Missing quarterly earnings benchmarks, CEO cash compensation and institutional ownership

Research suggests that transient institutions, i.e., institutions with short-term investment horizon,make management focus on short-term earnings goals. This study examines incentive in terms of CEO cash compensation that explains why management concentrates on short-term earnings results when transient institutions hold high levels of ownership. Using quarterly consensus analysts＇ expectations as a proxy for short-term earnings benchmarks, the author finds that CEO cash compensation and the frequency with which management misses quarterly earnings benchmarks in a year （MISSNUMt） are more strongly negatively associated in firms with high transient institutional ownership than in firms with low transient institutional ownership, suggesting that transient institutions strengthen the inverse relation between CEO cash pay and missing short-term earnings benchmarks and hence increase pressure on management in terms of cash pay for short-term results. Moreover, the author shows that change in CEO cash compensation is positively associated with change in transient institutional ownership, consistent with the idea that selling shares by transient institutions influences the boards of portfolio firms in CEO cash compensation decision. This study contributes to the governance literature and is relevant to business managers by providing additional evidence that transient institutions provide less patient capital and may not benefit long-run firm value creation.     

Can excess bring success? CEO compensation and the psychological contract

Strategic human resource management involves creating and maintaining employee skills as well as encouraging employees to perform at their maximum. Both require developing the appropriate psychological contract between the organization and the employee [Human Resource Management Review 8 (1998) 265]. This is no less true for the chief executive officer (CEO), who plays a major role in creating organizational culture. Trust is a critical component in the success of HR activities [Research Management Review 7 (1997) 389], yet the HR literature is relatively silent about how to encourage CEOs to perform trust-generating behaviors. Research on psychological contracts suggests that in order to encourage trust-based behavior, it is necessary to foster a relational psychological contract with employees [Rousseau, D. M., & McLean Parks, J. (1993). The contracts of individuals and organizations. In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior (pp. 1–43). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press]. However, the generally recommended CEO compensation practice (pay-for-performance) often risks violating the CEO's relational psychological contract. Conversely, the practice of providing golden parachutes (much criticized in the press) helps uphold the CEO's relational psychological contract. Implications are discussed.     

CEO compensation, shareholder rights, and corporate governance: An empirical investigation

We investigate whether CEO compensation is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our evidence reveals that CEOs of firms where shareholder rights are weak obtain more favorable compensation. It is also found that higher CEO pay is associated with a higher degree of potential managerial entrenchment. Additionally, CEOs of firms with governance provisions that offer them protection from takeovers enjoy more generous pay. We also examine the change in CEO compensation relative to the change in shareholders' wealth. The evidence shows that when there is an increase in shareholders' wealth, the CEO is able to obtain higher incremental compensation when shareholder rights are weak. On the contrary, when shareholders' wealth falls, there is no corresponding decline in CEO compensation when shareholder rights are weak. Given the empirical evidence, we argue that CEO compensation practices reflect rent expropriation rather than optimal contracting.     

A note on fourth-order risk aversion

Keenan et al. (J Risk Uncertain 24:264–277, 2002) introduced a measure of downside risk aversion (third-order risk aversion), and in Theorem 1, they showed four equivalent definitions of increased downside risk aversion. This result is thought as a higher-order extension of Theorem 3 in Diamond et al. (J Econ Theory 8:337–360, 1974). We consider fourth-order risk aversion and show four equivalent definitions of increased fourth-order risk aversion. Our result is thought as a higher-order extension of Theorem 1 in Keenan et al. (2002).     

企业破产清算内部控制的风险预警研究

破产清算是企业的特殊状态。本文在研究企业破产清算内部控制的基础上,利用风险管理的理论和方法,尝试构建了集风险识别、风险评估、风险应对和风险监控于一体的企业破产清算内部控制的风险预警机制。     

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and CEO tenure,turnover, and risk aversion

Using a sample of CEO turnover from 1999 to 2005, we find that CEOs become significantly more risk averse following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SOX. Their increased risk aversion may serve as an explanation for why CEO tenure is not significantly shortened and forced CEO turnover is not more likely post-SOX, as we document in this paper. In addition, we provide evidence that financial restatements have some effects on CEO tenure and the probability of forced CEO turnover. This may be due to intensified monitoring activities by the board and the financial press in the post-SOX era, but we cannot contribute all of it to SOX. In some occasions, SOX seems to weaken the effect of board monitoring on CEO tenure and the effect of firm performance on CEO risk aversion. Though the increased monitoring level post-SOX contribute to the increased CEO risk aversion, little impact is found from the SOX-mandated accuracy and transparency of financial reporting.     

股权结构、债务约束与高管薪酬——以2008—2013年上市公司为例

与西方经济环境不同,中国上市公司向来存在大股东控制、债务软约束的治理环境。在这样的治理环境中,股东与管理层、大股东与小股东、股东与债权人之间的代理关系集中在公司高管层的激励与约束上。本文在控制了业绩、规模、行业等因素后,研究了大股东控制程度、财务杠杆水平等如何影响\"货币薪酬+持股水平\"这个薪酬包的结构与水平,且这种影响有些存在非线性关系。     

对知识员工的薪酬管理体系研究

作者通过对知识员工的特点及其薪酬管理现状的分析,来探讨如何建立知识员工的薪酬管理体系,提出了对知识员工的长短期激励相结合等基本薪酬原则,实施全面薪酬战略,薪酬结构宽带化,以及团队薪酬等薪酬策略。     

基于用水主体的地下水补偿费征收研究

文章首先提出地下水补偿概念和范围,并根据用水主体提出相应的理论和现实补偿计算方法,最后提出相关的政策与建议。文章重点分析工业用水主体地下水补偿费的开征,提出从本量利的角度考察地下水补偿费征收界定,同时,分析影响地下水补偿费的经济因素。另外,结合我国工业企业的承受力,确定我国工业企业地下水补偿费的可接受范围。     

路径与选择:薪酬管理机制的完善

薪酬的功能主要体现在维持保障、激励员工、优化劳动力资源配置等方面。文章针对我国薪酬管理制度的现存问题,提出了相关对策建议。     

投资期权对经理薪酬的影响分析

文章对2004年我国853家上市公司的数据进行回归检验,分析投资期权对经理薪酬的影响效果。结果显示,相对于低IOS的企业,高IOS的企业经理能够获得更多的薪酬。     

经营者薪酬：西方国家的实践及对中国国有企业改革的启示

本文从薪酬水平、薪酬结构、薪酬的影响因素等方面回顾了美国和其他西方国家CEO薪酬的实践,并在此基础上,分析了我国国有企业在经营者薪酬激励问题上存在的问题及在改革中应如何借鉴相应的经验和教训。     

浅谈低压无功补偿在6300kVA硅铁炉中的应用

通过低压无功补偿设备在6.3 MVA半封闭硅铁合金电炉上的应用,达到了提高电炉功率因数及产能,同时改善电炉各项经济技术指标的目的。     

我国上市公司高管薪酬契约研究

文章分析了我国上市公司高管薪酬契约问题,并从公司治理角度提出改进薪酬契约设计的相关建议。     

从国内外企业高管薪酬对比看国企高管薪酬激励机制

从建国以来,我国的高管薪酬经历了一个漫长的发展历程,逐渐与世界接轨,但是国有企业作为一个特殊的主体,其薪酬结构还存在一定的问题。本文通过对美国、日本等国家高管薪酬机构的介绍,对比分析中国国企高管薪酬激励现状,根据国外的启示阐述了国企高管薪酬设计的原则与要点。     

基于土地保障功能的征地补偿测算

在分析传统征地补偿政策的基础上,结合南京市的具体调查数据,指出传统思路的缺陷和主要问题,并提出了以土地保障功能为导向的征地补偿新思路.     

电容储能补偿装置的分析计算与设计安装

针对高压配电系统发生故障、直流控制电源失压的情况下,保护回路和跳闸线圈不能可靠动作的问题,通过对实际进行分析计算,采用安装一套电容储能补偿装置的方法,有效地解决了上述问题,提高了保护回路动作的可靠性,避免了事故扩大。     

产品市场竞争、代理成本及代理效率：一个经验分析

文章以我国2004-2005年深沪两市上市公司为样本,检验我国产品市场竞争与代理成本及代理效率之间的经验关系。研究发现:产品市场竞争能够有效降低企业代理成本,提高企业代理效率,并且对于我国国有企业作用效果尤其显著。     

A note on the relation between the equity risk premium and the term structure

We show that nonlinearity in the relation between the equity premium and the slope of the term structure has two dimensions, namely asymmetry between positively and negatively sloped term structures, and regime switching. Asymmetry is uncovered only if volatility regime switching is allowed in equity premium dynamics. Predictive power for the equity premium arises only from the positively sloped term structure, and only in periods of low volatility of the equity premium.