Dividend Omissions and Intraindustry Information Transfers

We examine potential information transfers from companies that announce dividend omissions to their industry rivals. Specifically, we examine the abnormal stock returns and abnormal earnings forecast revisions of rivals after a company makes a dividend‐omission announcement. Our results show negative and significant abnormal stock returns and negative and significant abnormal forecast revisions for rival companies in response to the announcement, and a significant and positive relation between the two. We conclude that a dividend‐omission announcement transmits unfavorable information across the announcing company's industry that affects cash flow expectations and ultimately stock prices.     

Dividend policy: Reconciling DD with MM

Miller and Modigliani [1961. Dividend policy, growth and the valuation of shares. Journal of Business 34, 411–433] establish the irrelevance of dividend policy in a perfect capital market. DeAngelo and DeAngelo [2006. The irrelevance of the MM dividend irrelevance theorem. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 293–315.] suggest the Miller-Modigliani analysis is flawed and consequently their central conclusion is incorrect. The purpose of this paper is to show the vital role played by stock repurchases and agency costs in reconciling the two opposing views.     

Dividend policy,creditor rights,and the agency costs of debt

We show that country-level creditor rights influence dividend policies around the world by establishing the balance of power between debt and equity claimants. Creditors demand and managers consent to a more restrictive payout policy as a substitute for weak creditor rights in an effort to minimize the firm's agency costs of debt. Using a sample of 120,507 firm-years from 52 countries, we find that both the probability and amount of dividend payouts are significantly lower in countries with poor creditor rights. A reduction in the creditor rights index from its highest value to its lowest value implies a 41% reduction in the probability of paying a dividend, and a 60% reduction in dividend payout ratios. These results are robust to numerous control variables, sample variations, model specifications, and alternative hypotheses. We also show that the agency costs of debt play a more decisive role in determining dividend policies than the previously documented agency costs of equity. Overall, our findings contribute to the growing literature arguing that creditors exert significant influence over corporate decision-making outside of bankruptcy.     

The Market's Differential Reactions to Forward-Looking and Backward-Looking Dividend Changes

Empirical evidence on the signaling hypothesis of dividends is weak and mixed. Recent studies find that dividend changes reflect mostly current and past earnings but not future earnings. We provide a model in which not all dividend changes contain new information about future earnings. Some dividend decisions are backward looking (noninformation or nonsignaling events). Other dividend decisions are forward looking (information or signaling events). The model helps identify the two types of dividend changes and predicts that the market will respond strongly only to forward‐looking dividend changes. We provide evidence consistent with the implications of the model.     

Price incentives and consumer payment behaviour

In this paper we estimate the effect of particular price incentives on consumer payment patterns using transaction-level data. We find that participation in a loyalty program and access to an interest-free period tend to increase credit card use at the expense of alternative payment methods, such as debit cards and cash. Interestingly though, the pattern of substitution from cash and debit cards differs according to the price incentive. An implication of the findings is that the Reserve Bank reforms of the Australian payments system are likely to have influenced observed payment patterns.     

Do Emerging Market Firms Follow Different Dividend Policies From U.S. Firms?

We find that emerging market firms exhibit dividend behavior similar to U.S. firms, in the sense that dividends are explained by profitability, debt, and the market‐to‐book ratio. However, empirical dividend policy equations are structurally different, indicating different sensitivities to these variables. Additionally, emerging market firms seem to be more affected by asset mix, which seems to be due to their greater reliance on bank debt. Overall, country factors are as important in dividend policies as previous studies find them to be in capital structure decisions.     

Dividend signaling under economic adversity: Evidence from the London Stock Exchange

The signaling or information content hypothesis is amongst the most prominent theories attempting to explain dividend policy decisions. However, no research has, to date, examined the information content of dividends in conjunction with generalized economic adversity. With the majority of the western economies facing the tough reality of the economic recession since late 2007–early 2008, we focus on the possibility of asymmetrical dividend signaling effects between periods of stability and economic adversity. Using data from the London Stock Exchange (LSE), where earnings and dividend news are released simultaneously, we test the dividend signaling hypothesis and the interaction of earnings and dividends under both steady and adverse economic conditions. We document positive and significant average abnormal stock price returns around the dividend/earnings announcements. We also find a significant interaction between economic conditions and the information content of dividends. After testing the dividend signaling hypothesis under both stable and recessionary economic conditions we find that dividends have less information content than earnings in periods of growth and stability, but more in periods of economic adversity.     

Compensation incentives of credit rating agencies and predictability of changes in bond ratings and financial strength ratings

Over the past decade there has been mixed evidence on the lead–lag relation between issuer-paid and investor-paid credit rating agencies. We investigate the lead–lag relationship for changes in bond ratings (BRs) and financial strength ratings (FSRs), for the US insurance industry, where FSRs impose market discipline. First, we find that changes in issuer-paid BRs are led by changes in investor-paid BRs, even over a period that issuer-paid agencies have improved their timeliness. Second, information flows in both directions between changes in issuer-paid BRs and FSRs. Third, issuer-paid FSRs are predictable by investor-paid BRs. Fourth, the lead effect of investor-paid downgrades is economically significant as it is associated with an unconditional, post-event, 30-day cumulative abnormal return of −4%. This return is a result of investor-paid downgrades in BRs, which predict more downgrades in the following 90 days (same period return of −11%).     

Stock Market Development and the Decline of the Portion of Dividend Payers throughout the World

I contend that stock market development has substantially contributed to the decline of dividend payers worldwide. Using data from 31 countries, my research shows that stock market development makes firms in countries with a relatively high dependence on stock market financing less likely to pay dividends, to pay less, and more likely to omit. These results also are robust to the sample selection, the time‐varying firm characteristics, and the differences in legal systems, capital market scales, and country‐level information disclosure.     

Dividend distributions and closed-end fund discounts

Empirical support for the hypothesis that closed-end fund discounts are related to overhanging tax liabilities has been mixed. We introduce a new approach to testing this hypothesis by examining changes in discount levels following distributions of dividends and capital gains. Since distributions reduce future shareholder tax liabilities, the tax liability hypothesis implies that closed-end fund discounts should decline following distributions. Focusing on changes in discounts isolates this tax effect by eliminating the impact of other fund-specific factors on discount levels. Our results support the tax liability hypothesis, showing that short-run fluctuations in discounts are directly affected by taxable distributions.     

Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives

We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests could influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and cash holdings, and we find a negative relation between vega and the value of cash to shareholders. The negative effect of vega on the value of cash is robust after controlling for corporate governance, is stronger in firms with high leverage, is reversed for unlevered firms, and is not present in financially constrained firms. We also find that the likelihood of liquidity covenants in new bank loans is increasing in CEO vega incentives. Our evidence primarily supports the costly contracting hypothesis, which asserts that bondholders anticipate greater risk-taking in high vega firms and, therefore, require greater liquidity.     

Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis

We investigate whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives before the crisis. We find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and no evidence that they performed better. Banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. Bank CEOs did not reduce their holdings of shares in anticipation of the crisis or during the crisis. Consequently, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis.     

Managerial risk taking incentives and corporate pension policy

We examine whether the compensation incentives of top management affect the extent of risk shifting versus risk management behavior in pension plans. We find that risk shifting through pension underfunding (and, to a lesser extent, through pension asset allocation to risky securities) is stronger with compensation structures that create high wealth-risk sensitivity (vega) and weaker with high wealth-price sensitivity (delta). These findings are stronger for chief financial officers (CFOs) than for chief executive officers (CEOs), suggesting that pension policy falls within the CFO’s domain. Risk shifting through pension underfunding is also lower when the CFO’s personal stake in the pension plan is larger. Overall, these findings show that top managers’ compensation structure is an important driver of corporate pension policy. They also highlight firms within which the moral hazard concerns fueled by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation insurance are most relevant.     

Insiders’ incentives for asymmetric disclosure and firm-specific information flows

Recent research suggests that insiders’ incentives for capturing cash flows affect price formation process in which insiders are inclined to withhold good news and to accelerate the release of bad news (Jin and Myers, 2006). We investigate whether insiders’ incentives for private control benefit, proxied by control-ownership wedge, affect firm-specific return characteristics. We find that control-ownership wedge is negatively related to the likelihood of positive return jumps and positively related to the extent of asymmetric market reaction to good news rather than to bad news. Overall, our results support the notion that corporate insiders increase opaqueness and withhold good news in order to capture unexpected cash flow.     

CFOs versus CEOs: Equity incentives and crashes

Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 1993-2009, we provide evidence that the sensitivity of a chief financial officer's (CFO) option portfolio value to stock price is significantly and positively related to the firm's future stock price crash risk. In contrast, we find only weak evidence of the positive impact of chief executive officer option sensitivity on crash risk. Finally, we find that the link between CFO option sensitivity and crash risk is more pronounced for firms in non-competitive industries and those with a high level of financial leverage.     

Understanding merger incentives and outcomes in the US mutual fund industry

This paper examines the incentives of acquirers and targets in the merger market. Using data on acquisitions among mutual fund management companies from 1991 to 2004, I estimate a two-sided matching model of the merger market jointly with equations representing merger outcomes. According to the empirical investigation, although the desire to achieve a sufficient scale to attract investors is a key driver for mergers, some mergers seem to be driven by objectives other than shareholder value maximization. I find that companies that are potentially prone to misaligned incentives between owners and managers are more acquisitive than others, yet have significantly worse post-merger operating performance. I also find that these acquirers, despite their higher willingness to pay for targets, are not any more likely to match with high-quality targets, potentially due to targets’ incentive to avoid bad organizations.     

CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions

We analyze how the structure of executive compensation affects the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a sample of acquiring U.S. banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that CEOs with higher pay-risk sensitivity engage in risk-inducing mergers. Our findings are driven by two types of acquisitions: acquisitions completed during the last decade (after bank deregulation had expanded banks' risk-taking opportunities) and acquisitions completed by the largest banks in our sample (where shareholders benefit from ‘too big to fail’ support by regulators and gain most from shifting risk to other stakeholders). Our results control for CEO pay-performance sensitivity and offer evidence consistent with a causal link between financial stability and the risk-taking incentives embedded in the executive compensation contracts at banks.     

The evolving relation between earnings,dividends, and stock repurchases

This paper examines how the relation between earnings and payout policy has evolved over the last three decades. Three principal groups of payers have emerged: firms that pay dividends and make regular repurchases, firms that make regular repurchases, and firms that make occasional repurchases. Firms that only pay dividends are largely extinct. Repurchases are increasingly used in place of dividends, even for firms that continue to pay dividends. While other factors help explain the timing of repurchases, the overall level of repurchases is fundamentally determined by earnings. The results suggest that repurchases are now the dominant form of payout.     

Asymmetrical return on equity mean reversion and catering

Using a momentum threshold autoregression model, we find evidence showing that there is an asymmetrical mean reversion behavior in return on equity (ROE). Results show that the speed of adjustment of ROE towards the long-term mean is slower in the ROE increasing regimes than in the ROE decreasing regimes. Additional results indicate that investor earnings optimism is significantly related to change in abnormal ROE. These results are consistent with predictions from catering theory.     

Stakeholder conflicts and dividend policy

This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.