GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL TAX‐BASED PUBLIC PENSION REFORM*

This paper presents an overlapping generations model in which: (i) firms create emissions as by‐products of production; and (ii) tax revenue from the working young is transferred to the retired elderly as pay‐as‐you‐go pension benefits. The paper focuses on a replacement ratio, which measures the proportion of after tax work earnings replaced by the public pension, and considers a replacement ratio neutral reform in which the newly introduced environmental tax is devoted to cutting the social security tax, keeping the replacement ratio unchanged. It is shown that the reform may improve growth, environmental quality and the nonenvironmental utility of every generation.     

Public pensions and growth

This paper investigates the relationship between the size of an unfunded public pension system and economic growth in an overlapping generation economy, in which altruistic parents finance the education of their children and leave bequests. Unlike the existing literature, we model intergenerational altruism by assuming that children's income during adulthood is an argument of parental utility. Unfunded public pensions can promote growth when families face liquidity constraints preventing them from investing optimally in the education of their children. We consider two alternative ways of financing a public pension system, either by levying social contributions in a lump-sum manner or in proportion to labour income. We find that there is no case for unfunded public pensions in economies where bequests are operative. By contrast, there exists a growth-maximising size of the public pension system in economies where bequests are not operative and individuals are sufficiently patient.     

An inter-temporal general equilibrium analysis of the Australian age pension means test

The Australian age pension is somewhat unusual among developed countries in that it is means tested against both the claimant’s income and assets. While means testing of age pensions facilitates the aims of directing public pensions to those senior individuals most in need and of containing pension expenditures by governments, it also has the effect of changing the incentives of individuals to work and save. This paper examines the implications of the Australian means tested age pension for incentives of individuals to save and work, for government financial commitments and for the welfare of individuals. To this end, we develop an overlapping generations model of the Australian economy that incorporates the essential features of the Australian pension, superannuation and taxation policy settings and use it to explore the implications of several hypothetical policy changes that relax the means test of the age pension. Our results confirm that the existing means-tested, age pension represents a disincentive for some older Australians to work.     

OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS, WAGES, AND JOB MOBILITY IN GERMANY

Pension‐covered workers in Germany are three times less likely to change jobs than workers not covered by an occupational pension scheme. This paper examines the effects of occupational pension coverage and pension portability loss on voluntary job changes using a sample selection model with endogenous switching. The model estimates, derived from western German panel data for 1985–1998, indicate that occupational pension coverage reduces worker mobility by imposing a capital loss on those leaving their job before retirement age. Moreover, pension‐covered workers receive a higher compensation, which discourages mobility. Making pensions portable increases mobility, but from a low initial level.     

Welfare Analysis of Pension Reforms in an Ageing Japan

This paper uses a computable general equilibrium model with overlapping generations to explore the effects of different public pension schemes on economic welfare, and intergenerational and intragenerational equity. Besides the benchmark case based on the 2004 public pension reform, the present paper considers two alternative reforms: financing the basic pension benefit through a consumption tax, and eliminating the earnings‐related pension benefit. The simulation results suggest that even the consumption‐tax financing of only the basic pension, namely, the combination of both reforms, might not improve overall economic welfare, although it increases economic output by inducing capital formation.     

Pension Reform, Capital Markets and the Rate of Return

Abstract. This paper discusses the consequences of population aging and a fundamental pension reform – that is, a shift towards more pre‐funding – for capital markets in Germany. We use a stylized closed‐economy, overlapping‐generations model to compare the effects of the recent German pension reform with those of a more decisive reform that would freeze the current pay‐as‐you‐go contribution rate and thus result in a larger funded component of the pension system. We predict rates of return to capital under both reform scenarios over a long horizon, taking demographic projections as given. Our main finding is that the future decrease in the rate of return is much smaller than often claimed in the public debate. Our simulations show that the capital stock will decrease once the baby‐boom generations enter retirement, even if there were no fundamental pension reform. The corresponding decrease in the rate of return, the direct effect of population aging, is around 0.7 percentage points. While the capital market effects of the recent German pension reform are marginal, the rate of return to capital would decrease by an additional 0.5 percentage points under the more decisive reform proposal.     

Is an unfunded social security system good or bad for growth? A theoretical analysis of social security systems financed by VAT

This study investigates how unfunded public pensions financed by value added tax (VAT), as discussed in Japan, affect economic growth and whether payroll tax (PT) or VAT is the more growth‐friendly tax structure for financing public pensions. We examine these issues using overlapping generations models with parental altruism and find that a public pension system financed by VAT may increase economic growth when bequests are operative. By contrast, when bequests are inoperative, public pensions hinder growth unless agents are sufficiently patient. Finally, public pensions financed by VAT are more growth‐friendly than those financed by PT.     

Expectations,uncertainty and institutions. An application to the analysis of social security reforms

The aging process that many developed economies will face in the medium-term is leading to reforms in the public pensions systems in order to solve the potential financial unsustainability generated by the foreseeable increase in the expenditure in pension benefits (assuming that the current social security contributions and the eligibility conditions will remain unchanged). Neoclassical economics defends a radical reform of these systems, substituting the current pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) systems by funded systems. In this paper, using the Post-Keynesian theory as a theoretical framework, we provide an alternative reflection to that proposed by the neoclassical economics about the choice between the alternative pension systems. The focus of the paper is the advantages of the PAYGO pension systems to stabilize the expectations of future income.     

个税递延型养老保险——基于税收优惠的思考

个税递延型养老保险因其国际实施的普遍性、对个人投保的激励性和对保险企业的盈利刺激性,成为解决我国个人养老问题的当下选择.养老金计划的发展离不开完备有效的监管.政府在出台相关政策法规时,尽量能做到各类政策并驾齐驱,多管齐下.其中,规范和完善资本市场是发展个人养老金计划的重中之重.     

Life Expectancy and Claiming Behavior in a Flexible Pension System

We study the relationship between early claiming of pensions and incentives in the highly flexible Norwegian public pension system, measuring incentives to claim based on an estimated model for expected longevity. Despite a strong correlation between incentives and claiming decisions, the additional costs to public budgets arising from this selection turn out to be modest. Based on analyses exploiting only variation in expected pensions generated by variation in parental longevities and only claiming of pensions not in conjunction with retirement, we conclude that part of the selection is active: some individuals claim pensions early because they gain from doing so.     

National culture and the configuration of public pensions

This paper explores the determinants of public pension plan configurations. It is argued that the level of intragenerational redistribution in public pension plans is related to a country's cultural background. The level of intragenerational redistribution is measured by Krieger and Traub's Bismarckian factor. The countries’ cultural background is operationalized using cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede. The empirical results are in line with our hypotheses. Uncertainty avoidance appears to have a significant, positive association with the Bismarckian factor (low intragenerational redistribution in public pensions), whereas the relation with individualism is negative (high intragenerational redistribution). Moreover, a positive association is found between the Bismarckian factor and inflation shocks in the first half of the 20th century. While the sample size is limited, the results are robust to the inclusion of different economic, institutional, and demographic control variables as well as to using alternative model specifications. These findings have important public policy implications. We argue that pension reform proposals suggesting a transformation of public to private pension provision should consider the cultural background of countries.     

Do private pensions increase national savings?

This paper discusses how private pension programs differ from public social security in their likely impact on aggregate saving. Although private pensions are likely to reduce direct saving by employees, this should be offset by the combination of companies' partial funding and the shareholders response to unfunded liabilities. In contrast to several earlier empirical studies that implied that social security does depress national saving, the current time series evidence suggests that the growth of private pensions has not had an adverse effect on saving and may have increased saving by a small amount.     

Optimal accumulation in an endogenous growth setting with human capital

This paper considers a three-overlapping-generations model of endogenous growth wherein human capital is the engine of growth. It first contrasts the laissez-faire and the optimal solutions. Three possible accumulation regimes are distinguished. Then it discusses a standard set of tax-transfer instruments that allow for decentralization of the social optimum. Within the limits of our model, the rationale for the standard pattern of intergenerational transfers (the working-aged financing the education of the young and the pension of the old) is seriously questioned. On pure efficiency grounds, the case for generous public pensions is rather weak.     

Micro simulations on the effects of ageing-related policy measures

In the Netherlands, like in most OECD-countries, the ageing of the population endangers the sustainability of public finances. In this paper a dynamic micro simulation model is used for calculating the financial and economic implications of the ageing problem and the policy measures considered. The model uses micro datasets of all Dutch pensions and pension entitlements. The retirement decision is modelled by using an option value approach.     

Social Security Systems,Human Capital,and Growth in a Small Open Economy

We consider a small open economy in which the level of public education funding is determined by popular vote. We show that growth can be enhanced by the introduction of pay‐as‐you‐go pensions even if the growth rate of aggregate wages falls short of the interest rate. The reason is that the pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) system allows future retirees to partially internalize positive externalities of public education due to the positive effect of higher future labor productivity on their pension benefits. The majority support for education funding will be especially strong when the PAYG benefit formula is flat, i.e., progressively redistributive. If a flat benefit PAYG pension system is in place then the economy will achieve the highest growth rate relative to the alternative pension system designs. While such PAYG pension system may be opposed by the majority of working individuals due to inferior returns to their pension contributions relative to a funded scheme, it is likely to be politically sustained by a coalition of older individuals and lower income workers.     

The effect on the Italian private pension market of increased uncertainty concerning public pension provision

This paper examines the effect on the demand for private pensions in Italy of the recent strong increase in uncertainty concernin future public pension provision. Theory suggests that such increase uncertainty will increase the demand for all forms of private sector saving, and, in particular, the demand for private pensions — despite the present generosity of the Italian public pension arrangement. This theoretical proposition is confirmed by an empirical test. The implications are important.     

社会统筹养老金供给的两难困境与政策选择

在中国养老保险制度建立与完善过程中,其主要矛盾仍然是如何筹资和如何给付的问题。社会统筹主要通过提高缴费率和扩大覆盖面两条途径来增加基金供给,而现行制度却面临着养老金供给的两难困境。一是提高缴费率增加了基金收入,但不利于经济增长与扩大覆盖面;二是不同群体实行差别费率有利于扩大覆盖面,但加剧了养老金收支的失衡。经数理模型与实证分析,社会统筹缴费率应该保持适度水平,同时应该对不同群体实行差别费率的政策进行调整,以建立养老保障的长效机制。     

Uncertain Pension Income and Household Saving

This paper investigates the relationship between household saving and pensions, and estimates both the displacement effect of pensions on private saving and the precautionary saving effect due to uncertainty in pension income. I estimate the savings equation implied by a simple life‐cycle model featuring income uncertainty using survey data for Dutch households, with subjective expectations on pension benefits and uncertainty. Exploiting exogenous variation due to pension fund performance, I find that households save significantly more due to uncertainty in pension income. Not controlling for uncertainty biases the estimated displacement effect of pensions on private savings towards zero.     

Endogenous retirement and public pension system reform in Spain

Population aging has spurred developed countries around the world to reform their PAYG pension systems. In particular, delaying legal retirement ages and reducing the generosity of pension benefits have been widely implemented changes. This paper assesses the potential success of these policies in the case of the Spanish economy, and compares them with the results obtained by the (rather modest) reforms already implemented in 1997 and 2001. This evaluation is accomplished in a heterogeneous-agent dynamic general equilibrium model where individuals can adjust their retirement ages in response to changes to the pension rules. We check the ability of the model to reproduce the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior (particularly the pattern of early retirement induced by minimum pensions). The model is then used to explore the impact of pension reforms. We find that already implemented changes actually increase the implicit liabilities of the system. In contrast, delaying the legal retirement age and extending the averaging period in the pension formula to cover most of the individual's life-cycle can reduce the implicit liabilities substantially. These findings reveal the failure of the Spanish political system to distribute the costs of population aging more evenly across the generations.     

The Effect of Benefit Reductions on the Retirement Age: The Heterogeneous Response of Manual and Non‐Manual Workers

I estimate the effect of benefit reductions on the timing of retirement. The introduction of actuarial adjustments in the German public pension system serves as a source of exogenous variation to estimate discrete time transition rates into retirement for individuals of age 60–66. Responses to benefit reductions are elaborated separately for manual and non‐manual workers. On average, individuals postpone retirement by 13.2 months if pension benefits are reduced by 3.6 percent for each year of early retirement. This result is in line with the previous quasi‐experimental literature and suggests that people respond to the incentive of reducing the implicit tax on further periods of work. However, among men the response is about 50 percent lower for manual workers compared to non‐manual workers. Surprisingly, this does not necessarily indicate that retirement incomes of manual workers deteriorate. The explanation is that disability pensions are available at age 63—without benefit reductions.