Strategic capital investment decision-making: A role for emergent analysis tools?: A study of practice in large UK manufacturing companies

The complexity surrounding strategic capital investments present challenges to managers charged with evaluating these projects. In particular over-reliance on financial appraisal tools is thought to bias decision-makers against undertaking strategic projects that are crucial to the development of business capability and innovation. In response to this concern, several emergent analysis tools have been advanced as means to integrate strategic and financial analyses of capital investment projects. This paper examines the use of both conventional financial analysis tools and selected emergent analysis approaches in the capital investment decision-making of large UK manufacturing companies.The findings update previous studies on the use of financial analysis tools, but also examine how their use varies between strategic and non-strategic investment projects and the extent to which emergent analysis tools are impacting decision-making practice. Little evidence emerges of integration between strategic and financial analysis approaches. Financial analysis techniques still dominate the appraisal of all categories of capital investment projects, while risk analysis approaches remain simplistic, even for complex strategic projects. Despite their noted potential for informing strategic investment decisions, the emergent analysis tools barely register in practice. The appraisal of capital projects seems to reflect a ‘simple is best’ philosophy and a commitment to the role of intuition and judgement in assessing how the strategic dimensions of capital investments connect with their financial outcomes.     

REAL OPTIONS PRIMER: A PRACTICAL SYNTHESIS OF CONCEPTS AND VALUATION APPROACHES

Strategic capital investment decisions are being made every day in an increasingly uncertain world. While the traditional NPV approach does a reasonable job of valuing simple, passively managed projects, it does not capture the many ways in which a highly uncertain project might evolve, and the ways in which active managers will influence this evolution. In cases where managerial flexibility is a major source of strategic value, companies will want to use real options valuation methods.
This article serves as a managerial tutorial on this newer, less understood approach. It uses simple examples to illustrate the essence of four basic categories of real options—timing, growth, production, and abandonment. The examples begin by taking a "binomial" approach to option valuation, in which the value of an investment initiative is allowed to take on two possible future values. Besides being used to illustrate the distinctive features of a real option, the binomial approach also serves to help the reader understand the alternative Black-Scholes valuation approach (though without requiring the reader to master the complex mathematics underlying Black-Scholes). Basic instructions for implementing both approaches are provided, along with a discussion of how to set appropriate discount rates and the important role of volatility assessment in the valuation process.     

Single vs. Multiple Discount Rates: How to Limit “Influence Costs” in the Capital Allocation Process*

Most finance textbooks suggest that companies evaluate investment projects using discount rates that reflect both the debt capacity and the unique risks of the project. In practice, however, companies often use their company‐wide WACC to evaluate such investments because of the difficulty of (and subjectivity involved in) estimating the risk of individual projects, and the potential for managerial bias and influence to distort the estimates. This article proposes a practicable method for calculating the cost of capital that produces different discount rates for investment projects with different risks while minimizing the “influence costs” that arise when managers have discretion in the choice of discount rates. The proposed approach makes use of market information (in the form of the firm‐wide costs of debt and equity), thereby limiting managerial discretion, while typically still providing a good approximation of theoretically correct, project‐specific discount rates. The key to the method's effectiveness is its use of a project's debt capacity to define the capital structure weights, where debt capacity is defined by the amount of debt financing the project will support without lowering the firm's credit rating.     

Political risk and international valuation

Measuring the impact of political risk on investment projects is one of the most vexing issues in international business. One popular approach is to assume that the sovereign yield spread captures political risk and to augment the project discount rate by this spread. We show that this approach is flawed. While the sovereign spread is influenced by political risk, it also reflects other risks that are likely included in the valuation analysis — leading to the double counting of risks. We propose to use “political risk spreads” to undo the double counting in the evaluation of international investment projects.     

Managerial Preference,Asymmetric Information,and Financial Structure

If firm performance affects managers' wealth or reputation, preferences of managers dominate firms' financing decisions. When information about real asset investment is symmetric, managers finance exclusively with equity. If managers know more about asset quality than do investors and if managers are sufficiently risk averse, they signal high-quality projects with debt. Increases in collateral value decrease risky debt use. Increases in interest rates that do not change productive opportunities increase debt use. The explanation for these and further results is based on underpricing of equity and overpricing of debt at the margin.     

A project-level analysis of value creation in firms

This paper analyzes value creation in firms at the project level. We present evidence that managers facing short-termist incentives set a lower threshold for accepting projects. Using novel data on new client and product announcements in both the U.S. and international markets, we find that the market responds less positively to a new project announcement when the firm's managers have incentives to focus on short-term stock price performance. Furthermore, textual analysis of project announcements shows that firms with short-termist chief executive officers use vaguer and generically positive language when introducing new projects to the marketplace.     

Organizational culture and performance measurement systems

The aim of this study is to articulate and test the relationships between organizational culture and two attributes of performance measurement systems (PMS), namely the diversity of measurement and the nature of use. The results of a survey reveal that top managers of firms reflecting a flexibility dominant type tend to use more performance measures and to use PMS to focus organizational attention, support strategic decision-making and legitimate actions to a greater extent than top managers of firms reflecting a control dominant type.     

Endogenous Liquidity in Asset Markets

This paper analyzes a model in which long‐term risky assets are illiquid due to adverse selection. The degree of adverse selection and hence the liquidity of these assets is determined endogenously by the amount of trade for reasons other than private information. I find that higher productivity leads to increased liquidity. Moreover, liquidity magnifies the effects of changes in productivity on investment and volume. High productivity implies that investors initiate larger scale risky projects which increases the riskiness of their incomes. Riskier incomes induce more sales of claims to high‐quality projects, causing liquidity to increase.     

Creating project plans to focus product development

The long-term competitiveness of most manufacturers depends on their product development capabilities. Yet few companies approach the development process systematically or strategically. They end up with an unruly collection of projects that do not match long-term business objectives and that consume far more development resources than are available. Instead of working on important projects, development engineers spend their time fighting fires. Their productivity sinks, and products are invariably late to market. To attack development malaise and reinvigorate the process, companies should put together an "aggregate project plan." The plan helps managers restructure the development process so they no longer think in terms of individual projects but in terms of the "set" of projects. It is the set, not individual projects, that shapes the creation of a successful product line. The aggregate project plan also helps managers allocate resources, sequence projects, and build critical development capabilities. A central element of the aggregate project plan is the project map. The map categorizes projects into five types: breakthrough, platform, derivative, research and development, and partnerships. Each project type has its own unique characteristics and requires a different amount of development time. Companies should have projects in all categories to ensure a robust development process.     

Capital Budgeting in Multidivision Firms: Information, Agency, and Incentives

We examine optimal capital allocation and managerial compensationin a firm with two investment projects (divisions) each runby a risk-neutral manager who can provide (i) (unverifiable)information about project quality and (ii) (unverifiable) accessto value-enhancing, but privately costly resources. The optimalmanagerial compensation contract offers greater performancepay and a lower salary when managers report that their projectis higher quality. The firm generally underinvests in capitaland managers underutilize resources (relative to first-best).We also derive cross-sectional predictions about the sensitivityof investment in one division to the quality of investment opportunitiesin the other division, and the relative importance of division-leveland firm-level performance-based pay in managerial compensationcontracts.     

Costly trade,managerial myopia,and long-term investment

The costly trade theory predicts that it is much more difficult to exploit long-term private information than short-term. Thus, there is less long-term information impounded in prices. The managerial myopia theory predicts that a variety of short-term pressures, including inadequate information on long-term projects, cause asymmetrically-informed corporate managers to underinvest in long-term projects. The introduction of long-term options called LEAPS provides a natural experiment to jointly test both theories, which are otherwise difficult to test. We conduct an event study around the introduction of LEAPS for a given stock and test whether corporate investment in long-term R&D/sales increases in the years following the introduction. We find that over a two year period of time LEAPS firms increase their R&D/sales between 23% and 28% ($125–$152 million annually) compared to matching non-LEAPS firms. The difference depends on the matching technique used. Two other proxies for long-term investment find similar increases. We find that the increase is positively related to LEAPS volume. We also find that the increase is larger in firms where R&D plays a larger and more strategic role. We test if a firm becomes less likely to beat analyst's quarterly earnings forecasts after LEAPS are introduced and find support for the hypothesis. These results provide both statistically and economically significant support for the costly trade and managerial myopia theories.     

INVESTMENT DECISION CRITERIA USED BY LISTED NEW ZEALAND COMPANIES

This paper reports the results of a survey of listed New Zealand firms with regard to their investment objectives, their methods of evaluating investment projects and of estimating appropriate hurdle rates, and methods used to evaluate and adjust for project risk differences. Comparisons with similar studies of firms located in the U.S. and Australia indicate that New Zealand firms use accepted normative financial analysis techniques to a much lesser degree than firms in these other countries. The relatively greater usage of accounting-based rather than market-based measures by New Zealand firms is particularly marked.     

Investment Policy and Exit-Exchange Offers Within Financially Distressed Firms

This article examines the conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders in a setting in which firms can renegotiate the terms of existing debt with public debtholders. In particular, we consider one of the most common types of debt restructuring: the exit-exchange offer. Our analysis explores the relation between exit-exchange offers and investment choice by the manager, and it concludes that managers, acting strategically on behalf of shareholders, may select inefficient investment projects in order to enhance their bargaining position vis-a-vis creditors. Holding the upside potential of an investment project fixed, managers/shareholders prefer projects with lower payoffs in states of bankruptcy because it induces individual bondholders to accept poorer terms in a debt-for-debt exit-exchange offer, thus generating a greater residual for shareholders in states of solvency. Additionally, we show how the investment inefficiencies in our analysis depend on (i) the inability of bondholders to coordinate their actions; (ii) the ability of managers to commit to suboptimal investment projects; and (iii) the coupling of an individual bondholder's decision to tender and her decision to consent to allow the firm to strip fiduciary covenants. We suggest conditions under which a ban on coupled exit-exchange offers—or alternatively, constraints on “debt-for-debt” exchanges—would be efficiency-enhancing.     

Pension Fund Manager Tournaments and Attitudes Towards Corporate Characteristics

Abstract:  This paper explores the relationship between the tournament incentives of pension fund managers and the characteristics of equities they choose to hold. Using a comprehensive data set on pension fund portfolio holdings, we determine the intensity of fund manager tournaments by sorting pension funds into portfolios based on the number of concurrent managers each pension fund employs. We then investigate which corporate characteristics are preferred by each of these portfolios by estimating share selection models that include a range of corporate characteristics that are expected to shape the returns to investment in stocks over the short and long run. We find that the intensity of the tournament faced by fund managers plays a significant role in shaping preferences over corporate characteristics. Managers facing more intense tournaments exhibit significantly weaker preferences for attributes associated with long run payoffs, such as social performance and growth potential, and significantly stronger preferences for short term attributes, such as operational efficiency, when compared to managers that face weak or no tournament incentives.     

Cybersecurity breaches and investors’ interest in the firm as an investment

Cybersecurity breaches pose a significant risk to firms. To combat these risks, many firms engage in strategic cybersecurity risk management initiatives. While these efforts may reduce the likelihood of a cybersecurity breach, they do not eliminate the risk of a breach. In the event of a cybersecurity breach, firms may issue an apology to investors. This study uses an experiment to examine whether a firm indicates cybersecurity risk management is a strategic initiative and whether a post-cybersecurity breach apology by the CEO impacts nonprofessional investors’ investment interest in the firm. Results show that, in response to a cybersecurity breach, the presence of a CEO apology positively impacts investors’ investment impression and their perceptions of CEO affective and CEO cognitive trust. We find that investors’ investment interest is lowest for a firm that previously indicates cybersecurity risk management is a strategic initiative and where the CEO does not issue an apology. The CEO apology, however, does not significantly impact investment amount, a secondary measure of investor interest. Results from this study have implications for managers, investors, and regulators.     

The Theory-Practice Gap in Capital Budgeting: Evidence from the United Kingdom

We report the results of a survey of capital budgeting techniques used by United Kingdom firms. Where possible, the evidence is combined with data collected over a 22 year period to provide a basis for the discussion of causes of trends. We observe that there has been a substantial narrowing of the theory-practice gap in the use of project appraisal methods. The gap has also narrowed in other areas: the analysis of risk, inflation adjustment, capital budget preparation, WACC calculation and post-auditing. However, there are other elements of capital budgeting theory, e.g. probability and beta analysis which have been adopted by very few practising managers. We also discuss non-economic projects, capital rationing and hurdle rates.     

Making real options really work

As a way to value growth opportunities, real options have had a difficult time catching on with managers. Many CFOs believe the method ensures the overvaluation of risky projects. This concern is legitimate, but abandoning real options as a valuation model isn't the solution. Companies that rely solely on discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis underestimate the value of their projects and may fail to invest enough in uncertain but highly promising opportunities. CFOs need not--and should not--choose one approach over the other. Far from being a replacement for DCF analysis, real options are an essential complement, and a project's total value should encompass both. DCF captures a base estimate of value; real options take into account the potential for big gains. This is not to say that there aren't problems with real options. As currently applied, they focus almost exclusively on the risks associated with revenues, ignoring the risks associated with a project's costs. It's also true that option valuations almost always ignore assets that an initial investment in a subsequently abandoned project will often leave the company. In this article, the authors present a simple formula for combining DCF and option valuations that addresses these two problems. Using an integrated approach, managers will, in the long run, select better projects than their more timid competitors while keeping risk under control. Thus, they will outperform their rivals in both the product and the capital markets.     

The Impact of Ambiguity on Managerial Investment and Cash Holdings

Standard finance theory suggests that managers invest in projects that, in expectation, produce returns that justify the use of capital. An underlying assumption is that managers have the information necessary to understand the distributional properties of the pay‐offs underlying the decision. This paper examines firm investment behavior when managers are likely to find it more challenging to develop expectations of pay‐offs, namely during periods of increased macroeconomic ambiguity. In particular, we examine how macroeconomic ambiguity – proxied by the variance premium (Drechsler, 2010 ) and the dispersion in forecasts of corporate profits from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (Anderson et al., 2009 ) – impacts managerial capital investment and cash holdings. Consistent with ambiguity theory, we find that macroeconomic ambiguity is negatively associated with capital investment and positively associated with cash holdings. These results are robust to alternative explanations related to risk, investor sentiment and economic conditions. Moreover, consistent with recent theoretical real options literature, we find that ambiguity reduces the value of investment opportunities, while risk increases the value of such opportunities. Overall, these findings provide initial empirical evidence on the economic distinction between ambiguity and risk with respect to managerial investment and cash holdings.     

Stock price informativeness on the sensitivity of strategic M&A investment to Q

Using a strategic merger sample that covers the period from 1985 to 2011, we find that the acquirer’s stock price firm-specific information, the new information created by investors about the value of firm fundamentals, increases the positive sensitivity of strategic merger investment to the acquirer’s Q; the target’s stock price firm-specific information increases the negative sensitivity of merger investment to the target’s Q. These results suggest that managers learn from financial markets in identifying strategic merger investment opportunities by transferring assets from poorly managed firms to well managed firms. In addition, the target’s stock price firm-specific information itself increases the acquisition size, indicating that informed acquirer managers are more likely to take out large merger investment. Last but not the least, stock price informativeness increases merger synergies and post-merger performance, suggesting that informed managers make better merger investment that increases shareholder value. Our study contributes to the recent increasing stream of studies on managerial learning from the market.