Liberty and the Post‐utilitarian Society

Utilitarian foundations for limited government are shaky insofar as they assume rational and consistent individuals. Recently economists’ assumption of rational actors has come under sustained attack. Behavioural economics has suggested that people are plagued by irrational biases and inconsistencies. These developments have led to a post‐utilitarianism which is held to justify paternalistic interventions by the state via ‘sin taxes’, direct bans or new obligations. Individual responsibility is seriously undermined, as is faith in markets. Supporters of individual freedom need to move away from utilitarian reasoning, reassert core values of autonomy and responsibility, and define strict limits on the scope of government intervention.     

Causes and Cures of the Great Recession

The Great Recession was not a failure of free markets. Rather it was a classic example of the undesirable unintended consequences of government intervention, both through expansionary monetary policy and misguided attempts to bolster the housing market in the USA. Getting government out of banking is the best way to end the disastrous boom and bust cycles that have characterised the last century and a half.     

From equilibrium to autopoiesis: A Luhmannian reading of Veblenian evolutionary economics

The paper reconstructs the Veblenian critique of the pecuniary economy from the perspective of Niklas Luhmann's theory of autopoietic social systems. Luhmann argued that social systems relieve people from the overwhelming civilizational complexity, but develop autopoietic properties hindering rational solutions to human problems. This argument allows seeing the pecuniary economy as an important complexity-reducing device, which, however, develops excessive autonomy from the embedding societal and ecological environment. For this reason, like other autopoietic systems, the economy has a high chance of becoming societally and ecologically unsustainable. While Veblen criticized the obsession of classical economics with equilibrium and the natural order, Luhmann urged to replace the notion of equilibrium with that of autopoiesis, which focuses attention on the sustainability problem. Accentuating this problem is shown to be the main evolutionary economics implication of Luhmann's work.     

Henry George:

ABSTRACT While generally known today for his famous proposal for a Single Tax, Henry George has not been widely recognized as one of the first economists to write about the possibility of political market failure. Based on his appreciation for the allocational efficiency of markets and his suspicion of government intervention, George was an early advocate of public choice ideas who repeatedly warned of the dangers of rent seeking.     

THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK: AN INTERDICIPLINARY REVIEW OF THE THEORY AND POLICY

Abstract This paper engages in an interdisciplinary survey of the current state of knowledge related to the theory, determinants and consequences of occupational safety and health (OSH). It first describes the fundamental theoretical construct of compensating wage differentials, which is used by economists to understand the optimal provision of OSH in a perfectly competitive labour market. The plethora of incentives faced by workers and firms in job and insurance markets that determine the ultimate level of OSH are discussed in detail. The extensive empirical evidence from the hedonic wage and stated choice approaches used to assess the value of OSH is reviewed. The causes of inefficiency and inequity in the market for OSH, such as externalities, moral hazard in compensation insurance, systematic biases in individual risk perception/well‐being and labour market segregation are subsequently examined. The implications of government intervention and regulation for tackling the aforementioned inefficiencies in OSH are then considered. Finally, the survey identifies areas of future research interests and suggests indicators and priorities for policy initiatives that can improve the health and safety of workers in modern job markets.     

AUDIT MARKET FAILURE

The auditing profession has called for the current regime of unlimited liability to be replaced with liability caps. The Department of Trade and Industry has tabled proposals to reform the structure of the market for audit services. These proposals fall short of meeting the demand for liability limitation but modify the current regime inasmuch as auditor liability, though uncapped, would be proportional to the damage caused by audit failure. This step is unlikely to remedy audit market failure. This article argues the distortion of market incentives in audit markets can be traced to government intervention and the remedy lies in replacing government intervention with competition.     

The Endogenous Economist:

A bstract . In the social sciences there exist links of communication and influence between the scientists and the actors of the modelled social systems. Social scientists are therefore endogenous parts of the systems which they study. Theories and models shouid be self-referential. The treatment of information in the rational choice models of the new classical theory, with its core assumption of rational expectations , has stopped short of extending the concept of endogeneity to the economists themselves. Economic theory proceeds on the assumption that it yields the true model and that the actors in the system share this same model even though economists have not yet agreed on this unique model. Moreover, it assumes that economists' disputes about the true model do not prompt the actors of the system to take positions and opt for one or the other of the discussed models. The use of a unique model perspective to interpret the response of financial markets to monetary announcements leads to inconclusive interpretations of the evidence. These findings are better interpreted as the result of multi model competition that has spilled over from academic science to the financial markets themselves.     

‘Market failure’ arguments are a poor guide to policy

‘Market failure’ is frequently offered as a justification for government intervention in the economy. Proponents of interventions can point to almost limitless examples of markets which do not meet all the criteria for Pareto optimality and argue that government taxation, subsidies or regulation can perfect them, maximising social welfare. But comparing market outcomes with an unattainable and unidentifiable ideal is not useful in a world of imperfect knowledge and government failure. It is better to compare market outcomes against realistic alternatives. Furthermore, even within the market failure paradigm, concepts such as ‘public goods’ and ‘negative externalities’ are routinely misunderstood and inconsistently applied. This leads to predictably poor policy outcomes.     

The Libertarian Character of the Islamic Economy

This article reviews the shari'a approach to markets and examines its treatment by certain twentieth‐century Islamic economists such as Nejatullah Siddiqui, Nawab Haider Naqvi, Umer Chapra and M.A. Mannan. It characterises the arguments of these economists as largely statist, redistributive and socialist, possibly reflecting post‐colonial intellectual experiences. Yet shari'a endorses negative freedom by proscribing price controls and guaranteeing consumer protection from coercion. Islamic law, this article argues, as evinced in both revealed knowledge and human exegesis, has endorsed a market‐friendly, libertarian and limited‐government philosophy.     

On the Economics of Moral Preferences

Abstract . The long‐standing critique of the “economic model of man” has gained new impetus, not least due to the broadening research in behavioral and experimental economics. Many of the critics have focused on the apparent difficulty of traditional rational choice theory to account for the role of moral or ethical concerns in human conduct, and a number of authors have suggested modifications in the standard model in response to such critique. This article takes issue with a quite commonly adopted “revisionist” strategy, namely, seeking to account for moral concerns by including them as additional preferences in an agent's utility function. It is argued that this strategy ignores the critical difference between preferences over outcomes and preferences over actions, and that it fails to recognize that “moral preferences” belong in the second category. Preferences over actions, however, cannot be consistently accounted for within a theoretical framework that focuses on the rationality of single actions. They require a shift of perspective, from a theory of rational choice to a theory of rule‐following behavior.     

COPYRIGHT AND ARTISTS: A VIEW FROM CULTURAL ECONOMICS

Abstract.  Most of the standard economic literature on copyright ignores a number of aspects that have considerable significance for cultural production and for artists, the primary creators of copyright works, the supply of which copyright is supposed to stimulate. Specifically, there is little mention in that literature of moral rights, no distinction is made between copyright for authors and neighbouring rights for performers, the distributional effects of copyright are barely referred to, and the question of how much artists earn from copyright is ignored. In this article, I survey work that relates copyright and cultural economics showing that cultural economics offers another view to the 'standard' economics of copyright. Moreover, the case for government intervention in the arts and heritage made by cultural economists has resonance for the economic rationale of copyright.     

VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF CONNINGa IN MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS

Abstract The mathematization of economics is almost exclusively in terms of the mathematics of real analysis which, in turn, is founded on set theory (and the axiom of choice) and orthodox mathematical logic. In this paper I try to point out that this kind of mathematization is replete with economic infelicities. The attempt to extract these infelicities is in terms of three main examples and one general discussion: dynamics, policy and rational expectations and learning are the examples; a game theory without ‘subjectivism’, based on the axiom of determinateness, is discussed in general terms. The focus is on the role and reliance of standard fixed‐point theorems in orthodox mathematical economics.     

分工、交易效率与双边市场的形成

基于分工和交易费用两难冲突,运用新兴古典经济学理论,解释了双边市场形成和演进的根本原因。双边市场是一种特殊的中间平台;它是交易效率改进到一定程度导致的专业化水平提高和分工深化的结果。双边市场的出现和发展也预示着市场经济演进到了更高的层次。     

Do You See What I Mean? An Entrepreneurship Perspective on the Nature and Boundaries of the Firm

abstract In answering the questions ‘why does the firm exist?’ and ‘what determines its boundaries?’, established theories of the firm have focused on boundary choice in a context of relatively easily identified and evaluated alternatives. This paper starts by asking the kindred question ‘why does the firm come into existence?’, shifting attention to the circumstances and choices surrounding new firm formation and the exploitation of new and untried business ideas. It proceeds to delineate an entrepreneurship perspective on the nature and boundaries of the firm, where boundary decisions are driven by the difficulty of implementing new, subjective means–ends frameworks in sometimes very unreceptive markets. A set of propositions developing the concepts of cognitive incongruence and cognitive incompleteness suggests that activities are internalized when other market participants are unable to accept or understand the entrepreneur's subjectively perceived means–ends framework. In conclusion, the paper supports the development of theory that explains choice of modes of action based on subjective world views and the emerging notion of a distinctive entrepreneurship‐based theory of the firm.     

Prediction market prices under risk aversion and heterogeneous beliefs

In this paper, we examine the properties of prediction market prices when risk averse traders have heterogeneous beliefs in state probabilities. We show that the equilibrium state prices equal the mean beliefs of traders about that state if and only if the traders’ common utility function is logarithmic. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition ensuring that the state prices are systematically below or above the mean beliefs of traders, thus providing a rational explanation to the favorite-longshot bias in prediction markets.     

IR journal and conference literature from the 1960s to the 1990s: What can HR learn from it? Where is it headed?

The industrial relations (IR) literature has changed notably from the early 1960s until the late 1990s. Yet it has retained an externalist flavor — a sense that the key variables determining outcomes are often outside the control of firm-level actors. However, the kind of externalism found in the modern IR literature differs notably from that of the past. Externalism today is seen as labor market and personal variables — often in an econometric formulation — rather than grand social forces. Generally, the IR literature has moved toward sophisticated empiricism and toward a labor economics paradigm. To the extent that the older grand themes remain, they are more likely to be found in IR books rather than in academic journals. Human resource (HR) academics and practitioners can nonetheless benefit from the IR approach, even though the tyranny of tenure review has made journal articles in IR less readable. The IR literature emphasizes that labor–market forces, sometimes stemming from product and financial markets, matter to HR outcomes. And it regards conflict more as a source of information rather than just a cause of lost productivity.     

THE FAILURE OF THE POLL TAX AND CLASSICAL LIBERAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

The failure of the Poll Tax has been claimed to be an indictment of the principles of classical liberal political economy that it was intended to apply to local government finance. This article argues that, on the contrary, the failure of the Poll Tax was entirely predictable from the perspective of classical liberal political economy, and, in particular, public choice economics, because it involved a politically impossible reassignment of the local tax burden, presented local electors with an insurmountable collective action problem and ignored the 'vote motive' underlying the actions of national politicians held accountable for the new tax. Finally, the article proposes some lessons for the future of local government reform from the experience of the Poll Tax.     

MODELS OF BANKING INSTABILITY: A PARTIAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Abstract. This paper critically examines the theoretical literature on banking instability that has followed Diamond and Dybvig (1983). It explores the extent to which it (a) explains banking instability within a theoretical context in which financial intermediaries improve on unintermediated markets, and (b) justifies government involvement in the financial intermediation industry. It suggests that the literature has yet to provide a satisfactory theoretical basis for banking instability as such since the intermediaries which arise from it are peculiar mutual funds that bear little resemblance to real-world banks. In addition, the paper challenges the widespread belief that this literature provides a sound foundation for government involvement in the industry. It suggests that arguments for government intervention are open to objection on various grounds, the most important one being that they are inconsistent with the existence of properly motivated financial intermediation in these models.     

AN ALGORITHMIC INFORMATION THEORETIC APPROACH TO THE BEHAVIOUR OF FINANCIAL MARKETS

Using frequency distributions of daily closing price time series of several financial market indices, we investigate whether the bias away from an equiprobable sequence distribution found in the data, predicted by algorithmic information theory, may account for some of the deviation of financial markets from log‐normal, and if so for how much of said deviation and over what sequence lengths. We do so by comparing the distributions of binary sequences from actual time series of financial markets and series built up from purely algorithmic means. Our discussion is a starting point for a further investigation of the market as a rule‐based system with an algorithmic component, despite its apparent randomness, and the use of the theory of algorithmic probability with new tools that can be applied to the study of the market price phenomenon. The main discussion is cast in terms of assumptions common to areas of economics in agreement with an algorithmic view of the market.     

The economics of markets and platforms

Advances in the study of both markets and platforms contribute to economics. Platforms are typically digital markets, although platforms can designate markets generally. So, the economics of markets and the economics of platforms are one and the same. Platforms show the critical role of intermediaries in endogenous price adjustment and market clearing. The platform model remedies problems with general equilibrium analysis by combining and extending the basic Walrasian and Marshalian market models. The analysis of platforms provides explanations for the bid–ask spread, including market power, search costs, matching costs, adverse selection, and moral hazard. The study of platforms demonstrates the importance of participation and coordination in the formation of markets. The discussion emphasizes that platforms have significant implications for the theory of the firm. The analysis further considers how platforms affect innovation and entrepreneurship.