共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Kam-Chau Wong 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):177-188
Summary. We integrate and sharpen two characterizations of aggregate excess demand functions: we obtain Mas-Colell's (1977) equilibrium
invariance, and strengthen Geanakoplos' (1984) weakly concave utility functions to strictly concave ones. Our proofs modify
and extend Geanakoplos' utility-construction. We note two applications: a sharper characterization of equilibrium price sets
(cf. Mas-Colell (1977)), and a basis for the studies of computable economies (Richter and Wong (1996)).
Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: February 20, 1997 相似文献
2.
Summary. A single condition, limited arbitrage, is shown to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core in economies with any number of markets, finite or infinite, with or without short sales. This extends earlier results of Chichilnisky [8] for
finite economies. This unification of finite and infinite economies is achieved by proving that in Hilbert spaces limited
arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the compactness of the Pareto frontier. Limited arbitrage has also been shown to
be necessary and sufficient for a resolution of the social choice paradox [9], [10], [12], [13], [14].
Received: August 4, 1995; revised version: April 11, 1997 相似文献
3.
Anjan Mukherji 《Economic Theory》1997,10(3):509-520
Summary . The paper is concerned with the following question: in addition to local uniqueness, what other conditions must be imposed
to ensure global uniqueness of competitive equilibrium? The answer is provided within a standard framework involving excess
demand functions. Conditions are identified which have the nice property that they are true close to a regular equilibrium.
Uniqueness is established by considering an adjustment process and showing that under the mentioned conditions, every equilibrium
is locally asymptotically stable and moreover the process itself is globally stable; uniqueness follows from an Arrow and
Hahn (1971) result. Alternatively, the paper may be seen as identifying conditions under which there is a vectorfield satisfying
the requirements of an uniqueness result due to Dierker (1974).
Received: July 1, 1996; revised version October 7, 1996 相似文献
4.
Takashi Kamihigashi 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):103-122
Summary. This paper studies conditions under which the price of an asset is uniquely determined by its fundamental value – i.e., no
bubbles can arise – in Lucas-type asset pricing models with unbounded utility. After discussing Gilles and LeRoy's (1992)
example, we construct an example of a two-period, representative agent economy to demonstrate that bubbles can arise in a
standard model if utility is unbounded below, in which case the stochastic Euler equation may be violated. In an infinite
horizon framework, we show that bubbles cannot arise if the optimal sequence of asset holdings can be lowered uniformly without
incurring an infinite utility loss. Using this result, we develop conditions for the nonexistence of bubbles. The conditions
depend exclusively on the asymptotic behavior of marginal utility at zero and infinity. They are satisfied by many unbounded
utility functions, including the entire CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) class. The Appendix provides a complete market
version of our two-period example.
Received: January 22, 1996; revised version: February 18, 1997 相似文献
5.
Summary. We offer an alternative approach to the study of representability of choice behavior in a competitive framework that is based
on recent advances in utility theory (cf. Alcantud and Rodrí guez-Palmero (1999)). Our technique enables us to tackle this
classical problem efficiently in fairly general situations, thus obtaining alternative sufficient conditions as well as different
proofs and generalizations of prior results.
Received: July 14, 1999; revised version: February 15, 2001 相似文献
6.
Summary. We show that the set of balanced steady state (resp. golden rule) equilibria, parameterized by endowments, of stationary
overlapping-generations economies are smooth manifolds diffeomorphic to Euclidean spaces. These properties extend similar
properties of the Walrasian equilibria and enable one to apply the natural projection approach to the study of these equilibria.
Received: October 30, 1995; revised version: October 10, 1996 相似文献
7.
Summary. Convergence of the cores of finite economies to the set of Walrasian allocations as the number of agents grows has long been
taken as one of the basic tests of perfect competition. The present paper examines this test in the most natural model of
commodity differentiation: the commodity space is the space of nonnegative measures, endowed with the topology of weak convergence.
In Anderson and Zame [12], we gave counterexamples to core convergence in L
1, a space in which core convergence holds for replica economies and core equivalence holds for continuum economies; in addition,
we gave a core convergence theorem under the assumption that traders' utility functions exhibit uniformly vanishing marginal
utility at infinity. In this paper, we provide two core convergence results for the commodity differentiation model. A key
technical virtue of this space is that relatively large sets (in particular, closed norm-bounded sets) are compact. This permits
us to invoke a version of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem for compact subsets of an infinite-dimensional space. We show that,
for sufficiently large economies in which endowments come from a norm bounded set, preferences satisfy an equidesirability
condition, and either (i) preferences exhibit uniformly bounded marginal rates of substitution or (ii) endowments come from
an order-bounded set, core allocations can be approximately decentralized by prices.
Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: January 14, 1997 相似文献
8.
Summary. This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning
to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a
sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment.
Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: May 28, 1997 相似文献
9.
Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Summary. Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit
auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria
in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria
for the uniform price auction.
Received: July 31, 1995; revised version: May 28, 1997 相似文献
10.
Venkatesh Bala 《Economic Theory》1997,10(3):521-530
Summary . This note extends the example of Gale (1963) by considering the continuous time tatonnement process for a class of two agent,
two commodity exchange economies, parametrized by a number μ∈(0,1). We demonstrate that as the parameter passes a threshold
value μ* the unique, globally stable competitive equilibrium loses local stability while two new locally stable equilibria appear.
Intuitively, as μ increases the income effect become increasingly more important relative to substitution effect, and eventually
overwhelms the latter. As the parameter μ approaches 1, the economy tends to the example considered by Gale, as does the limiting
behavior of the tatonnement.
Received: February 28, 1996; revised version August 5, 1996 相似文献
11.
Benyamin Shitovitz 《Economic Theory》1997,10(3):559-563
Summary. Using a mixed market model for analyzing imperfectly competitive economies, we maximize the oligopolists' Welfare Function,
given individual rationality and feasibility constraints. We prove that solutions belong to the core for a large class of
economies. This class includes, in particular, every monopoly having a single type of small traders. Note that all such solutions
yield the large trader, utility-wise, strictly more than at any monopoly solution, where the monopolist plays strategically,
and the ocean of small traders act as being as price-takers.
Received: March 4, 1996; revised version July 7, 1996 相似文献
12.
Summary. This paper studies the conditions for aggregation, portfolio separation and effective completeness of competitive allocations
in general equilibrium models with incomplete markets where agents have general preference and endowment distributions. We
show that these properties are distinct. Demands may aggregate yet may fail to exhibit fund separation and conversely. Fund
separation implies effective completeness while aggregation does not. The implications of these properties for the structure
of equilibria are discussed, and generalizations of the CAPM, the consumption CAPM and the CAPM with nonmarketed wealth emerge
from the analysis.
Received: September 12, 1996; revised version: November 7, 1996 相似文献
13.
Summary. We present a consistent pure-exchange general equilibrium model where agents may not be able to foresee all possible future
contingencies. In this context, even with nominal assets and complete asset markets, an equilibrium may not exist without
appropriate assumptions. Specific examples are provided.
An existence result is proved under the main assumption that there are sufficiently many states that all the agents foresee.
An intrinsic feature of the model is bankruptcy, which agents may involuntarily experience in the unforeseen states.
Received: April 23, 1997; revised version: May 19, 1997 相似文献
14.
Contest success functions: an extension 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Summary. This note extends the axiomatic characterization of the power success function in fair contests by Skaperdas (1996) to an unfair contest. We show that the results previously obtained are straightforward to generalize; the success function is uniquely characterized by Luces Choice Axiom (implying independence of irrelevant alternatives) and homogeneity of degree zero.Received: July 1, 1996; revised version: October 30, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
15.
Summary. The main requirements for equivalence of the core of an economy and the Walrasian equilibrium allocations are largeness and the freedom to form almost arbitrary coalitions in the Edgeworthian barter processes. We investigate whether constraints on coalition formation and coalitional barter alter these insights. Our notion of the semi-core imposes a restriction on the collection of formable coalitions that does not affect the fundamental equivalence property. Using our concept of the contract-core we show that additional constraints on coalitional barter can only be alleviated within an environment with sufficiently many formable coalitions: besides a contract-core equivalence theorem we show certain non-equivalence results.Received: December 11, 1995; revised version: September 17, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date. 相似文献
16.
Summary. We consider the problem of reallocating the total initial endowments of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with
single-peaked preferences. With the uniform reallocation rule we propose a solution which satisfies many appealing properties,
describing the effect of population and endowment variations on the outcome. The central properties which are studied in this
context are population monotonicity, bilateral consistency, (endowment) monotonicity and (endowment) strategy-proofness.
Furthermore, the uniform reallocation rule is Pareto optimal and satisfies several equity conditions, e.g., equal-treatment
and envy-freeness. We study the trade-off between properties concerning variation and properties concerning equity. Furthermore,
we provide several characterizations of the uniform reallocation rule based on these properties.
Received: August 29, 1995; revised version June 26, 1996 相似文献
17.
James A. Dearden 《Economic Theory》1998,12(1):189-198
Summary. A group of individuals meet to share the cost and determine output allocations of a partial-excludable public good. We demonstrate
that, for general cost functions and preferences that satisfy the Spence-Mirlees sorting condition, the serial cost-sharing
formula (Moulin, 1994) has remarkable incentive properties. First, a direct economic mechanism that uses the serial formula is coalition strategy-proof, envy-free and satisfies the stand-alone property.
Second, the serial mechanism involves partial exclusion, which is important for the reduction of the free-rider problem.
Received: June 10, 1996; revised version; February 11, 1997 相似文献
18.
Summary. This paper reports on the use of laboratory experimental techniques to create relatively complete economic systems. The creation
of these market systems reflects a first attempt to explore the nature of inherently interdependent environments and to assess
the ability of simultaneous equations equilibrium models like the classical static general competitive equilibrium model,
to predict aspects of system behaviors. In addition, the impact of the quantity of a fiat money was studied. The economies
were successfully created. Classical models capture much of what was observed.
Received: May 21, 1996; revised version: May 21, 1997 相似文献
19.
Summary. This paper formulates a model of commodity money that circulates by tale, and applies it to a variety of situations, some
of which seem to confirm, and others to contradict, `Gresham's Law'. We analyze how debasements could prompt decisions of
citizens voluntarily to participate in recoinages that subjected them to seigniorage taxes.
Received: December 19, 1994; revised version August 1, 1996 相似文献
20.
Recursive utility and preferences for information 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Costis Skiadas 《Economic Theory》1998,12(2):293-312
Summary. This paper presents an axiomatic foundation for recursive utility that captures the role of the timing of resolution of uncertainty
without relying on exogenously specified objective beliefs. Two main representation results are proved. In the first one,
future utility enters the recursion through the type of general aggregators considered in Skiadas (1997a), and as a result
the formulation is purely ordinal and free of any probabilities. In the second representation these aggregators are conditional
expectations relative to subjective beliefs. A new recursive representation incorporating disappointment aversion is also
suggested. The main methodological innovation of the paper derives from the fact that the basic objects of choice are taken
to be pairs of state-contingent consumption plans and information filtrations, rather than the temporal (objective) lotteries
of the existing literature. It is shown that this approach has the additional benefit of being directly applicable to the
continuous-time version of recursive utility developed by Duffie and Epstein (1992).
Received: February 18, 1997; revised version: July 18, 1997 相似文献