Asset Policies During an Oil Windfall: Some Simple Analytics

Many developing countries are currently experiencing oil windfalls, whether due to discoveries or to price effects. Such windfalls pose a series of policy dilemmas. The literature has focused on one of these: the choice between using windfall savings for public capital formation and investment in foreign assets. There are good theoretical reasons for investing a substantial part of the windfall initially abroad: the return to investment would fall below the world interest rate if the windfall were to be used entirely for domestic investment. Investing abroad offers an escape from diminishing returns: foreign assets can be repatriated gradually and used for domestic investment. However, in practice the efficient balance between domestic and foreign assets is politically difficult to sustain. Also, even if politically feasible this strategy is inefficient due to the failure to expand the private capital stock (‘equipment’). The policy problem is that the government cannot undertake such investment itself and trying to induce private agents to undertake equipment investment by transferring part of the windfall to them is likely to fail as a result of information problems. We argue that domestic debt repayment solves this dilemma. It has the added advantage of making foreign asset accumulation difficult to reverse.     

Dangers in the reduction in U.S. international net worth

The great concern exercised over the accuracy of estimates of the net direct investment position as a part of the U.S. international net worth is largely misplaced. By focusing on additions to the U.S. international net worth embodied in real assets owned in foreign countries, analysts divert attention from the large and growing volume of foreign-owned claims in private U.S. financial markets and the implications of those claims for instability in the foreign exchange market and for financial crisis.     

The demand for safe assets in emerging economies and global imbalances: New empirical evidence

Recent economic theory has singled out mismatches between the supply and the demand of safe financial assets in emerging countries as drivers of international capital flows and, ultimately, global current account imbalances. This paper assesses empirically the contribution of such “search for safe assets” to the size and composition of emerging economies’ international asset portfolios. Excess demand for safe assets in financially less‐developed countries would imply that these countries hold disproportionately high shares of their total portfolios in foreign assets. Moreover, financially less‐developed countries would hold disproportionately high shares of their foreign portfolios in financially developed countries, which are the major producers of ostensibly safe assets. This paper finds little empirical support for these predictions. Financially less‐developed countries allocate a larger proportion of their total holdings to domestic assets. Even when focusing on their foreign portfolios, there is no evidence of a general bias towards the assets of financially developed countries. Overall, asset mismatches do not appear to explain the asset allocation of financially less‐developed countries.     

Macroeconomic interdependence under incomplete markets

This paper uses a two-country, flexible-price model with overlapping generations of infinitely lived households to study the role of net foreign asset dynamics in the propagation of productivity shocks. Absence of Ricardian equivalence ensures existence of a unique steady-state level of net foreign assets, to which the economy returns following temporary shocks. Model dynamics are significantly different from those of a setup in which terms of trade movements perform all the international adjustment and net foreign assets do not move. The difference relative to a complete markets economy in which net foreign asset movements play no role in shock transmission is smaller. It is amplified if the substitutability across goods rises and if shocks are permanent.     

When Do Long‐term Imbalances Lead to Current Account Reversals?

We extend the literature on sharp reductions in current account deficits by taking into account not only short‐term determinants, but also the deviation of net foreign assets from their long‐run equilibrium level. First, we analyse the long‐term relationship between net foreign assets and a set of explanatory variables and construct a measure of imbalances. Next, we model current account reversals by incorporating this new measure and compare the predictive power of this model with the baseline specification that does not account for long‐term imbalances. Our new model has a superior performance in and out‐of‐sample, especially when we control for the sign of imbalances. We also find that low net foreign assets do not necessarily lead to sharp reductions in current account deficits; it is rather the situation when they are below their equilibrium level that triggers reversals. Finally, we document that our new measure of net foreign asset imbalances is important only for developing countries, whereas standard models perform well for industrial economies.     

我国石油对外贸易流量分析与对策研究

石油是关系国家经济安全的重要战略物资,本文通过对我国石油进出口贸易一些流量指标的分析,发现:(1)石油净进口量过大,进口依存度偏高,并有逐年递增的趋势;(2)原油进口的地区集中度偏高,不利于石油资源供应稳定;(3)国际油价持续高企,对国内经济稳定造成威胁。并据此提出了相关政策建议。     

Medium-term determinants of current accounts in industrial and developing countries: an empirical exploration

This paper provides an empirical investigation of the medium-term determinants of current accounts for a large sample of industrial and developing countries, utilizing an approach that highlights macroeconomic determinants of longer-term saving and investment balances. Cross-section and panel regression techniques are used to characterize the variation of the current account across countries and over time. We find that current account balances are positively correlated with government budget balances and initial stocks of net foreign assets. Among developing countries, measures of financial deepening are positively associated with current account balances while indicators of openness to international trade are negatively correlated with current account balances.     

Betting the house

Is there a link between loose monetary conditions, credit growth, house price booms, and financial instability? This paper analyzes the role of interest rates and credit in driving house price booms and busts with data spanning 140 years of modern economic history in the advanced economies. We exploit the implications of the macroeconomic policy trilemma to identify exogenous variation in monetary conditions: countries with fixed exchange regimes often see fluctuations in short-term interest rates unrelated to home economic conditions. We use novel instrumental variable local projection methods to demonstrate that loose monetary conditions lead to booms in real estate lending and house prices' bubbles; these, in turn, materially heighten the risk of financial crises. Both effects have become stronger in the postwar era.     

Commodity Markets and Commodity Mutual Funds

Fundamental economic factors—market demand and supply conditions—provide the most consistent explanation for trends in commodity prices from 2004 to 2011. This paper presents empirical evidence that the rise and fall of commodity prices on a monthly basis can be strongly linked to the value of the U.S. dollar and the world business cycle—in particular, to the strength or weakness in emerging market economies such as China, Brazil, India, and Russia. Despite concerns raised by some policymakers that increased commodity index investment (the financialization of commodities) has driven commodity price movements, numerous academic studies have concluded that index-based investing has not moved prices or exacerbated volatility in commodity markets in recent years. An examination of weekly and monthly net flows into commodity mutual funds reveals that these flows have little or no effect on the overall growth rate of commodity prices. In particular, weekly flows into commodity mutual funds do not lead to future commodity price changes. These results are consistent with academic papers that find little or no impact of commodity index investors on commodity prices in individual markets. The paper concludes by briefly discussing three key factors that illustrate why flows into commodity mutual funds cannot explain commodity price movements.     

The effect of trade liberalization on child labor

The question of how trade liberalization affects the employment of children in developing economies is at the core of the debate on globalization. Trade theory predicts that an increase in the price of an exported good could either increase or decrease child labor depending on the magnitudes of the substitution and income effects. In this paper, we study the relationship between changes in the relative price of an exported commodity and child labor using household-level data from within a poor country. In particular, we relate child labor to regional and intertemporal variation in the real price of rice surrounding national and international rice market integration in Vietnam. We find that higher rice prices are associated with declines in child labor. Income effects play an important role in this relationship. Rice price increases are associated with the largest declines in child labor in households that are large net producers of rice. These findings show that greater market integration can be associated with less child labor. Moreover, our results suggest that the use of punitive trade sanctions on exports from developing countries to eradicate child labor is unlikely to yield the desired outcome.     

Patterns of foreign direct investment in poor countries

This paper introduces endogenous adoption costs for productive assets in a Ramsey-type growth model with international capital flows. There are two classes of productive assets: owner-specific and location-specific. Adoption costs are an increasing function of the level of technology embodied in the investor's owner-specific assets and a declining function of the host country's location-specific assets. In this setting, the observed pattern of international capital flows is consistent with diminishing returns to capital. Further, our model predicts that the sectoral allocation of foreign direct investment is similar in rich and poor countries.     

Are asset price guarantees useful for preventing Sudden Stops?: A quantitative investigation of the globalization hazard-moral hazard tradeoff

An implication of the globalization hazard hypothesis is that ‘Sudden Stops’ caused by global financial frictions could be prevented by offering foreign investors price guarantees on emerging markets assets. These guarantees create a tradeoff, however, because they weaken globalization hazard while creating international moral hazard. We study this tradeoff using a quantitative, equilibrium asset-pricing model. Without guarantees, margin calls and trading costs cause Sudden Stops driven by a Fisherian deflation. Price guarantees prevent this deflation by propping up foreign demand for assets. The effectiveness of price guarantees, their distortions on asset markets, and their welfare implications depend critically on whether the guarantees are contingent on debt levels and on the price elasticity of foreign demand for domestic assets.     

The external wealth of nations mark II: Revised and extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 1970-2004

We construct estimates of external assets and liabilities for 145 countries for 1970-2004. We describe our estimation methods and key features of the data at the country and global level. We focus on trends in net and gross external positions, and the composition of international portfolios. We document the increasing importance of equity financing and the improvement in the external position for emerging markets, and the differing pace of financial integration between advanced and developing economies. We also show the existence of a global discrepancy between estimated foreign assets and liabilities, and identify the asset categories accounting for this discrepancy.     

Foreign banking in developing countries; origin matters

Driven by globalization and increased financial integration, the last decade has seen many foreign banks entering developing countries. Although the majority of these banks are from high-income countries, recently banks from developing countries have followed suit. This paper looks at this phenomenon, by examining the differences and similarities between developing and high-income country foreign banks. Using a large dataset on banking sector FDI in developing countries, we find that 27% of all foreign banks in developing countries are owned by a bank from another developing country, while these banks hold 5%of the foreign assets. The importance of developing country foreign banks is much larger in low-income countries (both in number of banks and in terms of assets) and this type of foreign banking is strongly regionally concentrated. Although foreign bank entry by both developing country as well as high-income country banks seems to be driven by economic integration, common language and proximity, banks from developing countries are more likely to invest in small developing countries with weak institutions where high-income country banks are reluctant to go. This result seems to suggest that developing country banks have a competitive advantage dealing with countries with a weak institutional climate. Furthermore, our results indicate that developing country foreign banks have a higher interest margin and are less profitable than foreign banks from high-income countries.     

Demography and low-frequency capital flows

We consider the role of demographic trends in driving international capital flows in a multicountry overlapping generations model in which saving decisions are tied to agents' life expectancy. Capital flows reflect differences between saving and investment across countries. Demographic changes affect the aggregate accumulation of assets in two ways: by changing life expectancy which changes individual household saving behavior, and by changing the age distribution of the population by which individual household decisions are aggregated. We use a quantitative version of the model to illustrate the impact of demography on capital flows and net foreign assets in China, Germany, Japan, and the United States.     

Comparative Advantage and the Gains from Financial Trade: A Reappraisal

Emerging market crises have suggested that a national benefit‐cost assessment of external financial liberalisation could well prove unfavourable. This paper re‐examines the principle of comparative advantage in its application to financial trade to seek guidance on measures that might permit a fuller realisation of the potential benefits involved. Drawing a parallel with Balasubramanyam's work on the gains from FDI and international migration we distinguish between those arising in financial trade from the net transfer of capital, and those deriving from the contemporaneous exchange of financial claims or services of equivalent value. In the first interpretation a country's comparative advantage is manifested by its role in ‘intertemporal’ trade (as a borrower or lender). Our alternative emphasis is on the contractual risk‐return characteristics of the financial claims exchanged. This perspective is applied firstly to portfolio diversification gains arising from further international stock market integration. Secondly, price risk management for developing countries in international primary commodity trade is discussed. Both applications imply the need for significant institutional development but could realise approximately contemporaneous gains reminiscent both of those involved in merchandise trade and in the skills and product (or service) flows that Balasubramanyam has emphasised in relation to FDI and international migration.     

Funding development infrastructure without leverage: A risk‐sharing alternative using innovative sukuk structures

Muslim countries of the developing world suffer indebtedness resulting mostly from funding development infrastructure. Faced with a dire need for development infrastructure but with inadequate resources to fund them domestically, these governments often resort to foreign borrowing. As neither foreign banks nor international debt markets would allow for the debt to be in home currency, the funding is invariably denominated in foreign currency. For the borrowing country, in addition to currency exposure such borrowing increases the country's leverage and economic vulnerability. As these countries typically have a narrow economic base with heavy reliance on commodity exports, they are susceptible to the vagaries of commodity price fluctuation. Leverage increases the amplitude of the economy's fluctuation, resulting if not in outright crisis, then, at least in financial distress and depreciating home currency. As a result, when the foreign currency funded project comes on stream, it is burdened with huge accumulated debt which in many cases makes the project unmanageable without further government help through subsidy of operating costs. This further stresses already stretched government budgets and perpetuates indebtedness. This cycle of borrowing, leverage and vulnerability can be broken by innovative use of sukuk. The problem with debt financing is that the servicing requirements are independent of the underlying project's risk or cash flows. This paper presents two sukuk structures based on the risk sharing principles of Islamic finance. Sukuk that have returns linked to the nation's gross domestic product growth if the funded project is non‐revenue generating and linked to earnings of the project if it is revenue generating can avoid the problems above. The pay‐off profile, estimated cost of funds and returns to investors of these sukuk are discussed. When designed in small denomination, such sukuk can enhance financial inclusion, help build domestic capital markets and enable the financing of development without stressing government budgets.     

Resource-based FDI and expropriation in developing economies

Globally, foreign direct investment (FDI) assets are expropriated more in resource extraction industries compared to other sectors. Despite the higher apparent risk of expropriation in resources, countries more likely to expropriate also have a larger share of FDI in the resource sector. An incomplete markets model of FDI is developed to account for this puzzle. The type of government regime is stochastic, with low penalty regimes facing a relatively low, exogenous cost of expropriating FDI, and country risk is measured by the variation in these costs across different regimes. The key innovation of the model is that the government, before the regime type is known, is able to charge different prices to domestic and foreign investors for mineral rights. Granting cheap access increases FDI and reduces the country's share of resource rents, increasing the temptation to expropriate in a relatively low penalty regime. In very high-risk countries, subsidizing resource FDI increases the total value of output by raising investment, and the net gains from expropriating in a low penalty regime outweigh the rents foregone under a high penalty one. However, a stochastic resource output price results in relatively low-risk countries restricting FDI inflows to the resource sector instead — “windfall profits” in this sector raise incentives to expropriate when prices are high, yet minimization of the ex ante risk of expropriation is preferred owing to the relatively high penalty for expropriating. These results imply a higher average share of resource-based FDI in countries most likely to expropriate, while resources account for a high share of expropriated assets compared to the sector's global share of FDI. We show that the model is able to reconcile observed patterns of foreign investment and expropriation for a sample of 38 developing and emerging economies.     

Sterilisation and Monetary Control by the GCC Member Countries

The prevailing dollar peg of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the absence of any significant current and capital account restrictions led some to believe that these countries have lost monetary independence. However, the paper presents evidence that interest rates of the GCC countries did not converge to the interest rates of the US implying that the assets of the GCC countries are not perfect substitutes to the US assets. This imperfect asset substitutability has allowed the GCC countries to manoeuvre their monetary policies and the central banks of the GCC countries have had some control over their money growth rates by sterilising the changes in international reserves. Results indicate that the monetary authorities of these countries used domestic credit policy to attain some domestic policy objective while engaging in sterilised foreign exchange intervention. This result implies that the proposed GCC central bank should be able to maintain the monetary independence as a group and can reap the benefit of monetary efficiency of the proposed Gulf Monetary Union.     

Manufacturing outsourcing,onshoring, and global equilibrium

Manufacturing is now a national strategy for many countries to combat slow economic growth, and positively viewed with the current trend of onshoring foreign manufacturing operations. We develop a cross-country regression model that predicts manufacturing employment as a function of population growth, foreign direct investment, and purchasing power parity. Results through the year 2100 suggest that manufacturing is trending toward a global equilibrium with higher levels of manufacturing outputs but much lower levels of manufacturing employment. The reason is that countries tend to evolve from having little manufacturing to commodity manufacturing at large scale and low wages. As infrastructure and human capital develop, there is the tendency to pursue advanced manufacturing in support of higher valued goods. The manufacture of commodity products is then outsourced to those countries with lower costs justified by their less-developed infrastructure and human capital, and so the virtuous cycle continues. While this model suggests that current efforts in revitalization of domestic manufacturing would lead to an increase in wealth in the United States, the bad news is that these gains are unlikely to be sustainable in the long term. However, the good news is that manufacturing acts as a rising tide that raises all nations and our global quality of life.