Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189–206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, F., 2001. Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ. Theory 17, 141–162] provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process.     

Asymmetric evolutionary games with non-linear pure strategy payoffs

In this paper, I extend the analytical framework of evolutionary game theory to games with two distinct types of players where the type-specific payoff functions are nonlinear on the right—bi-player-type nonlinear (BNL) evolutionary games. That is, asymmetric games where the payoffs for pairwise interactions are influenced by the ambient frequencies of the pertinent strategies of both types of players.While this paper is motivated by my interest in inter- and intra-gender conflicts of interest in sexual reproduction, BNL games also arise just as naturally in most two-species interactions. Thus, the methodology may provide a novel approach to investigating such classical ecological phenomena as prey–predator/host–parasite interactions and interspecies competition for resources.Finally, given the growing tendency to utilize evolutionary games in economic modeling, a case can be made for the current paper being of interest to traditional game-theoretic modelers in connection with situations such as buyer/seller or employer/employee interaction.     

Noncooperative Equilibrium and Chamberlinian Monopolistic Competition

This paper addresses the existence of equilibrium for a nonatomic Bertrand game in a Chamberlinian environment. We reformulate O. Hart′s model (Rev. Econ. Stud. 52, 1985, 529–546) as a nonatomic game and show that under dispersion of tastes and continuity of the tastes density, there exists a pure-strategies ε-equilibrium where prices exceed marginal cost. Unlike Hart′s model there is no need to impose uniformity (or even independence) on the distribution of the m-tuple of differential commodities that consumers care about. Moreover, demand curves are allowed to vary across firms and in equilibrium firms may earn profits. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: B21, D43, L13.     

Nonparametric Tests of Differences in Medians: Comparison of the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney and Robust Rank-Order Tests

The nonparametric Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test is commonly used by experimental economists for detecting differences in central tendency between two samples. This test is only theoretically appropriate under certain assumptions concerning the population distributions from which the samples are drawn, and is often used in cases where it is unclear whether these assumptions hold, and even when they clearly do not hold. Fligner and Pollicello's (1981, Journal of the American Statistical Association. 76, 162–168) robust rank-order test is a modification of the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test, designed to be appropriate in more situations than Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney. This paper uses simulations to compare the performance of the two tests under a variety of distributional assumptions. The results are mixed. The robust rank-order test tends to yield too many false positive results for medium-sized samples, but this liberalness is relatively invariant across distributional assumptions, and seems to be due to a deficiency of the normal approximation to its test statistic's distribution, rather than the test itself. The performance of the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test varies hugely, depending on the distributional assumptions; in some cases, it is conservative, in others, extremely liberal. The tests have roughly similar power. Overall, the robust rank-order test performs better than Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney, though when critical values for the robust rank-order test are not available, so that the normal approximation must be used, their relative performance depends on the underlying distributions, the sample sizes, and the level of significance used.     

Growth and Transition: Why Has China''s Performance Been So Different?

This paper explains the differences in performance between the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) since 1989 and China since its 1978–1979 reforms by the differing goals of economic reformers in China and in the CEECs. In China reforms were intended to promote growth rather than to create a market-based economy. Eastern European reformers’ main goal has been the creation of a market-oriented economy. The paper focuses on policies toward foreign trade, foreign investment, and foreign exchange since these highlight the differences in goals.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1997,25(3), pp. 422–440. University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia 5005, Australia.     

Tests of Fairness Models Based on Equity Considerations in a Three-Person Ultimatum Game

Two recent models incorporating fairness considerations into the economics literature based on agents' concerns about the distribution of payoffs between themselves and others (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999,Quarterly Journal of Economics. 114 (3), 769–816; Bolton-Ockenfels, 2000,American Economic Review. 90, 166–193) are investigated using a new three-person ultimatum game: One person allocates a sum of money to two others, one of which is randomly chosen to accept or reject the offer. Rejection gives both the responder and the proposer zero income and a positive consolation prize for the non-responder. The data show essentially no reductions in rejection rates, holding offers constant, with and without consolation prizes, contrary to both models' predictions.     

Tobin's q, investment, and the endogenous adjustment of financial structure

Should q theory be modified to take account of financial structure? This paper analyzes a general equilibrium q model where financial structure affects firm value. Agency costs and taxes combine to yield an interior solution for the endogenous debt–equity ratio. Although q is still a ‘sufficient statistic’ for investment, the endogenous adjustment of financial structure alters the relation between the interest rate and investment. In this model an increase in the corporate tax rate could either raise or lower the steady-state capital stock. Furthermore, both q and investment could jump in opposite directions to that of their steady-state values.     

Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: Characterization in the two-agent case

Two agents jointly operate a decreasing marginal returns technology to produce a private good. We characterize the class of output-sharing rules for which the labor-supply game has a unique Nash equilibrium. It consists of two families: rules of the serial type which protect a small user from the negative externality imposed by a large user, and rules of the reverse serial type, where one agent effectively employs the other agent's labor. Exactly two rules satisfy symmetry; a result in sharp contrast with Moulin and Shenker's characterization of their serial mechanism as the unique cost-sharing rule satisfying the same incentives property [Moulin, H., Shenker, S., 1992. Serial cost sharing. Econometrica 60 (5), 1009–1037]. We also show that the familiar stand-alone test characterizes the class of fixed-path methods under our incentives criterion [Friedman, E.J., 2004. Strong monotonicity in surplus sharing. Econ. Theory 23, 643–658].     

Endogenous timing,strategic tariff game and bilateral trade in vertical oligopoly

This paper builds an observable delay game in endogenous timing to study the possible occurrence of trade wars in a vertical, bilateral trade model. It examines the effects of production cost differences and order of moves on optimal tariffs, market equilibria, dumping margin and social welfare in both fixed timing and endogenous timing games. In a fixed timing game, it shows that price dumping in the intermediate good market arises from differences in country-specific final good production costs. Different from Bernhofen (1995; Journal of International Economics), trade costs resulting from reciprocal tariffs in upstream markets can reverse the price dumping under certain conditions. In an endogenous timing game, this paper finds that the magnitude of cost differences significantly influences countries’ decisions on the order of moves in a strategic tariff-making game. Both countries want to be the first movers under a small cost difference and consequently reach a simultaneous equilibrium result. This demonstrates that the second-best equilibrium proceeds under certain conditions. Under a large cost difference, sequential policy-making is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If the cost difference is sufficiently large, both countries have an incentive to launch a trade war as a multiple equilibrium game.     

Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: Implications for growth and inequality

China's current fiscal system is largely decentralized while its governance structure is rather centralized with strong top-down mandates and a homogeneous governance structure. Due to large differences in initial economic structures and revenue bases, the implicit tax rate and fiscal burdens to support the functioning of local government vary significantly across jurisdictions. Regions initially endowed with a broader nonfarm tax base do not need to rely heavily on preexisting or new firms to finance public goods provision, thereby creating a healthy investment environment for the nonfarm sector to grow. In contrast, regions with agriculture as the major economic activity have little resources left for public investment after paying the expenses of bureaucracy. Consequently, differences in economic structures and fiscal burdens may translate into a widening regional gap. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 713–726.     

Rent Seeking and Government Ownership of Firms: An Application to China''s Township–Village Enterprises

Using its control of regulated inputs, a government agency extracts rents from a manager who undertakes an investment. Such government rent-seeking activity leads to a typical hold-up problem. Government ownership serves as a second-best commitment mechanism, through which the government agency will restrain itself from the rent-seeking activity and may even offer the manager assistance in the form of tax breaks and subsidies. This mechanism works at a cost, however, as government ownership also compromises ex post managerial incentives and creates distortion in resource allocation. Nevertheless, government ownership Pareto dominates private ownership under certain conditions. These conditions correspond to a host of stylized empirical observations concerning local-government-owned firms, i.e., township–village enterprises, during China's transition to a market economy.J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 328 David Kinley Hall, Urbana, Illinois 61801. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D72, L33.     

University education in future studies— a mark III critique: Part II

In 1970 an initial survey was made of futures courses at university level based on forty courses that could be located in the United States and Canada [Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 2, 133–148 (1970)]. This was replicated during 1970–1972 on approximately 200 North American courses and reported changes in the field at the Third World Future Research Conference in Bucharest, September 1972 (Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change, 4, 387–407 [1973]). A third interation was funded by the World Institute Council and published in abstracted form with their permission here. The conclusions to be drawn from some six years of analysis of such courses, and drawn especially from the specifics of the 300 courses in the third iteration, can be lumped under five main headings: (1) All disciplines are to some degree finally alerted to the future implications of both their research and their teaching. (2) There remains still much “froth and nonsense” in futures courses. How to control this and encourage lively creativity is a complex problem-especially since the intellectual image of futurism today is not that high! (3) There appears to be no reliable sociocultural change theory backing future studies and there is precious little solid theory backing future studies and there is precious little solid theory in the field itself-offset by some progress in methodology. (4) Despite these strictures, if all future-oriented courses in American/Canadian universities were lumped together (future Studies per se; technology forecasting/assessment; policy sciences; peace studies; demography; environmental/ecology courses; general systems theory/system analysis/system dynamics; mathematical modelling and game theory; eschatology; utopian literature and science fiction; even black studies and women's courses) the total might approach 5000 and it is still growing, as is popular and academic understanding of the necessity “to plan ahead” in this period of human malaise. (5) Informal education of varied worth, from free swinging communes to middle management cram courses conducted by think-tanks, may turn out to be more useful in future-oriented advanced education than that which takes place in formal “walled” traditional institutions.     

The inequality–growth nexus in the short and long run: Empirical evidence from China

This paper argues that the conventional approach of data averaging is problematic for exploring the growth–inequality nexus. It introduces the polynomial inverse lag (PIL) framework so that the impacts of inequality on investment, education, and ultimately on growth can be measured at precisely defined time lags. Combining PIL with simultaneous systems of equations, we analyze the growth–inequality relationship in postreform China, finding that this relationship is nonlinear and is negative irrespective of time horizons. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 654–667.     

Infinite Histories and Steady Orbits in Repeated Games

We study a model of repeated games with the following features: (a) Infinite histories. The game has been played since days of yore, or is so perceived by the players: (b) Turing machines with memory. Since regular Turing machines coincide with bounded recall strategies (in the presence of infinite histories), we endow them with "external" memory; (c) Nonstrategic players. The players ignore complicated strategic considerations and speculations about them. Instead, each player uses his/her machine to update some statistics regarding the others′ behaviour, and chooses a best response to observed behaviour. Relying on these assumptions, we define a solution concept for the one shot game, called steady orbit. The (closure of the) set of steady orbit payoffs strictly includes the convex hull of the Nash equilibria payoffs and is strictly included in the correlated equilibria payoffs. Assumptions (a)–(c) above are independent to a large extent. In particular, one may define steady orbits without explicitly dealing with histories or machines.     

The Role of Absolute Continuity in “Merging of Opinions” and “Rational Learning”

D. Blackwell and L. Dubins (1962, Ann. Math. Statist.38, 882–886) showed that opinions merge when priors are absolutely continuous. E. Kalai and E. Lehrer (1993, Econometrica61, 1019–1045) use this result to show that players in a repeated game eventually play like a Nash equilibrium. We provide an alternative proof of merging of opinions that clarifies the role of absolute continuity while casting doubt on the relevance of the result. Persistent disagreement, the opposite of merging, allows the construction of a sequence of mutually favorable “bets.” By a law of large numbers, both agents are certain they will win these bets on average. This certain disagreement violates absolute continuity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C11, C69, C72, D83.     

The ghost of financing gap: testing the growth model used in the international financial institutions

The Harrod–Domar growth model supposedly died long ago. Still today, economists in the international financial institutions (IFIs) apply the Harrod–Domar model to calculate short-run investment requirements for a target growth rate. They then calculate a “financing gap” between the required investment and available resources and often fill the “financing gap” with foreign aid. The financing gap model has two simple predictions: (1) aid will go into investment one for one, and (2) there will be a fixed linear relationship between growth and investment in the short run. The data soundly reject these two predictions of the financing gap model.     

Gender-Based Focal Points

The subjects behaved significantly more “hawkish” in an experimental battle of the sexes game when the co-player was a woman compared to when it was a man. Discrimination helped the parties to coordinate and increase the average earnings in the subject group of mixed sex, compared to the unisex groups. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J7, C7, C9.     

Are environmental concerns drivers of innovation? Interpreting Portuguese innovation data to foster environmental foresight

The relationship between environmental concerns and innovation is analyzed in the context of Portuguese manufacturing firms, with the ultimate goal to foster measures of environmental foresight.Based on data from the Community Innovation Survey in Portugal, simple statistical tests, including Chi², t, and Levene's tests and contingency tables (adjusted standardized residuals), were used to study the relationship between firms' characteristics and the introduction of innovation aiming to reduce environmental damage. Environmental foresight is discussed based on three groups of variables that allow considering the industrial context that frames firm's actions, the economic performance of the firm and its innovation patterns.Results show that the development of innovation due to environmental concerns is positively associated with the firm's size and exports share, and negatively associated with its technological content. Moreover, it is shown that the firms that introduced innovations due to environmental concerns are likely to belong to an economic group, to have performed continuous R&D, or received public support. It is also shown that “lack of organizational flexibility” and “lack of receptivity by customers” are the two most relevant innovation barriers for these firms.     

Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.     

Farsightedly stable networks

A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible farsighted pairwise deviations from any network g G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of G satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). A non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a Pareto dominant network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest pairwise consistent set and the von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set.