Common value auctions with independent types

In this paper I consider a common value model, with independent types, where the ex-post value of the good is influenced by the bidders' information at the auction stage. The seller cannot fully extract the surplus. In a symmetric model the optimal mechanism can be implemented through first price, second price, or English auctions; but not through a Dutch auction. Other properties of the optimal auctions are that the seller's reservation price is endogenous, and that in sealed bid auctions the price may exceed the value of the object (winner's curse).     

The set of equilibria of first-price auctions

I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of symmetric first-price auctions. A formula to recover the distribution of valuations for any equilibrium bidding strategy is given.     

Descending price multi-item auctions

We propose a simultaneous descending price auction mechanism to sell multiple heterogeneous items, each owned by a distinct seller, to a number of buyers. Each buyer has known private valuations on items, and wants at most one item. We show that if the sellers follow a descending price offer procedure and the buyers follow a greedy strategy for accepting the offers, the auction results in a nearly efficient allocation, and terminates close to a competitive equilibrium price vector. The descending price offer strategy of the sellers is close to a Nash equilibrium. However, we show that the buyers are better off waiting in our auction. There is a maximum limit (corresponding to the minimum competitive equilibrium price vector) till which they can wait without running into the risk of not winning any item. If the buyers wait within this limit, the prices can be brought arbitrarily close to a uniquely defined competitive equilibrium price vector.     

Quantile-based nonparametric inference for first-price auctions

We propose a quantile-based nonparametric approach to inference on the probability density function (PDF) of the private values in first-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values. Our method of inference is based on a fully nonparametric kernel-based estimator of the quantiles and PDF of observable bids. Our estimator attains the optimal rate of Guerre et al. (2000), and is also asymptotically normal with an appropriate choice of the bandwidth.     

Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity

We propose a novel methodology for identification of first-price auctions, when bidders’ private valuations are independent conditional on one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. We extend the existing literature ( and ) by allowing the unobserved heterogeneity to be non-separable from bidders’ valuations. Our central identifying assumption is that the distribution of bidder values is increasing in the state. When the state-space is finite, such monotonicity implies the full-rank condition needed for identification. Further, we extend our approach to the conditionally independent private values model of Li et al. (2000), as well as to unobserved heterogeneity settings in which the implicit reserve price or the cost of bidding varies across auctions.     

The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders

We consider standard auction models when bidders’ identities are not-or are only partially-observed by the econometrician. We first adapt the definition of identifiability to a framework with anonymous bids and explore the extent to which anonymity reduces the possibility of identifying private value auction models. Second, in the asymmetric independent private value model which is nonparametrically identified, we generalize Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong’s estimation procedure [Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions, Econometrica 68 (2000) 525-574] and consider the asymptotic properties of our multi-step kernel-based estimator. Monte Carlo simulations illustrate the practical relevance of our estimation procedure in small data sets.     

Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment

A competitive economy is studied in which sellers offer alternative direct mechanisms to buyers who have private information about their own private use value for the commodity being traded. In addition the commodity has a common value to all buyers, perhaps represented by the future resale value of the commodity. A competitive equilibrium in mechanisms is described. In every such equilibrium it is shown that sellers must offer mechanisms that are allocationally equivalent to English ascending price auctions. The reservation prices that sellers set are shown to be below their ex post cost of trading the commodity. Received: 24 April 1998 / Accepted: 8 March 1999     

Non-parametric estimation of sequential english auctions

I propose an empirical strategy to identify and to estimate non-parametrically the distribution and the density of latent valuations from the winning bids at sequential oral, ascending-price (hereafter English) auctions within the independent private-values paradigm. I evaluate the asymptotic and finite-sample properties of my approach, and the estimation strategy is applied to daily data from a fish auction held in Grenaa, Denmark, between January 2, 2000 and March 31, 2004.     

Semiparametric identification and estimation in multi-object,English auctions

Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of winning bids for two different objects sold sequentially at English auction, assuming the valuations across objects for a particular bidder are potentially dependent. We demonstrate that, within the Archimedean family of copulas, the model is identified using only observed winning bids, and then propose a semiparametric estimation strategy to recover the joint distribution of valuations. We implement our methods using data from fish auctions held in Denmark and estimate whether bundling is expected-revenue enhancing.     

Implementing optimal procurement auctions with exogenous quality

In this paper, we consider the implementation of the optimal procurement auction outcome when there is a trade-off between price and quality for the buyer. The quality proposals of the competing firms are assumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. After defining the optimal auction, we characterize the discriminatory first score auction and the modified second score auction implementing it when the buyer is assumed to have the same information as the firms. Then we consider an auction which requires no specific information from the buyer and show that a second score auction followed by a negotiation stage can implement the optimal auction outcome under this more realistic assumption. Received: 30 March 2001 / Accepted: 14 December 2001 I am grateful to the anonymous referees for comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Identification and estimation in sequential,asymmetric, English auctions

Within the independent private-values paradigm, we derive the data-generating process of the winning bid for the last unit sold at multi-unit, sequential, asymmetric, English auctions. When the identity of the winner and the number of units won by each bidder in previous stages of the auction are observed, we demonstrate nonparametric identification and propose a semi-nonparametric estimation strategy based on orthogonal polynomials. We apply our estimator to daily data from fish auctions in Denmark. For single-unit supply, we use our estimates to compare the revenues a seller could expect to earn were a Dutch auction employed instead.     

Semiparametric estimation in models of first-price,sealed-bid auctions with affiliation

Within the affiliated private-values paradigm, we develop a tractable empirical model of equilibrium behaviour at first-price, sealed-bid auctions. The model is non-parametrically identified, but the rate of convergence in estimation is slow when the number of bidders is even moderately large, so we develop a semiparametric estimation strategy, focusing on the Archimedean family of copulae and implementing this framework using particular members—the Clayton, Frank, and Gumbel copulae. We apply our framework to data from low-price, sealed-bid auctions used by the Michigan Department of Transportation to procure road-resurfacing services, rejecting the hypothesis of independence and finding significant (and high) affiliation in cost signals.     

Semi-nonparametric estimation of independently and identically repeated first-price auctions via an integrated simulated moments method

In this paper we propose to estimate the value distribution of independently and identically repeated first-price auctions directly via a semi-nonparametric integrated simulated moments sieve approach. Given a candidate value distribution function in a sieve space, we simulate bids according to the equilibrium bid function involved. We take the difference of the empirical characteristic functions of the actual and simulated bids as the moment function. The objective function is then the integral of the squared moment function over an interval. Minimizing this integral to the distribution functions in the sieve space involved and letting the sieve order increase to infinity with the sample size then yields a uniformly consistent semi-nonparametric estimator of the actual value distribution. Also, we propose an integrated moment test for the validity of the first-price auction model, and an data-driven method for the choice of the sieve order. Finally, we conduct a few numerical experiments to check the performance of our approach.     

Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: Identification,estimation and application to construction procurements

This article studies a model of asymmetric risk averse bidding within the independent private value paradigm. The inherent asymmetry in cost and risk aversion imposes an original restriction on the observed bid data, an exact equality which leads to the model semiparametric identification and estimation. The unobserved arguments of this equality need to be simulated in order to estimate the bidders’ Constant Relative Risk Aversion or Constant Absolute Risk Aversion parameters and their heterogeneous cost distributions. In the Los Angeles City Hall construction contracts offered between 1994 and 2003, the model and methodology help reveal that financial asymmetries affect the firms’ cost distribution, while experience influences their degree of risk aversion.     

Sequential bargaining with common values

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players who jointly own this object. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object’s value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no depreciation during the bargaining process which involves signalling of private information. We characterise the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of this game which is unique if offers are required to be strictly increasing. Equilibrium agreement is reached gradually and non-deterministically. The better informed player obtains a rent.     

The Nature of Corruption Deterrence in a Competitive Media Sector

This paper compares the deterrence provided by a competitive media sector towards government induced corruption with that of a media monopoly in a setting where the media might raise both true as well as false allegations of corruption. It finds that competition’s impact on corruption deterrence is not necessarily better than a monopoly but rather hinges on a delicate balance between government’s kickback from corruption and the media’s potential benefit from exposure. While the paper does identify conditions in which a competitive media sector would improve upon the deterrence provided by a monopoly, it also find conditions under which it would do no better than a monopoly and in some situations its strategic response could be even worse especially when it intensifies effort towards justifying false allegations.     

Charity auctions as assets: Theory and simulations of fundraising risk management in mean-variance space

This paper demonstrates how the risk over auction revenue at fundraising events can be managed with modern portfolio theory. Within the independent private values (IPV) framework, it is shown that auction mechanisms offer charities an inherent mean-variance tradeoff over revenue when contributions produce a public good benefit among bidders. This allows the fundraiser to construct a “portfolio” of auction mechanisms for their event so as to manage auction revenue outcomes according to the charity's risk preferences. Simulations provide support for the empirical prominence of the second-price winner-pay (i.e. English) auction, as this is often the portfolio's most heavily weighted mechanism under reasonable risk preferences.     

On the screening power of incentive schemes

We demonstrate the screening power of incentive schemes. The model is a synthesis of a signaling model and the principal-agent problem. A non-cooperative stage where the agent may send a signal precedes a contractual stage where the agent serves a principal under an incentive scheme. After establishing the existence of a revealing equilibrium in an environment with long-lived principals and overlapping contracts, the paper discusses the implications for efficiency of the distribution of surplus. Finally, it is shown that under commitment the agency relationship may serve self-selection purposes and hence reduce the need of costly signaling.     

Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments

Consider a seller and a buyer who write a contract. After that, the seller produces a good. She can influence the expected quality of the good by making unobservable investments. Only the seller learns the realized quality. Finally, trade can occur. It is always ex post efficient to trade. Yet, it may be impossible to achieve the first best, even though the risk-neutral parties are symmetrically informed at the contracting stage and complete contracts can be written. The second best is characterized by distortions that are reminiscent of adverse selection models (i.e., models with precontractual private information but without hidden actions).