Training For Older Managers

Peter Warr, Director of the MRC/ESRC Social and Applied Psychology Unit and a member of the ESRC Centre for Economic Performance, draws upon the Labour Force Survey and a study of members of the Institute of Management to provide detailed information about the incidence and duration of training undertaken by managers at different ages. In the context of projected ageing of the working population, he makes recommendations at three levels: encouraging adaptability through organisational norms, developing and applying training procedures which are effective for older learners, and the creation of national training targets for managers.     

Credit claiming

We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who work in a team. The public observes the organization’s performance, but not the separate contribution of the leader or of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low ability.JEL Classification: M5Björn Segendorff gratefully acknowledge financial support from The Swedish Council for Research in Humanities and Social Sciences (HSFR, F0357/97). We are also grateful for comments by an anonymous referee.     

Fisher's Introductory Text

A bstract .   In this essay, James Tobin discusses Fisher's Elementary Principles of Economics (1912 ). This essay was first published in the American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings , 87 (May 1997): pp. 430–432. We are grateful to the American Economic Association for permission to republish this essay.     

The influence of co-location in higher education institutions on small firms’ perspectives of knowledge transfer

Since 1980, the UK has experienced a dramatic growth in firms and employment in information–intensive business services, such as management consultancy and market research. Recent expansion of new and small firms operating in these sectors is the focus of a major ESRC–sponsored research project currently under way at Cambridge University Small Business Research Centre.

Small business service firms are able to compete successfully with large firms due to the imperfect nature of the market which characterizes business services demand and supply, together with specialization of expertise. The success of small business service firms depends on informal person–to–person networks, word–of–mouth recommendation and repeal business based on successful earlier assignments or personal contacts acquired, for example, while working in a large consultancy or market research company. This paper examines the types of networks utilized by small business service firms and argues that two distinct types exist: demand– and supply–related networks; the former involves links with clients, the latter links and co–operation between complementary small business service firms.     

An exploration of older worker flexible working arrangements in smaller firms

This article explores flexible working arrangements (FWAs) for older workers in smaller UK firms. We address three questions: how far older workers need and value FWAs, the type of FWAs they need, and whether smaller firms can offer these FWAs. We draw on 46 semi‐structured interviews from six smaller case study firms to present a qualitative exploration of both owner‐manager and (under‐researched) worker perspectives. We evidence the offer and importance of temporal and work‐role FWAs, together with the use of i‐deals and ad hoc FWAs in meeting the needs of this diverse group. We make three contributions: first, theoretically, in arguing for an extended definition of FWAs and understanding formality of offer; second, to practice, in highlighting FWA mechanisms appropriate to older workers; third, to policy, in questioning the effectiveness of both the business case approach to older worker FWAs in smaller firms and policy's positioning of older workers as a homogeneous group.     

Characterizing neutrality in the voluntary contribution mechanism

When public goods are provided by voluntary contributions, redistribution of initial holdings among an unchanged set of contributors will not alter the Nash equilibrium allocation.Constraint invariance, where a participant faces the same class of constraints even after her endowment is changed, impliesglobal neutrality under a generalized Nash equilibrium concept. Geometrically,path invariance, where the best response path does not move even after the endowment change, is equivalent to global neutrality assuming a sufficiently rich class of economies. We thank Shinji Ohseto, Hiroaki Osana and Stephen Turnbull for their comments. We are also grateful to an anonymous referee and an associate editor for their comments and suggestion. Research was partially supported by the Nomura Foundation for the Social Sciences and the Grant in Aid for General Research 03803008 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of Japan.     

Spatial social networks

We introduce a spatial cost topology in the network formation model analyzed by Jackson and Wolinsky, Journal of Economic Theory (1996), 71: 44–74. This cost topology might represent geographical, social, or individual differences. It describes variable costs of establishing social network connections. Participants form links based on a cost-benefit analysis. We examine the pairwise stable networks within this spatial environment. Incentives vary enough to show a rich pattern of emerging behavior. We also investigate the subgame perfect implementation of pairwise stable and efficient networks. We construct a multistage extensive form game that describes the formation of links in our spatial environment. Finally, we identify the conditions under which the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these network formation games are stable. We are very grateful for the constructive comments of Matt Jackson and an anonymous referee. We also like to thank Vince Crawford, Marco Slikker, Edward Droste, Hans Haller, Dimitrios Diamantaras, and Sudipta Sarangi for comments on previous drafts of this paper.We acknowledge Jay Hogan for his programming support. Part of this research was done while visiting the CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands.Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Resrarch (NWO), grant B46-390, is gratefully acknowledged.-->,     

Link bidding in laboratory networks

This paper presents the results of laboratory experiments that explore the network formation process. Performances of three institutions, each derived from theoretical models found in the literature, are compared. All three institutions are found to generate similar levels of efficiency. In hospitable environments, the institutions achieve 85% efficiency, but all three fail to generate any positive surplus when stress tested.Received: 28 May 2002, Accepted: 14 March 2003, JEL Classification: A14, C70, C90, D20The authors wish to thank the International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics for financial support in the form of subject payment money. This work has greatly benefited from comments by an anonymous referee, Rob Gilles, participants in the Social Network session at the 2001 Southern Economic Association Meetings, and seminar participants at the University of Arkansas.     

Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons

We consider the problem of the tragedy of commons in cooperative production economies, and propose a mechanism to resolve this tragedy, taking into account that the coordinator cannot perfectly monitor each agent’s labor skill and each agent may have an incentive to overstate as well as understate his own skill. Even in such a situation, the mechanism implements the proportional solution (Roemer in Soc Philos Policy 6:74–92, 1989 and Roemer and Silvestre in J Econ Theory 59:426–444, 1993) in Nash and strong equilibria when it is played as a normal form game. Moreover, the mechanism triply implements the solution in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong equilibria when it is played as a two-stage extensive form game. We are greatly thankful to Semi Koray, William Thomson, and an anonymous referee of this journal for their concrete and helpful comments on improving the paper. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Japanese Economic Association held at Hitotsubashi University in October 2001 and at the Conference on Economic Design held at NYU in July 2002. We are grateful to Takehiko Yamato for his useful comments in the former conference. We are also thankful to Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Kotaro Suzumura, and Yoshikatsu Tatamitani for their kind comments.     

Monopsonistic competition for the “best” workers

In this paper we analyse an economy where firms use labour as the only production factor, with constant return to scale. We suppose that jobs differ in their non-wage characteristics so each firm has monopsonistic power. In particular, we suppose that workers are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity. Then, each firm has incentives to offer higher wages in order to recruit the most productive workers. Competition among firms leads to a symmetric equilibrium wage, which is higher than the reservation wage, and to involuntary unemployment for the less productive workers, who are willing to work at the current wage but are not hired because their productivity is lower than the wage level. If firms have no institutional constraint on paying lower wages for the same job, an endogenous labour market segmentation emerges.     

Intangible investment in people and productivity

Organizational activity, information and communication technology work, and research and development (R&D) can be classified as work that creates intangible capital. We measure the returns to these three types of labor input by accounting for differences in their productivity compared with other labor inputs using Finnish firm-level data from 1998 to 2008. We apply a novel idea to use hiring as one proxy for productivity and demand shocks. We find that organizational workers increase total factor productivity and improve the profitability of high-productivity firms. R&D workers account for a large share of intangible capital; however, the returns to R&D are low. Investments in organizational competence are more likely to result in more rapid productivity growth. Firms with performance-related pay or domestically owned firms with extensive foreign activities have been among the highest performers with respect to the use of organizational work.     

Informal employment and the earnings of home-based home care workers in the United States

Informal employment continues to exist in parallel with formal employment among the US home-based home care workers and undermines the workers' economic security. This study examines the extent to which the earnings of the US home-based home care workers are affected by informal employment arrangements and state labour policies designed to benefit low-wage home care workers. Using a sample of 1,318 home-based home care workers from the 2017 and 2018 Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey, this study found that (i) informally employed home-based home care workers had a 9% reduction in annual earnings and that (ii) their earnings were not improved by generous state minimum wages and Domestic Workers' Bill of Rights while the earnings of agency employees were. The findings highlight the importance of strong enforcement of labour standards for informally employed home care workers in the United States.     

Dating Business-Cycle turning points

This paper presents a logit model for dating business-cycle turning points. The regressors are monthly series from the Business Cycle Indicators database of the Conference Board. Dividing the sample period into a subset for model initialization (1959∶9–1970∶12) and a subset for testing (1971∶1–2003∶12) yields a chronology that is nearly identical to that established by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). However, the recognition lag is less than four months, in contrast to an average of more than eleven months for the official chronology. (JEL E320) The author is grateful for comments by an anonymous referee.     

Litigation Risk and Corporate Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Two Quasi-Natural Experiments

Abstract

We examine the effect of litigation risk on corporate voluntary disclosure using two quasi-natural experiments, which have substantial and opposing impacts on the litigation risk of firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit. We find that firms in the Ninth Circuit decrease (increase) the quantity and quality of their voluntary disclosure, relative to control firms, when their litigation risk is lowered (elevated). The pre-treatment test shows an indistinguishable trend between treatment and control firms. A battery of robustness checks indicates that our results are not driven by alternative explanations. We hypothesize and find that the impact of litigation risk is more pronounced when firms have bad news and that firms are more likely to preempt bad news through voluntary disclosures when litigation risk is elevated. Overall, results from both experiments suggest that litigation risk causally increases corporate voluntary disclosure.     

Foreign remedies for local difficulties: the case of three Scottish manufacturing firms

Literature on Japanese transplant manufacturing firms in the automotive sector often emphasise the importance placed on attitude as opposed to skills in the hiring decisions for line workers. In this paper, a case study of one second-tier components supplier for a major Japanese automotive assembler in the Midwestern United States provides the opinions of senior managers and human resource associates regarding recruitment and selection practices. In-depth interviews, carried out over a two-week period in August 2000, are used to develop an understanding of the recruitment and selection process for line workers as well as to investigate the desired skills and value of previous Japanese experience. Results of the case study analysis are compared with two models from the literature: (1) a model of recruitment and selection at Japanese automotive-related firms in Japan and (2) a model of recruitment and selection at Japanese transplant automotive-related firms abroad. Deviations from the two models point not to a new paradigm of ‘second-generation’ Japanese transplants – those that have moved into regions quite familiar with Japanese firms and related management and production methods – but rather to overall weaknesses in the stereotypical models. Managerial opinions within the case study firm place limited value on familiarity with a Japanese environment, considering such experience secondary to attitudes and work ethics that are in line with the philosophy of the case study firm.     

Timeliness of Annual Report Releases and Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements in an Emerging Capital Market: The Case of China

This paper examines the relation between firm performance and the timing of annual report releases in an emerging capital market. Based on the population of listed Chinese firms with A-shares for 1994-1997, we find that good news firms release their annual reports earlier than bad news firms, and loss firms release their annual reports the latest. Moreover, consistent with Chambers and Penman (1984) and Begley and Fischer (1998), these firms unexpectedly accelerate the release of good news and delay the disclosure of bad news relative to their previous reporting pattern. We also observe a significant price reaction to the annual earnings announcements for both early (good news) and late (bad news) reporting firms. Similar results are found for those A-share firms which have also issued B- or H-shares to foreign investors. Our study documents a systematic timing pattern of annual report disclosures, which is useful for investors to predict future earnings, especially in anticipating bad news in China's emerging market where information about future earnings is very limited.     

Efficiency wages,wage comparison,and public sector budgeting

We develop a government decision model where efficiency wage mechanisms affect the allocation of resources between different public services. We show how the introduction of interdepartment wage relativities modifies the standard Solow wage setting conditions. We compare the outcome under centralised and decentralised wage setting, and show that a decentralised wage setting system creates a distortion. Finally, we discuss the possibility of elimination this distortion using alternative financing systems.Final version: 08 April 2003JEL Classification: H23, J45We are grateful to Jan E. Askildsen, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Agnar Sandmo, participants at conferences and seminars in Trondheim, Uppsala and Åsgårdstrand, and several anonymous referees for helpful comments. The second author is grateful to The Norwegian Research Council for financial support. The usual disclaimer applies.     

SMEs and public procurement policy

In this paper, we characterize an optimal procurement policy as a mechanism design problem when an allotment of the contract is available, i.e., when a government faces both SMEs and large firms for carrying out a heterogeneously divisible project. Our model allows us to analyze all procurement policies (set-asides, favoritism, non-discriminatory rules), taking into account both efficiency and distributive arguments and derive a normative framework. We show that set-asides are not generally optimal, whatever the industrial preferences of the government are, while the optimal preferential treatments of firms implies complex non-linear rules. We prove that the optimal policy can be implemented using a modified Vickrey-type auction. We also consider that the firms can reduce their cost by a non observable effort, and exhibit the specific impact of cost reduction incentives on the optimal policies.Received: 24 September 2001, JEL Classification: D44Pierre-HenriMorand : I am grateful to the anonymous referees for comments. The usualdisclaimer applies.     

Optimal money growth in a limited participation model with heterogeneous agents

This paper studies optimal money growth in a cash-in-advance production economy with heterogeneity in patience levels and know-how. We show that the rate of deflation suggested by the Friedman rule is limited by the subjective discount rate of the most patient agent in the economy. The output distortion due to cash-in-advance constraints on firms can completely be eliminated by means of the Friedman rule if and only if firms are run by the most patient agents.Received: 16 August 2003, Accepted: 22 March 2005, JEL Classification: D52, D90, E21, E41, E52Parts of this paper were completed while the first and second authors were visiting the University of York and Princeton University respectively. We are thankful for the hospitality of these institutions. The second author also acknowledges the hospitality and support of Bilkent University that he is currently visiting, the support from the Turkish Academy of Sciences in the framework of the ‘Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program’ (TUBA-GEBIP/2004), the grant awarded by the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) under the NATO Science Fellowship Program as well as the support from the Center for Economic Design of Bogaziçi University. This paper was presented in the ERC/METU Second International Conference on Economics, Ankara, September 1998, and at seminars in Bilkent, Bogaziçi and Ohio State Universities. We thank, in particular, Emre Alper, Sumru Altug, Huw Dixon, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Ivan Pastine, Murat Sertel and Alan Sutherland for useful comments. We also thank two anonymous referees for comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect that of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey.     

Acquisition of skills, labor subsidies, and agglomeration of firms

The paper develops an analytically solvable model of new economic geography in which agglomeration of firms is caused by workers' investment in the acquisition of skills. Skilled workers earn high wages and have a large demand for goods. Since firms are attracted towards the demand, they locate at proximity of skilled workers. More workers invest in the acquisition of skills when more firms ask for these skills. Consequently, partial or full agglomeration of firms may be the location equilibrium. We also show that a reduction in transport costs increases the regional governments' incentives to subsidize the acquisition of skills.