我国股票期权税收政策存在的问题及对策

股票期权制度是目前盛行于西方的一种比较有效的公司分配激励机制。但目前在我国还处于起步阶段。为促进股票期权这一新生事物在我国的发展,推动国有企业改革的深入,我们应借鉴发达国家的成功经验,尽快规范和完善我国的股票期权政策。     

股票期权激励机制及其在我国上市公司的应用

股票期权作为一种薪酬激励的有效方式,能较好地实现对经理人长期激励的目的。本文探讨了股票期权激励机制形成的理论依据,阐述当前我国上市公司具备实施股票期权激励机制的前提,分析股票期权方案将在我国上市公司激励机制中普遍使用,最后指出实施股票期权激励机制中需注意的关键问题。     

实行股票期权应以完善公司治理为前提

本文结合股票期权与公司治理关系的现代观点,从委托代理的框架出发,分析股票期权激励机制的内在机理和完善的公司治理机制对股票期权实施的重大意义,并进而寻求报酬性股票期权存在和发展的合理性解释。     

股票期权制度对中小投资者的影响及应对策略

股票期权制度作为对公司经理人的一种有效激励机制在西方国家得到了广泛的应用,而在对中小投资者利益保护方面股票期权制度也具有同样重要的意义。然而,在我国上市公司股票期权制度中,经理人行为的不规范却会损害和侵占中小投资者的利益,这不利于我国资本市场的持续、稳定发展。本文在研究我国上市公司股票期权制度实施过程中对中小投资者利益损害方式的基础上,提出了中小投资者规避利益损害的系统对策,旨在维护中小投资者的利益、促进我国资本市场的规范化发展。     

新会计准则中股票期权会计核算例举及分析

股票期权是公司治理中的一种重要并且行之有效的激励机制。目前,我国多数上市公司的股权激励方案是采用股票期权方式。2006年2月我国颁布的《公司会计准则第11号——股份支付》规范了股票期权的会计处理,使股份支付业务会计处理有了操作指南。本文拟通过举例来分析股票期权的会计核算,同时对股票期权的会计核算规则做出相应的分析。     

新会计准则中股票期权会计核算例举及分析

股票期权是公司治理中的一种重要并且行之有效的激励机制。目前,我国多数上市公司的股权激励方案是采用股票期权方式。2006年2月我国颁布的《公司会计准则第11号——股份支付》规范了股票期权的会计处理,使股份支付业务会计处理有了操作指南。本文拟通过举例来分析股票期权的会计核算,同时对股票期权的会计核算规则做出相应的分析。     

股票期权制度对中小投资者的影响及应对策略

股票期权制度作为对公司经理人的一种有效激励机制在西方国家得到了广泛的应用,而在对中小投资者利益保护方面股票期权制度也具有同样重要的意义。然而,在我国上市公司股票期权制度中,经理人行为的不规范却会损害和侵占中小投资者的利益,这不利于我国资本市场的持续、稳定发展。本文在研究我国上市公司股票期权制度实施过程中对中小投资者利益损害方式的基础上,提出了中小投资者规避利益损害的系统对策,旨在维护中小投资者的利益、促进我国资本市场的规范化发展。     

股票期权理论及在公司激励中的应用研究

股票期权无论在投资中还是在公司激励中都有着重要的作用。本文首先从期权的内涵出发 ,对股票期权进行规范与分类 ;重点对公司激励中的股票期权进行界定与分类 ;对股票期权合约中的财务与会计问题进行研究 ;最后提出完善股票期权激励机制的政策建议。     

我国股票期权激励与公司绩效比较分析

本文对上市公司实施股票期权的进行了行业分类,然后运用EXCEL和SPSS11.5进行对我国股票期权激励与公司绩效(每股收益)统计与分析,最后得出研究结论,并指出了由于我国上市公司内控制度的不健全等因素的存在,使得该股票期权激励机制与绩效之间仍然呈现弱势效应。     

我国股票期权激励与公司绩效比较分析

本文对上市公司实施股票期权的进行了行业分类,然后运用EXCEL和SPSS11.5进行对我国股票期权激励与公司绩效(每股收益)统计与分析,最后得出研究结论,并指出了由于我国上市公司内控制度的不健全等因素的存在,使得该股票期权激励机制与绩效之间仍然呈现弱势效应。     

关于经理人股票期权会计确认问题的研究

本文对经理人股票期权会计确认问题进行了较深入的研究。本文提出 ,按照现代企业理论 ,经理人股票期权的经济实质是企业经理人参与企业剩余索取权的分享 ,行权前的经理人成为企业的非股东所有者。因此 ,应将股票期权确认为企业的利润分配 ,而非美国现行的确认为费用之处理 ,以反映经理人股票期权的经济实质。这样 ,股票期权的会计处理将不影响利润表 ,从而也更有助于推动用公允价值法计量之 ,以更科学地反映其价值。为此 ,应革新现行的财务会计观念与模式 ,建立非股东所有者的新概念 ,使之适应企业经理人参与现代企业剩余索取权分享的现实。     

The Cost of Employee Stock Option Grants: An Empirical Analysis

This study presents empirical evidence on the ex post costs of employee stock option (ESO) grants to issuing firms and examines whether the Black–Scholes [1973] model provides reasonable estimates of these values. Because there are no market prices for ESOs, the traditional avenues for testing option–pricing models are unavailable. This research relies instead on techniques from the economic forecasting literature, viewing model values as forecasts of the options' payoff. The theoretically appropriate rate at which to discount ESO payoffs is derived under the maintained hypothesis that the Black–Scholes model is valid. This rate is used in estimating ex post ESO costs at the time of grant, which are then compared with Black–Scholes estimates using Theil's [1966] tests of forecast rationality. Based on a sample of 966 ESO grants over 1963–1984, the results suggest that the Black–Scholes model, adjusted for concavity in the time to exercise using the Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin [1994] procedure, appears to provide reasonable estimates of ex post ESO costs for the average ESO grant. However, there is significant variability in the amount of model error on an individual grant basis.     

Analytic Pricing of Employee Stock Options

We introduce a model that captures the main properties thatcharacterize employee stock options (ESO). We discuss the likelihoodof early voluntary ESO exercise, and the obligation to exerciseimmediately if the employee leaves the firm, except if thishappens before options are vested, in which case the optionsare forfeited. We derive an analytic formula for the price ofthe ESO and in a case study compare it to alternative methods.     

再论经理人股票期权的会计确认

谢德仁和刘文(2002)提出了经理人股票期权会计确认的利润分配观。本文在此基础上进行进一步论证,认为经理人股票期权赠予交易的经济实质是股东为激励经理人而将部分剩余索取权(在财务会计意义上就是利润分配权)让渡给经理人,而不是经理人直接用服务来交换股票期权,经理人股票期权赠予并不以经理人服务的投入为必备前提,经理人股票期权赠予交易内含的价值运动是具有一定价值的剩余索取权(所有者权益)从现有股东那里来,流到经理人处去。因此,在经理人股票期权赠予交易的会计确认上,应将经理人股票期权的对应项目确认为企业的利润分配。     

American GARCH employee stock option valuation

We implement a flexible simulation-based approach for the fair value of employee stock option (ESO) that accounts for the vesting period, departure risk and voluntary suboptimal early exercise. We introduce GARCH effects on the underlying asset and we analyze the price bias with respect to the constant volatility case. We also perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in several ESO characteristics. We compare this valuation with FAS 123 method revealing a FAS overvaluation. Finally, we value a real ESO plan providing the confidence intervals for the estimated ESO prices.     

Non-marketability and the value of employee stock options

We adapt the Benninga et al. (2005) framework to value employee stock options (ESOs). The model quantifies non-diversification effects, is computationally simple, and provides an endogenous explanation of ESO early-exercise. Using a proprietary dataset of ESO exercise events we measure the non-marketability ESO discount. We find that the ESO value on the grant date is approximately 45% of a similar plain vanilla Black–Scholes value. The model is aligned with empirical findings of ESOs, gives an exercise boundary of ESOs and can serve as an approximation to the fair value estimation of share-based employee and executive compensation. Using the model we give a numerical measure of non-diversification in an imperfect market.     

Exercise behavior,valuation, and the incentive effects of employee stock options

We use a large database on ESO exercises to document characteristics of exercise behavior and calibrate a utility-based model for measuring how differences in exercise behavior are manifested in option values and incentives. Option values and incentives computed from the model calibrations are compared to those computed from models used to value tradable options. Our analysis provides guidance to both academics and practitioners about how differences in exercise behavior and model choice affect measures of ESO values and incentives, and underscores the importance of gaining a thorough understanding of the underlying economic forces that affect the behavior of ESO holders.     

Which approach to accounting for employee stock options best reflects market pricing?

We use a residual income valuation framework to compare equity valuation implications of four approaches to employee stock options (ESOs) accounting: APB 25 “recognize nothing”, SFAS 123 (revised) “recognize ESO expense”, FASB Exposure Draft “recognize and expense ESO asset” and “recognize ESO asset and liability”. Theoretical analysis shows only grant date recognition of an asset and liability, and subsequent marking-to-market of the liability, results in accounting numbers that capture the dilution effects of ESOs on current shareholder value. Out-of-sample equity market value prediction tests and in-sample comparisons of model explanatory power also support the “recognize ESO asset and liability” method.     

Evidence on differences between recognition and disclosure: A comparison of inputs to estimate fair values of employee stock options

I investigate reliability differences across recognition and disclosure regimes to shed light on differing incentives and reporting of employee stock option (ESO) fair values. I compare ESO fair values based on firm-reported inputs with ESO fair values based on benchmark inputs, estimated following authoritative guidance. On average, I find opportunism increases with recognition as compared with disclosure, and that it is associated with incentives to manage earnings. Despite the increase in opportunism, I find that accuracy does not decline for recognizers, and that accuracy differs across voluntary and mandatory recognition.     

The association between employee stock option disclosures and corporate governance: Evidence from an enhanced disclosure regime

This study examines the role of corporate governance in employee stock option (ESO) disclosures following the revision of AASB 1028 Employee Benefits in 2001. We find that, while firms do not fully comply with AASB 1028 ESO disclosures, they voluntarily provide other ESO disclosures. In relation to corporate governance measures that have a role in the financial reporting process, we find two corporate governance measures dominate our results—the quality of auditor and duality of the role of CEO and Chair of the Board of Directors. We show that, in general, external auditor quality has positive incremental association with both mandatory and voluntary ESO disclosures while the dual role of CEO and chairperson of the board is associated with lower levels of mandatory disclosure.