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王雄元;胡彩霞 《中央财经大学学报》2024,(6):76-88
价值相关性越来越高的非财务信息是否具有薪酬辩护效应?既有文献仅在文本可读性上找到了证据。本文基于“管理层讨论与分析”(MD&A)文本,从文本相似度角度探讨非财务信息的薪酬辩护效应。研究发现:(1)存在超额薪酬时,公司会提高MD&A文本相似度,即公司对普遍存在的超额薪酬采取了“避而不谈”的辩护策略,而且这种策略更可能发生在业绩辩护手段匮乏的情形下,会减少风险、人力资源以及薪酬主题的信息披露。(2)但当超额薪酬较极端时,公司会降低MD&A文本相似度,“巧言令色”地为其辩护,而且这种策略更可能发生在业绩辩护手段较为有效的情形下,会增加风险、人力资源以及薪酬主题的信息披露。这些结论有助于从非财务信息文本操纵角度丰富薪酬辩护假说,以及从薪酬披露角度丰富非财务信息文本操纵的经济后果。 相似文献
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以2011~2014年我国 A 股上市公司为研究样本,基于薪酬辩护的视角,考察管理层权力对薪酬—业绩敏感性的影响以及产品市场竞争的监督约束作用。实证结果表明,企业高管利用手中权力获取超额薪酬、谋取私利的同时,会通过提升薪酬—业绩敏感性为自身薪酬进行辩护,形成薪酬契约合理有效的表象;产品市场竞争能够显著抑制企业高管的薪酬辩护行为,降低管理层权力对薪酬契约的影响和扭曲。 相似文献
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近年来,并购交易引发的商誉泡沫现象已成为我国A股市场的重大风险要素之一,引起了各界的广泛关注。本文以2007—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从公司信息披露违规的角度切入,探究超额商誉引发的负面效应。研究发现,超额商誉规模越大,上市公司的信息披露违规倾向和频率越高;机制检验表明,经营风险、代理成本和融资约束是超额商誉触发信息披露违规的传导路径;针对治理对策的进一步研究发现,在独立董事规模较小、非经四大会计师事务所审计的情形下,超额商誉触发信息披露违规的现象更明显;异质性分析发现,超额商誉触发信息披露违规的现象在民营企业以及市场化程度较高的地区更为明显。本文结论丰富了商誉以及企业违规领域的研究,对监管机构、投资者以及上市公司正确认识超额商誉的经济后果具有启示意义。 相似文献
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本文基于最优契约理论和管理者权力理论的矛盾出发,将经理薪酬进行了有效分离,结果发现超出经济因素决定的部分是公司的一类代理问题.进一步还证明了经理攫取的超额薪酬会损毁公司价值. 相似文献
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本文考察了自愿信息披露程度对高管薪酬绩效敏感度的影响。我们发现,自愿信息披露本身对高管薪酬无显著影响,但对高管薪酬绩效敏感度的影响显著为正。此外,在董事会有女性董事或者不存在两权分离的情况下,自愿信息披露对高管薪酬绩效敏感度的影响显著为正。这说明公司治理较好的董事会可以更好的利用自愿披露的信息对高管进行评价,从而改善对高管的激励。 相似文献
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作为上市公司的一个重要的战略性目标,上市公司的信息披露对公司的战略性管理起着极其重要的作用.目前,我国上市公司信息披露对公司的战略性的作用主要有以下几个方面:1.信息披露可以缓解融资约束;2.可以在一定程度上减少融资成本;3.增大公司的核心竞争力;4.提高上市公司的整体形象与声誉等.本文将结合已有的研究文献,对上市公司信息披露的相关方面进行探讨,以期我国上市公司能够得到更好的发展. 相似文献
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This paper examines the impact of information disclosure on the valuation of CEO options and the incentives created by those options. Prior executive compensation research in the US has made assumptions about key input variables that can affect the calculation of option values and financial incentives. Accordingly, biases may have ensued due to incomplete information disclosure about noncurrent option grants. Using new data on a sample of UK CEOs, we value executive option holdings and incentives for the first time and estimate the levels of distortion created by the less than complete US-style disclosure requirements. We also investigate the levels of distortion in the UK for the minority of companies that choose to reveal only partial information. Our results suggest that there have to date been few economic biases arising from less than complete information disclosure. Furthermore, we demonstrate that researchers using US data, who made reasonable assumptions about the inputs of noncurrent option grants, are unlikely to have made significant errors when calculating CEO financial incentives or option wealth. However, the recent downturn in the US stock market could result in the same assumptions, producing exaggerated incentive estimates in the future. 相似文献
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本文在对深交所信息披露考评进行分析的基础上,采用事件研究方法对考评公告的市场效应进行了实证分析。研究发现,2002~2006年度,市场对信息披露公告未做出显著反应;但2007年度,市场针对不同的信息披露考评等级做出了显著的理性反应。这一变化,反映了投资者对信息披露质量的关注程度和对深交所信息披露考评机制的认可程度在不断提高。 相似文献
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From 2011 in Australia, if over 25% of shareholders vote against a non‐binding remuneration resolution, firms are awarded a ‘strike’. We examine 237 firms that receive a strike relative to matched firms, and find no association with any measure of CEO pay. However, we do find that strike firms have higher book‐to‐market and leverage ratios, suggesting that the remuneration vote is not used to target excessive pay. We also find that firms respond to a strike by decreasing the discretionary bonus component of CEO pay by 57.10% more than non‐strike firms and increasing their remuneration disclosure by 10.95%. 相似文献
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This study analyzes the likelihood of management's involvement, the determinants of the offer premium and the market's reaction to the target in order to evaluate the pervasiveness of the agency cost motive and the information asymmetry motive in LBO transactions in the most recent LBO wave. In addition, we consider the role that market volatility plays in the key elements of LBOs. There is strong evidence to suggest that market volatility plays an important role in determining all three elements under investigation due to its effect on the market value of the firm. In addition, management's involvement has a strong positive effect on offer premiums indicating that positive information asymmetry remains to be a motive for management's involvement in LBOs. The agency cost hypothesis is also supported in all three analyses and there is evidence that increased financial distress costs are a concern to private equity groups. 相似文献
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Fixed income excess returns and time to maturity 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
The paper explores the relationship between fixed income excess returns and maturity differentials. In a quest to quantify this relationship, we go beyond testing the monotonicity of excess returns, by exploring the functional form of excess returns' dependence on the maturity differential. Essentially, the paper tests whether the monotonicity of excess returns is linked to maturity differential in a linear or nonlinear fashion. The findings suggest that a quadratic relationship fits the data adequately, and therefore imply that excess returns exhibit sensitivity both to maturity differential and also to their location on the yield curve. Thus, although excess returns increase monotonically with maturity they do so at a decreasing rate. 相似文献
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Chen Sheng-Syan Ho Kim Wai Yeo Gillian H.H. 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》1999,12(4):341-350
This study presents important international evidence by examining the determinants of debt maturity of listed firms in Singapore, a major financial center in Asia. We focus on bank debt because it is the principal source of financing for most Singapore firms. We find that consistent with the contracting-cost hypothesis, firms with greater growth opportunities rely more heavily on short-term bank debt whereas larger firms are more likely to use long-term bank debt. In contrast, we find no strong support for either the tax or signaling hypotheses. 相似文献
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曲延英 《中央财经大学学报》2003,(6):42-45
本首先从对信息披露制度的争论提出问题,然后以新兴古典经济学视角研究证券市场信息披露制度。股东与经理之间的分工导致信息不对称,为消除信息不对称、为减少股东与经理之间交易协调失灵的风险,需要证券市场信息披露制度。章最后从减少内生交易费用和限制外生交易费用的角度,指出我国信息披露制度应该完善的地方。 相似文献
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Because of imperfections in auditing technology, firms can successfully misrepresent financial reports. We offer a new mechanism, a sunshine rule, by which firms are required to publicize a management draft prior to the audited reports. If the final reports are materially different from the management's draft, the market penalizes both the firm and the manager. The proposal's effectiveness in eliminating earnings management, increasing the quality of the financial reports, and reducing the cost of the manager's incentives is illustrated in signaling games with perfect and imperfect information and a principal-agent model with perfect information. 相似文献
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