Method and analysis in Piero Sraffa's 1925 critique of Marshallian economics

This paper provides an analysis of the logical structure and analytical content of Piero Sraffa's 1925 Italian paper, ‘Sulle relazioni fra costo e quantità prodotta’. It shows that Sraffa's criticism of the supply side of Marshall's theory of value in a competitive partial equilibrium model involves analytical and methodological issues. Endorsing an agressive methodology Sraffa logically reconstructs Marshall's model on variable returns to determine its empirical domain. He demonstrates that the latter encompasses only the empirically irrelevant cases of specific factor industries and specific external economies industries and that it cannot be generalized to non-specific factor industries and to non-specific external economies industries.     

Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique

We examine the role of off-path “superstitions” in macro-economics, and show how a false belief about off-path play is the key element underlying both the Lucas Critique and the game-theoretic concept of self-confirming equilibrium. However, the impact of false beliefs in these two cases is different: In the Lucas case, a policy maker's incorrect beliefs about off-path play can lead to the adoption of mistaken policy innovation. However, the consequences of such an innovation provide evidence that the belief that motivated them was wrong. In contrast, play may never escape an undesirable self-confirming equilibrium, as the action implied by the mistaken belief does not generate data that contradicts it; escape from the self-confirming equilibrium requires that players do a sufficient amount of experimentation with off-path actions.     

Sraffa's legacy

This review essay of Critical Essays on Piero Sraffa's Legacyin economics situates Sraffa's work in relation to the Marshalliantradition and neo-Walrasian general equilibrium theory, andreviews the current state of debate between adherents of thesetraditions on the role of demand, returns to scale, capitaltheory and policy analysis. Other issues considered includethe corn model, Sraffa's critique of Hayek, and the extensionof the capital theory critique to the intertemporal equilibriummodel.     

Coupons and 'everyday low prices': price competition with multiple instruments

Abstract A simple two‐stage game is examined, where firms compete in prices by chosen pricing instruments. Those considered include a simple, uniform pricing technology and a promotional pricing technology like an advertised discount coupon. Consumers are separated by types, informed and uninformed. Therefore, a motive for price competition exists for the purpose of separating the two types of consumers. It is shown that the sustainability of an asymmetric choice of pricing instrument between the two firms will prevail in a duopoly market in equilibrium. Consequently, the coexistence of two different pricing schemes is viable even when firms are otherwise symmetric. JEL Classification: L1, L13
Coupons et « bas prix tous les jours >> : concurrence par les prix à l'aide de multiples instruments Ce mémoire examine un simple jeu à deux étapes dans lequel des entreprises se concurrencent par les prix à l'aide d'un instrument particulier. Les instruments considérés incluent une simple technologie de prix uniforme, et une technologie de prix de promotion sous la forme de l'annonce d'un coupon d'escompte. On divise les consommateurs en deux groupes – ceux qui sont informés et ceux qui ne le sont pas. Un des motifs pour ce genre de concurrence est de séparer les deux types de consommateurs. On montre qu'on peut soutenir un choix asymétrique d'instrument de tarification entre les deux entreprises dans un marché de duopole en équilibre. En conséquence, la coexistence de deux stratégies de prix différentes est viable quand les entreprises sont symétriques sous tous les autres rapports.     

The econometric critique of computable general equilibrium modeling: the role of functional forms

Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are among the most influential tools in applied economics. However, some serious questions have been raised about the empirical validity of these models. The core of the critique is that the parameter selection criteria are unsound and the use of first-order (CES class) functional forms imposes influential restrictions on the model's structure. A formal summary of the case against standard CGE modeling is presented, as is an alternative econometric-based modeling strategy which answers the critique. We then present a comparative CGE modeling experiment designed to assess the role of function forms. It is found that choice of functional forms affects not only industry-specific results, but aggregate results as well, even for small policy shocks.     

On the monotonicity of the labour-capital ratio in Sraffa's model

Work done in part while visiting (1988–1989) the Department of Mathematics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, U.S.A. One of the authors (E. S.) wishes to thank Paolo Caravani for bringing the subject matter of Caravani and DeLuca (1987), in an earlier version, to his attention; and David Rosenblatt for illuminating correspondence on aggregation.     

Keynes and Sraffa's 'Difficulties with J. H. Hollander'

The paper reports on Jacob H. Hollander's cooperation with John Maynard Keynes and Piero Sraffa in the preparation of the latter's edition of The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo. The report is based on archive material from various sources, including the unpublished papers of Edwin Cannan, Piero Sraffa, Jacob H. Hollander, John Maynard Keynes, and Jacob Viner, and the archive of the Royal Economic Society. The archive material consulted by us shows that, put mildly, Jacob H. Hollander did not promote Sraffa's editorial project: he held back material which he had received from Frank Ricardo and did not disclose to Sraffa that he owned several important letters which he had privately purchased. Moreover, Sraffa was refused access to Ricardiana even after he had traced them down in laborious detective work to be in Hollander's possession. Hollander's unwillingness to cooperate with Sraffa considerably delayed the publication of the Ricardo edition.     

Managerial delegation and partial privatization in general equilibrium with sector-specific unemployment

This paper explores the effects of managerial delegation in a general-equilibrium, oligopolistic competition model with sector-specific unemployment. It specifically examines the effects of managerial delegation on outputs, factor returns and the urban unemployment ratio. It is found that if the managerial firm is less profit-oriented, managerial delegation can lead to an increase in the urban output, a decrease in the rural output, an increase in the capital rental and a decrease in the rural wage. In particular, it worsens the urban unemployment ratio.     

Against the current: Sraffa's unpublished manuscripts and the history of economic thought *

The paper throws some new light on Sraffa's contribution, using material from his yet unpublished papers. Attention focuses on Sraffa's rediscovery of the distinct character of the classical theory of value and distribution and his refutation of the Marshallian interpretation that it is only a special case of demand and supply theory, his reformulation of the classical theory, and his criticism of the alternative neoclassical theory.     

Sraffa's system: Equal rate of profits and the notion of center of gravitation

This paper argues that the condition of uniform rate of profits in Sraffa's system is not based on his implicit assumption that the system is at the ‘equilibrium’ or the center of gravitation. It is rather a logical requirement of a reproducing system of basic goods as long as prices are not imposed from outside the system. This condition holds irrespective of supplies being equal to their respective effectual demands. It conjectures that Sraffa could have arrived at this conclusion through his analysis of the Standard system. On the basis of this result, a critique of the received interpretation, led by Garegnani, of Sraffa's prices is developed.     

An appraisal of Piero Sraffa's 'The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions'

The paper proposes a new interpretation of Sraffa's 1926 Economic Journal article, ‘The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions’, according to which the latter derives from the same strategy of research which underlies its 1925 Italian precursor, ‘Sulle relazioni fra costo e quantità prodotta’. Sraffa tested the explanatory power of a Marshallian monopolistic partial equilibrium model and concluded that that model is able to treat one source of variable returns (firm-internal economies); but this articulation of Marshall‘s theory does not substantially improve on the trade-off between logical consistency and empirical relevance which afflicted the theory in its whole.     

Disaggregated data and trade policy analysis: The value of linking partial and general equilibrium models

Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are now routinely utilized for the evaluation of trade policy reforms, yet they are typically quite highly aggregated, which limits their usefulness to trade negotiators who are often interested in impacts at the tariff line. On the other hand, Partial Equilibrium (PE) models, which are typically used for analysis at disaggregate levels, deprive the researcher of the benefits of an economy-wide analysis, which is required to examine the overall impact of broad-based trade policy reforms. Therefore, a PE–GE, nested modeling framework has the prospect of offering an ideal tool for trade policy analysis. In this paper, we develop a PE model that captures international trade, domestic consumption and output, using Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) and Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) structures, market clearing conditions and price linkages, nested within the standard GTAP model. In particular, we extend the welfare decomposition of Huff and Hertel (2001) to this PE–GE model in order to contrast the sources of welfare gain in PE and GE analyses. To illustrate the usefulness of this model, we examine the contentious issue of tariff liberalization in the Indian auto sector, using PE, GE and PE–GE models. Both the PE and PE–GE models show that the imports of motorcycles and automobiles change drastically with both unilateral and bilateral tariff liberalization by India, but the PE model does a poor job predicting the overall size and price level in the industry, post-liberalization. On the other hand, the GE model overestimates substitution between regional suppliers due to “false competition” and underestimates the welfare gain, due to the problem of tariff averaging in the aggregated model. These findings are shown to be robust to wide variation in model parameters. We conclude that the linked model is superior to both the GE and PE counterparts.     

Sraffa's path to Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities. An interpretation

The present article provides a reconstruction of the path followedby Sraffa in the long journey (begun in the late 1920s) whichbrought him to his 1960 book. The starting point of Sraffa'sresearch was the formulation of his cost-price equations, whichsurprisingly enough appear to have been derived neither fromRicardo's theory of value, nor from Marx's ‘transformationof values into prices of production’, but rather fromMarx's reproduction schemes, published in volume II of Capital,to which Sraffa was almost certainly brought by his study ofMarx's interpretation of Physiocratic theory in volume I ofTheories of Surplus Value. The main device that Sraffa usedin his attempts to bring to light the existence of solutionsto his system and their properties, which basically meant buildinga consistent wage–profit–price relationship, wasthat of somehow cutting out the prices from this relationship.The paper shows that different routes were attempted by Sraffato achieve this end, and that the main influences on these attemptswere Ricardo and Marx, in particular Ricardo's corn-ratio theoryof profits, and the related conception of a maximum rate ofprofits. In the course of his research, Sraffa was helped bysome distinguished mathematicians, in particular Frank P. Ramseyand Abram S. Besicovitch. Of Ramsey's contribution there areimportant traces, but no more than traces, while ample recordsremain of the relationship between Sraffa and Besicovitch, andthey will play an important part in the story told in this paper.     

Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium

Summary We show by an example that the sunspot equilibria of a competitive economy are not equivalent to the correlated equilibria if sunspots generate transfers between (extrinsic) states of nature (through a contingent commodities market). Nevertheless, we prove that the sunspot equilibrium allocations of a standard overlapping generations economy coincide with the (strategic form) correlated equilibrium allocations of a natural market game mimicking the economy.     

Assessing the impact of environmental charges a partial general equilibrium model of the forest sector

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of how environmental charges affect a particular sector of the economy. Our approach allows a simple comparison of how partial and general equilibrium results may differ.A research grant from the Nordic Council is gratefully acknowledged.     

An entrepreneurial critique of Georgism

This paper develops a critique of the single-tax proposal of Henry George. We present a simple search-theoretic model for the discovery of natural resources and show that a tax on the unimproved value of land is distortionary. We then consider the time inconsistency and regime uncertainty problem created by even incremental Georgist policy. We discuss historical cases of land reform and the subsequent challenge to re-establish a credible commitment to property rights in land and natural resources.     

A critique of capitalist man

Humanistic economics is founded on the reality of human needs. One of those needs is for truth. According to the correspondence theory, that truth is a relation between statement and objective reality. This reality serves as a constraint on the (ego) self. Therefore, it can also be shown that self-interest is an independent principle from the commitment to truth, and that these two principles can clash. These two principles of the self, or the “higher” and “lower” self, constitute what we call the dual self.