Hiring Older Employees: Do the Age Limits of Early Retirement and the Contribution Rates of Firms Matter?

We examine the effects of a Finnish pension reform on firms' incentives to hire older employees. The reform restricted the eligibility ages for early retirement and changed the size‐related contribution rates of firms. According to our theoretical model, the positive effect on the values of new hires extends to age groups younger than those directly affected by the reform, and the effects are strongest in the largest firms. These model predictions were confirmed in a difference‐in‐difference‐in‐differences analysis on the probability of the hiring of workers of different ages in firms of different sizes.     

Social Security Earnings Test and the Labour Supply of the Elderly: New Evidence from Unique Survey Responses in Japan

This study proposes an alternative approach of utilizing direct responses to a survey on the social security earnings test for the elderly to provide new evidence on the sensitivity of the labour supply decision of workers aged between 60 and 64 with respect to the test. Our empirical results show a discouraging effect on working in a large proportion of these workers in Japan, even after correcting for the observed attributes of individuals who reported being either affected or unaffected.     

Social Desirability of Earnings Tests

Abstract. In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual's benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two 'endings': an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before. We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before.     

Micro simulations on the effects of ageing-related policy measures

In the Netherlands, like in most OECD-countries, the ageing of the population endangers the sustainability of public finances. In this paper a dynamic micro simulation model is used for calculating the financial and economic implications of the ageing problem and the policy measures considered. The model uses micro datasets of all Dutch pensions and pension entitlements. The retirement decision is modelled by using an option value approach.     

Endogenous retirement and public pension system reform in Spain

Population aging has spurred developed countries around the world to reform their PAYG pension systems. In particular, delaying legal retirement ages and reducing the generosity of pension benefits have been widely implemented changes. This paper assesses the potential success of these policies in the case of the Spanish economy, and compares them with the results obtained by the (rather modest) reforms already implemented in 1997 and 2001. This evaluation is accomplished in a heterogeneous-agent dynamic general equilibrium model where individuals can adjust their retirement ages in response to changes to the pension rules. We check the ability of the model to reproduce the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior (particularly the pattern of early retirement induced by minimum pensions). The model is then used to explore the impact of pension reforms. We find that already implemented changes actually increase the implicit liabilities of the system. In contrast, delaying the legal retirement age and extending the averaging period in the pension formula to cover most of the individual's life-cycle can reduce the implicit liabilities substantially. These findings reveal the failure of the Spanish political system to distribute the costs of population aging more evenly across the generations.     

Disability benefit microsimulation models in the Netherlands

Disability rates in the Netherlands used to be among the highest in the world. In 2002 the number of disability recipients approached one million. However, since then the number of disability cases has dropped remarkably due to a number of policy changes, the last of which being the new 2006 disability insurance scheme. On the other hand, in recent years the number of beneficiaries in the special scheme dedicated to the young handicapped has increased rapidly.     

The effects of the raising-the-official-pension-age policy in an overlapping generations economy

This paper studies how economic variables are affected by raising the official pension age. Although it is said that such a policy increases output, this paper shows that such a statement is not necessarily true. Moreover, the paper finds that the social security benefit can decrease, which implies that it might be impossible to sustain the same level of benefit only by such a policy.     

Sick of work or too sick to work? Evidence on self-reported health shocks and early retirement from the BHPS

We follow individuals as they retire using discrete-time hazard models applied to a stock sample from 12 waves of the British Household Panel Survey. We use a generalised ordered probit model to explore the existence of reporting bias and to purge the self-reported measure of health of this bias. This model takes into account the possibility that anticipated retirement may influence reporting of health. There is evidence that health shocks are a determinant of retirement age. This is the case for both men and women and is observed for both health limitations and a measure based on latent health status derived from the generalised ordered probit model. While the size of the health effect varies according to how we measure health, the relative effect is large compared to the other variables, and in particular when compared to the effects of private pensions. However numerical simulations show that this high hazard ratio interacts with the, relatively low, incidence of new health limitations among the age group of interest to generate only a modest number of excess early retirements. Further, our results do not show evidence that the health status of their partner affects the hazard of early retirement for both men and women. Having an employed partner does reduce the hazard of early retirement.     

An inter-temporal general equilibrium analysis of the Australian age pension means test

The Australian age pension is somewhat unusual among developed countries in that it is means tested against both the claimant’s income and assets. While means testing of age pensions facilitates the aims of directing public pensions to those senior individuals most in need and of containing pension expenditures by governments, it also has the effect of changing the incentives of individuals to work and save. This paper examines the implications of the Australian means tested age pension for incentives of individuals to save and work, for government financial commitments and for the welfare of individuals. To this end, we develop an overlapping generations model of the Australian economy that incorporates the essential features of the Australian pension, superannuation and taxation policy settings and use it to explore the implications of several hypothetical policy changes that relax the means test of the age pension. Our results confirm that the existing means-tested, age pension represents a disincentive for some older Australians to work.     

THE GENDER GAP IN PRIVATE PENSIONS

In many western countries, older women receive considerably less private pension income than older men on average. We analyse this differential in Britain, examining differences between the sexes both in private pension coverage and in pension income conditional on receipt. Using regression‐based decompositions, we show that both gender gaps are associated mainly with differences in returns to personal characteristics rather than with differences in personal characteristics per se.