Special and differential treatment in the WTO agricultural negotiations: Analysis and policy recommendation

The on-going Doha Development Round under the World Trade Organization (WTO) has its main focus on development. This is due to the widespread disappointment with the results from the former Uruguay Round Agreement. Developing countries have not reaped the benefits of free trade. For this current Round to be a success, developing countries have to be more integrated in the multilateral trading system. One of the means of integrating is Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). SDT is a deviation from the basic principle of Most Favoured Nation, positing that developing countries can have more flexibility than others. This article investigates the positions on SDT made by WTO members. The analysis gives some insights into the negotiations. First, the analysis reveals the fact that the positions of WTO members are relatively close to each other. This could indicate that countries in fact agree or that sensitive areas are maintained as yet unaffected. Second, being able to sustain a certain level of tariff rates attracts most interest from developing countries. Third, higher income developing countries want to retain their right to support domestic producers. Finally, the article identifies the July Package right in the middle of the positions which indicate a future agreement.     

Challenges in quantitative economic analysis in support of multilateral trade negotiations

A wide range of economic analysis of agricultural trade liberalization was performed prior to and during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. Views differ as to the effectiveness of this research, although most would agree that it became less relevant as the negotiations progressed. This paper reviews the contributions of economists to the trade liberalization debate, with an emphasis on the quantitative assessment of multilateral agricultural trade liberalization. With a new round of agricultural trade negotiations scheduled to begin in 1999 it is crucial that the quantitative work required to support these negotiations begin in the near future. The authors conclude that the Uruguay Round outcome provides numerous challenges and opportunities in analyzing the traditional agenda of agricultural trade liberalization. In addition, new issues will be added to the agenda of the next round of negotiations. These include: trade and the environment, competition policy and intellectual property rights. It is important that economists begin to develop a research agenda that can address these issues and become activists in addressing these topics in public forums.     

The road from Doha to Hong Kong in the WTO agricultural negotiations: a developing country perspective

Developing countries have both offensive and defensive interestsin the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations. This paper discussesthe extent to which these interests have been addressed in theJuly 2004 Framework Agreement and in the subsequent negotiations.Many of the key demands of developing countries appear to havebeen accepted in principle in the Agreement, but the lack ofspecific details on how most of these principles will be operationalisedmakes it hard to evaluate their real significance. Progressis needed on the development dimension of the negotiations ifthe Hong Kong Ministerial Council meeting is to succeed.     

WTO Constraints on Domestic Support in Agriculture: Past and Future

The domestic support provisions in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture originate in the 1958 Haberler Report. Economic analysis often overlooks the agreement's legally important distinctions. Few domestic support issues lead to dispute settlement proceedings. The Doha negotiations would result in more constraints on domestic support than the sole commitment on Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) in the present agreement: ceilings on overall trade‐distorting support and blue box payments, and also product‐specific caps. Some 18 members would reduce their Total AMS commitments, and 25 would reduce the de minimis percentages. Most members would not reduce their constraints at all or only little. If today's developing countries continue to grow as they did in recent decades, their capacity to support agriculture increases significantly. If they then choose to support agriculture as today's developed countries did at the same stage of economic development, the future WTO constraints on trade‐distorting domestic support would allow them to provide considerably more such support than developed countries. Les règles sur le soutien interne de l'Accord sur l'agriculture de l'OMC tirent son origine du rapport ?Haberler? de 1958. L'analyse économique oublie souvent les distinctions d'importance juridique de l'accord. Peu de questions en soutien interne entraînent des procédures de règlement des différends. Les négociations de Doha se solderaient par plus de contraintes sur le soutien que le seul engagement de l'accord actuel, celui sur la mesure globale de soutien (MGS) totale. Ces contraintes comprennent des plafonds sur le soutien interne global ayant des effets de distorsion des échanges et sur les paiements dans la boîte bleue, ainsi que des plafonds par produit. Environ 18 membres réduiraient leurs engagements sur la MGS totale, et 25 membres réduiraient les pourcentages de minimis. La plupart des membres ne réduiraient pas leurs engagements ou les réduiraient seulement un peu. Si la croissance économique des pays, qui aujourd'hui sont en voie de développement, continue au même taux que dans les décennies récentes, leur capacité de soutenir leur agriculture augmente. S'ils choisissaient dans l'avenir de soutenir leur agriculture, comme l'ont fait les pays qui sont aujourd'hui les pays développés lorsqu'ils se trouvaient au même stage de développement, les contraintes futures de l'OMC sur le soutien interne faussant les échanges permettraient aux pays en voie de développement d'accorder de tel soutien dans des montants considérablement plus importants que ceux des pays développés.     

WTO Disciplines on Domestic Support and Market Access in Agri‐Food Supply Chains

Multilateral negotiations on agriculture in the WTO are making very little progress as developed economies are reluctant to bind trade‐distorting domestic support and import tariffs at levels acceptable to developing countries. This paper presents the basic Bagwell–Staiger framework as it relates to agricultural trade negotiations. In its basic version, market access commitments are sufficient to achieve efficient trade agreements. We show that vertical linkages between agricultural goods and processed food commodities may prevent countries to reach an efficient trade agreement. We argue that the features of agricultural supply chains hinder the argument that total discretion over domestic policies is appropriate. Les négociations multilatérales de l'OMC sur l'agriculture progressent très lentement étant donné que les pays développés hésitent à maintenir un soutien interne qui fausse les échanges et des barrières tarifaires à des niveaux acceptables pour les pays en développement. Le présent article traite du modèle Bagwell–Staiger dans le contexte des négociations sur le commerce des produits agricoles. Dans sa version de base, les engagements quant à l'accès au marché sont suffisants pour permettre des échanges commerciaux efficaces. Nous montrons que les liens verticaux entre les produits agricoles et les produits alimentaires transformés peuvent empêcher les pays d'atteindre un accord commercial efficace. Nous soutenons que les caractéristiques des chaînes d'approvisionnement agricole entravent l'argument voulant que l'entière discrétion quant aux politiques intérieures soit appropriée.     

The climate change negotiations: the case for differentiation

The major elements of the climate change negotiations since the negotiation in 1995 of the Berlin Mandate to the Framework Convention on Climate Change are outlined and background on the greenhouse effect is provided in this article. It is shown that the same uniform emission reduction target for all countries is inefficient and that such targets would not lead to an equal sharing of the economic burden of achieving a given commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It is concluded that the negotiation of differentiated targets can help to solve this problem.     

Agriculture's 'multifunctionality' and the WTO

Are the agricultural policy reforms embodied in the Uruguay Round consistent with meeting domestic policy objectives such as providing adequate food security, environmental protection and viability of rural areas? This article examines the claim that agriculture deserves more price support and import protection than other sectors because of the non‐marketed externalities and public goods it produces jointly with marketable food and fibre (agriculture’s so‐called ‘multifunctionality’). Do these unrewarded positive externalities exceed the negative externalities from farming by more than the net positive externalities produced by other sectors? To what extent are those farmer‐produced spillovers under‐supplied, and what are the most efficient ways to boost their production to the socially optimal levels? The article concludes that there is little trade‐off required to meet domestic policy objectives on the one hand and agricultural protection reform objectives as embodied in WTO rules on the other.     

加入WTO与标准化

加入世界贸易组织对我国企业的生产、经营和管理带来挑战和机遇。要将我国产品打入国际市场 ,就要搞好采用国际标准和国外先进标准工作 ,林业行业的采标工作也要抓好此项工作。     

Agricultural trade negotiations as a strategic game

This study views multilateral trade negotiations as a strategic game among nations or regions, including taxpayer, consumer, and producer components. Payoffs are calculated from an intermediate-run international trade model initialized with 1989 data. For the public at large, the Nash equilibrium and socially optimal outcome is liberalization of trade – unilateral or multilateral. Maintenance of the status quo of market distortions costing the world billions of dollars each year is rational only if producer payoffs are sovereign so that strategies optimal for producers are considered optimal for nations. Remedial policies are discussed, including opportunities for economic education, political system reform, and less incentives for producers to scuttle multilateral trade negotiations.     

Farm-gate tomato price negotiations under asymmetric information

This article provides an empirical analysis of farm‐gate tomato price negotiations under asymmetric information. Regression models are estimated to analyze when and by how much sellers stick to their initial ask prices and what explains the variation in the initial ask–offer price spread. Detailed information on 66 farm‐gate tomato transactions and daily tomato wholesale price data from the central vegetable market in Addis Ababa are used for the analysis. Estimation results show that farmers are less committed to their initial ask price when the buyer speaks out the transaction price first, when their quality perceptions of the tomatoes being transacted differ from those of the buyers, and when their tomato farm is at a large distance from the main road. Sellers stick more to their initial ask price when they know that the central market price is high. The initial ask–offer price spread decreases when the buyer speaks out the initial negotiation price first, but increases in the difference in quality perception between buyer and seller, and in the quantity of tomatoes being transacted.     

Implications of the US Farm Bill of 2002 for agricultural trade and trade negotiations

The US Farm Bill of 2002 is the latest in a 7-decade history of farm subsidy laws that transfer funds to farmers and regulate and subsidize production of selected commodities. Fruit, tree nut, ornamental and vegetable crops, hay and meats remain outside scope of main subsidy programs. The new law continues many innovations of the 1996 Act, such as removal of authority for annual land idling and crop price floors accompanied by government stockholding. Government payments remain the primary focus of commodity programs. The total amount of these payments are likely to remain similar to the amount paid in the period 1999–2001, but with some changes in the form of the programs. For example, allowing owners to update acreage and yield payment bases creates additional incentives for farmers to link current planting decisions to anticipated farm subsidies. Similarly, the new program that ties "counter-cyclical" payments to the price of a specific crop also has production stimulus. A new program, estimated to add about 5–10 per cent to marginal milk revenue for smaller farms, makes 'deficiency' payments to dairy farms when milk prices are low. Despite the new programs with added links to stimulating production, new USA programs stimulate production only marginally more than the subsidies of the 1999–2001 period, which were replaced. Furthermore, the USA has flexibility to avoid explicitly violating its WTO commitments. Nonetheless, this US Farm Bill of 2002 has curtailed the previous trends toward lower farm subsidies and smaller production stimuli, and the negative publicity surrounding it has made negotiating reductions of farm trade distortions more difficult.     

Determinants of a social clause in international trade negotiations

Survey data are used to examine the determinants of a “social clause” in international trade negotiations. Proponents of such a clause argue that the inclusion of labor laws, environmental impacts, and other social issues in international trade negotiations would ensure fair competition, an equitable distribution of the benefits of free trade, and, in the case of labor, protect the basic rights of workers. Opponents see these arguments as a disguised form of protectionism and self‐interest based on the protection of labor‐intensive industries in developed countries. Results from a logit model indicate a decreased likelihood for the inclusion of a social clause in international trade negotiations across farm sizes. In particular the results suggest that agricultural producers with annual gross sales including government payments between US$500,000 and US$999,000, are 40% less likely to want labor laws, environmental impacts, and food safety standards to be included as part of international trade negotiations. The results also show that agricultural producers with college experience or college degrees are less likely to want these social interventions while second generation farmers and first generation farmers with a master's degree want labor laws, environmental impacts, and food safety standards to be included as part of international trade negotiations.     

WTO来龙去脉

GATT：世贸组织的前身世界贸易组织（WTO）的前身是关贸总协定（GATT）。关贸总协定自１９４８年开始临时实施至１９９５年１月１日世界贸易组织正式成立，拥有４７年的历史，其制定的一整套有关国际贸易的原则和规章得到了世界大多数国家和地区的认可，并在WTO中继续有效。关贸总协定的产生是资本主义积极推行自由贸易的产物，即针对战后国际贸易中的保护主义，试图通过互减关税，扭转日益盛行的贸易保护主义和歧视性的贸易政策，促进国际贸易的自由发展。１９４７年４月～１０月，２３个国家同意接受国际贸易宪章草案中有关关税与贸…