irish administration is a high rate of inflation in wage rates and domestic asset prices chiefly housing. While monetary policy is no longer available as an instrument of domestic policy, fiscal policy can still be used to effectively target these problems. The lessons of the first three years of membership is that the focus of fiscal policy within Ireland needs to change, and that the EU institutions also need to focus more clearly on the needs of the Euro area rather than on those of individual regional economies.     

A theory of the currency denomination of international trade

The currency denomination of international trade has significant macroeconomic and policy implications. In this paper we solve for the optimal invoicing choice by integrating this microeconomic decision at the level of the firm into a general equilibrium open economy model. Strategic interactions between firms play a critical role. We find that the less competition firms face in foreign markets, as reflected in market share and product differentiation, the more likely they will price in their own currency. We also show that when a set of countries forms a monetary union, the new currency is likely to be used more extensively in trade than the sum of the currencies it replaces.     

Targetsalden: Viel mehr als nur ein Haftungsrisiko

The Target2 balances of the ESCB have become a focus of scholarly discussion. Triggered by a loss of international competitiveness and subsequent current account deficits in the EMU’s periphery states, they now constitute a default risk for the core states. But there is more to it: balance of payment disequilibria in a currency union are supposed to trigger money supply flows from surplus countries to deficit countries. Since they form the basis for readjustments in relative prices and competitiveness, they must not be neutralised by monetary policy. The ECB’s Target2 balances create precisely this neutralisation and thus undermine the self-adjusting mechanism of the EMU.     

EMU and trade: A PPML re-assessment with intra-national trade flows

This paper examines the EMU effect on trade for the eleven early joiners and Greece relying for the first time on data that include both international and intra-national trade flows, in line with all the microfoundations of the structural gravity model of trade. We find that the overall EMU impact on trade is positive between its members and, specially, for trade between members and non-members. Interestingly, we further show that the effect of the EMU on bilateral trade remarkably differs across countries. For Ireland, Belgium–Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal and Austria, we find robust evidence that EMU has boosted trade both with other members and with third countries, while for Finland, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the results suggest that only trade with third countries has been enhanced by the EMU. Greece is the only country that shows a negative impact in trade with other EMU members and no effect in trade with non-members. Finally, the results across countries according to the direction of the trade flows (exports versus imports) do not show significant differences in any case.     

Current Account ‘Core–Periphery Dualism’ in the EMU

Current account (CA) dispersion within European Union (EU) Member States has been increasing progressively since the 1990s. Interestingly, the persistent deficits in many peripheral countries have not been accompanied by a significant growth process able to stimulate a log run rebalancing as neoclassical theory predicts. To shed light on the issue, this paper investigates the determinants of Eurozone CA imbalances, focusing on the role played by financial integration. The analysis considers two samples of 22 OECD and 15 EU countries, three time horizons corresponding to various steps in European integration, different control variables and several panel econometric methods. The results suggest that within the EU group of countries financial integration contributed to explain the CA deterioration in the peripheral countries especially in the post‐EMU period creating an asymmetric behaviour within the EMU. From a financial stability perspective, this ‘divergence’ could hinder the effectiveness of monetary policy. By reducing the apparent benefits of participating in the monetary union, it also raises the risk of a break‐up.     

Monetary Union Viability: A Criterion Proposal

We propose a model that represents the dynamic behaviour of a monetary union comprising two countries whose natural interest rates are initially unequal. This initial disparity and the subsequent application of a common monetary policy generate different national inflation rates and lead to losses of competitiveness, foreign deficits, and the indebtedness of one country with respect to the other. We propose as a viability criterion for the modelled monetary union a combination of non‐explosive foreign debt and the ability of the central bank to neutralize the contracting effects of taking on additional debt to avoid falling into a liquidity trap.