Sudden crash or long torture: The timing of market reactions to operational loss events

An emerging literature investigating market responses to operational loss announcements concludes that financial markets tend usually to overreact to loss events. This overreaction is commonly interpreted as reputational damage. We revisit this issue by focusing on the timing of markets’ reactions and highlight two variables: the start and the speed of stock markets’ responses. It appears that when operational losses are caused by internal fraud the negative market reaction materializes earlier and faster. Industry sectors and prevailing market conditions influence the timing of market reactions as well. Our empirical findings reveal moreover that a higher initial grading of the company is associated with a later stock market reaction to the announcement. While the relative magnitude and the length of markets’ overreactions is positively correlated to the concomitant downgrading our study shows that overreaction magnitudes are also strongly correlated to our estimate of the total duration of the reaction.     

The determinants of reputational risk in the banking sector

What determines reputational loss following operational losses in banking? The purpose of this paper is to empirically address this question. We estimate the reputational risk for a large sample of banks in Europe and the US between 2003 and 2008. We have two main results. First, we provide evidence that there is the probability that reputational damage increases as profits and size increase. Second, we show that a higher level of capital invested and intangible assets reduce the probability of reputational damage.     

The market value impact of operational loss events for US banks and insurers

This paper conducts an event study analysis of the impact of operational loss events on the market values of banks and insurance companies, using the OpVar database. We focus on financial institutions because of the increased market and regulatory scrutiny of operational losses in these industries. The analysis covers all publicly reported banking and insurance operational risk events affecting publicly traded US institutions from 1978 to 2003 that caused operational losses of at least $10 million – a total of 403 bank events and 89 insurance company events. The results reveal a strong, statistically significant negative stock price reaction to announcements of operational loss events. On average, the market value response is larger for insurers than for banks. Moreover, the market value loss significantly exceeds the amount of the operational loss reported, implying that such losses convey adverse implications about future cash flows. Losses are proportionately larger for institutions with higher Tobin’s Q ratios, implying that operational loss events are more costly in market value terms for firms with strong growth prospects.     

Tunneling or propping: Evidence from connected transactions in China

Friedman et al. (2003) develop a model in which, in equilibrium, controlling shareholders may choose either tunneling or propping of their listed companies depending on the magnitude of an adverse shock and the magnitude of the private benefits of control. In this paper, we employ connected transaction data from China to test the implications of their model. We hypothesize that, when listed companies are financially healthy (in financial distress), their controlling shareholders are more likely to conduct connected transactions to tunnel (prop up) their listed companies and the market reacts unfavorably (favorably) to the announcement of these transactions. Our empirical findings strongly support our hypotheses. We also find that all of the transaction types in our sample can be used for tunneling or propping depending on different financial situations of the firms. Finally, political connection is negatively associated with the announcement effect. Overall, our analysis supports Friedman et al.'s (2003) model by furnishing clear evidence for propping and tunneling to occur in the same company but at different times.     

Quantitative measures of operational risk: an application to funds management

Basel II defines operational risk as the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people or systems or from external events. In the past decade, there have appeared a number of quantitative approaches to measuring this risk, approaches that abstract from market risk and reputational risk. The challenge is to develop operational risk measures in an asset management context where there is only limited information available about the incidence and severity of operational loss events. We survey different approaches to this problem and argue that managing this risk through operational due diligence is a source of alpha in this funds management context.     

Cyclicality in catastrophic and operational risk measurements

Using equity returns for financial institutions we estimate both catastrophic and operational risk measures over the period 1973–2003. We find evidence of cyclical components in both the catastrophic and operational risk measures obtained from the generalized Pareto distribution and the skewed generalized error distribution. Our new, comprehensive approach to measuring operational risk shows that approximately 18% of financial institutions’ returns represent compensation for operational risk. However, depository institutions are exposed to operational risk levels that average 39% of the overall equity risk premium. Moreover, operational risk events are more likely to be the cause of large unexpected catastrophic losses, although when they occur, the losses are smaller than those resulting from a combination of market risk, credit risk or other risk events.     

The differential impact of corporate blockchain-development as conditioned by sentiment and financial desperation

This paper investigates how companies can utilise Twitter social media-derived sentiment as a method of generating short-term corporate value from statements based on initiated blockchain-development. Results indicate that investors were subjected to a very sophisticated form of asymmetric information designed to propel sentiment and market euphoria, that translates into increased access to leverage on the part of speculative firms. Technological-development firms are found to financially behave in a profoundly different fashion to reactionary-driven firms which have no background in ICT technological development, and who experience an estimated increased one-year probability of default of 170 bps. Rating agencies are found to have under-estimated the risk on-boarded by these speculative firms, failing to identify that they should be placed under an increased degree of scrutiny. Unfiltered market sentiment information, regulatory unpreparedness and mis-pricing by trusted market observers has resulted in a situation where investors and lenders have been compromised by direct exposure to an asset class becoming known for law-breaking activity, financial losses and frequent reputational damage.     

The role of the media in corporate governance: Do the media influence managers' capital allocation decisions?

Using 636 large acquisition attempts that are accompanied by a negative stock price reaction at their announcement (“value-reducing acquisition attempts”) from 1990 to 2010, we find that, in deciding whether to abandon a value-reducing acquisition attempt, managers' sensitivity to the firm's stock price reaction at the announcement is influenced by the level and the tone of media attention to the proposed transaction. We interpret the results to imply that managers have reputational capital at risk in making corporate capital allocation decisions and that the level and tone of media attention heighten the impact of a value-reducing acquisition on the managers' reputational capital. To the extent that value-reducing acquisition attempts are more likely to be abandoned, the media can play a role in aligning managers' and shareholders' interests.     

Loan underpricing and the provision of merger advisory services

This paper investigates the primary and secondary syndicated bank loan market to analyze the effect on pricing when the financial institution commingles syndicated lending with merger advisory services. In particular, we investigate the connection between the acquirer’s choice of financial advisor in a merger and future financing commitments. We find evidence of underpricing of syndicated bank loans in both the primary and secondary market. In the primary market, we show that non-acquisition loans granted by merger advisors to acquiring firms after the merger announcement date are charged a lower all-in-spread relative to acquisition loans if there has been a prior lending relationship. Consistent with this finding, we find that syndicated bank loans for non-acquisition purposes arranged by the acquirer’s advisor after the merger announcement date trade in the secondary market at a significant discount. Since the terms on these non-acquisition loans are not set upon merger announcement, they are most subject to risk shifting and underpricing agency problems. These findings offer evidence consistent with the existence of loss leader and potentially conflicted loans (priced at below-market terms) that are offered by the acquirer’s relationship bank advisor in order to win merger advisory business.     

How loss averse are investors in financial markets?

We investigate loss aversion in financial markets using a typical asset allocation problem. Our theoretical and empirical results show that investors in financial markets are more loss averse than assumed in the literature. Moreover, loss aversion changes depending on market conditions; investors become far more loss averse during bull markets than during bear markets, indicating their more profound disutility for losses when others enjoy gains. Contrary to most previous results, we find that investors are more sensitive to changes in losses than changes in gains.     

The ex-date impact of special dividend announcements: A note

This study examines the impact of special dividend announcements for a sample of Australian companies on the ex date of the special dividend. This study documents that the drop-off ratio is significantly greater for special dividends that participate in DRPs than non-DRPs. Further, it reveals that the drop-off ratio is greater for resources firms than for financial and industrial firms. Finally, a cross-sectional regression model reveals that the drop in price on the ex-date is significantly related to the announcement period price reaction, DRPs versus non-DRPs, size of the company, and special dividend per share.     

The post–announcement performance of dividend–changing companies: The dividend–signalling hypothesis revisited

This study revisits the dividend–signalling hypothesis by examining the post–announcement performance of U.K. companies which disclose dividend and earnings news to the capital market on the same day. For this purpose, we first analyse market–adjusted excess returns for three periods around the announcement and then examine the financial performance in the year of the announcement and in the subsequent five–year period. The near announcement excess returns and the announcement–year financial profiles provide strong evidence in support of the dividend–signalling hypothesis. However, in contrast to the predictions of the hypothesis, the longer–term results suggest that the companies which announce a reduction in both dividends and earnings (bad news companies) outperform their dividend–increasing counterparts.     

Distressed acquirers and the bright side of financial distress

Extant literature states that managers who fear the consequences of financial distress may inhibit investments in profitable opportunities. Here, we posit that the career and reputational damages that distress and potential default cause are large enough to align the interests of managers and shareholders thus improving investment decisions. We find that financially distressed firms see a 3.5% higher market reaction to the announcement of acquisitions than non-distressed firms. This effect is stronger for poorly governed firms, consistent with the hypothesis that the large reputational cost of failure incentivizes managers to act in the best interest of their firm.     

The reputational effects of analysts' stock recommendations and credit ratings: Evidence from operational risk announcements in the financial industry

This paper investigates whether more favorable stock recommendations and higher credit ratings serve as a reputational asset or reputational liability around reputation-damaging events. Analyzing the reputational effects of operational risk announcements incurred by financial institutions, we find that firms with a “Buy” stock recommendation or “Speculative Grade” credit rating are more likely to incur an equity-based reputational damage. In addition, firms with lower credit ratings incur a much more severe debt-based reputational damage. Moreover, credit ratings are more instrumental in mitigating the debt-based reputational damage caused by fraud incidents or incurred in non-banking activities. Furthermore, the misconduct of senior management could demolish the reputation of firms with less heterogeneous stock recommendations. Finally, credit ratings serve as an equity-based reputational asset in the short term but turn into an equity-based reputational liability in the long term. Overall, our analysis reveals that stock recommendations represent a reputational burden and credit ratings act as a reputational shield; however, the persistence and magnitude of such reputational effects are moderated by time and event characteristics.     

我国境内上市银行操作损失事件披露对市值的影响分析

近年来随着商业银行的损失事件不时出现,操作风险日益受到金融机构的广泛关注。本文通过收集我国境内上市的5家银行2002～2006年6月披露的308个事件的相关数据,运用Tobin#Q比率来测算企业绩效和公司成长性,从而验证操作风险损失事件披露对银行市值的影响。实证结果显示,上市银行的股价波动同操作风险损失事件的披露存在显著的负相关,而且市场价值的损失会显著高于操作事件自身金额;对于不同资质的上市银行,Tobin#Q比率高的银行,损失的比例也会偏高,这意味着对于高成长性银行,操作损失事件对市值的影响更大。     

How Much Do Corporate Defendants Really Lose? A New Verdict on the Reputation Loss Induced by Corporate Litigation

Using a novel sample of 83,260 lawsuits filed in US Federal District courts, we extend the results of prior studies investigating market value and reputational losses due to corporate misconduct. We examine alternative explanations for the loss in market value, such as media coverage, the expectation of subsequent litigation, and the defendant's willingness to settle, in addition to previously documented factors. Our results suggest that with the exception of securities litigation, this loss in market value can be attributed to these alternative explanations rather than to reputational consequences. This finding is confirmed by several indirect measures of reputation loss.     

Stockholder returns and international acquisitions of financial firms: An emphasis on banking

The wealth effects for shareholders of American financial firms involved in foreign acquisitions and also the wealth effects for shareholders of U.S. target firms acquired by foreign concerns are the topics of this study. The findings indicate that stockholders of U.S. bidding financial firms (and its subset of banks) earn neither abnormal gains nor suffer abnormal losses upon the announcement of an acquisition or regulatory approval. On the other hand, stockholders of U.S. target financial firms (and its subset of banks) earn significant abnormal profits at both the announcement of the proposed acquisition and the announcement of regulatory approval of the acquisition. The wealth effects for these two samples are also compared to samples in which both parties to the acquisition are U.S. firms. The research suggests that there is no significant difference in the size of the announcement gains or losses for either stockholders of the target or bidding firms based on whether the acquisition is foreign or domestic. These findings conflict with prior research which indicates that, for firms in general, stockholders of U.S. targets earn significantly greater wealth benefits when they are acquired by foreign firms than by domestic firms. Overall, these results are consistent with a competitive market for acquisitions of financial firms in which buyers do not earn or lose at the announcement of an acquisition, and in which abnormal gains are received only by the sellers.     

Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members

I use a sample of 409 companies that restated their earnings from 1997 to 2001 to examine penalties for outside directors, particularly audit committee members, when their companies experience accounting restatements. Penalties from lawsuits and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) actions are limited. However, directors experience significant labor market penalties. In the three years after the restatement, director turnover is 48% for firms that restate earnings downward, 33% for a performance‐matched sample, 28% for firms that restate upward, and only 18% for technical restatement firms. For firms that overstate earnings, the likelihood of director departure increases in restatement severity, particularly for audit committee directors. In addition, directors of these firms are no longer present in 25% of their positions on other boards. This loss is greater for audit committee members and for more severe restatements. A matched‐sample analysis confirms this result. Overall, the evidence is consistent with outside directors, especially audit committee members, bearing reputational costs for financial reporting failure.     

U.S. Banking Sector Operational Losses and the Macroeconomic Environment

Using supervisory data from large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), we find that BHCs incur more operational losses in adverse macroeconomic conditions driven significantly by the higher frequency and severity of tail events. Among different operational risk types, we find that losses from BHCs' failure to meet obligations to clients or from the design of their products are particularly countercyclical. We also show that larger and more leveraged BHCs have a higher macroeconomic sensitivity of operational risk. Overall, our findings provide new evidence regarding U.S. banking organizations' exposure to macroeconomic shocks with implications for risk management practices and supervisory policy.     

When LIBOR becomes LIEBOR: Reputational penalties and bank contagion

We study whether commonality of incentives and opportunity to commit fraud trigger reputational contagion from culpable firms to nonculpable firms. Relying on a sample of 30 banks involved in fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and a control sample of 30 banks, we find that banks' reputations suffered substantial damage upon the announcement of their involvement in the scandal. We also document reputational contagion spread from banks that manipulated LIBOR to banks that shared the same incentives and opportunity to commit the fraud. The reputational contagion is more pronounced for large derivatives dealers who have had the strongest incentive to commit the fraud.