高管任期、高管薪酬与薪酬委员会有效性研究

本文结合中国具体的国情上市公司的产权性质因素,对薪酬委员会的作用进行检验：从高管盈余管理动机(尤其是任期末)、可操控性应计项两个方面来考察它们对高管薪酬的影响。通过历史数据检验来证实我国上市公司中设立薪酬委员会是否会在高管任期最后一年通过调整盈余构成提升自身薪酬的影响程度来缓解高管的盈余管理动机。     

薪酬委员会在高管薪酬激励有效性中的治理效应研究——基于2002-2010年A股上市公司的实证研究

本文考察了薪酬委员会在高管薪酬考核与评价中对高管薪酬与会计业绩关系的调整。研究发现,当盈余波动性较大时,薪酬委员会会减弱高管薪酬与会计业绩之间的相关性。与应计利润相比,薪酬委员会会增强经营活动现金流对高管薪酬的影响。本文还发现了薪酬委员会降低薪酬粘性给公司薪酬激励造成的不利影响。我们的研究表明,薪酬委员会对高管薪酬与会计业绩之间关系的调整是积极、有效的,设立薪酬委员会的公司对高管薪酬的考核与评价也更加客观、合理。     

会计信息可比性与高管薪酬契约有效性

会计信息在高管激励契约中的作用历来是理论与实务中关注的重要问题。本文以2006～2016年我国上市公司为对象,研究会计信息可比性与高管薪酬契约有效性之间的关系,结果发现,会计信息可比性与公司高管薪酬-业绩敏感度之间存在显著正相关关系。与国有企业相比,会计信息可比性对薪酬契约有效性的影响在非国有企业中更为显著。进一步分析发现,会计信息可比性与高管薪酬-业绩敏感度之间的正相关关系在信息复杂程度较高、内部控制质量较差、外部监督较弱的企业中更为显著。总体而言,本文的研究结果表明会计信息可比性特征对薪酬契约有效性具有重要影响。     

高管薪酬、员工薪酬与公司的成长性——基于中国中小上市公司的经验数据

高管薪酬的激励作用一直是研究的热点,而很多学者忽略了同样具有激励作用的员工薪酬。本文对深市中小板上市公司2007-2011年的数据进行了实证分析,通过研究薪酬激励与企业成长性的关系,寻找企业可持续发展的方式。研究结果表明:员工薪酬与高管薪酬仅在国有中小上市公司中具有激励作用,可以提高其成长性;通过对薪酬差距的研究可知,在设计薪酬时不仅要考虑薪酬的绝对值和相对值,还应注意企业所处的具体情境,考虑高管团队协作需要、财务风险、技术复杂性和企业规模等因素对薪酬差距的影响。     

媒体报道与高管薪酬契约有效性

本文利用2003-2011年中国A股上市公司11567个年度观察样本数据,实证检验了媒体报道对公司高管薪酬契约有效性的影响关系,并进一步考察这一影响关系在不同产权性质公司中和不同制度环境下的差异。结果发现:(1)媒体报道水平与高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性之间存在显著的正向影响关系,说明媒体报道提高了高管薪酬契约有效性。(2)区分产权性质后发现,媒体报道的上述正向影响作用仅在国有上市公司样本才显著成立,意味着媒体报道主要提高了国有企业高管的薪酬契约有效性。(3)上市公司所处地区的制度环境水平越高,媒体报道的上述正向影响作用越强,表明制度环境是媒体报道有效发挥上述作用的重要条件。     

高管薪酬与企业经营业绩相关性分析——基于上交所A股上市公司的实证分析

本文以上海证券交易所A股上市公司为研究对象,对高管薪酬与企业经营业绩之间的关系进行实证分析。分析结果表明高管薪酬与企业经营业绩呈正相关关系,同时,高管薪酬水平很大程度上也受到企业规模大小的影响。     

高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性研究——基于山东省上市公司的实证分析

本文选取沪A股山东省33家上市公司作为主要研究对象,对公司高管薪酬、高管持股比率和国家(国家法人)持股的整体情况进行了分析,分别从高管薪酬、薪酬差距和高管持股的角度研究了这些因素与企业绩效的相关性,考察了企业规模与高管薪酬以及平均薪酬的相关性.在目前的薪酬体系下,山东省上市公司高管薪酬逐年增长.整体看来,这些公司中国家...     

高管薪酬与公司业绩的关系

公司高级管理层的薪酬问题越来越受到社会的普遍关注。高管薪酬问题是由于控制权和所有权的分离而产生的。高管的薪酬进而又产生了代理成本问题。本文研究的目的是分析高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的关系。经研究发现:高管薪酬与公司业绩之间存在显著正相关。     

高管薪酬契约设计的研究进程与展望

随着经济的发展,企业的委托一代理问题日益为政府、企业相关利益人和学者所关注。通过企业的高管人员薪酬契约来实现对高管人员的激励与约束,在最大程度上降低代理成本,已经成为各方共识。对高管薪酬的讨论和研究在报刊杂志和专业论文中层出不穷,     

企业参与精准扶贫与高管薪酬契约有效性

本文以2016—2020年A股上市公司为样本,检验了企业参与精准扶贫对高管薪酬契约有效性的影响。研究结果显示,企业参与精准扶贫显著提高了高管薪酬-业绩敏感性,提升了薪酬契约有效性。这一结论经过一系列内生性和稳健性检验后依然成立。机制分析表明,参与精准扶贫降低了信息不对称水平并吸引了媒体关注,从而提高了高管薪酬契约有效性。异质性分析发现,参与精准扶贫对高管薪酬契约的治理效应存在于非国有企业。进一步研究发现,企业参与精准扶贫能够显著抑制高管薪酬粘性,且参与后续乡村振兴工作同样可以提高高管薪酬契约有效性。本文为全面理解参与精准扶贫对企业的治理效应提供了重要参考依据,也为进一步引导企业参与乡村振兴提供了经验证据。     

Remuneration committees,shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay–performance link

We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority‐ and majority‐independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority‐independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.     

Pay me Right: Reference Values and Executive Compensation

This paper examines the importance of reference values for executive compensation contracts. We rely on a quasi‐experimental setting (the adoption of pay guidelines), and a well‐defined measure of individual‐specific reference values to provide evidence on how a change in CEO reference compensation leads to subsequent changes of actual pay. We find that executive compensation adjusts gradually towards the new reference values, and that the speed of the adjustment depends on the corporate governance characteristics: the firm ownership structure, the role of the State and of the employees in the firm decision making. These results provide empirical support for theoretical models of bargaining that take into account reference values.     

The Effect of the Mandatory Adoption of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Executive Compensation

This study investigates empirically the effect of corporate governance principles on executive compensation and firm performance prior to and after the adoption of the first Greek Law on corporate governance. Prior to the adoption of the law, managers were not compensated in line with their performance. Since its introduction, a significant link has been observed between executive compensation and company performance as measured by accounting measures of performance. Following the adoption of corporate governance principles by law, the main mechanism that controls executive compensation is the election of independent non-executive board members. The results are robust to alternative accounting measures of performance.     

高管薪酬粘性、风险承担与企业投资效率——管理者权力与融资约束的调节作用

本文选取2010―2019年中国A股上市公司数据,实证分析了高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的影响及其作用机制。研究表明:(1)高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率具有负向影响,会加剧企业过度投资,由此加大非效率投资及降低投资效率。(2)高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响仅对“奖优-低惩劣”薪酬契约有效。相对于非国有、高估值与制造业企业,高管薪酬粘性对国有、低估值与非制造业企业投资效率的负向影响更为显著。(3)管理者权力的提高会加剧高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响,加剧高管权力寻租引发的薪酬补偿效应,由此稀释薪酬奖惩对业绩变动的敏感度。融资约束程度的提高会减弱高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响,这种负向影响主要针对投资不足企业,对过度投资企业不显著。(4)风险承担在高管薪酬粘性与企业投资效率的关系中承担着中介作用,高管薪酬粘性通过影响企业风险承担来影响企业投资效率,“高管薪酬粘性-风险承担-企业投资效率”的传导渠道有效。     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Executive Compensation

This paper examines the relationship between the compensation of the top five executives at a set of over 400 publicly listed Canadian firms and various internal and external corporate governance‐related factors. The media is full of stories suggesting a relationship between large executive compensation packages and failures in governance at various levels within organisations, but there exists little formal analysis of many of these relationships. Our analysis provides empirical evidence supporting some of these assertions, refuting others and documenting new relationships. We find that variances in internal governance related to differences across firms in the characteristics of the CEO, compensation committee and board of directors do influence both the level and composition of executive compensation, especially for the CEO. Considering external measures of corporate governance, we find that different types of shareholders and competitive environments impact executive compensation. We do not find that either the internal or external governance characteristics dominate.     

The Relationship Between Equity-Based Compensation and Managerial Risk Taking: Evidence from China

The authors analyze the impact of equity-based compensation on managerial risk-taking behavior in Chinese listed firms from January 2006 to July 2011. They find that greater risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest more in research and development (R&D) projects and less in capital expenditures. Greater managerial risk-taking incentive increases firm focus. Managerial risk-taking incentives have positive effects on firms' leverage. Overall, increasing the sensitivity of chief executive officers' portfolio value to stock return volatility helps incentivize executives to work harder, as sharing gains and losses with shareholders aligns the interests of executives and shareholders. In addition, the results indicate that state control of firms has a negative effect on R&D investment, and this suggests that state-controlled firms should take more initiative to innovate.     

高管薪酬外部公平性对代理人行为激励效应的实证研究

高管薪酬外部公平性是社会公平研究的重要问题。本文重新定义和区分了高管薪酬外部公平性概念,并基于相对分位数计量方法对高管薪酬外部公平性激励效应进行了研究。实证结果表明:我国高管薪酬分配总体服从右偏分布,分配总体上不公平;分配的公平性趋势逐年恶化;分配不公平的公司集中度加强;相对于普通员工薪酬,高管薪酬的市场定价相对更公平;高管薪酬外部公平性显著影响企业业绩,且存在区间效应,从而导致了公平分配的机会成本。本文为评价高管薪酬分配的外部公平性和估算公平分配的机会成本提供了计量参考。     

The Impact of Ownership Structure on the Structure of Compensation Committees

The practice of appointing insiders to the compensation committee has drawn considerable criticism since compensation committees play an important role in executive compensation decisions. This paper examines the association between the firm's ownership structure and the decision to use insiders on the compensation committee. The paper finds that CEO stock ownership is positively related to the presence of insiders on the compensation committee whereas the stockholdings of non-executive employees, as a group, is negatively related to the presence of insiders.     

才能信号抑或薪酬辩护:超额薪酬与战略信息披露

本文研究了高管在获得超额薪酬时是否披露了更多的战略信息,并进一步检验了此时战略信息披露动机符合管理者才能信号假说还是薪酬辩护假说。结果表明,战略信息披露与超额薪酬正相关,且在国企尤其是央企中、薪酬业绩敏感性较低以及机构投资者持股比例较低的公司中两者正相关性更强,这表明两者的关系符合薪酬辩护假说,即高管在获得超额薪酬时,为了提高薪酬的正当性和合理性,会披露较多的战略信息来展现自己的才能。本文从高管薪酬辩护视角考察了信息披露的动机,特别是在发展中国家的制度背景下丰富了有关信息披露动机的研究。     

Value of Multinationality: Internalization, Managerial Self-interest, and Managerial Compensation

In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial self-interest on the value of multinationality. Since agency theory also suggests that a divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders can be aligned by effective managerial incentive, we also examine the effect of managerial compensation on the value of multinationality. Our results show that for high- Q (Tobin's Q > 1 ) firms, investors do not associate the spending of free cash flow on multinationality with the problem of overinvestments. For high- Q firms, it is also found that the value of multinationality can be enhanced by effective managerial incentives. For low- Q firms (Tobin's Q < 1 ), it is found that the concern of managerial self-interest overwhelms the benefits of internalization, making multinationality a value-decreasing event. For low- Q firms, managerial compensation is also ineffective in promoting value-enhancing foreign direct investments.