Regional burden sharing of GHG mitigation policies in a decentralized federation

The distribution of the burden of cost of GHG mitigation policies is a contentious issue. This is particularly true among regional jurisdictions within a federal country with decentralized power. The regional allocation of emissions permits could hinder the political feasibility of national GHG mitigation policies. We build a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the implications of different burden sharing rules in a hypothetical national GHG abatement policy with a market-based instrument. In addition to assessing the impacts of regional permit allocation rules that entail inter-regional transfers of wealth, we consider a particular emissions allocation scheme, called ‘no prior entitlement’ (NPE), that avoids such transfers. The insights derived from the simulations suggest that the NPE policy avoids the politically contentious issues of inter-regional transfers of scarcity rents. Its welfare impact lies between those in the entitlement-based permit allocation schemes.     

Risk sharing and inventories

The paper shows how various features of market organization, such as existence of retail chains, the centralized warehousing of inventories by wholesalers, and the arrangements whereby suppliers partially reimburse sellers for unsold inventories can be explained in terms of optimal contracts for sharing the risks of excess inventories. When retailers face heterogeneous demands, the paper demonstrates the optimality of shared inventories and obtains optimal incentive properties for the risk sharing policy.     

Risk sharing and export performance with firm heterogeneity

We investigate how market uncertainty affects the export performance of a firm through financial frictions. We first extend Melitz's (2003) heterogeneous firm trade model by incorporating demand shocks, linking the demand uncertainties to the financing costs of firms. In this extension, the default probability is endogenously determined by a firm's productivity and demand uncertainty. Hence, firms with higher productivity or lower market uncertainty are offered lower interest rates and thus show better export performance. As an application, we also show that a risk-sharing mechanism, that pools default risk for a certain group of firms, lowers the default risk. This mechanism allows banks to charge lower interest rates to the member firms and therefore ultimately improves their export performance in both extensive and intensive margins. We find a real-world example of such a mechanism from business groups in Korea. Using Korean firm-level data, we show that the more diversified the business group, the greater the likelihood that its member firms export and the bigger their export revenues. We also show that our results are robust to alternative explanations for Korean business groups’ export competitiveness.     

Risk sharing and retrading in incomplete markets

At a competitive equilibrium of an incomplete-markets economy agents’ marginal valuations for the tradable assets are equalized ex-ante. We characterize the finest partition of the state space conditional on which this equality holds for any economy. This leads naturally to a necessary and sufficient condition on information that would induce agents to retrade, if such information was to become publicly available after the initial round of trade.     

Risk sharing and industrial specialization in China

We investigate how risk sharing shapes industrial specialization across prefecture-level cities in China. By unbundling the mechanisms of risk sharing, we find that ex ante risk sharing generates a first-order stimulant effect on the geographical concentration of manufacturing industries, particularly for non-state-owned enterprises and cyclical industries. Ex post risk sharing matters only for state-owned enterprises. This result remains robust to instrument variable estimation and controlling for other determinants of industrial specialization. Finally, we show that interregional labor migration (special fiscal transfers) plays an important role in promoting interregional ex ante (ex post) risk sharing. The study implies that much more risk sharing and efficiency gains from industrial specialization would be achieved if capital markets and credit markets are better developed.     

Interest group politics in a federation

The optimal degree of decentralization depends on the importance of inter-state externalities of local policies. We show that inter-state externalities are determined by the spatial distribution of interest groups within the country. Interest groups who have multi-state scope internalize inter-state externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests within a single state. We use variation in the geographic boundaries of politically-powerful industrial interests to estimate the effect of inter-state externalities on firm performance. Using firm-level panel data from a peripheralized federation, Russia in 1996–2003, we show that, controlling for firm fixed effects, the performance of firms substantially improves with an increase in the number of neighboring regions under influence of multi-regional business groups compared to the number influenced by local business groups. Our findings have implications for the literatures on federalism and on international trade as trade restrictions are a common source of inter-state externalities.     

Government debt spillovers and creditworthiness in a federation

Estimates are presented for the impact of debt accumulation by the central and subcentral governments of a federation on the creditworthiness of other federation member governments. The estimates, calculated using an ordered probit model and Canadian provincial data, indicate that debt accumulation by the central government has reduced the creditworthiness of indebted provincial governments. Interprovincial debt accumulation effects are negative but relatively small, except for the debt of the largest province, which has a strong positive effect on the creditworthiness of the other provinces. These findings may have implications for other federations and associated jurisdictions, such as the European Union. JEL Classification: H63, F36
Les effets de retombée de la dette gouvernementale et la cote de crédit dans une fédération. On calcule l'impact de l'accumulation de la dette par les gouvernements fédéral et sub-fédéraux dans une fédération sur la cote de crédit des autres gouvernements de la fédération. Ces calibrations, à l'aide d'un modèle probit en utilisant les données provinciales canadiennes, montrent que l'accumulation de la dette par le gouvernement central a réduit la cote de crédit des gouvernements provinciaux endettés. Les effets trans-provinciaux de l'accumulation de la dette sont négatifs mais relativement faibles, sauf dans le cas de la province la plus grande, laquelle a un fort effet sur la cote de crédit des autres provinces. Ces résultats peuvent avoir des implications pour d'autres fédérations comme l'Union Européenne.     

Risk sharing in the Middle East and North Africa

This study investigates welfare gains and channels of risk sharing among 14 Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, including the oil‐rich Gulf region and the resource‐scarce economies such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. The results show that for the 1992–2009 period, the overall welfare gains across MENA countries were higher than those documented for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations. In the Gulf region, the amount of factor income smoothing does not differ considerably when output shocks are longer lasting rather than transitory, whereas the amount smoothed by savings increases remarkably when shocks are longer lasting. In contrast, both factor income flows and international transfers respond more to permanent shocks than to transitory shocks in the non‐oil MENA countries. The results also show that a significant portion of shocks is smoothed via remittance transfers in the economically less‐developed MENA countries, but not in the oil‐rich Gulf and OECD countries. Finally, for the overall MENA region, a large part of the shock remains unsmoothed, suggesting that more market integration is needed to remedy the weak link of incomplete risk sharing.     

Wage,labour mobility and working time effects of profit sharing

This study presents empirical tests of a number of labour market hypotheses related to profit sharing using individual-level data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. It examines questions of differing wage, mobility (inter-and intra-firm) and working time responses under profit sharing as compared to conventional compensation arrangements.

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Zusammenfassung Auf Basis der Daten des deutschen Sozio-ökonomischen Panels werden verschiedene Hypothesen über Wirkungen der Gewinnbeteiligung auf dem Arbeitsmarkt getestet. Im einzelnen geht es um Fragen der Lohndifferenzierung, der inner- und zwischenbetrieblichen Mobilität sowie der Arbeitszeit. Es wird untersucht, ob und in welchem Umfang Effekte von der Gewinnbeteiligung ausgehen.

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We thank anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Budgetary policies in a DSGE model with finite horizons

This paper presents a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, capital accumulation and finite horizons. Our New Keynesian framework exhibits intergenerational wealth effects and is intended to investigate the macroeconomic implications of fiscal policy, which is specified by either a debt-based tax rule or a balanced-budget rule allowing for temporary deficits. The model predicts that fiscal expansions generate a trade-off in output dynamics between short-term gains and medium-term losses. It is shown that the effects of fiscal shocks crucially depend upon the conduct of monetary policy. Simulation analysis suggests that balanced-budget requirements enhance the determinacy properties of feedback interest rate rules by guaranteeing inflation stabilization.     

Risk,trust, and altruism in genetic data sharing

How does concern about genetic data privacy compare with other concerns? We conduct behavioral experiments to compare risk attitudes towards sharing genetic data with a healthcare provider with risk attitudes towards sharing financial data with a money manager. Both scenarios involve identical decisions and monetary stakes, permitting us to focus on how the framing of data sharing influences attitudes. To delve deeper into individual motivations to share data, we provide treatments that study how data sharers' altruism and trust affect their decisions. Our findings (with 162 subjects) indicate that individuals are more willing to risk a loss to privacy of genetic data (for an anticipated return framed as health benefits) than they are to risk loss of financial data (for an anticipated return in financial benefits). We also find that 50%–60% of data recipients choose to protect another person's data, with no significant differences between frames.     

The deductibility of provincial business taxes in a federation with vertical fiscal externalities

Should provincial business taxes be deductible under a federal profit tax? We show that the ‘optimal deductible,’ which neutralizes the vertical fiscal externality between the federal and provincial government, is the change in the federal tax base per dollar of tax revenue collected by the provincial government. The optimal payroll tax deductibility rate depends on the extent to which it is shifted to workers and on the difference between the federal tax rates on profits and on labour income. Two apparently contradictory positions – full deductibility of a payroll tax and non‐deductibility – are special cases of our model. La déductibilité des taxes provinciales imposées aux entreprises dans une fédération où il y a des externalités fiscales verticales. Est‐ce que les taxes provinciales imposées aux entreprises devraient être déductibles de l'impôt fédéral sur les profits? Les auteurs montrent que l'optimum de déductibilité qui neutralise les externalités fiscales verticales entre le fédéral et les provinces est le changement dans la base d'imposition fédérale par dollar de revenu fiscal collecté par le gouvernement provincial. Le taux de déductibilité optimal d'un impôt sur les salaires dépend de la portion du fardeau fiscal qui est déportée vers les travailleurs et de la différence entre les taux d'imposition du fédéral sur les profits et sur le revenu du travail. Deux positions apparemment contradictoires – pleine déductibilité d'un impôt sur les salaires et déductibilité nulle – sont des cas spéciaux du modèle général.     

Risk sharing role of foreign aid in developing countries

The effects of foreign aid on economic growth have been extensively investigated over the past 40 years. However, even though foreign aid can be a significant source of insurance against domestic output shocks for developing countries, its risk-sharing role has not been well explored. Using a sample of 22 developing countries over the period 2003–2013, we estimate the degree of income smoothing generated by foreign aid serving as an effective channel of international income smoothing. In particular, for the period 2003–2008, we estimate that foreign aid offset about 4% of the domestic output shocks. Furthermore, we investigate the determinants of the extent of risk sharing via foreign aid, recognizing the diversification of the originating countries as a key factor. Surprisingly, humanitarian aid seems to have a negative effect, which might be explained by its predominant role in the short run.     

International risk‐sharing in the short run and in the long run

Abstract International risk‐sharing has far‐reaching implications both for economic policy and for basic research in economics. When countries do not share consumption risk, individuals experience consumption fluctuations that are undesirable and possibly unnecessary. We investigate bilateral risk‐sharing at short vs. long horizons. We find substantial cross‐country consumption correlations at trend and business‐cycle frequencies. Correlations are particularly high within Europe. Prior research focused on first‐difference correlations, which are typically quite low. We argue that this reflects measurement error. At all horizons, we find that consumption correlations are not significantly different from output correlations, implying a lack of deliberate consumption risk‐sharing.     

Political bargaining in a federation: Buchanan meets Coase

In recent decades, the issues of federalism and political integration have gained prominence in public debate as well as in the academic realm. A frequently made point is that allowing free secession may protect the minority's interests, thus providing it with an incentive to enter the federation. This paper explicitly considers the political process in the federation arguing that the option to secede may distort the political choices made by the individual regions to improve their bargaining positions. As a result, the allocation of resources in the federation could well end up being inefficient and unattractive for the minority region. In contrast, limiting the secession possibilities by requiring the consent of a majority of voters through a regional referendum, rather than leaving it to the discretion of the legislature, restores efficiency.     

Wage discrimination and population composition in the long run

We derive the conditions that sign the effects of changing population composition on wage levels and ratios, when labor supply and discrimination preferences vary. The overall effect depends on an aggregate market, a relative market, and a preference distribution effect.     

Can regional policy in a federation improve economic efficiency?

In the European Union and in many federal and non-federal countries, the central government pays subsidies to poor regions. These subsidies are often seen as a redistributive measure which comes at the cost of an efficiency loss. This paper develops an economic rationale for regional policy based on economic efficiency. We consider a model of a federation consisting of a rich and a poor region. The economy is characterized by imperfect competition in goods markets and unemployment. Firms initially produce in the rich region but may relocate their production to the poor region. We show that a subsidy on investment in the poor region unambiguously increases welfare if labour markets are competitive. If there is unemployment in both regions, the case for regional subsidies is weaker.     

Risk sharing and transition costs in the reform of pension systems in Europe

Unfunded pay-as-you-go state pension schemes are financially unsustainable in Europe as elsewhere. Proponents of reform argue that, by switching to a fully funded scheme that takes advantage of the high return on assets such as equities, the solvency of the state scheme could be restored at little or no financial burden to current taxpayers. We show that this is mistaken for two reasons.
First, making the transition is itself costly. Unless this cost is substantially financed by debt, it will fall on current generations, who are therefore likely to oppose the reform. Second, potentially higher returns are accompanied by significantly higher risk, which we quantify. We explain how an insurance scheme could be designed to mitigate both risk and moral hazard.