Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis

This article challenges the conventional result according to which an instrument-independent central bank able to strictly commit to price stability makes fiscal constraints unnecessary. We present a model of a monetary union with heterogeneous members where the inefficient policy mix resulting from the lack of coordination between the common monetary policy and national fiscal policies incites the governments to appoint excessively liberal delegates to the central bank's board. We characterize the fiscal restraints necessary to restore the central bank's ability to deliver the most desirable degree of price stability. It appears that even country-specific and state-contingent restraints may be counterproductive for some member states.     

Strategic Interactions Among Central Bank and National Fiscal Authorities in a Monetary Union Subject to Asymmetric Country Shocks

In this paper we extend Nordhaus’ (Brookings Pap Econ Act (2):139–199, 1994) results to an environment which may represent the current European situation, characterised by a single monetary authority and several fiscal bodies. We show that, even assuming that the monetary and the fiscal authorities share the same ideal targets, in the presence of asymmetric shocks the “symbiosis” result found by Dixit and Lambertini (J Int Econ 60:235–247, 2003) no longer obtains. Thus, fiscal rules as those envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact may work as monetary/fiscal coordination devices that improve welfare. The imposition of common targets, however, may work as a substitute for policy coordination only if these are made state contingent, an aspect that the recent version of the Stability and Growth Pact takes into account in a more appropriate way than its original version.

Endogenous Symmetry of Shocks in a Monetary Union

The monetary union issue, when assessed with the traditional inferences for optimal currency areas, misses an important dimension. Increased specialisation induced by reduced transaction costs, suggested by Krugman's lessons of Massachusetts, is only a part of the story. Even if agglomeration and inter-industry trade may occur as a result of reduced transaction costs, this tendency may be counteracted by the elimination of uncertainty associated with bilateral exchange rate variability within the monetary union.Thus, in contradiction to what is generally assumed on the basis of the reduction in transaction costs only, the European Monetary Union (EMU) is likely to foster intra-industry trade in Europe, leading to more symmetric shocks between member states. The monetary union will endogenously create the conditions of its success. Empirical evidence is provided for EU countries' bilateral trade over the period 1980–1994, using disaggregated trade data.     

When a Monetary Union Fails: A Parable

The political imperative is an important driving force behind the dissolution of monetary unions. But economic factors are also likely to play an important role. Using a two-country model of government finance in a common currency area, we suggest that when countries are very heterogeneous in terms of financing requirements or in terms of tolerance for inflation, one of them will benefit from achieving monetary independence. The results are contrasted to the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian crown area in the 1920s and especially to that of the ruble area in the 1990s.     

Fiscal policy independence in a European Monetary Union

Do plans for a monetary union in Europe call for limits on the freedom of the country members of the union to use fiscal policy? In order to provide a tentative answer, we simulate the IMF model MULTIMOD, given various shocks, in the case of a European Monetary Union consisting only of France and Germany. The results clearly indicate the possible value of allowing unfettered use of fiscal policy in both countries. The reasons lie partly in differences in the initial position of the two, partly in differences in their preferences. We also examine the change in the policy significance of the current account in the monetary union. Current account imbalances clearly cease to have the same significance in a monetary union; but they do not therefore become irrelevant.     

Openness to Trade and the Potency of Monetary Policy: How Strong is the Relationship?

Economic theory suggests that an economy's openness to international trade reduces the ability of monetary policy to affect output. Using quarterly data from the 1960:1–1993:4 period for a set of eight countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Africa, the U.K., and the U.S.A.), this article's empirical results support this theoretical prediction: the more open the economy, the smaller the output effects of a given change in the money supply. This finding, robust across all the different specifications and estimation methods examined, has straightforward implications for stabilization policy. Moreover, it suggests that an economy's net benefit from joining a monetary union is increasing with the economy's openness to foreign trade.     

财政政策与货币政策的动态搭配和组合模式

基于经济周期的不同阶段,从IS-LM曲线和供求理论的双重视角解析利用财政政策与货币政策对宏观经济进行调控的内在机理,揭示两类政策搭配组合的理论逻辑,分析制约财政政策与货币政策调控效应的现实因素。研究发现,财政政策与货币政策的搭配组合要根据经济发展的不同阶段进行动态供给,以满足经济周期不同阶段的需求,如此方能实现经济的稳定增长。现阶段,我国应采取"更加积极的财政政策与稳健适度的货币政策"这一政策组合。产品市场与货币市场对利率的弱敏感性使政策刺激经济的效果受到制约,因而两类政策不仅要在总量层面"对冲"经济增速减缓的压力,而且要在结构层面增强协调性。     

Fiscal policy in monetary unions: Implications for Europe

This paper analyzes how the feasible mix of government expenditure and financing arrangements may change with the establishment of a monetary union such as that planned by members of the European Community. We find that a monetary union reduces the feasible divergence across countries in their present discounted levels of fiscal spending. Wide differences across countries in their present and future time patterns of spending are still possible, however. Examination of the empirical evidence suggests that the movement toward greater exchange rate fixity associated with the EMS and participation in quasi monetary unions havenot been accompanied by significant fiscal convergence. The experience of member states of several existing monetary unions, however, suggests that a more effective constraint to budgetary discipline arises within full-fledged unions in operation over long periods, even in the absence of binding central rules on government deficit and debt positions.     

Is the proposed East African Monetary Union an optimal currency area? a structural vector autoregression analysis

This paper empirically assesses the suitability of the East African (EA) countries for a regional monetary union by testing for symmetry of the underlying structural shocks. The results indicate that supply and demand shocks are generally asymmetric, which does not lend strong support for forming a currency union in the EA region at the moment. However, the speed and magnitude of adjustment to shocks is similar across the countries. Therefore, further integration of the economies might lead to more favorable conditions for a monetary union. Although evidence in favor of linking an EA currency to an external anchor is weak, such support seems to favor the Euro.     

Monetary Union and the Interest-Exchange Rate Trade-off

By using a multi-country simulation model this paper analyzes the qualitative effects of joining a monetary union. The transition to EMU (European Monetary Union) is shown to produce interest and exchange rate changes with substantial and countervailing effects on the real economy which can be traced through the model. Observable anticipation effects in the wake of the EMU are substantiated; and some policy recommendations for joining any monetary union are derived. It is also shown that fixing conversion rates at last-day market rates produces a unique outcome and not exchange rate indeterminacy as argued by De Grauwe (1997), Obstfeld (1998), and others.     

货币联盟中的货币政策承诺与财政纪律

单一货币政策和成员国分散的财政政策的相互作用和协调是货币联盟面临的一个重要问题。本文运用博弈模型分析了货币联盟中有关财政与货币政策几种协调安排的宏观经济含义,指出在成员国无法达成目标一致的条件下,财政纪律和货币政策承诺有助于通货膨胀目标的实现,但产出目标能否实现则取决于财政纪律的合理性。合理的财政纪律必须考虑成员国基础环境、财政政策乘数及其溢出效应以及潜在产出水平等因素。无效的财政纪律将损害货币政策承诺的效力。本文认为2005年欧洲经济货币联盟对《稳定与增长公约》的改革只是缓和了危机而没有从根本上解决危机,财政纪律危机风波仍将上演,对SGP的改革也远未结束。     

Monetary Union,Trade Integration,and Business Cycles in 19th Century Europe

This paper studies the impact of monetary arrangements on trade integration and business cycle correlation in late 19th century Europe. We estimate a gravity model and show that tighter monetary integration was associated with substantially higher trade, as in recent studies using contemporary data. For instance, the Austro-Hungarian monetary union improved trade between member states by a factor of 3. To explain this, we build and estimate a simple model where greater monetary integration weakens the current account constraint by fostering business cycle co-movements.     

货币与财政政策后续效应评估:40次银行危机样本

以20世纪80年代以来40次重要的系统性银行危机为基础,对金融危机后的货币政策和财政政策选择进行实证评价。实证结果表明,"适度扩张"的货币政策和财政政策能产生相对较优的经济效果,应成为金融危机后的主要政策选择,但由于两种政策刺激或稳定经济的效力都集中体现在短期,为避免持续和大规模货币扩张和财政赤字带来的负面影响,一旦危机消退、经济企稳回升,之前作为"反危机工具"出现的扩张性货币和财政政策就应该逐步淡出。     

Global Implications of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules in the EMU

In order to analyze successful strategies for economic policy in a global environment both international interdependencies and the strategic behavior of global players must be considered. We use a global model of the world economy (the MSG2 Model) to show the effects of dynamic policy optimization in the presence of various supply and demand shocks to different world regions. We show that fixed rules are generally superior for supply shocks, while demand shocks call for more active or discretionary policies.     

Transatlantic Trade-Offs in the Age of Balanced Budgets and European Monetary Union

We develop a model of monetary and fiscal policies appropriate for considering U.S.-European policy interactions in an era of near-balanced budgets and European monetary union. We study the determinants of policy trade-offs and incentives for central banks and governments across the Atlantic. Smaller, more open economies face more favorable trade-offs, since openness enhances policy effectiveness via the exchange-rate channel. Changes in Europe's monetary arrangements do not affect U.S. trade-offs, although they alter the trade-offs facing European policy-makers. Fiscal trade-offs depend crucially on the extent to which fiscal policy is distortionary. Changes in taxes and spending move both employment and inflation in the desired direction following a worldwide supply shock when spending is financed with distortionary taxes.     

Introducing Instruments of Central Bank Accountability in a Monetary Union

With an increasing number of independent central banks, accountability of central banks is also getting more attention. This paper analyses the possibility of introducing instruments of central bank accountability in a monetary union. In our model, monetary policy is influenced by the governments of the member states according to the degree of independence granted to the central bank. Instruments of democratic accountability are introduced which generate different expected losses for a government. The amount of the expected loss will determine the approval of a government to the implementation of a particular mechanism. We show that the agreement between the governments will only be unanimous for the definition of the inflation target of the central bank.

Joining the European Monetary Union—Comparing First and Second Generation Open Economy Models

We log-linearise the Dellas and Tavlas (DT) model of monetary union and solve it analytically. We find that the intuition of optimal currency area analysis of DT’s second generation open economy model is essentially the same as that of first generation models. Monetary union results in no welfare loss if its member states are symmetric. However, asymmetry causes loss in welfare both due to the failure of the union policy to deal suitably with a country’s asymmetric shocks and due to an active monetary policy by the union in pursuit of its distinct objectives. The asymmetry in DT is largely due to the differing wage rigidities across countries. JEL Classification Numbers: F41, F42, E4     

Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?

This paper surveys the literature that uses two-country models to analyze monetary and fiscal policy issues faced in interdependent economies. We discuss sources of structural interdependence that researchers typically include in these models. We describe many of the types of policy interactions that researchers have considered and summarize the key results that they have obtained. Finally, we briefly explain the limitations of two-country models and outline directions that this literature might usefully be extended.     

Why is Inflation in China a Monetary Phenomenon？

This paper proposes that inflation in China during the post‐reform era (1978 onwards) is always a monetary phenomenon. We construct a multivariate dynamic model based on Friedman's quantity theory of money and use the standard Granger causality test to show that money growth contains significant predictive power for inflation during the underlying period. The finding is robust to alternative measures of monetary aggregates and both closed and open economy frameworks. The baseline finding of the paper indicates that quantitative tools remain the most important policy instruments for China to manage its inflation effectively.