Taxation of uncertain business profits,private risk markets and optimal allocation of risk

In this paper we explore what happens if the government bears some of the risk through a profit tax when the risk sharing in the venture capital market is incomplete due to non-observability of effort and moral hazard. If the external equity investors can enforce exclusive contracts with the entrepreneurs, the risk relief through a profit tax will lead to too much insurance and too low effort as compared with a second best optimal solution. Bond and Devereux [Bond, S.R. and Devereux, M.P. (1995). On the design of a neutral business tax under uncertainty. Journal of Public economics, 58, 57–71.] show that a proportional profit tax would be neutral in the absence of moral hazard. In the presence of moral hazard we demonstrate that the tax may affect the risk shifting through the market, in which case the premise for the neutrality result will no longer hold.     

IMF’s assistance: Devil’s kiss or guardian angel?

This paper contributes to the debate on the efficacy of IMF’s catalytic finance in preventing financial crises. Extending Morris and Shin (J Int Econ 70: 161–177, 2006), we consider that the IMF’s intervention policy usually exerts a signaling effect on private creditors and that several interventions in sequence may be necessary to avert an impending crisis. Without the IMF’s signaling ability, our results state that repeated intervention is required to bail out a country, whereby additional assistance may induce moral hazard on the debtor side. Contrarily, if the IMF exerts a strong signaling effect, one single intervention suffices to avoid liquidity crises.      

风险投资的激励机制

风险投资中存在各种较高的风险,其中包括企业家的道德风险.如何有效控制道德风险,提升风险投资的效率?通过什么样的机制或治理结构来激励创业企业家,使其努力工作?从效用、投资阶段、剩余控制权和剩余索取权等角度,分析了风险投资家对创业企业家实行的正反向激励机制.     

Ownership Structure and Technological Upgrading in International Joint Ventures

In a model of a joint venture between a local and a foreign firm who provide complementary inputs, this paper derives optimal ownership structures under different sharing rules. The local firm's profits may be maximized by assigning a majority share to the foreign firm. Efficiency (i.e., the minimization of double moral hazard) requires that the firm with the more productive input should get majority ownership. When only the foreign firm can upgrade its input, it should receive a larger share than what it receives in the absence of upgrading. The analysis implies that a blanket policy of prohibiting majority foreign ownership is theoretically unfounded.     

基于公平心理偏好的风险融资契约研究

在风险融资市场中,由于风险投资者和风险投资家之间存在着信息不对称,道德风险问题不可避免。因此,需要设计一种有效的激励机制来规避这一问题。考虑到现实中风险投资者和风险投资家都是有限理性的个体,结合行为经济学和委托代理理论,针对具有公平心理偏好的风险投资者和风险投资家,构建一种新的支付模式,通过设计有效的激励机制,为风险投资者建立合理的支付契约提供依据。     

论风险投资的制度安排

风险投资活动应通过合理的制度安排来降低代理风险带来的逆向选择和道德风险问题 ,具体包括采用有限合伙制、激励合同与保护性条款相结合的契约形式、以可转换债券为主的复合证券投资工具、多元化的风险资金退出渠道等。     

Pessimistic information gathering

An agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal. Information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent's effort. Contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering, and there are both moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-powered, productivity-dependent screening options following “good news” with a fixed low-powered option otherwise.     

化解道德风险问题的风险资本分阶段投资策略

由于风险投资存在因信息严重不对称而引起的道德风险问题,风险投资家就采用资本分阶段注入这一强有力的控制机制来收集信息,监控企业进程,并保持定期退出低质投资项目的选择权,从而降低因决策不当所造成的潜在损失,并实现对风险企业家的有效激励。     

风险投资中的双向道德风险与帕累托有效的合约区间-讨价还价的视角

该文在双向道德风险的模型下,从讨价还价的角度,研究了风险投资家和创业者之间的帕累托有效合约区间的确定问题.该文首先在给定条件下分析了帕累托有效合约区间的构造条件,并在此基础之上探讨了双方的努力效率和风险投资家的声誉动机对合约的帕累托有效区间的影响,以及投资额对帕累托有效合约的可行区间的影响,进而从理论角度解释了现实风险投资合约中存在的部分现象.     

Long‐term care and intrafamily moral hazard: Optimal public policy

The paper studies optimal public long‐term care (LTC) policy in the context of intrafamily moral hazard suggested by Pauly. The model considers a representative family consisting of an adult child and her elderly parent who might become dependent, in which case he places a special value on the LTC provided to him by his child. Since the child's caregiving is decreasing in the amount of insurance coverage, the parent prefers to underinsure, which is socially suboptimal. The child's choice of caregiving is also inefficient since she does not internalize its positive effect on the parent. The paper tackles these inefficiencies and shows that intrafamily moral hazard is a sufficient justification for public intervention targeted at insurance. If not necessarily for the introduction of mandatory public insurance, then at least for the taxation or subsidization of private insurance premiums.     

基于国外实证研究结果的风险企业治理机制探析

由于风险企业多为新创企业,资产透明度低、缺乏生产经营的历史记录和市场上的可观测信息,因此会产生逆向选择问题;又由于风险投资家作为财务投资人并不参与风险企业的运营管理,企业家行为难于观测和衡量,因此会产生道德风险问题。自20世纪70年代以来,西方发达国家尤其是美国的风险投资业在实践中所形成的创新性的制度安排和治理机制,不仅是西方风险投资家的现实选择,也对我国的风险投资从业者们提供了很好的借鉴意义。     

Start-ups, venture capitalists, and the capital gains tax

A model of start-up finance with double moral hazard is proposed. Entrepreneurs have ideas and technical competence, but lack own resources as well as commercial experience. Venture capitalists (VCs) provide start-up finance and managerial support. Both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm's success, but neither type's effort is verifiable. We find that the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low entrepreneurial effort and venture capital support. In this situation, the capital gains tax is particularly harmful. The introduction of a small tax impairs effort and advice and leads to a first-order welfare loss. Several other policies towards venture capital and start-up entrepreneurship are also investigated.     

风险投资家的最优激励契约模型研究--一种基于逆向选择和道德风险条件下的博弈模型分析

为减少风险投资融资中风险投资家的逆向选择和道德风险,风险投资者必须设立一套有效的激励机制来让风险投资家选择,从而根据风险投资家选择的结果来甄别其真实能力类型,同时又能激励其努力工作。文章建立了风险投资家能力类型和努力都是不可观测条件下的最优激励契约模型,并根据显示原理,利用最优控制理论求出了最优解进而进行了分析。得出的结论是:最优激励契约能使高能力风险投资家乐于选择具有高强度激励、低固定收入和风险小的项目,同时又能激励其签约后更加努力工作。     

新兴市场合资企业R&D强度与企业绩效或有关系及调整

MNCs（跨国公司）通过组建合资企业进入新兴市场,由于其R&D活动面临着创新专用性风险,使其R&D强度与合资企业绩效之间表现为一种或有关系。使用厦门、长沙和重庆3地制造业样本检验验证了该理论假设。就市场战略而言,只有那些以国际市场战略为主的合资企业才能获得R&D对合资企业绩效的促进效应;进一步考虑合资企业不同的所有权结构——市场战略配置结构,发现只有在以国际市场战略——MNCs占绝对多数股权的合资企业中,R&D强度对企业绩效的促进效应才会显现,而其它任何类型的配置结构均没有发现这种促进效应。这些发现可为中国完善外资政策提供理论指导。     

Double moral hazard and renegotiation

We examine renegotiation in a double moral hazard model with an ex ante budget balancing constraint when both the principal and the agent are allowed to make a renegotiation offer even though the principal proposes an initial contract. Under a belief restriction, any perfect-Bayesian equilibrium leads to an allocation that is superior to the second-best allocation of the standard double moral hazard model without renegotiation. The result of this paper gives some reasons for the existence of intermediary organizations such as holding companies, law houses, consulting firms, investment banks or venture capital. The result can also provide the rationalization for a fund set up by a group of firms of the industry in which their product is legally required to be recyclable.     

风险企业的道德风险与控制权配置的模型分析

风险企业的控制权配制是在满足风险企业家激励相容和风险投资家参与约束条件下的一种相机性配置机制,它有别于 传统理论要求的"剩余索取权必须与控制权相匹配"的配置原则,能使双方在签约后根据企业绩效(或企业风险)的变动,进行相 应的权利调整,因而尽可能地解决了风险企业中的风险分担和激励问题。     

Convergence Clubs: Some Additional Evidence

The paper shows that the joint presence of moral hazard and repudiation risk generates an important interaction effect. In order to provide the proper incentives to borrowers, the optimal financial contract under moral hazard calls for all available resources to be paid to the lender in the event of a poor realization for output. Repudiation risk limits the size of this transfer, as the debtor has the option to default. This upper bound on the resource transfer exacerbates the moral hazard problem, reducing lending and the equilibrium level of investment and output.     

North–South Lending with Moral Hazard and Repudiation Risk

The paper shows that the joint presence of moral hazard and repudiation risk generates an important interaction effect. In order to provide the proper incentives to borrowers, the optimal financial contract under moral hazard calls for all available resources to be paid to the lender in the event of a poor realization for output. Repudiation risk limits the size of this transfer, as the debtor has the option to default. This upper bound on the resource transfer exacerbates the moral hazard problem, reducing lending and the equilibrium level of investment and output.     

CAPITAL CONTROL AND DOMESTIC INTEREST RATES: A GENERALIZED MODEL

This article addresses the question of capital control (inflow) and its varied effect on interest rates and real-side economy. The moral hazard problem causes interest rates to increase as a function of external debt. Decreased capital inflow (external debt) can reduce moral hazard and outweigh the effect of costly capital transactions, with capital control decreasing interest rates and increasing output. This result runs counter to other theoretical works on capital control. The policy implication is that a government can generate national gains from capital inflow control by prohibiting new external debt (borrowing from abroad). With old debt retired and no new borrowing from abroad, external debt is reduced. This will reduce the moral hazard problem and lead to a drop in interest rates and an increase in output. (JEL F32 , F41 , E43 )     

International policy coordination mechanism with respect to the moral hazards of financial intermediaries

This paper examines the impact of cross-border financial externalities on moral hazards of the banking sector, and an international policy coordination mechanism to reduce the moral hazards of the banking sector considering cross-border financial externalities. We demonstrate that the moral hazard of banking, such as reducing the monitoring efforts, is aggravated by cross-border financial externalities, while the introduction of an international policy coordination mechanism might reduce the moral hazard caused by these externalities. Moreover, international policy coordination is less likely to be sustained when the policy maker is short-sighted and the banking sector has greater political influence. However, when the distortionary cost of a liquidity aids policy is lower with high administrative transparency, and cross-border financial externality is greater, the coordination mechanism is more likely to be sustained. The results imply that efforts to launch an effective international financial coordination mechanism should start with countries with higher administrative transparency, more political stability, and enhanced financial integration.