Critical Realism as a Basis for Economic Methodology: A critique

This paper considers the claim that critical realism provides a convincing critique of mainstream economics and offers a sound methodological basis for an alternative approach. It argues that critical realism presents a tendentious definition of positivism and a characterisation of mainstream economics that is misleading, and that it misrepresents the nature and purpose of the work of Hume and modern Humean philosophers. It also argues that critical realism's bold ontological claims lack epistemological support. The paper concludes that critical realism does not provide a compelling basis for economic methodology.     

Mr Keynes,the Classics and the new Keynesians: A suggested formalisation

Abstract

The paper suggests a new Keynesian model of the General Theory. A reduced form entails a diagram with three curves relating employment and the real wage, which represent the two fundamental classical postulates and the principle of effective demand. This diagram illustrates better than IS–LM the generality of Keynes's theory, clarifying the distinction between voluntary and involuntary unemployment. Other significant features are the role of the distribution of expected interest rates among heterogeneous agents, whether dispersed or concentrated, in shaping the LM curve, as well as the role of wage competitiveness constraints as a foundation of Keynes's relative wage hypothesis.     

Keynes and India, 1909–1913: a study on foreign investment policy

Abstract

Keynes's work on India before the First World War concentrated on analysis of the gold exchange standard and the stabilization of the rupee external value. Indian monetary arrangements were framed into a plan for foreign investment, implemented by the India Office in London. This policy, which was a typical example of public control over investments, occasioned Keynes's first job as an applied economist. Although neglected by Keynesian scholarship, this learning by doing experience is likely to have played a significant role in the young economist's training and education.     

A historiographical exhumation of J.A. Hobson's Over-Saving Thesis: General theory versus historiography

Abstract

The discussion of J.A. Hobson's understanding of over-saving has been largely confined within John Maynard Keynes' famous critique in the General Theory. I argue that gauging Hobson's contribution by ‘general theory’, that is, by an ahistorical, non-evolutionary yardstick, is to miss the larger part of Hobson's achievement. Hobson's conception of over-saving was contained within an evolving historiography of capital accumulation and took on various meanings depending on whether Hobson was discussing a competitive or monopolistic environment. I show that Keynes' ‘corrected’ version of over-saving was implicitly contained within Hobson's analysis of an evolving monopolistic industrial structure.     

Money as an Institution of Capitalism: Some Notes on a Monetary Theory of Uncertainty

Dillard notes that to consider money as an institution of capitalism means to emphasize that money is an essential element in explaining fluctuations in income and employment. He states that Keynes's liquidity preference theory offers a sound explanation of money as an institution of capitalism. Keynes's explanation is based on a necessary condition, independent of money: the presence of uncertainty. The objective of the paper is to elaborate a different explanation of the role of money, based on Keynes's 1933 and 1937–39 works, according to which the presence of money constitutes the necessary condition to justify the importance of uncertainty.     

An overview of probability,expectations, uncertainty and rationality in Keynes's conceptual framework 1

Keynes's writings on the cognate topics of probability, expectations, uncertainty and rationality exhibit considerable complexity. This paper seeks to provide a clarifying overview of his position on these topics, both in his main philosophical workThe treatise on probability, and his main economic workThe general theory. It is argued that the most useful approach for understanding the deeper structure of Keynes's thought in each work is by means of a two-dimensional, two-domain analysis.Such an analysis helps demonstrate some of the ways in which the conceptual framework of The treatise on probability provides an essential part of the philosophical foundations of The general theory, while at the same time recognizing some of the key differences between the two works. It also illuminates Keynes's non-neoclassical theorization of rationality, and his path-breaking attempt to develop a theory of rationality under irreducible uncertainty.     

Sraffa,Keynes and 'The Years of High Theory'

This paper argues that Shackle's interpretation of 'the years of high theory' is flawed. Shackle (1967) sees Sraffa's critique of the Marshallian theory of value only as a step in the development of the theory of imperfect competition. In the same vein, Shackle reduces the message of Keynes's General Theory to the claim that unemployment results from the existence of uncertainty and irrational expectations. Thus, Shackle leaves open the possibility that both Sraffa's critique of Marshall and Keynes's theory of effective demand do not question the internal coherence of neoclassical theory, but instead merely assert that market imperfections render it irrelevant for the analysis of the real world. This paper argues, in contrast, that the theories of Sraffa and Keynes should be interpreted as radical departures from marginalism, and represent a return to the surplus approach of classical political economy.     

Keynes and probability: An assessment

Abstract

Most interpreters agree that Keynes had a wide-ranging, complex, ‘vision of the world’, which underlies his theoretical contributions. Whenever this is forgotten, as happens in the so-called neoclassical synthesis, not only the original Keynesian spirit goes lost but also, and especially, we lose substantive bricks for our theoretical constructions. The paper considers an important instance of this general rule; namely Keynes's views on the logic of probability, meant as the field concerning human behaviour in an uncertain world (hence connected to, but distinct from, the pure theory of probability, meant as a field of mathematics). The paper begins by recalling the main aspects of the classical and frequentist approaches to probability and the main criticisms they received, pertaining among other things to the limits of their applicability. We then consider Keynes's own views, stressing three aspects: the definition of probability as pertaining to the field of logic, the notion of uncertainty and of the ‘weight of the argument’, the ‘theory of groups’. We then discuss the subjective approach of de Finetti, Ramsey and Savage, and contrast it with Keynes's own views. Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for the interpretation of Keynes's General Theory, and of his attitude towards econometrics.     

Hayek and Keynes: From a common critique of economic method to different theories of expectations

The methodological positions of Hayek and Keynes contain striking similarities. Both authors opposed empiricist approaches to economics that assign priority to mere observation as the source of knowledge. Both emphasised intentionality, motivation and human agency. Notwithstanding this common ground, they had different conceptions of how beliefs are formed and had different explanations of thought and action in economics. Hayek grounded his explanation on an evolutionary theory of the mind, i.e. on psychological premises, whereas Keynes based his view of belief formation on probable reasoning, where probability is a logical concept. Starting from psychological premises Hayek maintained that individuals act rationally only by following rules. As a consequence, he considered conventional expectations to be the primary guide for agents in economic life. Keynes agreed that conventional expectations actually guide economic behaviour, but he maintained that they are justified only in situations of total ignorance. In conditions of limited knowledge, agents can base their action on reasonable expectations, independently of conventions. Moreover, agents?particularly those institutions responsible for economic policy?ought to shun conventional behaviour in order to counteract its negative social consequences. We argue that Keynes's theory of expectations is well grounded upon his theory of logical probability. Hence his advocacy of discretionary policy is rationally justified.     

An Archaeology of Adam Smith's Epistemic Context

Abstract

Adam Smith played a key role in Foucault's archaeology of political economy. This archaeology, which Foucault accomplished in The Order of Things, is the focus of this article. Foucault may have disagreed with the writings of the classical political economists but he widens our perspective through new possibilities of understanding. It is very illuminating to understand Smith's thinking as following a discursive practice that economic thought shared with the knowledge of living beings (natural history) and language (grammar). Foucault's archaeology highlights some ontological and epistemological conditions that shed light on some of the pillars of Smith's thinking: the centrality of exchange, the division of labour and the labour theory of value. The proximity between Newton and Smith is also examined in ontological and epistemological terms which can be understood through an investigation of that interdiscursivity practice. Beyond testing Foucault's considerations, our aim is to demonstrate their potential for the current scholarship of Smith's works. Foucault's archaeology of knowledge offers a range of elements that warrants greater analysis by historians of economic thought.     

Was Keynes a Realist?

Lawson (1989a) has interpreted Keynes as a philosophical realist, adhering to the view that the economy has a constant inner structure. Against this it is claimed below that, although Keynes speaks about realism, it is not in this sense, but in the common sense way of referring to actually observable entities of an economic model. In addition, it can be shown that Keynes's views can be interpreted as instrumentalist—he emphasises characteristics such as usefulness and convenience, besides and instead of truth. Thus, truth and truthlike concepts do not, in Keynes's thinking, have the paramount position that they have in realist philosophy.     

The Point of Effective Demand

Abstract

Keynes's principle of effective demand conceives competitive equilibrium in terms of the choices of entrepreneurs, investors and consumers, rather than of the optimal allocation of factors of production. In The General Theory, effective demand is distinguished from aggregate demand and from income, expected or realised, and there is no suggestion that equilibrium means the convergence of expectations. Reconsideration of Keynes's use of time and equilibrium periods leads to the conclusion that he treats employment as in continuous equilibrium, at the point of effective demand, determined by the state of expectation, the correctness of which is strictly irrelevant. The nature of the equilibrium represented by the point of effective demand is here described, not in terms of the multiplier, but in terms of the continuous equilibrium of supply and demand in short-term forward markets. This reading is faithful to Keynes's conception of aggregate demand as dependent upon the expectations of entrepreneurs, and it resolves the meaning of his ‘long-period employment.’ Formal appendices identify the differences between Keynes and Walras and the nature of the multiplier. The paper concludes that the Keynesian cross and ‘Swedish’ analysis should be abandoned, and the Walrasian conception recognised as only the limiting case of general competitive equilibrium in a monetary economy.     

Whither Keynesian probability? Impolite techniques for decision-making

The critical literature on Keynes has provided extensive analysis of why individual agents may find convenient to adopt a “conventional judgement”, and what he meant by “polite techniques” used to save their faces as “rational, economic men.” This paper concentrates instead on impolite techniques of thought suited to deal with Keynesian uncertainty. The paper suggests that the thread going from Keynes's Treatise on Probability to the General Theory and its defence provides a positive analysis of decision-making under uncertainty, and that placing emphasis on this positive analysis simply means adhering to Keynes's long-standing commitment to a (surely peculiar) probabilistic set-up.     

Profit Expectations and Confidence: Some unresolved issues in the Austrian/Post-Keynesian debate

Austrian and Post-Keynesian economists both continue to make important contributions to subjectivism in economics. Yet, as the ongoing debate between members of the two schools demonstrates, Austrians and Post-Keynesians have very different views about the possibility of intertemporal coordination in a market economy. This paper returns to the debate between Hayek and Keynes in order to respond to a contemporary Austrian critique of Keynes's theory of expectations. The paper shows that the fundamental difference between the two schools ultimately boils down to the nature of conventional expectations and the question of confidence. If the conventional expectation holds to assume the future will look enough like the present to give investors confidence in their decisions, Hayek's arguments about the possibility of intertemporal coordination merit attention. If, however, this convention does not hold, as Keynes thought was sometimes likely, the self-regulating potential of a market economy is called into question.     

Volume XXXIV – 2000

In the attempt to deepen the understanding of Keynes' thought as an international macroeconomist, we explore the hypothesis of consistency between his general methodological approach to the economic material and his way of reasoning about international economic relations. As a first step toward this direction, we investigate the methodology of The Economic Consequences of the Peace and find that it reflects Keynes' attempt to cope with the attributes of the complexity characterizing the European settlement for the post-war period, e.g., 1) organic interdependence among variables at play, 2) irreducible dilemmas and situations of conflict, as well as 3) the need for external, public assistance to overcome the impasse and promote a "shared responsibilities" approach to the imbalances. Striking similarities appearing with the method of Keynes' economic diplomacy in the 1940s are shown to substantiate the current rediscovery of his plans for Bretton Woods.     

A tale of two traditions: Pierre Force's Self-interest before Adam Smith

Abstract

The paper compares different strands of New Keynesian Economics with regard to Keynes' original work. Two issues are analysed in detail. First, the explanations provided by Keynes and New Keynesians of nominal and real wage behaviour. Second, the different theories concerning the ability of flexible nominal wages in assuring full employment. It is argued that, although involuntary unemployment is a central problem both in Keynes' and New Keynesians' views, referring to the role of nominal and real wages in explaining unemployment, New Keynesians theories present important features that differ, sometimes substantially, from the concepts developed by Keynes in his General Theory.     

Beauty contested: how much of Keynes' remains in behavioural economics' beauty contests?

Abstract

In one of the most famous passages of the economic literature, John Maynard Keynes likens the stock market to a beauty contest (BC), in which the winners are those who anticipate the average opinion. In behavioural economics there have recently been attempts at investigating the BC experimentally. We argue that there exist important differences between Keynes' and behavioural economics' BCs. We identify several types of BCs and propose a taxonomy. We also suggest that, in spite of these differences, Keynes' theory of decision under uncertainty is central to understanding the actual behaviour observed in experimental BCs.     

The Role of credit in a Keynesian monetary economy

Abstract

This paper describes the features of a monetary economy on the basis of Keynes's distinction between a real exchange economy and a monetary economy. In The General Theory, Keynes identifies the reasons for the non-neutrality of money by highlighting the store of wealth function of money; this approach has been adopted by most Keynesian economists. The aim of this paper is to show that such an approach only partially explains the reasons for money non-neutrality and that important elements which demonstrate the relevance of monetary variables emerge when the means of payment function of money is considered. Investigating the role of this function requires that we deal explicitly with how spending decisions are financed. The paper argues that the market for credit must be considered separately from the market for money, and that a viable credit theory can be built from Keynes's post-General Theory writings.     

The neglect of replacement investment in keynesian economics

Abstract

This article describes Keynes's early analysis of replacement investment and his subsequent neglect of the subject, especially by his followers. It goes on to explain how this deficiency helped to mislead later economists who attempted to use Keynes as a guide for economic policy and theory and the consequences of the errors of these economists.