格兰仕危机自救——买格兰仕电器看世界工厂

企业常常会面对一些突发事件，如果反应迟缓或反应不当都会让企业损失重大，所以企业要不停地问自己：“我们有预警系统吗？”“我们的预警系统运行正常吗？”     

格兰仕集团运用的价格战策略的分析

<正> 1993年,当格兰仕集团进入微波炉行业时,微波炉的销售价格高达3000元以上,所以产品具有巨大的降价空间。凭借价格战,格兰仕集团3年后成为中国第一,2年后成为全球第一。如今,格兰仕集团在国内和国外市场的占有率分别达到70%和30%以上。综观微波炉市场风起云涌的变化,1997年是格兰仕成为行业老大的分水岭。在此之前,其优势并不明显。但是就在这一年,格兰仕继又掀起了持续几年的价格战。     

格兰仕再造

在中国，能把单一产品做到世界第一的企业并不多。从做鸡毛掸子起家，到把微波炉做成世界第一，格兰仕集团董事长梁庆德向世界展示了一个顺德人的商业豪气和胆略。今天，当格兰仕与众多曾经辉煌的顺德企业一样，面对难以跨越的企业成长瓶颈，面对或先或后到来的“产业升级”大考，此时的商业实践，对梁庆德和他的儿子、格兰仕集团执行总裁梁昭贤的决策智慧，无疑是一次更为严峻的大考。     

格兰仕重估乡村渠道价值

9月的一天，格兰仕集团副总裁赵静异常兴奋地走在山东省德州市临邑县的大街上，这个小县城快速发展的经济和迅速提高的收入水平，以及由此带来的对消费的新要求新观念，令他感叹不已。而这种兴奋之情从他开始在山东县级市场考察以来，就一直伴随着他。     

鏖兵海外——格兰仕出海谋“蝶变”

就像格兰仕的产品遍布全球一样．入得格兰仕的大门，记的思维也不由得国际化起来。这不能不说是格兰仕“OEM”（为国外品牌贴牌生产）出海方式成功的魔力。在2003年，格兰仕海外出口总额达5亿多美元，无论是绝对值还是占其总销售额40％多的比例．这两个数字都足以令人惊讶。但笔很快就将这种惊讶归结为一种“内陆式思维”的惊讶。因为在广东沿海．在格兰仕所在地顺德．靠“OEM”创造出海奇迹的大有人在．且使得“OEM”成了许多企业走出国门挣外汇的“葵花宝典”。     

格兰仕：演绎成本绝技

提起格兰仕，人们在脑海中的第一印象可能就是价格战了。“价格战“是企业竞争中最残酷也是最有效的手段，没有什么比价格战更能摧残企业资源的方式了，但是格兰仕却将这个手段发挥到了极致；哪怕是价格战鼻祖长虹也不例外。     

Investment financing, inflation, risks, and stabilization

This paper discusses financial problems of stepping up the investment process in Russia, approaches to intensifying financial redistribution, opportunities for using government savings to boost and upgrade economic growth, and suggests financial support measures for the modernization of the Russian economy.     

Sickness, absenteeism, presenteeism, and sick pay

The annual cost of absenteeism from the workplace in the UKhas been estimated to be over 1% of GDP. The traditional approachto a discussion of absence has been for the firm to passivelyaccept both wages and sick pay and allow workers to choose theirabsence behaviour. Most empirical research has been based onthis approach. However, if absence is costly why should firmspay extra-statutory sick pay? One reason may be the phenomenaof presenteeism (ill workers attending work). This may adverselyaffect productivity. This paper shows that allowing for presenteeismhas important implications for both the design of optimal wage-sickpay contracts and for the interpretation of empirical studies.Specifically, we show that firms will offer a level of sickpay greater than the statutory minimum.     

Management,managers, and revolution

Management and managers play a critical role in revolutionary societies. During revolutions the increased demand for and decreased supply of managers create a costly management gap. Revolutionary governments face significant problems in mobilizing and developing managers for state-owned enterprises and in motivating private sector managers who face eroding social status and changing societal values. Meeting the management needs in the state enterprises requires significant efforts in management training as well as organizational changes. With the private sector the government's task involves identifying areas of goal congruency and developing cooperative relationships around these. Conflictive relationships with some segments of the private sector complicate the task. This article's emperical basis is derived primarily from the Nicaraguan experience. A final section suggests avenues for further research on management and revolution.     

Trade, Institutions, and Credit

Within economics there has been a mounting interest in institutions. Virtually all the work to date on institutions has examined a single institution. The problem is that in many settings the performance of the institution under examination is affected by other, unexamined institutions. This paper examines the relationship between two types of private-order institutions that facilitated trade in a specific setting—Mexican California during the 1830s and 1840s. The surviving evidence suggests that a multilateral institution enabled merchants to extend credit to their retail customers, and a similar multilateral institution enabled the merchants to extend credit to one another. The relationship between these institutions makes them of particular interest. This relationship arose because local communities imposed costs on merchants that affected their trade with one another. The barriers to entry and exit posed by these costs, in turn, facilitated the operation and persistence of the institution that supported intermerchant trade. They also precluded other organizational forms such as the vertical integration of wholesalers.     

Institutions,Capital, and Growth

The international development community has encouraged investment in physical and human capital as a precursor to economic progress. Recent evidence shows, however, that increases in capital do not always lead to increases in output. We develop a growth model where the allocation and productivity of capital depends on a country's institutions. We find that increases in physical and human capital lead to output growth only in countries with good institutions. In countries with bad institutions, increases in capital lead to negative growth rates because additions to the capital stock tend to be employed in rent‐seeking and other socially unproductive activities.