Sentiments and Motivations in Adam Smith and Vernon Smith

Vernon Smith (VS) discovered Adam Smith (AS) late in his professional career, and has adopted ideas from The Theory of Moral Sentiments to explain findings in experimental economics. Most important is the theorized link between moral sentiments and the evolution of property rights and law as foundations for commerce. VS's encounter with AS, while not new, provides a compelling look at the modern laboratory of social science through the lens of the Enlightenment, and cannot easily be encapsulated within a utilitarian framework. This paper provides an overview and commentary on VS's approach.     

Adam Smith: From Propriety and Sentiments to Property and Wealth

“Why return to Adam Smith?” Because we learn that he had fresh-for-today insights, derived from a modeling perspective that was never part of economic analysis. Smith wrote two classics: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; hereafter Sentiments); and An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776; hereafter Wealth). In Sentiments it is argued that human sociability in close-knit groups is governed by the “propriety and fitness” of conduct based on sympathy. This non-utilitarian model provides new insights into the results of 2-person experimental “trust” and other games that defied the predictions of traditional game theory in the 1980s and 90s, and offers testable new predictions. Moreover, Smith shows how the civil order of “property” grew naturally out of the rules of propriety. Property together with what I call Smith's Discovery Axiom then enabled his break-through in Wealth that defined the liberal intellectual and practical foundation of two centuries of Western economic growth.     

"道义论"抑或"功利论":生态伦理学的根据

道义论和功利论是西方近代以来伦理学思想的两条主线,它们有着不同的道德理念、道德标准、道德追求和伦理精神。在生态伦理学理论的诠释中,仍可看到道义论和功利论的思想痕迹以及它们之间的理论冲突与融合在当代的延续。如何超越道义论与功利论的对立是当代生态伦理学的重要课题。     

Hedonic adaptation and the role of decision and experience utility in public policy

Many economists are becoming supportive of ‘soft’ paternalistic interventions that help people to avoid common decision errors without curtailing individual autonomy. To identify when such interventions could be beneficial, and to assess their success, requires a welfare criterion. However, traditional preference or choice-based criteria cannot serve this function because they assume that whatever people choose makes them better off. An alternative criterion that bases welfare on happiness rather than choice avoids this problem but has several of its own drawbacks. Most notably, people often adapt to serious chronic health conditions, and exhibit high levels of happiness, even though both those with and those without the condition agree that it is much preferable to be healthy. After reviewing different lines of research that shed light on the pros and cons of these alternative welfare criteria, we argue that no simple criterion based on either concept can surmount these problems. Instead, evaluations of welfare will inevitably have to be informed by a combination of both approaches, patched together in a fashion that depends on the specific context.     

Adam Smith on the future of experimental evolution and economics

Experimental evolution is difficult to apply to humans because of the need to study possible changes over many generations. A similar method, though, may see history as a substitute for experiments. The 18th century economist Adam Smith uses methods compatible with the logic of experimental evolution, through the assumption of human homogeneity and the study of history, to explain endogenous variations of preferences and institutions.     

A class of multiattribute utility functions

A function u(z) is a utility function if u′(z) > 0. It is called risk averse if we also have u′′(z) < 0. Some authors, however, require that u ⁽ⁱ⁾(z) > 0 if i is odd and u ⁽ⁱ⁾(z) < 0 if i is even. The notion of a multiattribute utility function can be defined by requiring that it is increasing in each variable and concave as an s-variate function. A stronger condition, similar to the one in case of a univariate utility function, requires that, in addition, all partial derivatives of total order m should be positive if m is odd and negative if m is even. In this paper, we present a class of functions in analytic form such that each of them satisfies this stronger condition. We also give sharp lower and upper bounds for E[u(X ₁,... , X _s )] under moment information with respect to the joint probability distribution of the random variables X ₁,... , X _s assumed to be discrete and representing wealths. Partially supported by OTKA grants F-046309 and T-047340 in Hungary.     

Subjective ambiguity, expected utility and Choquet expected utility

Summary. Using the Savage set up, this paper provides a simple axiomatization of the Choquet Expected Utility model where the capacity is an inner measure. Two attractive features of the model are its specificity and the transparency of its axioms. The key axiom states that the decision-maker uses unambiguous acts to approximate ambiguous ones. In addition, the notion of ‘ambiguity’ is subjective and derived from preferences. Received: March 23, 2000; revised version: April 24, 2001     

马克思与斯密:关于投机行为的不同看法

本文强调马克思与斯密对投机的认识存在分歧,主张把这种分歧追溯到他们秉持的不同的个人观念。斯密在对个人进行抽象时只强调了自利性和理性,马克思则把相互依赖、相互制约也看作个人的行为特征。因为强调人们彼此间的依赖和制约,马克思没有忽视彼此依赖和制约着的任意一方行为主体,他正视选择投机的资本家的存在,承认投机还会对资产价格进而对日常生活和生产经营活动造成冲击,在他笔下,选择投机的资本家、选择投资的资本家和雇佣工人总是结成一定的关系借以制约彼此的行为选择。因为没有把个人理解为彼此依赖和制约着的。斯密轻易忽视了选择投机的资本家的存在,他否认投机及其对资产价格进而对日常生活和生产经营活动造成的冲击,无法正确理解选择投机的资本家与他人结成的关系。     

On the Value of Life in Rich and Poor Countries and Distributional Weights Beyond Utilitarianism

This paper discusses the use ofdistributional weights in CBA based on a generalBergson-Samuelson SWF. In particular it illustratessome consequences of applying a SWF characterized byconstant inequality aversion (which includes classicalutilitarianism as a special case), together with aconstant relative risk aversion utility function, whencalculating the damage costs of global warming. Itextends and clarifies earlier unintuitive results, andemphasizes that utility must be seen as fully cardinalin terms of levels in this context. In the specialcase of utilitarianism, on the other hand, it issufficient to be able to make interpersonalcomparisons of utility changes.     

Adam Smith versus Sima Qian: Comment on the Tao of markets

In contrast with Professor Young's views ( Pacific Economic Review , 1, 137–45), this paper argues (1) that Adam Smith came to his conclusion about the invisible hand before 1766, and hence the intellectual debt, if any, of Smith to the great Chinese historian Sima Qian via the agency of Turgot and the two Chinese visitors is minimal; and (2) that the allocative function of the price mechanism is explicit not only in The Wealth of Nations but also in Adam Smith's lecture notes and other writings from his years at Glasgow University before he left for Europe in 1764.     

Preferences over characteristics and utility functions over commodities

Following Lancaster, preferences are defined over a set of characteristics, while commodities vectors are transformed into characteristics by a production function. We assume that both the preferences over the characteristics and the production functions are “neoclassical” and we characterize the set utility functions over the consumption space derived as the composition of preferences over characteristics and production functions. We prove that, under regularity conditions, any function can be derived by such a composition. Thus, the theories of characteristics does not impose any restrictions on derived utility functions. We thank an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions. The research of Aldo Rustichini was supported by the NSF grant NSF/SES-0136556. Paolo Siconolfi acknowledges the support of the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University.     

Adam Smith on Relations of Subordination, Personal Incentives and the Division of Labour

In elaborating his stadial approach to economic and social progress, Smith placed special emphasis on the evolution of the conceptual pair authority/subordination. The aim of this paper is to analyse the reciprocal relations which link together the evolution of the relations of subordination, personal incentives, and the division of labour with special reference to the agricultural and the commercial stages. In the former case, Smith pointed out the exclusive role performed by personal incentives in increasing labour productivity, a role which is consistent with his manifest preference for the figure of the 'independent small-scale proprietor'. In the latter case we note a change of emphasis due both to the pervasive role of the division of labour in increasing labour productivity, and—as a by-product of this change—to the emergence of a new form of relation of subordination. In this new context the division of labour engenders a new form of property polarisation, one connected no longer to land but to capital accumulation. Moreover, because of its harmful effects on the mental capacity of manufacturing workers, the division of labour appears to act as an obstacle against social mobility, and this in turn further reinforces the process of property polarisation.     

Strength of preference and cardinal utility

Summary. This paper provides simpler and more general preference foundations for difference representations than known before and shows how to obtain cardinal utility from those difference representations. In addition, this paper unifies all earlier derivations of cardinal utility by showing that they are implied as direct corollaries.Received: 9 November 2002, Revised: 27 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C6.The author particularly thanks Peter P. Wakker and an anonymous referee for many helpful comments and suggestions. The author also thanks Han Bleichrodt and Horst Zank. The paper was partly written during a visit at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. The author thanks the Dutch Science Foundation NWO for financial support under grant 425-11-003.     

Risk preference and indirect utility in portfolio-choice problems

We consider a portfolio-choice problem with one risky and one safe asset, where the utility function exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). We show that the indirect utility function of the portfolio-choice problem need not exhibit DARA. However, if the (optimal) marginal propensity to invest is positive for both assets, which is true when the utility function exhibits nondecreasing relative risk aversion, then the DARA property is carried over from the direct to the indirect utility function.     

Fiscal policy,wealth divergence,and lifetime utility

Using a two-country dynamic optimization model where the less patient country decumulates and the more patient one accumulates wealth, we analyze spillover effects of lump-sum and consumption taxes. A lump-sum tax on a country definitely harms the other country through a change in the rate of interest. A lump-sum tax on either country always improves the less patient country's asset position. A consumption tax has no spillover effect, although it is Pareto-inferior. Applying these results into a closed-country context with heterogeneous agents, we also discuss policy implications of a discriminatory tax.     

Upper and lower bounds for expected utility

Summary.   The decision-theoretic literature has developed very few techniques to bound the expected utility of a random variable when only simple statistics like its median or mode or mean are known. One reason for this lack of results is that we are missing a convenient way to link probability theory and expected utility. This paper is written to demonstrate a general (and genuinely probabilistic) technique to obtain upper and lower bounds for the expected utility of a lottery. Received: December 14, 1999; revised version: March 8, 2000