Cournot, Bertrand, and game theory: A further note

This note synthesizes the discussion on the role of Cournot and Bertrand in the analysis of duopoly by drawing on the history of the debate. We conclude that while Bertrand presented a critique of the mathematical economics of Cournot and stimulated the analysis of strategic choice in game theory, he did not present a duopoly model with price as a strategic variable, as opposed to Cournot's model with quantity. In fact, Cournot has both types of models. We show that Irving Fisher contributed to the myth about Bertrand's duopoly theory.     

Endogenous transportation technology in a Cournot differential game with intraindustry trade

We investigate a dynamic Cournot duopoly with intraindustry trade, where firms invest in R&D to reduce the level of iceberg transportation costs. We adopt both open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium concepts, showing that a unique (saddle point) steady state exists in both cases. In the open-loop model, optimal investments and the resulting efficiency of transportation technology are independent of the relative size of the two countries. On the contrary, in the closed-loop case firms’ R&D incentives are driven by the relative size of the two countries. Policy implications are also evaluated.     

个人信用的博弈模型

本文运用博弈论的方法对个人信用的运作机制进行了分析,并确定了信用申请者失信的机会成本。通过分析得出,只有在信用申请者和授信方之间信用行为的有限次博弈转化为无限次博弈之后,由于信用申请者失信的机会成本过高,信用申请者才会尽力履行信用合同,在保障自己利益的同时,亦保障了授信方的利益。     

Ideological myths of modern economic theory and reality

According to the authors, the concept of a market and its antipode, central planning, essentially represent different tools in the arsenal of the state regulation of the economy. The dominance of a particular instrument (the market in modern Russia and centralized planning in the Soviet Union) defines only the predominant type of government regulation and not fundamental differences between economic systems.     

Underdevelopment and the economics of corruption: A game theory approach

Previous attempts to treat corruption are surveyed critically. A game theory approach is preferred on the grounds that it can most effectively explain the basis for decisions of reasonable men to be corrupt. A simple model is presented showing how bribery might be a dominant strategy. A prisoner's dilemma type of situation emerges with the added complication that the judge and jailer may be corrupt. Other conclusions are that one official will not accept bribes from more than one firm. It is impossible to predict which firm will win the contract. No obvious solution emerges and legal remedies are discounted. This paper then reviews the principal general equilibrium effects and concludes that their likely effect on economic development is negative.     

关于当代中国“增量式发展”理论的再探讨

"增量式发展"就是总体的增量伴随着部分质变的缓急相济式发展。辩证性是当代中国的"增量式发展"的重要特性。构建"增量式发展"理论是全球化时代的迫切诉求。     

合同相对性原则的现代发展新论

自罗马法上产生契约自由思想的萌芽以来，契约自由似乎是民法永恒不变的核心和灵魂。但随着人类生存环境的急剧变化，古典契约法3大原则之一的合同相对性原则受到了巨大的冲击，有了新的发展。     

博弈视角下的地王现象及其治理建议

自土地出让方式改革后,"地王"逐渐出现在人们的视野中,高位上扬的房价引起了社会各界对"地王"的高度关注。"地王"在促进我国土地市场化的同时,也直接推高了房价并使人们对未来房价有上涨的预期。如何理性地看待"地王"这一现象,探索其形成原因,有利于土地市场的健康发展。鉴于此,文章基于博弈论这一独特视角,对引起"地王"这一现象的土地拍卖制度进行了系统的研究。研究得出:在土地出让过程中,地方政府和房地产开发商更加青睐高价拍卖土地。研究认为:"地王"现象必须从完善土地招拍挂制度、改革财税制度以改善地方政府的财政困境、改善地方政府的绩效评估制度等方面入手对其进行治理。     

C2C电子商务中的博弈论分析

C2C是电子商务中发展较为迅速也比较有前景的一个模式,但信用是阻碍其发展的最大瓶颈,本文运用博弈论方法探讨C2C电子商务中失信产生的原因,通过一次博弈,重复博弈情况下的分析,得出解除C2C电子商务发展障碍的方法。     

治理理论与当代中国政府治理模式的创新

1989年,世界银行首次使用了“治理危机”这个词语,1992年世界银行年度报告的题目也称为《治理与发展》,治理与善治的概念逐步流行起来。20世纪90年代后,治理理论在西方国家兴起,成为国际社会科学研究中的热门话题之一。许多西方学者,尤其是政治学家和政治社会学家,对治理做出了     

Economic theory and ideology inMarx and modern economic analysis Giovanni A. Caravale,editor Edward Elgar, 1991, 512 pp.

The collection of essays edited by Giovanni Caravale has the explicit aim of letting the reader know the principal positions that have characterized the long-lasting debate in the themes of Marxian economics. In particular, the book is concerned with the contributions of those authors who recognize the relevance of Piero Sraffa's analysis for the interpretation of Marxian economic thought, showing that, even among these authors, opinions on the topic are deeply different. The book consists of two volumes: the first one, "Values, Prices and Exploitation," deals with the main theme of Marxian value theory, while the second, "The Future of Capitalism and the History of Thought," deals with discussion of the law of the falling rate of profit and of the role of Marx's theory in the history of economic thought.     

借鉴现代金融监管理论完善中国金融监管体系

完善的金融监管体系应是一个包括政府监管、金融机构内部控制、行业自律3个层次的立体监管体系。目前我国的金融监管体系存在的问题是：政府监管效率不高，金融机构内部控制不完善，行业自律能力极其薄弱。政府监管方面，保监会、证监会、银监会几大金融监管当局各自独立，实行分业经营下的分业监管制度。另一方面，加入世贸带来的影响是巨大的。分业监管体制将受到混业经营世界大趋势的冲击，中资金融机构自律能力也面临挑战。     

The modern theory of consumer behavior: Ordinal or cardinal?

Summary and Conclusion In sum, the cardinal utility numbers generated by neoclassical utility functions provide more information than do their ordinal counterparts. In fact, for any given set of bundles they contain all of the information implicit in ordinal utility numbers for the same set, plus they provide additional information concerning the intensity of the preference for any one bundle relative to any other. It is precisely because utility functions cannot be used to calculate ordinal rankings of bundles without prior calculation of their cardinal utility numbers that the use of utility functions is unacceptable for economic purposes. Moreover, although meaningless with respect to the reality of actual individuals’ preferences, this extra information is harmful because it is misleading. I conclude by reiterating the purpose of this article. I have attempted to demonstrate that neoclassical utility functions are an invalid means of analyzing consumer behavior for three reasons: first, and most important, because such functions, and their attendant rankings, are cardinal, not ordinal in nature; second, because, with respect to the set of bundles relevant to actual human beings, such functions are not continuous and, therefore, not differentiable; and, third, because such functions do not correctly, consistently, and properly include dimensions/units. Let me put this in another way. I will accept the validity of utility functions as soon as its proponents can show me how to perform basic mathematical or arithmetic operations on such ordinal numbers as 1^st, 3^rd, 6^th, and 17^th. Although the paper has been vastly improved through their exertions, the author is still responsible for all remaining errors and infelicities.     

全面把握科斯定理的本质 完善现代企业制度

科斯是出生于英国的美国经济学家后在美国布法罗大学、弗吉尼亚大学。其代表作主要有:《企业的性质》(19)和《社会成本问题》(1960年)等。19,由于发现并解释了财产权和商业经理成本如何影响经济这一重要问题,获得了该年度的诺贝尔经济学奖。科理是现代西方产权经济学关于产权与     

综合现代激励机制理论探析企业战略联盟内部激励机制的设计

本文以现代激励机制理论为基础,分析企业战略联盟内部激励机制的系统构成模式(内外环境、关键问题)、形成模式(信息共享型、产学研式知识共享型、监督激励型、联盟产权型)、运行模式(过程和步骤)和互动模式(激励约束机制、防共谋机制),并结合激励理论及公司运作实际,探讨激励机制的应用模式。     

风投新风向：传统也现代

风投机构进入所谓的“传统行业”,实际上并不是简单复制传统行业的盈利模式,而是在渠道、制造或者服务方面有重大创新,从而提高自身的盈利能力和扩张速度     

Investment in transport and communication technology in a Cournot duopoly with trade

We investigate the role of R&D investment in transport and communication (TCRD) in a Cournot duopoly with trade. We consider countries of different size and show that the firm located in the smaller country has a higher incentive to invest than the rival in the larger country. We also prove that social incentives are aligned with private ones. As for the terms of trade, any improvement of TC technology favours the smaller country, all else equal.