Liquidity-saving mechanisms

This paper studies the incentives of participants in a real-time gross settlement system with and without the addition of a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM). Participants in the model face a liquidity shock and different costs for delaying payments. They trade off the cost of delaying a payment against the cost of borrowing liquidity from the central bank. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the design of an LSM has important implications for welfare. In particular, parameters determine whether the addition of an LSM increases or decreases welfare.     

Information asymmetries and spillover risk in settlement systems

I show how information asymmetries between agents in different settlement systems can increase the risk that a problem in one may spill over to another. I focus on the strategic behavior of participants who operate in multiple systems as they choose how best to manage their liquidity across the systems. In the event of an operational shock in one system, these participants may continue to make payments in order to avoid delay costs, thereby risking a liquidity sink, if they believe they can recycle liquidity from the other, unaffected system. They are more likely to risk a liquidity sink if they believe banks in the unaffected system will continue making payments early, unaware of the operational problem. I show that a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM) in one system may reduce the probability of spillover into the other; in this sense, I identify a positive externality from the introduction of an LSM.     

Liquidity-saving mechanisms in collateral-based RTGS payment systems

This paper studies banks’ incentives regarding the timing of payment submissions in a collateral-based RTGS payment system and how these incentives change with the introduction of a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM). We show that an LSM allows banks to economise on collateral while also providing incentives to submit payments earlier. This is because in our model an LSM allows payments to be matched and offset in real time without any or very minimal funds. Under a collateral-based RTGS payment system, introduction of the LSM always improves welfare. The result contrasts with earlier work, which shows that under a fee-based RTGS system, the introduction of an LSM in some circumstances may reduce welfare.     

Measuring aggregate risk: Can we robustly identify asset-price boom–bust cycles?

We investigate the extent to which it is possible to detect asset-price booms and banking crises according to alternative identification strategies and we assess their robustness. We find some evidence that house price-booms are more likely to turn into costly recession or to trigger a banking crisis than stock-price booms. Resorting both to a non-parametric approach and a discrete-choice (logit) model, we analyze the ability of a wide set of indicators to robustly explain costly asset-price booms. According to our results, real long-term interest rates and real stock prices tend to increase the probability of a costly housing-price boom, whereas real GDP tends to increase the probability of a costly stock-price boom. Interestingly, the credit-to-GDP gap indicator, sometimes put forward in the literature as a key reference for setting countercyclical capital buffers, does not seem to be a robust leading indicator of costly booms or banking crises.     

Identifying the balance sheet and the lending channels of monetary transmission: A loan-level analysis

We make a novel attempt at comparing the strength of the lending and balance sheet channels of monetary transmission. To make this comparison, we use loan-level data to determine how borrower balance sheets and bank liquidity are related to bank lending decisions and how monetary policy can affect these relationships. The key innovation in this paper is the use of loan-level data. This enables us to measure the independent effects of the two channels and directly account for borrower balance sheets and lender liquidity instead of using proxies. Our results show that the balance sheet channel is the main mechanism through which monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the economy and that the lending channel does not play a significant role.     

Another Example of a Credit System that Co-Exists with Money

We study an economy in which exchange occurs pairwise, there is no commitment, and anonymous agents choose between random monetary trade or deterministic credit trade. To accomplish the latter, agents can exploit a costly technology that allows limited record-keeping, and enforcement. An equilibrium with money and credit is shown to exist if the cost of using the technology is sufficiently small. Anonymity, record-keeping, and enforcement limitations also permit some incidence of default, in equilibrium.     

The Effects of Bank Lending in an Open Economy

This article assesses the effects of bank lending in a small open economy with a floating exchange rate and sticky prices. A theoretical model with costly financial intermediation is developed for New Zealand. The results show that the long-run and business cycle effects of bank lending are small. Whether firms borrow from financial intermediaries or public debt markets is unlikely to affect economic activity. In other words, the financial structure, or degree to which a country's financial system is intermediary based or market based, does not matter.     

Customer anger at price increases, changes in the frequency of price adjustment and monetary policy

While firms claim to be concerned with consumer reactions to price increases, these often do not cause large reductions in purchases. The model developed here fits this by letting consumers react negatively only when they become convinced that prices are unfair. This can explain price rigidity, though its implications are not identical to those of existing models of costly price adjustment. In particular, the frequency of price adjustment can depend on economy-wide variables observed by consumers. This has implications for the effects of monetary policy and can explain why inflation does not fall immediately after a monetary tightening.     

Optimal pricing of payment services

Payments are increasingly being made with payment cards despite the fact that the cost of clearing a card payment usually exceeds the cost of transferring cash. We examine this puzzle through the lens of monetary theory. We consider the design of an optimal card-based payment system when cash is available as an alternative means of payment. We find that a feature akin to the controversial “no-surcharge rule” may be necessary to ensure the viability of the card payment system. This rule states that merchants cannot charge a customer who pays by card more than a customer who pays by cash.     

Fighting Tax Evasion by Discouraging the Use of Cash?

We propose a bargaining model of tax evasion with a seller that offers a price discount to a buyer in exchange for a cash payment without a receipt, which allows tax evasion. We study the effect on evasion and government revenue of two policy instruments: a tax on cash withdrawals (TCW), which imposes a cost on the buyers who pay cash, and a tax rebate conditional on having the receipt. The tax rebate reduces evasion but it is costly if tax evasion is low. The TCW reduces evasion only if it is set at a sufficiently high rate, which must be higher the larger is the mass of cash users. We also show that the implementation of a TCW, which poses several challenges, is easier if the cost of cash hoarding is high.     

Insurance law and incomplete contracts

We analyze how insurance law can mitigate moral hazard by allowing insurers to reduce or cancel coverage in some circumstances. We consider an incomplete contract setting in which the insurer may obtain information related to the policyholder's behavior through a costly audit of the circumstances of the loss. Court decisions are based on a standard of proof such as the balance of probabilities. We show that an optimal insurance law brings efficiency gains compared to the no-audit case. We also highlight the conditions under which the burden of proof should be on the insured, provided that insurers are threatened with sanctions for bad faith.     

Inflation Targeting Matters: Evidence from OECD Economies' Sacrifice Ratios

Using data from OECD economies, we show that inflation targeters suffered smaller output losses during disinflations when compared to nontargeters. We also study why some countries choose to inflation target while others do not and find that higher average inflation and smaller debt levels render the adoption of the regime more likely. Applying Heckman's procedure to control for selection bias does not alter the link between inflation targeting and less costly disinflations.     

The variability of velocity of money in a search model

We construct a dynamic equilibrium model where there is costly search in the goods market and the labor market. Incorporating shocks to money growth and productivity, we calibrate the model to the US time series data to examine the model's quantitative predictions on aggregate variables and, in particular, on the variability of consumption velocity of money. Despite the fact that money is the only asset, the model captures most of the variability of velocity in the data. It also generates realistic predictions on the moments of other variables and provides persistent propagation of the shocks. The model generates these results largely because costly search gives an important role to the extensive margin of trade.     

Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets

We use an asset market model based on Diamond (1985) to demonstrate that increased central bank transparency may lead to crowding out of costly private information, which can result in a market that is less able to predict monetary policy. Consequently, for intermediate levels of public information precision, it is optimal for the central bank to actually disclose less than it knows. We show that such crowding out can occur, even in the likely scenario that public information is more precise than private information, under the plausible assumption that traders are nearly risk neutral. Central banks should be aware of possible adverse effects of transparency and take note if market participants reduce investment in information.     

Financial Shocks and Corporate Investment in Emerging Markets

We examine how cross-firm and cross-country heterogeneity shapes the responses of corporate investment in emerging markets to changes in U.S. monetary policy and financial-market volatility, the latter proxying for uncertainty. We find that in response to increases in U.S monetary policy rates or financial-market volatility, financially weaker firms reduce investment by more than financially strong firms. We also show that firms with stronger balance sheets delay investment voluntarily when faced with higher uncertainty. Finally, we find that stronger macroeconomic fundamentals (lower public debt or higher international reserves) help to buffer corporate investment from increases in U.S. monetary policy rates.     

Does mandatory gender balance work? Changing organizational form to avoid board upheaval

Norway is the first, and so far the only, country to mandate a minimum fraction of female and male directors on corporate boards. We find that after a new gender balance law surprisingly stipulated that the firm must be liquidated unless at least 40% of its directors are of each gender, half the firms exit to an organizational form not exposed to the law. This response suggests that forced gender balance is costly. The costs are also firm-specific, because exit is more common when the firm is non-listed, successful, small, young, has powerful owners, no dominating family owner, and few female directors. These characteristics reflect high costs of involuntary board restructuring and low costs of abandoning the exposed organizational form. Correspondingly, certain unexposed firms hesitate to become exposed. Overall, we find that mandatory gender balance may produce firms with inefficient organizational forms or inefficient boards.     

Alternative central bank credit policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments

I explore alternative central bank policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments. I use a mechanism design approach so that agents’ incentives to default are explicit and contingent on the credit policy designed. In the first policy, the central bank invests in costly enforcement and charges an interest rate to recover costs. I show that the second-best solution is not distortionary. In the second policy, the central bank requires collateral. If collateral does not bear an opportunity cost, then the solution is first best. Otherwise, the second best is distortionary because collateral serves as a binding credit constraint.     

Prioritising disclosures in the annual report

Drawing upon information economics, this paper presents a relative assessment of 24 of the most common disclosure items in the management commentary and notes sections of the annual report. We design and conduct an Internet survey using a large representative sample of users with an investment focus (n?=?288) and preparers of annual reports (n?=?89). Using cost-effectiveness analysis, an evaluation method widely used in healthcare economics, the balance between preparation costs and user satisfaction, relative to user demand is assessed. Our main findings show that corporate social responsibility and corporate governance, the least demanded disclosure items in the management commentary, are also costly items to prepare. Further, preparers do not consider indirect costs (i.e. competitive position costs and potential litigation costs) of information provided in the management commentary to be a major concern. With regard to the notes, we find that business combinations (IFRS 3), financial instruments (IFRS 7) and impairment tests (IAS 36) are highly demanded but are also among the items most costly to prepare, and users are less satisfied with these notes. The findings have important implications for practitioners and policy-makers and can be used for setting priorities.     

Managerial incentives,capital reallocation,and the business cycle

We argue that when managers have private information about the productivity of assets under their control and receive private benefits, substantial bonuses are required to induce less productive managers to declare that capital should be reallocated. The need to provide incentives for managers to relinquish control links executive compensation to capital reallocation and managerial turnover over the business cycle, rendering them procyclical if expected managerial compensation increases when more managers are hired. Moreover, capital is less productively deployed in downturns because agency costs make reallocation more costly. Empirically, we find that both CEO turnover and executive compensation are remarkably procyclical.     

Capital reallocation and liquidity

This paper shows that the amount of capital reallocation between firms is procyclical. In contrast, the benefits to capital reallocation appear countercyclical. We measure the amount of reallocation using data on flows of capital across firms and the benefits to capital reallocation using several measures of the cross-sectional dispersion of the productivity of capital. We then study a calibrated model economy where capital reallocation is costly and impute the cost of reallocation. We find that the cost of reallocation needs to be substantially countercyclical to be consistent with the observed joint cyclical properties of reallocation and productivity dispersion.