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吴国鼎 《中央财经大学学报》2021,(9):100-112
控制权转移能够通过代理成本的变化对企业绩效产生影响。笔者以2004—2018年中国沪深A股市场上市公司中所发生的控制权转移事件为研究样本,运用中介效应检验方法,考察了控制权转移如何通过管理层在职消费率、资产利用率和大股东占款率等代理成本度量指标变化以影响企业绩效。研究结果表明:从总体上看,控制权转移影响企业绩效的作用过程中几类代理成本的中介效应都显著。区分控制权转移类型研究的结果显示出代理成本的中介效应有差异:就国资控制权的转移而言,管理层在职消费率和资产利用率的中介效应显著;而对于民资控制权转移的代理成本中介效应却不能一概而论,其中,若转让给民营资本,则管理层在职消费率和大股东占款率的中介效应显著,若转让给国有资本,则几类代理成本之中介效应均不显著。笔者通过进一步考察控制权转移影响企业代理成本渠道发现:控制权转移后,高管变更可以提高资产利用率,控制人的控制权减少可以降低大股东占款率。本研究揭示了控制权转移如何通过代理成本的变化影响企业绩效的机理,得出的研究结论有助于丰富控制权转移绩效研究领域的相关文献,能够为规范中国控制权转移市场、提高中国企业公司治理水平提供理论依据。 相似文献
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本文选取2014-2018年A股化工行业上市公司为研究对象,采用中介效应模型研究环境规制、代理成本和公司绩效的关系.研究结果显示,环境规制具有降低代理成本的作用,在此基础上能够对公司绩效产生积极影响.进一步地,将总样本按照地区进行划分,发现环境规制对代理成本的降低程度在东、中、西部地区无明显差异,但对公司绩效的提升作用存在地区性差异.具体来说,命令控制型环境规制会降低公司绩效,代理成本能削弱该降低作用;市场激励型和公众参与型环境规制会提升公司绩效,代理成本能强化该提升作用,以上结论在分地区样本中仍然成立,并且市场激励型环境规制对东部地区公司绩效的提升作用明显高于中、西部地区. 相似文献
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本文采用深市A股192个上市公司2014-2020年的面板数据,以委托代理理论和隧道效应理论为支撑,运用固定效应面板模型实证研究信息披露质量、双重代理成本与公司绩效的关系。研究结果表明,信息披露质量与公司绩效在1%的水平下显著正相关,双重代理成本在信息披露质量与公司绩效的关系中起部分中介效应。 相似文献
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随着低碳经济的提倡与发展,大力发展绿色信贷成为商业银行发展绿色金融的有效手段,而发展绿色信贷能否为商业银行的经营绩效带来增长也一直广受关注。本文首先选择36家商业银行的样本数据,运用DID模型对实施绿色信贷政策能否提高商业银行经营绩效进行验证;其次选用有效披露的16家商业银行,从盈利性、流动性和安全性三方面构建商业银行经营绩效指标,并构建面板模型验证绿色信贷对商业银行经营绩效的异质性影响和环境声誉的中介效应。实证结果表明:(1)绿色信贷政策对商业银行经营绩效的提高是有效的;(2)绿色信贷和商业银行经营绩效存在“倒U”型的关系,且在不同类型银行间存在异质性;(3)环境声誉在绿色信贷对商业银行经营绩效的影响中具有21.68%的中介效用。 相似文献
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我国是全球最大的碳排放国,碳排放权交易作为我国重要的市场型环境规制手段,在提升地区碳绩效促进经济可持续发展方面发挥了重要作用。基于此,运用我国30个省份2001—2020年的面板数据构造准自然实验,采用双重差分模型检验我国的碳交易政策对地区碳绩效的影响,并在此基础上采用链式中介效应模型,解析碳交易政策的影响机制。研究结果表明:碳交易政策可通过减少碳排放量、促进技术创新和优化产业结构改善碳绩效,并且技术创新和产业结构升级表现为正向空间溢出效应,碳排放量存在负向空间溢出效应。技术创新可以促进产业结构升级,产业结构的升级可以减少碳排放量,但是技术创新对降低碳排放量的作用并不明显。因而应当对各区域碳配额进行协调管理,并且严格控制核证自愿减排量的交易占比。 相似文献
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基于中国制造业上市公司2003~2009年的财务数据,讨论多元化经营和企业内部代理对企业业绩的影响,结果表明:多元化经营对企业业绩具有负向影响,股东与管理层之间的代理成本、经理层之间的代理成本对企业的业绩具有显著的负向影响,控股股东与中小股东之间的代理问题对企业业绩不具有负向影响;多元化经营导致企业股东与管理层之间代理成本增加,同时使得控股股东与中小股东之间的代理成本减少。 相似文献
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以2000-2015年我国A股上市公司为样本,考察CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系、内部控制质量对代理成本的影响,研究发现:CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系能显著降低代理成本;随着公司内部控制质量的提高,CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系对代理成本的降低程度越来越低。进一步研究发现:CEO与董事间的“老乡”关系只在非国有企业、CEO为男性的样本中能显著降低代理成本。 相似文献
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CEOs are “lucky” when they receive stock option grants on days when the stock price is the lowest in the month of the grant, implying opportunistic timing. Extending the work of Bebchuk et al. (2010), we explore the effect of overall corporate governance quality on CEO luck. Provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), our comprehensive governance metrics are much broader than those used in prior studies, encompassing more diverse aspects of corporate governance, such as audit, state laws, boards, ownership, and director education. We show that an improvement in governance quality by one standard deviation diminishes CEO luck by 14.77–21.06%. The governance standards recommended by ISS appear to be effective in deterring the opportunistic timing of option grants. 相似文献
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This paper investigates the association between firms' engagement in real activities manipulation (hereafter REM) on future firm performance in an international setting, and whether the association is conditional upon country-level institutional factor. Our inquiry is motivated by a paucity of research on the consequences of REM in an international setting. Using a large sample over the period of 2001 to 2015, we find that current-period REM is positively associated with future performance: a finding that is consistent with Gunny (2010) in the US. Importantly, we find that the positive performance effect is driven by firms operating in countries with strong institutional environments. Finally, we find that future operating performance improves when REM is undertaken by firms in strong institutional environments only during a non-economic crisis period, but not during an economic crisis period. The paper adds to the existing REM literature by showing a non-monotonic effect of REM on future performance that is conditional on the strength of a country's institution. We also contribute to the accounting information and crisis literature by documenting a time-variant effect of REM on future performance. 相似文献
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Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting. 相似文献
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The paper analyzes the role of agency driven takeover activity.The analysis shows that takeovers can play an important rolein reducing agency costs even though the gains from the corporaterestructuring that follows the takeovers are zero, which countersexisting models of agency driven takeover activity. The modelcan therefore form the basis for deriving empirical predictionswhich discriminate between the "agency paradigm" and the "corporaterestructuring paradigm" of takeover activity. Negative post-mergerperformance (Agrawal et al., 1992), which is inconsistent withcorporate restructuring is consistent with this model, and thattakeover target's investment levels are below or at the average(Servaes 1994), which is inconsistent with the free cash flowtheory is also consistent with this model. JEL numbers: G14,G31, G32, G34. 相似文献
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Norvald Instefjord 《European Finance Review》1999,3(1):1-22
The paper analyzes the role of agency driven takeover activity. The analysis shows that takeovers can play an important role in reducing agency costs even though the gains from the corporate restructuring that follows the takeovers are zero, which counters existing models of agency driven takeover activity. The model can therefore form the basis for deriving empirical predictions which discriminate between the agency paradigm and the corporate restructuring paradigm of takeover activity. Negative post-merger performance (Agrawal et al., 1992), which is inconsistent with corporate restructuring is consistent with this model, and that takeover targets' investment levels are below or at the average (Servaes 1994), which is inconsistent with the free cash flow theory is also consistent with this model. 相似文献
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Jonathan A. Wiley Leonard V. Zumpano 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2009,39(2):180-201
Many studies have hypothesized that the turn-of-the-month effect is caused by institutional investment. However, there is
little evidence to support this hypothesis. This study provides an empirical test that measures the impact of the level of
institutional investment on the turn-of-the-month effect using a sample of REITs over the period 1980 to 2004. We find that
a significant change in the turn-of-the-month effect occurred following the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 which relaxed
the requirements on the level of institutional investment in REITs. The evidence suggests that the dramatic rise in institutional
holdings can account for a good part of this change. However, the impact of institutional investment may not be as large as
some researchers have suspected. There is no evidence to suggest that institutional investment impacts returns on the day
when the turn-of-the-month effect is most pronounced, suggesting that this calendar anomaly is not caused exclusively by institutional
investors in the market.
相似文献
Jonathan A. WileyEmail: |
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本文实证检验了不同内部控制水平下,异质机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的公司治理效应。研究发现,相比外地或短期机构持股,本地或长期机构持股更有助于提升应计质量和降低盈余噪音;当公司存在实质性内部控制缺陷时,本地或长期机构持股在抑制管理层盈余操纵方面的治理效应显著降低;相比国有控股,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥在非国有控股公司中受内部控制的影响更大;当公司存在财务报告实质性内控缺陷时,异质机构持股发挥的治理效应明显更弱。这些结果表明,异质机构持股治理效应的发挥离不开公司内部控制机制,二者之间是互补而非替代关系,这种互补关系主要由财务报告内部控制缺陷驱动。本研究有助于深化理解异质机构持股影响公司治理的具体作用机理,为实务界和监管机构改善公司治理、加强投资者保护提供经验参考。 相似文献