The influence of entrepreneur’s personal characteristics on MSEs growth through innovation

Research in the separate areas of innovation and growth has considerably intensified in recent years. However, little scholarly attention has been paid to the entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics that might explain the growth of micro and small enterprises (MSEs) through innovation. This study examines the key entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics affecting micro and small enterprises (MSEs) upgrading, defined here as substantial growth through innovation. Six major determining types of entrepreneurs’ characteristics were identified from the innovation and the growth literature: education, work experience, gender, motivations, nationality and age. The empirical results which are based on t-tests of the differences between upgraders and non-upgraders, the linear probability model and the logit model, all suggest that work experience and motivations are cornerstones in the likelihood that an MSE will upgrade. The policy implications of this study on promoting MSEs upgrading are also discussed.     

‘Thirlwall's Law’ and balance of payments constrained growth: more on the debate

The various criticisms that have levelled against Thirlwall's Law by McGregor and Swales are examined. It is shown that their arguments are untenable. The relationship between the necolassical law of one price and Thirlwall's Law is clarified. Thirlwall's Law is not overwhelmingly rejected by the evidence as McGregor and Swales assert. Their suppression of the influence of the price term on the estimates used in the test proposed by McCombie is inappropriate. Their regression analyis is also mid-specified and a preferable specification provides no support for their conclusions. They repeatedly argue that Thirlwall's modele cannot account for changes in market shares and the that the estimated income elasticities of demand for exports and imports cannot capture the effects of non-price competition. This was shown to be erroneous by McCombie and the reasons advanced are further elaborated. McGregor and Swales provide another interpretation of the relationship between Thirlwll's Law and the Harrod foreign trade multiplier, But their criticism of McCombie is unwarranted. The methodology of McGregor and Swales seems to be one of ‘naive falsificationism’.     

‘Unproductive’ sectors and economic growth: a theoretical analysis

This paper examines the role of service, nonmarket and unproductive activity sectors in causing stagnation. The literature on this subject is critically discussed and it is argued that although these three sectors are not the same, the discussion of their roles raises similar theoretical issues regarding the nature of sectoral distinctions and macroeconomic structure. Three simple models are developed to illustrate how these ‘unproductive’ sectors may or may not cause stagnation. It is concluded that more attention should be given to sectoral distinctions and macroeconomic structures before these sectors are dismissed as being ‘unproductive’.     

Explaining differences in the productivity of investment across countries in the context of ‘new growth theory’

The purpose of this paper is to explain differences in the productivity of investment across 84 rich and poor countries over the period 1980–2011, and to test the orthodox neoclassical assumption of diminishing returns to capital. The productivity of investment is measured as the ratio of the long-run growth of GDP to a country’s gross investment ratio. Twenty potential determinants are considered using a general-to-specific model selection algorithm. Education, government consumption, geography, export growth, openness, political rights and macroeconomic instability are the most important variables. The data also suggest constant returns to capital, so investment and the determinants of productivity of investment differences matter for long-run growth.     

Dominance testing for ‘pro-poor’ growth with an application to European growth

This article introduces statistical testing procedures to evaluate ??pro-poor?? growth. Our measure of ??pro-poorness?? follows Kakwani (J Quant Econ 16(1):67?C80, 2000), Kakwani and Pernia (Asian Dev Rev 18(1):1?C16, 2000), and Son (Econ Lett 82:307?C314, 2004), who decompose the generalized Lorenz ordinates into a growth effect and an inequality effect. We derive an asymptotic distribution-free covariance matrix for the decomposed generalized Lorenz curves. Using this decomposition (and our standard errors), we test for pro-poor dominance in the growth process. We illustrate our test for the pro-poor dominance by evaluating the degree of pro-poor growth in five European countries.     

Chocolate-box soldiers: A critique of ‘an economic theory of military tactics’

The purpose of this article is to challenge Geoffrey Brennan and Gordon Tullock's application of methodological individualism to battle in ‘An Economic Theory of Military Tactics’, this journal, 3 (1982, pp. 225–242). My thesis is that methodological individualism distorts the social nature of combat. To defend this thesis, first, I argue that the analysis of Brennan and Tullock assumes the very thing that is most in doubt in a battle, namely, that anyone is motivated to be killed or to kill. These motivations rest on the social ties of combatants to their comrades. Finally, a proper understanding of heroism illustrates the responsibility and sacrifice of battle neglected by Brennan and Tullock's analysis.     

Hayek’s monetary theory and policy: A note on alleged inconsistency

Challenging the dominant view, we claim that Hayek’s monetary views did not significantly change over his lifetime. The prevalent perception of early Hayek as a money stream stabilizer and late Hayek as a price level stabilizer is attributable to an unjustified normative interpretation of Hayek’s positive analysis. We argue that in his contributions to monetary theory, Hayek took the goals of monetary policy as exogenously given and analysed the efficiency of different means of achieving them. Hayek’s allegedly inconsistent transformation from a critic to an advocate of price level stabilization is explained by a change of issues under his focus, rather than by a change in his positive views. We also claim that Hayek was always aware that every practical monetary policy involves difficult trade-offs and that he was therefore reluctant to impose his own value judgments on what people should strive for.     

Credit money and Kaldor’s ‘institutional’ theory of income distribution

This paper combines two major contributions by Kaldor: the view that the supply of money, ensuing mainly from bank credit, is endogenous, and the framework which assigns a crucial role to the saving and investment behaviour of corporations in determining the general rate of profit (the neo‐Pasinetti theorem). Bank loans are introduced as another means of financing investment by firms, in addition to retained profits and the new issuance of shares. The proposed model provides a convenient framework in which two different approaches in the money‐endogeneity view are classified. Kaldor’s neo‐Pasinetti theorem is shown to hold for only one of these approaches and is then extended to include the influence of banks.     

The ‘minimal’ state reconsidered: governance on the margin

Classical liberal scholars have defined a “minimal state” as performing certain basic functions that include the provision of policing, courts, and national defense. We argue that these functions need not be fully provided by the state. Private provision of all three of these functions exists. Thus a truly minimal state would provide these functions only on the margins where private provision fails. Thus, a truly minimal state is much more minimal than scholars have traditionally envisioned.

     

Sectoral Changes in Employment: An eclectic perspective on ‘good’ jobs and ‘poor’ jobs

The linkage Keynes established between the volume of employment that business firms require to make a particular number of jobs available provides an operational perspective about the way in which labor markets work. The aggregate supply or Z function is, in fact, a job offer curve. The most significant insight to derive from this curve is that job offers are inseparable from the economy's aggregate expenditure (or demand) level. This interdependency of aggregate supply and aggregate demand is necessary to understand the functioning of labor markets in the real world. This paper argues that a disaggregated model which encapsulates the economy's price-taking and price-making sectors offers a promising analytical tool to gain perspective about ‘good jobs’ and ‘poor jobs’ in post-Fordist economies. It is maintained that the sectoral deployment of workers reflects whether employing firms, as price-makers, can capture the increasing returns inherent in modern technology.     

‘Death effect’ on collectible prices

It has been widely observed that the price of art or celebrity memorabilia rises around the time of the artist or figure's death. Previous authors attribute this ‘?death effect?’ primarily to expectations on the part of collectors concerning the future supply of collectibles relating to the public figure as in the case of a durable goods monopolist. The observations of the sports memorabilia market suggest that the increase in prices is instead due to a ‘?nostalgia effect?’ as a result of the media attention that surrounds the death of a prominent public figure.     

Experiment-inspired comments on John Roemer’s theory of cooperation

Abstract

We report on a nonsocial experiment where we find that all participants choose the dominant strategy in the experimental payoff, and compare it with the payoff-isomorphic, but social, Prisoner’s Dilemma treatment presented in a recent paper by Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre where 28% choose cooperation instead of the dominant strategy. The contrast reinforces Roemer’s emphasis on human cooperation. Next, we argue that Roemer’s Simple Kantian Equilibrium works well as a theory of cooperation under the assumption of monotonicity (positive or negative externalities), but not when efficient cooperation requires the division of labor by coordinating dissimilar tasks.