Dynamic risk, accounting-based valuation and firm fundamentals

This study extends the accounting-based valuation framework of Ohlson (Contemp Acc Res 11(2):661–687, 1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (Acc Rev 74(2):165–183, 1999) to incorporate dynamic expectations about the level of systematic risk in the economy. Our model explains recent empirical findings documenting a strong negative association between changes in economy-wide risk and future stock returns. Importantly, the model also generates costs of capital that are solely a linear function of accounting variables and other firm fundamentals, including the book-to-market ratio, the earnings-to-price ratio, the forward earnings-to-price ratio, size and the dividend yield. This result provides a theoretical rationale for the inclusion of these popular variables in cost of capital (expected return) computations by the accounting and finance literatures and obviates the need to estimate costs of capital from unobservable (future) covariances. The model also generates an accounting return decomposition in the spirit of Vuolteenaho (J Finance 57(1):233–264, 2002). Empirically, we find that costs of capital generated by our model are significantly associated with future returns both in and out of sample in contrast to standard benchmark models. We further obtain significantly lower valuation errors in out-of-sample tests than traditional models that ignore dynamic risk expectations.     

The hospital capital crisis: issues for trustees

The erosion of the capital position in the hospital industry--one of the most complex and overregulated industries in the United States--is a major challenge to trustees. Hospital trustees have often neglected to examine their hospitals' capital needs on more than a project-by-project basis. In dealing with their hospitals' capital needs, trustees, most of whom are successful business people, too often take off their "business" hats and put on their "social worker" hats. In doing so they not only neglect to subject their hospitals' capital and operating programs to searching cost-benefit review, but they also overlook much useful knowledge about how to use corporate organization to shelter new ventures and strengthen their hospitals' market position and solvency. In this article, the authors discuss how hospitals can adopt successful corporate restructurings and strategies to respond to the adverse financial developments they will have to face in the coming years.     

DUTCH AUCTION VERSUS FIXED-PRICE SELF-TENDER OFFERS: DO FIRMS OVERPAY IN FIXED-PRICE OFFERS?

We investigate differences in purchase premiums and returns of common stock the day following the offer expiration of firms conducting Dutch auction self-tender offers versus those conducting fixed-price self-tender offers to see whether firms overpay for shares in fixed-price offers. After controlling for the proportion of shares sought and firm size, no statistically significant differences in premiums or returns are found between the two types of offers.     

Evidence on the existence of speculative bubbles in farmland prices

We conduct tests for the contribution of speculative bubbles to farmland prices. These tests are carried out under the hypothesis that farmland investors rationally form expectations. The outcome of tests reported here allows us to infer whether farmland prices are determined by market fundamentals-discounted returns from the highest economic land use-or whether rumors about farmland price movements are self-fulfilling. The tests are stationarity and cointegration tests relating farmland prices to rents. The tests are carried out using data from three farm production regions-the Corn Belt, the Northern Plains, and the Lake States. In each region, we find little evidence to reject the hypothesis that market fundamentals determine farmland prices.     

Do corporate insiders circumvent insider trading regulations? The case of stock repurchases

We use calculated values of standardized abnormal insider trading activity to investigate for patterns of unusual insider activity around fixed-price and Dutch auction repurchase announcements. Firms are classified according to whether the repurchase is signaling information about future cash flows, about the distribution of excess free cash flows, or about management's attempts to maintain control in the presence of a takeover. We find below normal levels of sales well before the event and above normal levels of sales after the event. This tendency is strongest for fixed-price offers and for firm's conveying information about future cash flows, and is absent for firms involved in takeovers. No evidence exists of abnormal levels of purchases before or after the event. We interpret the evidence as consistent with insiders successfully circumventing policies and regulations designed to prevent the exploitation of private information by timing the pattern of their security sales.     

A search cost model of obfuscation

This article develops models in which obfuscation is individually rational for oligopolistic firms. Firms sell a homogeneous good to rational consumers who incur search costs to learn prices. Search costs are endogenized by allowing obfuscation—firms have an unobservable action that increases the time needed to learn their price. One model involves search costs convex in shopping time. We show that slight convexity can dramatically alter the equilibrium price distribution. A second model examines an informational linkage between current and future search costs: consumers are uncertain about a component of search costs. Here, a signal‐jamming mechanism can lead to equilibrium obfuscation.     

RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS UNDER CONDITIONS OF COSTLY INFORMATION

This paper analyzes optimal formation of rational expectations where information is costly to obtain to utilize. Under these conditions, expectations normally formed by an estimator will be intermediate between those based on all available information and those which are optimal extrapolative predictors. ¹ 1 A large literature has grown out of Muth's seminal article 2 which argued that expectations should be consistent with available information. 3 and others have used the techniques of 1 to formulate expectations making use of all the information contained in the past values of the series being predicted.
Since the costs of information are likely to vary less than the value of information, this model can explain systematic differences in expectations in markets, such as, labor, for which the value of accuracy of expectations differs between or among buyers and sellers. Similarly, expectations about the same variable may differ between markets where arbitrage is also costly. Section I extends a model due to Theil toanalyzetheeffectsofcostlyinformation. Illustrative applications are discussed in Section II .     

Investment under uncertainty and time-inconsistent preferences

While standard real options models assume that agents possess a constant rate of time preference, there is substantial evidence that agents are impatient about choices in the short term but are patient when choosing between long-term alternatives. We extend the real options framework to model the investment-timing decisions of entrepreneurs with time-inconsistent preferences. The impact on investment-timing depends on such factors as whether entrepreneurs are sophisticated or naive in their expectations regarding their future time-inconsistent behavior, and whether the payoff from investment occurs all at once or over time. The model is extended to the case of a competitive equilibrium.     

The tests of a prince

When a CEO takes office, stakeholders dissect his or her intellectual, physical, and emotional capacities as they try to gauge whether the new leader will help them fulfill their aspirations and protect them from trouble. For the heir to a family business, the challenge of turning stakeholders into followers is particularly thorny: He or she must manage many constituencies--family members, directors, senior executives, investors, trade unions--that may not be convinced the successor has earned the right to hold the top spot. Making matters worse, says Lansberg, a family business expert, corporate scions usually ignore or greatly underestimate stakeholders. They don't realize that, particularly after they are formally anointed as CEOs, they must establish their credibility with and authority over these spheres of influence. Smart CEOs understand that their success depends on how well they respond to the iterative testing process that stakeholders use to make judgments about would-be leaders. This article offers a road map for managing the four kinds of tests that constitute iterative testing: Qualifying tests are assessments based on criteria--such as formal education, work experience, and professional awards--that executives can cite as evidence of suitability for the top job. Self-imposed tests are expectations that leaders themselves set and against which they assume stakeholders will measure their performance. Circumstantial tests are unplanned challenges or crises, during which stakeholders can observe the leader coping with the unexpected. And political tests are challenges from rivals who want to enhance their own influence, often by undermining the leader.     

Imperfect Information, Screening, and the Costs of Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan

Many governments have perceived the rural moneylender as usurious.This article takes a first step toward directly testing thevalidity of this view. In a study of services, costs, and chargesof fourteen informal market moneylenders and their clients inChambar, Pakistan, the article examines whether the high implicitinterest rates charged reflect the actual costs of operatingin that market. Estimates of the resource costs incurred byinformal lenders for screening, pursuing delinquent loans, overhead,and cost of capital (including unrecoverable loans) suggestthat lenders' charges are equal to their average cost of lendingbut exceed their marginal cost. This finding is consistent withthe view that the informal credit market is characterized byexcess capacity and monopolistic competition in the presenceof imperfect information.     

WHO WINS IN LARGE STOCK BUYBACKS – THOSE WHO SELL OR THOSE WHO HOLD?

Both fixed-price and dutch auction repurchases offer large premiums over current values to tendering shareholders. And, because announcements of such offers are generally accompanied by significant increases in stock prices, economists view selftender offers as mechanisms for signaling undervaluation. Using samples of fixed-price and dutch auction self-tender offers from the 1980s, this study attempts to answer the following questions: Are non-tendering shareholders fully compensated for the premium wealth transfer by the increase in the intrinsic value of their shares? Since fixed-price offers feature larger premiums, are they accompanied by larger increases in intrinsic value (or do insiders have a tendency to “overpay” in fixed-price offers)? Is the premium wealth transfer a big component of the returns to the two shareholder groups—and what percentage of firm value does the transfer represent? The findings of this study, unlike those reported by earlier research, suggest that the two types of offers generate roughly the same total returns (about 10–11%, on average, during the offering period) to shareholders who do not tender. Fixed-price offers involve considerably larger premiums (over the new, “full-information” price) and wealth transfers than dutch auctions. Reflecting the higher premiums, shareholders tendering into fixed-price offers receive higher returns than those tendering into dutch auctions (13.8% vs. 11.3% during the announcement period). But while fixed-price offers involve a considerably larger wealth transfer from non-tendering to tendering shareholders, fixed-price repurchases compensate the non-tendering shareholders for the larger wealth transfer with larger increases in “intrinsic value,” thus generating the same total return as dutch auctions. Moreover, despite the large premiums offered in both types of offers, the wealth transfer implicit in the premium represents a small cost (less than 1% in fixed-price offers, and less than 0.1% in dutch auctions) to non-tendering shareholders.     

Regulating bidder participation in auctions

Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first‐price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first‐price auctions with free entry for bridge‐building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly.     

Fiduciaries--HMOs--incentives to ration care. Pegram v. Herdrich

Pegram v. Herdrich, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (June 12, 2000): An HMO cannot be liable for breach of fiduciary duty because of mixed eligibility decisions by its doctors, even if the HMO gives the doctors financial incentives to minimize care because treatment decisions made by an HMO through its physician employees are not fiduciary acts within the meaning of ERISA. Where eligibility for benefits depends upon decisions by doctors concerning their conclusions about when to use diagnostic tests, when to authorize consultations or make referrals, proper standards of care, whether a proposed treatment is experimental, the reasonableness of certain treatment, and the emergency nature of a condition, such "mixed eligibility decisions" are not fiduciary acts under ERISA, and an HMO will not be treated as a fiduciary to the extent it makes such decisions through its doctors.     

What do professional forecasters' stock market expectations tell us about herding,information extraction and beauty contests?

We study how professional forecasters form equity market expectations based on a new micro-level dataset which includes rich cross-sectional information about individual characteristics. We focus on testing whether agents rely on the beliefs of others, i.e., consensus expectations, when forming their own forecast. We find strong evidence that the average of all forecasters' beliefs influences an individual's own forecast. This effect is stronger for young and less experienced forecasters as well as forecasters whose pay depends more on performance relative to a benchmark. Further tests indicate that neither information extraction to incorporate dispersed private information, nor herding for reputational reasons can fully explain these results, leaving Keynes' beauty contest argument as a potential candidate for explaining forecaster behavior.     

TRADE SIZE AND PRICE CLUSTERING: THE CASE OF SHORT SALES AND THE SUSPENSION OF PRICE TESTS

In this article, we compare trade size and price clustering of short sales with regular trades. We find that short sales cluster less on round sizes and round prices than do nonshort trades. When price tests are suspended, both trade size and price clustering markedly increase for short sales although the difference between shorts and nonshorts remains significant during the postsuspension period. These results are consistent with the idea that because of execution uncertainty caused by price tests, short sellers are less concerned with cognitive processing costs, negotiations costs, and the costs associated with revealing information through trade sizes.     

Learning from Trading

The incorporation of diverse information into asset prices isempirically examined in an actual securities market with multiplerounds of trade. Using prices of Israeli index and nominal bondsof equal maturity, we calculate implied expectations of inflationthat has already occurred but for which the official statistichas not yet been announced. Learning is defined as the convergenceof these expectations to the actual level of inflation in theperiod after the end of the month but before the announcementof the official statistic. We find that the variance of theinflation expectation errors decreases with trading days inthis period. The decline in the variance suggests that investorslearn, by repeatedly observing prices, about the distributionof other investors' information. We also find a positive relationbetween the dispersion of relative price changes and the sizeof the inflation-expectation errors on the first round of trade.The correlation diminishes as investors learn about the distributionof inflation information in the economy.     

The Forgone Gains of Incomplete Portfolios

This article proposes a test for the cost-based explanationof nonparticipation, by estimating a lower bound to the forgonegains of incomplete portfolios; these are in turn a lower boundto the costs that could rationalize nonparticipation in financialmarkets: high bounds would imply implausibly high costs. Assumingisoelastic utility and a relative risk aversion of three orless, for the stock market I estimate an average lower boundof between 0.7 and 3.3 percent of consumption. Since total annual(observable plus unobservable) participation costs are likelyto exceed these bounds, the cost-based explanation is not rejectedby this test.     

Testing the Expectations Hypothesis on the Term Structure of Volatilities in Foreign Exchange Options

This article tests the expectations hypothesis in the term structure of volatilities in foreign exchange options. In particular, it addresses whether long-dated volatility quotes are consistent with expected future short-dated volatility quotes, assuming rational expectations. For options observed daily from December 1, 1989 to August 31, 1992 on dollar exchange rates against the pound, mark, yen, and Swiss franc, we are unable to reject the expectations hypothesis in the great majority of cases. The current spread between long- and short-dated volatility rates proves to be a significant predictor of the direction of future short-dated rates.