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<正>当前欠发达地区中小企业发展面临的最大问题是融资难,而制约中小企业融资的一个关键问题就是寻保难。为了解决中小企业资金缺乏的问题,各级地方政府都在积极行动,建立了中小企业信用担保体系,中小企业信用担保业务得到了发展,确实解决了一些中小企业的融资问题。 相似文献
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中小企业信用担保机构风险管理与控制探析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
近年来,中小企业担保业的发展缓解了中小企业的融资难问题.然而,随着中小企业信用担保机构的快速发展,其风险管理存在的诸多问题日益突出,给中小企业信用担保机构的健康发展带来严重的挑战.本文结合中小企业信用担保机构发展的特点,指出其风险管理的现状和风险管理存在的问题,并提出加强SMECG机构风险管理和控制的对策. 相似文献
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信用担保机构面临的问题与发展思考 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
我国的中小企业信用担保体系从无到有,在改善中小企业融资环境方面发挥了积极作用.但担保机构运行中面临的一些问题,直接影响着信用担保体系发展和完善. 相似文献
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In this paper we summarise and extend the agency‐based model of asset pricing of Brennan (1993) to show that the implied agency effects on asset pricing are too small to be empirically detectable: empirical tests confirm this and we show that the positive findings of Gomez and Zapatero (2003) are due to their choice of sample. We also derive new empirical implications for the composition of institutional investment portfolios and empirically confirm the major result, that institutional portfolios will be short the minimum variance portfolio. 相似文献
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Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Agency problems limit firms access to capital markets,curbing investment. Firms and investors seek contractual waysto mitigate these problems. What are the implications for investment?We present a theory of a firms investment dynamics inthe presence of agency problems and optimal long-term financialcontracts. We derive results relating firms investmentdecisions, current and past cash flows, firm size, capital structure,and dividends. Among the results, optimal investment is increasingin current and past cash flow; and optimal investment is positivelyserially correlated over time (after controlling for investmentopportunities). These results hold for a range of agency problems.(JEL G30, G31, G32, G35, D82, D86, D92) 相似文献
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在实施创新驱动发展的战略背景下,结合对外担保广泛存在的现状,本文以2008—2019年沪深两市上市公司为样本,根据风险转移理论和代理理论,从创新资源和创新意愿两个维度,理论分析和实证检验了对外担保对企业创新投入的影响及其作用机理。结果表明,对外担保显著降低了企业创新投入,该影响在非国有企业和技术密集型企业更为显著。在控制内生性影响后,该作用依然存在。进一步剖析内在作用机理发现,一方面,对外担保通过提高债务融资成本和增强融资约束,迫使企业削减创新投入;另一方面,对外担保还通过提高大股东代理成本和降低股权激励力度,削弱大股东和高管的创新意愿并最终减少企业创新投入。 相似文献
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PETER M. DEMARZO MICHAEL J. FISHMAN ZHIGUO HE NENG WANG 《The Journal of Finance》2012,67(6):2295-2340
We develop an analytically tractable model integrating dynamic investment theory with dynamic optimal incentive contracting, thereby endogenizing financing constraints. Incentive contracting generates a history‐dependent wedge between marginal and average q, and both vary over time as good (bad) performance relaxes (tightens) financing constraints. Financial slack, not cash flow, is the appropriate proxy for financing constraints. Investment decreases with idiosyncratic risk, and is positively correlated with past profits, past investment, and managerial compensation even with time‐invariant investment opportunities. Optimal contracting involves deferred compensation, possible termination, and compensation that depends on exogenous observable persistent profitability shocks, effectively paying managers for luck. 相似文献
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金融担保机构信用风险的生成机理研究 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
在企业申请担保贷款投资项目中,大多数中小企业(特别是科技型中小企业)缺乏可抵押标的,这导致了中小企业信贷交易中担保风险的生成。企业申请担保贷款投资项目的平均成功概率与企业提供的担保标的的价值成正相关关系;企业提供抵押是有效抑制或消除担保机构与中小企业之间信息不对称及由此而引发的逆向选择和道德风险问题的关键和必要条件。另外,在信息不对称的情况下,信用担保行业的系统性风险越小,意味着信用担保实践的平均成功率越高,这将诱发经理人道德风险的发生。 相似文献