Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets

This article studies a two-period game between the public and a central bank about whose ability to commit to an announced target the public is uncertain. The central bank chooses between announcing a target for an intermediate variable (money growth) and its goal variable, inflation. Prior to setting its instrument, the central bank receives private, noisy information about the link between money growth and inflation. Monetary targeting facilitates communication of the central bank's type, in that the probability of separation is always higher than under inflation targeting. This advantage of monetary targets from a dependable central bank's perspective is outweighed for most parameter values by the advantage of inflation targeting in terms of inflation control. If the regime choice is treated as a strategic decision, over a large range of parameter values both central banks choose the regime that a dependable central bank would prefer.     

The educational and occupational background of central bankers and its effect on inflation: An empirical analysis

We test the hypothesis that the inflation preferences of central bankers depend on their educational and/or occupational background. In a panel data analysis for the euro area and eleven countries since 1973, we explain inflation either by the weights with which the educational and occupational characteristics of the 391 council members were represented in the various central bank councils or by the education or occupation of the median council members. Control variables are added. Our most robust result is that former members of the central bank staff prefer significantly lower inflation rates than former politicians do.     

Sustainability, flexibility, and inflation targeting

This paper examines sustainability of an inflation-targeting policy regime in terms of sustainable equilibrium using a canonical model in the recent literature. Overly flexible inflation targeting is not sustainable. Strict inflation targeting is sustainable only when shock persistence is high enough.     

Evaluating inflation targeting as a monetary policy objective for India

This study formulates a small open economy model for India with exchange rate as a prominent channel of monetary policy. The model is estimated using the Instrumental Variable-Generalized Methods of Moments (IV-GMM) estimator and evaluated through simulations. This study compares different cases of domestic and CPI inflation targeting, strict and flexible inflation targeting, and simple Taylor type rules. The analysis highlights the unsuitability of simple Taylor-type monetary rules in stabilizing the Indian economy and suggests that discretionary optimization works better in stabilizing this economy. There seems to be a trade-off between output gap stabilization and exchange rate stabilization in flexible domestic inflation targeting and CPI inflation targeting respectively. However, flexible domestic inflation targeting seems a better alternative from an overall macro stabilization perspective in India where financial markets are still not sufficiently integrated to ensure quick transmission of interest rate impulses and existence of rigidities in the economy.     

Policy reform and optimal inflation rate for Japan in computable OLG economy

We build a computable OLG model with monetary growth to calculate the optimal level of inflation rate for Japan, and to study policy reforms make any quantitative impacts on it. Four main results were obtained: (i) the optimal inflation rate for Japan is calculated around 1.0%; (ii) the calculated underlying inflation rate is about 9% under the present Japanese economic and fiscal situation; (iii) to prevent high inflation, fiscal reconstruction needs to be implemented; and (iv) if fundamental fiscal reform is conducted, the optimal inflation rate might be achieved. These results are very robust to calibration.     

Welfare cost of inflation in a stochastic balanced growth model

There is a large and growing literature on the welfare cost of inflation. However, work in this area tend to find moderate estimates of welfare gains. In this paper we reexamine welfare costs of inflation within a stochastic general equilibrium balanced growth model paying a particular attention to recursive utility, portfolio balance effects, and monetary volatility and monetary policy uncertainty. Our numerical analysis shows that a monetary policy that brings down inflation to the optimum level can have substantial welfare effects. Portfolio adjustment effects seem to be the dominant factor behind the welfare gains.     

Eurosystem monetary targeting: Lessons from U.S. data

Using a small empirical model of inflation, output, and money estimated on U.S. data, we compare the relative performance of monetary targeting and inflation targeting. The results show monetary targeting to be quite inefficient, yielding both higher inflation and output variability. This is true even with a nonstochastic money demand formulation. Our results are also robust to using a P∗ model of inflation. Therefore, in these popular frameworks, there is no support for the prominent role given to money growth in the Eurosystem's monetary policy strategy.     

On the dynamics of international inflation

We investigate the dynamic properties of inflation in 20 OECD countries with a novel approach based on the autocorrelation function. We find evidence in favor of long memory and nonlinearity. Linear autoregressive models are shown to be misspecified.     

Monetary Policy Rules for a Small Open Economy

In this paper, the optimal choice of a monetary target is investigated for a small open economy that is subject to foreign monetary policy shocks. In contrast to large parts of the literature, pegging the exchange rate is never the best policy choice for the small open economy in our model. Instead, monetary targeting and, depending on the parameter combination, producer price index targeting come closest to the optimal policy rule in terms of welfare. Generally, the welfare performance of the simple targeting rules under consideration hinge critically on the degree of pass-through in the home economy and in the rest of the world.     

Announcements and credibility under inflation targeting

We inspect how inflation target announcements are instrumental in building central bank credibility and shaping inflation expectations. Investigating the role of announcements by using a time varying credibility measure, we find that both the accuracy and the frequency of inflation announcements have a positive impact on how much attention the public pays to target announcements.     

Monetary policy,heterogeneous population and inflation

Adding heterogeneity to an otherwise simple model results in a deviation from the Friedman rule. We show that a central bank concerned with inequality delivers an outcome below the Pareto frontier. Our results may shed light as to why central banks around the world do not follow the Friedman rule and instead deliver positive inflation rates. On the other hand, the calibrated model indicates that the implied optimal inflation rates are much higher than those observed in the data. One possible interpretation of our results is to question the recent wisdom of thinking of inequality as part of central banks’ concerns.     

Timeless perspective versus discretionary policymaking when the degree of inflation persistence is unknown

One major strand in optimal monetary policy analysis considers the robustness of alternative policies under model uncertainty. Another has focused on the appropriate perspective for optimal monetary policy, namely discretion or the timeless perspective (TP). The paper bridges these two parallel lines of research by assessing the welfare consequences of both policy perspectives in the presence of misperceptions about the degree of intrinsic inflation persistence. Contrary to most standard results, discretion can be the more robust perspective, the reason being that the TP exploits the expectations channel. With misperceptions this leads to large deteriorations in welfare.     

Optimal monetary policy for a small open economy

This paper focuses on the design of monetary policy rules for a small open economy. The model features optimizing behavior, general equilibrium and price stickiness. The real exchange rate is shown to affect the firm's real marginal cost, aggregate supply and aggregate demand. The welfare objective depends on the openness of the economy, and the optimal policy rule differs from that which obtains in a closed economy. The inflation versus output gap stabilization trade-off is caused by the real exchange rate. The implied optimal monetary policy regime is domestic inflation target coupled with controlled floating of the real exchange rate.     

Causal relations between inflation and inflation uncertainty—Cross sectional evidence in favour of the Friedman-Ball hypothesis

We test for causality between inflation and its associated uncertainty by means of both in-sample and out-of-sample modelling. Our findings indicate that the impact of inflation on inflation uncertainty is more pronounced than the reverse causal effect.     

Household's preferences and monetary policy inertia

Interest rates set by central banks puzzlingly move with a certain inertia. We show that household's preferences can be important determinants of the optimal interest rate inertia due to their impact on the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.     

Formal targets, central bank independence and inflation dynamics in the UK: A Markov-Switching approach

We examine inflation and uncertainty in the UK with a version of the Markov Switching model, which allows for changes in the variance as well as in the mean and persistence of a series. We find that the UK’s attempts at exchange rate pegs in the form of shadowing the deutschmark and entering the ERM were ineffective, and in the latter case counterproductive in lowering inflation uncertainty. The 1981 budget, however, greatly lowered uncertainty, and the adoption of a formal inflation target also had a palpable, negative impact on inflation uncertainty. As a suggestive exercise, we examine inflation uncertainty in the US, and find that, over 2005–2008, in the absence of an inflation target, uncertainty rose in the US, while uncertainty remained low in the UK over this period of rising commodity prices and financial turmoil.     

More effective than we thought: Central bank independence and inflation in developing countries

This study examines the effect of legal central bank independence on inflation in developing countries. In spite of the policy consensus suggesting that central bank independence is an effective tool to control inflation, the evidence is still limited, particularly for developing countries. Using a novel dataset, we analyze the effect of central bank independence on inflation for a sample of 118 developing countries between 1980 and 2013. We find that higher central bank independence is associated with lower inflation rates. This effect on inflation is stronger the more democratic a country is, but it is also present in non-democratic countries. Our results are robust to different specifications and methodologies. Furthermore, we find that all dimensions included in the measurement of central bank independence (objectives, personnel, policy, and financial independence) contribute to curb inflation. Our results shed light on which types of reforms may be more effective at fighting inflation in developing countries.     

Sticky prices and moderate inflation

Recent evidence shows that there is great heterogeneity in the price setting frequency across sectors, and that those changing prices frequently do so even under low inflation. What happens to price setting strategies of sticky price goods under moderate inflation? We built a dataset of monthly newspaper and magazine prices for Colombia, for the period 1960–2005, an exceptional example of prolonged moderate inflation. Within this macroeconomic scenario, and the novel database, we study the frequency of price adjustment, the relative importance of time- and state-dependent theories, and their evolution as inflation declined from moderate rates to single digits.     

Information acquisition, dissemination, and transparency of monetary policy

Abstract.  This paper examines the role of transparency in a benevolent monetary authority's policies. Each firm's payoff depends on unobservable macroeconomic conditions and firms may incur a cost to acquire private information about macroeconomic conditions. The policy authority attempts to infer the underlying macroeconomic conditions from a noisy measure of aggregate actions and makes a public announcement to inform firms of this inference. High-quality announcements provide firms the incentive not to gather private information and base actions solely on information contained in policy announcements. However, this makes the observed actions of firms less informative to the policy authority.     

Inflation, unemployment, and the time consistency of the US monetary policy

This paper verifies the performance of the Barro and Gordon (1983) model to explain the US inflation since the early 1950s. We divide the period from 1951:2 to 2010:2 according to each chairman of the Federal Reserve (FED). In addition, we consider aggregated periods, represented by pre-Volcker, Volcker-Greenspan, Greenspan-Bernanke, and whole sample. A genetic algorithm of stochastic search is applied to reduce the sensitivity of the maximum likelihood estimator to the initial parameter values. Surprisingly, our results show that the time consistency problem explains the US inflation during the Greenspan chairmanship at the FED.