我国上市公司大股东减持股份与盈余管理关系探讨

上市公司大股东股份减持现象是2007年股权分置改革完成后产生的新现象.在股改之后的全流通时代,大股东倾向于利用种种手段操纵股价,在二级市场上以较高价减持股份,其中盈余管理就是主要影响股价手段之一.如果大股东减持股份过程中实施盈余管理的行为缺乏监管,必将影响到我国资本市场的健康持续发展.因此本文探讨了我国上市公司大股东减持过程中的盈余管理行为,对充实、丰富上市公司大股东减持过程中的盈余管理行为的研究体系具有一定的学术价值.     

大股东控制与盈余管理行为研究:来自配股公司的证据

在上市公司配股融资过程中,大股东具有通过盈余管理来获得配股资格和提高股票价格的强烈动机。本文以1998—2002年间456家实施配股的上市公司为样本,基于行业横截面数据和修正的Jones模型研究了配股融资过程中盈余管理的分布特征,并分析了大股东控制对盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果表明：（1）上市公司在配股前3个年度和配股当年存在显著的盈余管理机会主义行为;（2）配股公司的盈余管理程度与第一大股东持股比例具有倒u型关系：当第一大股东持股比例低于53．20％时表现出正相关关系,而当第一大股东持股比例高于53．20％时则表现出负相关关系;（3）盈余管理程度与前2—10大股东持股集中度、负债比率和资本支出水平之间具有负相关关系．而与管理层持股比例和公司规模之间具有正相关关系。大股东通过盈余管理实现了对小股东财富的掠夺效应。造成了上市公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降。     

大股东股权质押、股权性质与盈余管理方式

外部监管环境的变化影响公司盈余管理成本及操控手段的选择,文章采用2009-2013年间大股东股权质押的上市公司样本,检验了在股权质押的特定情形下上市公司真实性盈余管理与应计性盈余管理的替代效应。研究发现,大股东股权质押债务融资引入了质权人这一外部治理角色,强化了对上市公司的外部监督,抑制上市公司的“应计性盈余”操控行为,使其盈余管理方式向更加隐蔽的真实性盈余管理转变。     

亿利科技 年报揭露了大股东谎言

2007年，亿利科技很风光，短短三个月之内三次上新闻联播，总裁王文彪当选全国工商联副主席，并被央视称为中国沙产业的领袖级人物。     

创业板上市公司大股东与高管减持行为分析

创业板上市公司大股东与高管的减持行为可以依照减持动机细分为投机型减持与流动型减持行为,其减持前后的市场表现存在明显的差异性,这样的差异包含本身市场波动的影响,但更多的是高管及大股东减持行为传递给市场讯号后,引发的企业市场股票价值的变动及其他方面的变化。本文区分投机型减持与流动型减持对企业价值的影响以及不同动机下企业股权集中度、盈利能力、成长性等指标对减持程度的影响分别进行研究,探讨不同减持动机间的区别。     

会计制度改革、盈余稳健性与盈余管理分析

在进行会计确认、会计计量和会计报告的过程,会计稳健性原则发挥的作用是非常重要的,其对我国会计准则的制定造成的影响是非常大的。在进行会计准则制定的过程中,经常会产生忽略盈余管理交叉作用的现象,文章就会计制度改革、盈余稳健性与盈余管理进行分析,希望能够在一定程度上完善我国的会计制度。     

盈余管理、收益平滑与盈余操纵解读

在人们高呼提高会计信息质量的背景下,盈余管理、收益平滑与盈余操纵成为人们关注的焦点.针对不少人的模糊认识,文章拟从三者的概念以及利弊角度出发进行分析,以期澄清人们的认识,为提高会计信息的质量贡献一份力量.     

非控股大股东退出威胁与企业绩效

公司治理与企业绩效的相关研究日渐增多,独立董事、监事等传统治理手段作用受限。在逐渐兴起的非控股大股东参与公司治理现实背景下,非控股大股东的公司治理效应及其对企业绩效的影响值得关注。基于此,文章以2009—2020年沪深A股26 570个年度观测样本为研究对象,研究非控股大股东退出威胁对企业绩效的影响机理。研究发现：非控股大股东退出威胁能显著提升企业绩效,在控制内生性问题后依然稳健,退出威胁通过抑制两类代理成本提升企业绩效;高战略差异度可增强退出威胁治理效应,市场竞争更加激烈或退出更可信时,退出威胁治理效应更加显著。文章丰富了企业绩效研究,从退出威胁角度验证了非控股大股东治理效应,为非控股大股东参与公司治理、提升企业绩效提供参考依据。     

大小非解禁和股价波动关系的实证分析

本文基于2007年1月至2011年3月的月度时间序列样本,构建了经典的多元回归模型,对"大小非"解禁与股价走势之间的关系进行了分阶段实证研究。计量结果表明,国内国际经济形势、货币政策以及预期等因素才是影响我国股价走势变化的最主要因素,而"大小非"解禁对股价走势的影响程度则要受到我国股市所处行情阶段的限制。     

Dividend Stickiness,Debt Covenants,and Earnings Management

Consistent with the notion that dividends are very sticky, Daniel, Denis, and Naveen ( 2008 ) report evidence that firms manage earnings upward when pre‐managed earnings are expected to fall short of dividend payments. However, we find that this evidence is not robust when controlling for firms' tendency to manage earnings upward to avoid reporting earnings declines; only firms with high leverage exhibit a statistically weak tendency to manage earnings to close deficits of pre‐managed earnings relative to dividends. We further report that the decision to cut dividends depends on whether reported earnings fall short of past dividends, but not on earnings management that eliminates a shortfall in pre‐managed earnings relative to dividend payments. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms that face dividend constraints are more likely to cut dividends than to manage earnings to avoid dividend cuts.     

The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management*

This study examines the relation between audit quality and earnings management. Consistent with prior research, we treat audit quality as a dichotomous variable and assume that Big Six auditors are of higher quality than non-Big Six auditors. Earnings management is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones 1991 model. Prior literature suggests that auditors are more likely to object to management's accounting choices that increase earnings (as opposed to decrease earnings) and that auditors are more likely to be sued when they are associated with financial statements that overstate earnings (as compared to understate earnings). Therefore, we hypothesize that clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that increase income relatively more than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. This hypothesis is supported by evidence from a sample of 10,379 Big Six and 2,179 non-Big Six firm years. Specifically, clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.5-2.1 percent of total assets higher than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. Also, consistent with earnings management, we find that the mean and median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals are greater for firms with non-Big Six auditors. This result also indicates that lower audit quality is associated with more “accounting flexibility”.     

公司治理、转让价格与盈余管理

上市公司在公平原则下进行关联交易可以减少企业之间的交易成本,但上市公司往往会利用关联交易对公开报表中的盈余信息进行调整,从而侵害了利益相关者的合法权益.从上海证券交易所获取上市公司披露的关联方销售总利润这一独特数据,对良好的公司治理结构是否有助于限制管理层通过转让价格操纵盈余进行了实证检验.结果表明,在董事会中有高比例的独立董事或低比例的代表母公司的董事、董事会主席与CEO的职位不相容以及在审计委员会中有财务金融专家的上市公司,不太可能进行转让价格操纵.     

市场化程度、盈余管理与银行贷款定价

本文从盈余管理角度考察了财务报告质量对银行贷款定价的影响。研究发现,银行关注了企业报表中的盈余管理问题,盈余管理程度越高,企业获得的贷款利率越高;在市场化程度越高的地区,银行对企业盈余管理行为的识别能力越强。该研究结论不仅为会计信息的经济后果提供了经验证据,同时也暗示了债权人监督的有效性。     

Auditor Conservatism,Asymmetric Monitoring,and Earnings Management*

In this paper, we investigate whether, and how, audit effectiveness differentiation between Big 6 and non‐Big 6 auditors is influenced by a conflict or convergence of reporting incentives faced by corporate managers and external auditors. In so doing, we incorporate into our analysis the possibility that managers self‐select both external auditors and discretionary accruals, using the two stage “treatment effects” model. Our results show that only when managers have incentives to prefer income‐increasing accrual choices are Big 6 auditors more effective than non‐Big 6 auditors in deterring/monitoring opportunistic earnings management. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find Big 6 auditors are less effective than non‐Big 6 auditors when both managers and auditors have incentives to prefer income‐decreasing accrual choices and thus no conflict of reporting incentives exists between the two parties. The above findings are robust to different proxies for opportunistic earnings management and different proxies for the direction of earnings management incentives.     

我国上市公司控制权市场公司治理效率——基于股权分置改革的研究

股权分置改革后,对股权分置问题的研究,从应否改革、如何改革等问题,转到改革后我国控制权市场能否走上健康发展的轨道,控制权市场外部治理机制能否有效约束公司管理层和大股东的行为等问题上来。本文就我国上市公司控制权市场的公司治理效率进行了实证研究,得出了股权分置改革前后我国上市公司控制权市场低效率的研究结论。     

Equilibrium Earnings Management,Incentive Contracts,and Accounting Standards*

In this paper, we model earnings management as a consequence of the interaction among self‐interested economic agents ‐ namely, the managers, the shareholders, and the regulators. In our model, a manager controls a stochastic production technology and makes periodic accounting reports about his or her performance; an owner chooses a compensation contract to induce desirable managerial inputs and reporting choices by the manager; and a regulatory body selects and enforces accounting standards to achieve certain social objectives. We show that various economic trade‐offs give rise to endogenous earnings management. Specifically, the owner may reduce agency costs by designing a compensation contract that tolerates some earnings management because such a contract allocates the compensation risk more efficiently. The earnings‐management activity produces accounting reports that deviate from those prescribed by accounting standards. Given such reports, the valuation of the firm may be nonlinear and s‐shaped, thereby recognizing the manager's reporting incentives. We also explore policy implications, noting that (1) the regulator may find enforcing a zero‐tolerance policy ‐ no earnings management allowed ‐ economically undesirable; and (2) when selecting the optimal accounting standard, valuation concerns may conflict with stewardship concerns. We conclude that earnings management is better understood in a strategic context that involves various economic trade‐offs.