Freeware as a competitive deterrent

Using perfect foresight and adaptive models, this paper examines the effect of competitor asymmetry, consumer sensitivity to incentives and adaptive processes on freeware strategies and competitive outcomes. Four roles played by freeware in competitive markets are identified – it can be a mechanism to build or speed up the growth of a network without the need to lower prices on the commercial version, a deterrence mechanism, a hindrance to a rival’s network building efforts, and a coordination device in the presence of forward looking consumers. We determine the optimal prices of the commercial version, the decisions to introduce freeware and the freeware qualities for both competing firms.     

The role of innovation and quality change in Japanese economic growth

This paper explores the use of time series data to isolate quality change in the Japanese economy using a hedonic procedure. We argue that the traditional approach to hedonic estimation based upon panel data sets of different brands in a given product area is extremely resource intensive and, thus, unlikely to be adopted by official statistical bodies outside of key areas, such as computers. This paper adopts a “top-down” approach to see whether more traditional measures of technical change, such as patents, can be used to separate pure inflation from quality change. If this is possible, it offers a much simpler route to estimate the role of quality change in economic growth and performance. In practice, we extend the analysis not only to include patents, but other forms of intellectual property that might reflect technology and attribute changes, such as designs, utility models and trademarks. We begin by taking a longer-term historical perspective, exploring the development of indigenous inventive capacity in Japan during the early years when R&D data are not available. It is possible to show that the rise in utility models pre-dates the main growth in patenting activity, suggesting the development in more low-level indigenous creative work prior to higher level inventive activity. The principal aim of this paper, however, is to demonstrate that it is possible to develop robust models to explain changes in the producer price index in Japan, which can then be used to re-examine Japanese growth performance over the period from about 1960. If the official Japanese statistical body has fully accounted for quality change in the price indices (i.e. produced fully quality-constant price deflators), then the official estimates of growth will be correct. However, we provide strong evidence that this is not the case. Changes in quality, proxied by the IP variables, are important determinants of prices in Japan over the period 1960 to 1995 as a whole. Indeed, we provide evidence that the true rate of growth of the Japanese economy, taking into account the rate of quality change, is significantly higher than that suggested in official statistics.     

Determinants of the diffusion of U.S. digital telecommunications

This paper examines the diffusion of digital switches from 1983 to 1996. It expands upon the existing literature by extending the data available back an additional six years and by adding independent companies such as Frontier, SNET and Cincinnati Bell. The data (graciously provided by DataQuest) indicate that the early period of adoption, which previous papers have been unable to examine due to lack of data, is significantly different than the later period of adoption. In the early period the installed base and the ability of larger networks to internalize more of the total benefits are the primary determinants of adoption, while the distribution of population becomes important in the later period as firms finish building out their densest areas. Overall, independents adopted earlier than the RBOCs, although this difference appears to be driven by the fact that independents were still using primarily electromechanical switches in 1983, while RBOCs had already invested heavily in analog technology. The data suggest that new technologies such as internet telephony will be adopted most rapidly by newly built networks such as Qwest and Level 3.     

Variety,growth and demand

A dynamic model of demand compatible with a changing composition of the economic system is presented in this paper. Consumers are not expected to have completely formed preferences for radically new objects of consumption. Consumers adopt new goods or services ,created by innovation, only if three barriers are overcome: 1) a critical (minimum) level of income, 2) critical human capital, 3) critical fitness. However, even a new good or service with a fitness higher than that of pre-existing ones, will not be immediately adopted. Consumers'.limited knowledge will slow down the rate of adoption of any new good or service.     

Technology transfer in United States universities

This paper examines the role of offices of technology transfer (OTT) in 12 U.S. universities in 1998 in commercializing research results in the form of patents, licenses, and start-ups of new companies. We study the organization and place of OTTs within the university structure, the process of technology transfer, and the staffing and funding of the office. Data were collected through a mail questionnaire followed up through telephone interviews. We also conducted a statistical analysis of data for 170 U.S. universities, hospitals, and research institutes for the period 1991–1996. Our findings suggest that technology transfer from universities to the commercial sector needs to be understood in its broader context. The primary purpose of a technology transfer program is for the university to assist its researchers in disseminating research results for the public good. Success in this endeavor is only partially reflected in income generated for the university or the number of business start-ups. The degree of success depends not only on the nature of the interface between the university and the business community but also on the receptivity in the surrounding community as well as the culture, organization, and incentives within the universities themselves.     

Numerical solution of dynamic oligopoly games with capital investment

Summary. This paper discusses how numerical techniques may be used to solve the simultaneous functional equations that arise in general dynamic stochastic games. Unlike the conventional linear-quadratic approach, our methods may be used to address general model specifications that may include non-quadratic objective functions, non-linear equations of motion, and constraints on decision variables. As an illustration, we apply our methods to a dynamic duopoly game in which competing firms play short-run quantity game subject to production cost that can be lowered through investment in capital stock in the long run. Received: June 1, 2000; revised version: December 27, 2000     

Relative backwardness and technology catching up with scale effects

Controlling for capital accumulation from per capita income growth, this paper shows robust scale effects on total factor productivity growth. The estimated speeds of technology catching up are around 2 percent per year. In addition, the empirical analysis confirms the catching up theory, in which the initial relative backwardness and policy variables conducive to technology adoption are statistically significant. RID="*" ID="*" This is a revised part of Ph.D. thesis at Stanford University. I would like to thank the committee members, Charles I. Jones, Anne O. Krueger, and Paul Romer as well as Ronald Findlay, Ronald I. Mckinnon, Yasuyuki Sawada, Robert Sinclair, a referee and seminar participants at Stanford University, the Pacific Rim Allied Economic Organizations Conference, the East Asian Economic Association Conference, and the 8th World Congress.     

Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly

An analytical framework for dealing with political entrepreneurship and reform is proposed which is based on some new combinations of Schumpeterian political economy, an extended version of Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly and some basic elements of New Institutional Economics. It is shown that problems of insufficient award criteria and incomplete contracts which may arise in economic bidding schemes, also – and even more so – characterise political competition. At the same time, these conditions create leeway for Schumpeterian political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and political contestability which will be discussed with special emphasis on incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the sense of risking long-term investments in basic political reforms.     

Regulation of the evolution of the architecture of a network by tensors operating on coalitions of actors

Socio-economic networks, neural networks and genetic networks describe collective phenomena through constraints relating actions of several actors, coalitions of these actors and multilinear connectionist operators acting on the set of actions of each coalition. We provide a class of control systems governing the evolution of actions, coalitions and multilinear connectionist operators under which the architecture of the network remains viable. The controls are the “viability multipliers” of the “resource space” in which the constraints are defined. They are involved as “tensor products” of the actions of the coalitions and the viability multiplier, allowing us to encapsulate in this dynamical and multilinear framework the concept of Hebbian learning rules in neural networks in the form of “multi-Hebbian” dynamics in the evolution of connectionist operators. They are also involved in the evolution of coalitions through the “cost” of the constraints under the viability multiplier regarded as a price.     

Economic policy making in evolutionary perspective

Economic policy making is discussed from three different angles: the political economy of actual policy making (“what policy does do”), the analysis of policy instruments for given ends (“what policy could do”), and the debate on policy goals and their legitimization (“what policy ought to do”). Center stage in the evolutionary perspective is new, positive and normative knowledge which is unfolding during the policy making process and in its aftermath. It is argued that this implies regularities and constraints which extend and modify the comparative-static interpretations of public choice theory, economic policy making theory, and social philosophy. RID="*" ID="*" The author should like to thank three anonymous referees of this journal and the editor for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.     

Darwinism in economics: from analogy to ontology

Several social scientists, including ‘evolutionary economists’, have expressed scepticism of ‘biological analogies’ and rejected the application of ‘Darwinism’ to socio-economic evolution. Among this group, some have argued that self-organisation is an alternative to biological analogies or Darwinism. Others have seen ‘artificial selection’ as an alternative to natural selection in the socio-economic sphere. Another objection is that Darwinism excludes human intentionality. It is shown that all these objections to ‘biological analogies’ and ‘Darwinism’ are ungrounded. Furthermore, Darwinism includes a broad theoretical framework for the analysis of the evolution of all open, complex systems, including socio-economic systems. Finally and crucially, Darwinism also involves a basic philosophical commitment to detailed, cumulative, causal explanations. For these reasons, Darwinism is fully relevant for economics and an adequate evolutionary economics must be Darwinian, at least in these fundamental senses. However, this does not undermine the need for auxiliary theories and explanations in the economic domain.     

Routines and incentives in group tasks*

The artificial context “Target the Two” has been used in experiments to explore some of the features of routinization and learning. Two agents must learn to coordinate their actions to achieve a common goal, without being allowed to use verbal communication. This article reports an experiment, in which we compare the degree of routinization and the performance of players in two treatments. Each treatment submits players to the same sequence of starting configurations, but differs in terms of the payoff function. In the first treatment (A), the payoff is based on the number of moves required to achieve the goal, whereas in the second treatment (B) the payoff depends on the time required for completion. We observe that (1) in treatment B subjects tend to play in a more “routinized” way and (2) treatment B reduces the time spent on play, but does not decrease the resources (the number of moves) used, relative to treatment A.     

Growth and equilibrium indeterminacy: the role of capital mobility

Summary. The paper presents a human capital driven endogenous growth model which, in general, permits a multiplicity of equilibrium balanced growth paths. It is shown that allowing for perfect capital mobility across countries increases the range of parameter values for which the model permits equilibrium indeterminacy. As opposed to the closed capital markets case, simple restrictions on preferences are no longer sufficient to eliminate the indeterminacy. Intuitively, under perfect capital mobility agents are able to smooth consumption completely. This induces an economy with open capital markets to behave like a closed economy with linear preferences thereby increasing the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy. Received: 18 November 1998; revised version: 10 August 1999     

Transferring exploration and production activities within the UK's upstream oil and gas industry: a capabilities perspective

Following Richardson (1972), capabilities comprise tacit, personal, subjective and context-specific knowledge that may be shared in practice only with difficulty across small, task oriented groups within firms or other types of organisation, and are expressed in the form of activities. The definition has been influential, and its focus on tacit knowledge has, arguably, encouraged research activities in the form of studies adopting experimental and simulation techniques, while providing less impetus for complementary empirical inquiry. This paper presents an empirical inquiry into an aspect of the development of capabilities in the UK's upstream oil and gas industry promoted by the changing organisation of activities across oil companies and contracting and supply companies. The main argument is that researchers can gain partial and subjective access to capabilities – distinct from activities – because individuals involved in the industry articulate and codify understandings of capabilities through practical theorising and commercial experimenting. Such articulation and codification plays an important role in the development of capabilities in industrial contexts.     

Schumpeter and the revival of evolutionary economics: an appraisal of the literature

During the last two decades we have seen a revival of interest in the works of Joseph Schumpeter and “evolutionary” ideas in economics more generally. A professional society honouring Schumpeter's name has been founded, and linked to it we have had for more than fifteen years now a professional journal devoted to this stream of thought. However, it has been argued that, despite these developments, the link between Schumpeter's own work and the more recent contributions to evolutionary economics is in fact rather weak. This paper considers this claim. Based on an analysis of Schumpeter's contribution to economics the paper presents an overview and assessment of the more recent literature in this area. It is argued that although there are important differences between Schumpeter's work and some of the more recent contributions, there nevertheless remains a strong common core that clearly distinguishes the evolutionary stream from other approaches (such as, for instance, so-called “new growth theory”). RID="*" ID="*" Many people have contributed to this paper in various ways. Jon Hekland at the Norwegian Research Council started it all by asking me to make an overview of the contribution from “evolutionary economics” to our understanding of contemporary economies. Several people helped me on the way by supplying written material, comments and suggestions, and I am indebted to all of them. Brian Arthur, Stan Metcalfe, Keith Pavitt, Erik Reinert, Paolo Saviotti and Bart Verspagen may be particularly mentioned. A preliminary version was presented at the conference “Industrial R&D and Innovation Policy Learning – Evolutionary Perspectives and New Methods for Impact Assessment” organised by the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) at Leangkollen, Asker, April 18–19.2002. I wish to thank the discussant, Tor Jakob Klette, and the participants at the conference for useful feedback. Moreover I have benefited from comments and suggestions from the editors and referees of this journal. The final responsibility is mine, however. Economic support from the Norwegian Research Council (“SAKI”) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Semicollusion vs. Full Collusion: The Role of Demand Uncertainty and Product Substitutability

We examine the profitability of two different cartel organizational forms: full collusion, under which firms collude on both price and quality, and semicollusion, under which firms collude on price only. We show that, in the presence of demand uncertainty that cannot be contracted upon in the cartel agreement, firms may be better off limiting their collusive agreement to price only. However, a positive relationship between demand uncertainty and the relative profitability of semicollusion exists only for low levels of demand substitutability. The converse is true for high levels of demand substitutability. Therefore, if demand substitutability is sufficiently high, no level of demand uncertainty will make semicollusion the optimal organizational form. In contrast, semicollusion is guaranteed to be optimal for a sufficiently low level of demand substitutability. The market structure described is motivated by and closely parallels that of shipping cartels. Received September 29, 2000; revised version received December 10, 2001 Published online: November 11, 2002     

Firm routines,customer switching and market selection under duopoly

This paper explores the dynamics of market selection for an industry in which firms employ relatively simple pricing, production and investment routines and in which consumers switch between rival firms in response to price differentials but do not all do so instantaneously. The key issue is whether market processes result in the elimination of less efficient firms by their more efficient rivals. That is to say, do such processes unfailingly increase the efficiency with which available economic resources are used? In the context of duopoly, we show that the survival of the more efficient firm is not guaranteed and that, more generally, the outcome depends upon the speeds with which firms adjust prices and capacities and with which customers switch between rival firms.     

A differentiable homotopy to compute Nash equilibria of n-person games

Summary. The literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games is dominated by simplicial methods. This paper is the first to introduce a globally convergent algorithm that fully exploits the differentiability present in the problem. It presents an everywhere differentiable homotopy to do the computations. The homotopy path can therefore be followed by several numerical techniques. Moreover, instead of computing some Nash equilibrium, the algorithm is constructed in such a way that it computes the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten. As a by-product of our proofs it follows that for a generic game the tracing procedure defines a unique feasible path. The numerical performance of the algorithm is illustrated by means of several examples. Received: December 21, 1999; revised version: December 27, 2000     

Competitive selection, self-organisation and Joseph A. Schumpeter

Post-Schumpeterians have tended to use biological analogies to understand economic evolution, in contrast to Schumpeter himself. In this paper it is argued that the biological analogies used tend to be outdated and that Schumpeter espoused an intuitive understanding of the evolutionary economic process that is closely related to modern conceptions of self-organisation, suitably adapted for application in socioeconomic systems. Using a self-organisation approach, competition can be understood without recourse to biological analogy, in terms of general systemic principles that operate in the presence of variety. Viewing economic evolution in terms of complex adaptation in self-organising systems yields nonequilibrium and nonlinear perspectives that parallel Schumpeter's own intuitions, reinvigorating them as the basis of evolutionary economic thinking in the new Millennium.     

A close eye on the invisible hand

The paper shows how, and under what minimal information supply conditions, a market finds its competitive equilibrium price and thus solves the so-called tatonnement process, without sellers and buyers knowing the equilibrium price in advance. The information premises must be understood as a basic first approach, and do not necessarily mimic the real market process. Demonstration of a discovery process under these information handling conditions is an important finding for an evolutionary market theory. Additional information-processing elements should augment the efficiency of the discovery process. The results of the simulated market process set out above raise new questions. The role of institutional elements (such as the relevance of demand flexibility or “certainty” of knowledge in the learning process, etc.) is discussed further outside the context of the simulation model, providing new insight into the market process.